TILMANN KÖPPE/TOM KINDT

Unreliable Narration With a Narrator and Without

1. Introduction

Wayne C. Booth coined the term ›unreliable narrator‹ with the following often-cited formulation:

> For lack of better terms, I have called a narrator *reliable* when he speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied author's norms), *unreliable* when he does not. (Booth 1961, 158 f.)[1]

According to this definition, a narrator is deemed unreliable if his account deviates from the »norms of the work«. In question here is an interest, grounded in ›rhetorical‹ literary criticism, in evaluative attitudes of narrative agents which may or may not correlate to those expressed by a work in its entirety. In the practice of literary studies today, however, a fictional narrator is regarded as unreliable if he distorts the fictional facts. Thus, it is not the »norms of the work« (however they might be understood) that serve as the standard in determining whether a narrator is regarded as reliable or unreliable, but rather an unobjectionable (accurate, adequate, exhaustive, credible, etc.) description of fictional states of affairs. Accordingly, and simply put, a fictional narrative is reliable if it gives a reliable account of the fictional facts, and unreliable, if it does not. Call this ›mimetically unreliable narration‹.[2] It is this incomparably more influential concept of unreliable narration that will stand in the centre of our essay.

We agree with the bulk of contemporary narratology that a narrative can be mimetically unreliable in a number of different ways. The most influential current theories hold that the diversity of unreliable narration is a matter of what a narrator is unreliable *about*, that is, whether it is, for instance, his or her factual descriptions, evaluations, ideology or interpretations that cannot be trusted.[3]

---

[1] Emphasis in the original. For context and background of this proposal cf. Kindt 2008, 29–34.

[2] This term was first introduced in Martínez/Scheffel 1999, 95–107. We will adopt the term but propose a somewhat different understanding of the concept.

[3] See, for instance, Phelan/Martin 1999; Cohn 2000; Olsen 2003; Nünning 2005, 2005b; Phelan 2005; and, for an overview, Fludernik 2005. Other typologies focus on the purposefulness of a narrator's unreliability, cf. De Reuck 1990; Heyd, 2006.

While we believe that a narrator can indeed be distrusted along all these lines (and several others too, maybe), we shall argue that the diversity of mimetically unreliable narration in fact runs deeper. There is a distinction to be made here that is based on the question whether the unreliable narration has, or has not, a narrator in the first place. Thus we shall argue that there are two kinds of mimetically unreliable narrations: ones with a narrator and ones without a narrator. In what follows, we shall explain this distinction and defend it against a number of objections. We would like to stress at the outset that the distinction we propose is not meant to replace other current distinctions.[4] The realm of unreliable narration can be mapped in any number of ways (although, of course, not all of them will be equally consistent or useful). As will become clear in what follows, the interest of our proposal lies in the way it uses the theory of fiction in order to shed light on narrative unreliability. Narrative unreliability, in our view, is a complex phenomenon in that its explanation presupposes some such theoretical underpinning. Thus, our proposal does not so much add to received knowledge about narrative unreliability by adding just another subdivision of an allegedly well-known field, but rather seeks to elaborate a rather new way of thinking about the matter (or so we hope).

2. Two Kinds of Mimetically Unreliable Narration

As we have pointed out, in contemporary literary studies the term ›unreliable narration‹ is not generally used as introduced by Booth's initial definition. Instead, a narrative is regarded as unreliable if the narrative cannot be trusted.[5] The reader's trust or mistrust, which leads to a corresponding classification of the narrative as unreliable, depends on whether or not the fictional world is described reliably. Based on this intuition we will use the following explication of ›mimetically unreliable narration‹ as a starting point for our reflections:

---

[4] It is meant to replace the idea that there is no unreliable narration without a narrator, though; cf. Zerweck 2001, 155: »Unreliable narration can only occur in personalized situations of narration. In addition, an unreliable narrator must be strongly personalized in the reading process.« On this widespread view, see, for instance, Jahn 1998, or Fludernik 2005; for criticism of Jahn's proposal, see Yacobi 2001.

[5] In Kindt 2008, 46–52, the basic distinction between ›mimetically unreliable narration‹ and ›axiologically unreliable narration‹ as defined by Booth is both explained and argued for; cf. also Hillebrandt, this volume.

(UN$_{\text{mim}}$–0)   In a literary work W, the narration N is *mimetically reliable* if and only if it is part of the composition strategy$_{\text{W}}$ that N contains completely accurate and all relevant information concerning the fictional world$_{\text{W}}$; N is *mimetically unreliable* if and only if it is part of the composition strategy$_{\text{W}}$ that N does not contain completely accurate or all relevant information concerning the fictional world$_{\text{W}}$. (cf. Kindt 2008, 51)[6]

Discussing the components of this explication shall lead us to various suggestions for its modification.

To begin with, the term ›narration‹ demands our attention. There is a consensus in narratology that not all fictional narratives feature a ›figural‹ or ›personal‹ fictional narrator. The majority of narratologists believe that there are not only ›figural‹ or ›personal‹ narrators but also non-figural and non-personal fictional narrators which do not leave any traces in the narrative discourse and are thus fully ›covert‹.[7] We do not share this view and rather take sides with those who have argued that there is no need, theoretical or practical, to postulate the presence of a fictional narrator for every fictional narrative.[8] In this article, we cannot argue for this position extensively, and we shall take its tenability more or less for granted. However, we do want to say some things in order to clarify the position in the first place.

Our assumption that not every fictional narrative has a fictional narrator is based on a certain understanding of fictionality.[9] According to the so-called ›Institutional Theory of Fiction‹, fictional texts ask their readers to adopt a particular, rule-governed attitude of reception towards the text. Adopting this attitude means, centrally, to treat the sentences of the text as an invitation to imagine certain things. For example: If W states that *p*, we are invited to imagine that *p*.[10]

---

[6] The term »composition strategy« is meant to prevent the explication from becoming too broad, cf. Kindt 2008, 50 f., for more details. Cases in which a text does not contain completely accurate information simply because of a mistake (made by the author, the typesetter, etc.) should not be regarded as unreliable narration, cf., for instance, Yacobi 1981, 119, and Martínez/Scheffel 1999, 105 f. – For a different view, see Nünning 1998, 1999, and Hansen 2007.

[7] For talk of ›impersonal‹ or ›covert‹ narrators, cf. Ryan 1981, 518, and Chatman 1978, 197. In addition, it has been proposed that narrators can be ›backgrounded‹ (Toolan 2001, 5); ›unself-conscious‹ or ›undramatised‹ (Booth 1961, 151 f.; Phelan/Booth 2005), or ›non-perceptible‹ (Bal 1997, 27).

[8] For an extensive argument against the need to postulate a fictional narrator for every fictional narrative cf. Köppe/Stühring 2011. Similar arguments to the same effect can be found in Banfield 1982; Morreall 1994; Walsh 1997; Gaut 2004; Kania 2005; Banfield 2005; Patron 2006; Walsh 2007, ch. 4; Currie 2010, ch. 4.5.

[9] Cf. Lamarque/Olsen 1994, in particular ch. 2, and, for a brief summary, Gertken/Köppe 2009.

[10] We call imaginations thus prompted ›authorized imaginings‹; for explanations cf. Walton 1990, 51. It is important to note here that complex interpretations are sometimes necessary to determine which imaginings a fictional text authorizes; cf. Walton 1990, ch. 4, and especially Stühring, this volume.

Some fictional texts invite their readers to imagine that there is a fictional narrator. This means that the text prompts us to imagine that we are reading or listening to someone's narrative. To be more precise, we are invited to imagine *of* the words of the text that they are a narrator's (oral or written) utterances and, moreover, we are usually invited to imagine a couple of things about the teller and a communicative context. This is not always the case. Some fictional narratives do not prompt us to imagine anything about the text of the work or about a teller. Instead, these narratives require us to merely *use* the sentences of the work as a prop to imagine certain things based on their content.[11] This difference between fictional narrative texts with a narrator (*S*) and those without a narrator amounts to two different invitations to imagine which can be represented schematically as follows:

(A)   Based on the narrative text, imagine that (*S* tells that *p*).
(B)   Based on the narrative text, imagine that (*p*).

Both types of fictional narration share an (implicit) ›fiction operator‹ (›Based on the narrative text, imagine that‹), indicating that the conventions of the institution of fiction are operative and we are invited to imagine certain things. The difference between the two lies within the scope of the operator: with (A), we are prompted to imagine that there is a fictional intermediary *S* telling something, while within (B) we are merely invited to imagine *p* (rather than *S* tells that *p*).

   Let us pause here a little and see how this distinction relates to current narratological accounts of fictional narrators. It is important to note that the distinctions between *both* homodiegetic and heterodiegetic narrators *and* covert and overt narrators appear to fall within category (A). The homodiegetic-heterodiegetic distinction relates to whether the narrator is or is not part of his or her story and thus takes his or her existence for granted. Similarly, the distinction between overt and covert narrators, as commonly understood by narratologists, takes the existence of a fictional narrator for granted and merely relates to his or her ›perceptibility‹. Since we do not know what a non-perceptible narrator is supposed to be, we would prefer to say that, when there is no narrator ›perceptible‹, *then (most likely) there is none.* Thus, fictional narratives featuring ›covert‹ narrators are good candidates for category (B), that is, those fictional narratives that do not ask us to imagine anything about a fictional narrator. Fictional narrations of this type should be regarded as narrator-less.

   With this distinction in mind we can now come back to our initial definition of mimetically unreliable narration. The ›narration N‹ of a fictional narrative (as dealt with in UN_{mim}–0) should be taken to cover both narratives with a narrator and narrator-less narratives. We can thus identify two subtypes of mimetically un-

---

[11] Cf. Walton's distinction between »props« and the »content« of a work in Walton 1990, 37 f.

reliable narration.[12] A first preliminary definition, relating to subtype (A), is as follows:

(UN$_{mim}$–A)   The narration expressed by a literary work W is mimetically unreliable if, and only if, W authorizes (as part of the composition strategy$_W$) readers to imagine that the narrator does not provide completely accurate information or all relevant information.[13]

Now, before we turn to the second subtype (B), we should quickly steer clear of some apparent problems of this proposal.

First, with many unreliable narrations, we come to realize only towards the end that the narrator does not provide completely accurate information or all relevant information (Agatha Christie's *The Murder of Roger Ackroyd* comes to mind here). The somewhat dramatic effect of these narratives actually seems to depend on our initial trust in the narrator's report. Thus, when UN$_{mim}$–A states that we are invited to imagine that the narrator does not provide completely accurate information or all relevant information, this should be taken to refer to what we are authorized to imagine upon completion of our reading or on the basis of an interpretation that takes into account the narrative text in its entirety.[14] UN$_{mim}$–A thus covers both the narrating idiot who is marked as such right from the beginning and the artful deceiver who keeps us on the wrong track for a prolonged (reading-)time.

Second, UN$_{mim}$–A refers to two different flaws in a narrator's report that may constitute its unreliability, namely a lack of accuracy and a lack of relevant information. As Jan Stühring (this volume) convincingly argues, a lack of relevant information actually constitutes a lack of accuracy. If a narrator fails to supply us with information that is vital for our correct understanding of what is narrated, we thereby acquire false beliefs about what is narrated. Thus omitting relevant information has the same effect as telling what is not true. We are mislead about what is the case in either way, and this is what constitutes narrative unreliability.[15] Keeping

---

[12] Gregory Currie was the first – and probably the only – person to call attention to »unreliable narrative without a narrator« (Currie 1995, 22); as an advocate of a version of hypothetic intentionalism he interprets it as a »certain kind of *complex intention* on part of the implied author« (Currie 1995, 22).

[13] As ›authorized‹ imaginings are those imaginings a literary work W is designed to prompt due to its composition strategy (see notes 6 and 10), we will from now on leave out the parenthesis »(as part of the composition strategy$_w$)« in our proposals to define ›mimetically unreliable narration‹.

[14] See again Stühring, this volume, on the notion of interpretation required here.

[15] Note that the above also serves to explain an important distinction between narrative unreliability and suspense (as generated by fictional narratives). For suspense, it is crucial that a particular information, usually concerning the outcome of a situation, is withheld from the reader (cf. Anz 2003). However, this does not imply that the reader acquires false believes concerning what is narrated or that he is mislead in any way. Rather, he or she has to be fully aware about the possibility of different outcomes and, moreover, he or she has to develop desires concerning one particular preferred outcome. In short, the lack of a particular piece of information is necessary but not

this in mind, and in order to keep our explication simple, we can delete the reference to »all relevant information« from the *explicans* of UN$_{mim}$–A.[16]

Another problem concerns the dimensions along which a narrator's report can be accurate. Our discussion so far mainly captures the intuition that in unreliable narration we are not properly informed about certain (fictional) *facts*. (This might be called the ›mimetic intuition‹ behind mimetically unreliable narration.) The term ›not accurate‹ primarily invokes alethic connotations, that is, it is understood in the sense of ›not true‹. In literary studies the prevalent understanding of narrative unreliability defines the term in a much broader sense which also includes incorrect *evaluative* assessments of a situation as instances of unreliable narration.[17] This is problematic in that one cannot simply state that a fictional evaluation is not accurate as it does not *correspond* to certain fictional facts. In any case, philosophers remind us that there is no easy correspondence relation between evaluation and values.[18] Bearing this in mind, we would like to leave open the question if, or to what extent, UN$_{mim}$–A covers cases of unreliable evaluative assessments of fictional facts.[19]

Instead, let us turn to another problem concerning the ›accuracy‹ of a fictional narrative. We should ask whether UN$_{mim}$–A is too *strict* because it readily claims that a narrative is unreliable if the text prompts us to imagine that the narrator does not provide *completely* accurate information. Is the formulation »completely accurate information« too strong? We can begin to answer this question by taking a quick look at assessments of the unreliability of a person in everyday contexts. It seems that we do not call a person unreliable (or not trustworthy) simply because he or she makes a mistake. Once we discover a mistake, we need to *evaluate* it and consider its degree of seriousness. For instance, somebody must repeatedly err, or

---

sufficient for suspense. With narrative unreliability, a lack of information is neither necessary nor sufficient (for, as we have argued, what is essential is that the information is not accurate). On suspense, cf. also Hillebrandt, this volume.

[16] Another reason to do so is this: in some sense, every narration that features an open ending does not supply us with all relevant information, but that does not make it narrated unreliably. So withholding relevant information in and of itself does not make a narrative unreliable. Rather, the withholding of information that has the effect of preventing an accurate understanding of the narrated is what does the trick.

[17] Cf. Phelan/Martin 1999; Cohn 2000; Olsen 2003; Fludernik 2005; Nünning 2005b; Phelan 2005.

[18] Cf. Mackie 1977, ch. 1. Assuming such a relation might confine us to a realistic conception of values that faces strong philosophical counterarguments.

[19] Maybe understanding narrative unreliability as including false evaluative assessments results from failing to distinguish between UN$_{mim}$ and ›axiologically unreliable narration‹ (UN$_{ax}$) as originally introduced by Booth (see our introduction, and especially Kindt 2008). Based on a distinction of UN$_{mim}$-A and UN$_{ax}$, one might try to stick to an alethic interpretation of ›accurate‹ in UN$_{mim}$-A and interpret unreliable evaluative assessments of fictional facts and circumstances as cases of UN$_{ax}$. Alternatively, one might want to drop the ›mimetic intuition‹ and take ›accurate‹ to refer to both factual and evaluative matters.

be considerably mistaken, or make mistakes in combination with certain other behaviors in order for us to be justified in categorizing him or her as unreliable. What is more, the relationship between the unreliability of an informant and the unreliability of his information is rather complex. It may be the case that we do not believe a person's narration to be true even though we regard the person as generally reliable; and we can also take the narration to be true even though we regard the person as (generally) unreliable. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with considering a person occasionally reliable (say, depending on what he or she talks about), or more or less reliable (due to certain biases or partial information, say).

We believe that we can make similar assumptions regarding fictional persons (cf. Walton 1990, 359). Fictional texts can authorize (virtually) all kinds of imaginings, including that a narrator is entirely unreliable, or that he or she is occasionally unreliable, or that it is not possible to decidedly determine how reliable or unreliable he or she actually is.[20] Having conceded this, what can be said in defense of UN_{mim}–A? The strong formulation according to which *one* incorrect piece of information suffices to classify a fictional narrator as unreliable can be said to rest upon the premise that we attach importance to minute details in artistic texts.[21] Even if the narrator only contradicts himself once, this detail of his speech can be considered important. It is crucial, though, that one must interpret the text to determine how important such a detail really is. As interpretations are generally fallible, this allows for considerable uncertainties in the ascription of unreliable narration.[22] However, we do not think that these uncertainties are necessarily

---

[20] On degrees of narrative unreliability, see Lanser 1981; Rimmon-Kenan 1983; Müller 2000; Currie 2004. – The fictional *reasons* for the fictional unreliability of a fictional character, of course, may vary as well. For instance, a literary text could prompt us to imagine that the narrator lies, is mistaken or insane etc. In accounts of literary history and narratology various distinctions of subtypes of unreliable narration are based on such cases; cf. Riggan 1981, De Reuck 1990, or Phelan/Martin 1999.

[21] An example of this is the infamous *Rule of Chekhov's Gun.*

[22] On this, see Currie 2004. – Following our preferred framework of intentionalistic interpretation, one might ask if the findings in question can be understood as being part of a composition strategy that allows one to plausibly interpret the text as expressing an unreliable narration. In general, the justification process of ascribing unreliable narration does not differ from other interpretive processes commonly used in the context of literary studies (see Köppe/Winko 2008, ch. 14; Kindt/Köppe 2008; Köppe/Winko 2010). We suggest that these interpretive processes, properly understood, exemplify instances of the hypothetical-deductive method (see Føllesdal 1979). One starts with a hypothesis concerning the unreliability of a narrator, and then determines whether what follows from this hypothesis is compatible with further hypotheses concerning the description of fictional facts. These hypotheses in turn must be checked against both the text and relevant contextual data. The task at each stage is to see whether there is an alternative hypothesis that accounts for the same data but is more elegant or economic; whether there is an alternative hypothesis that accounts for more data, or more significant data; and whether there is an alternative hypothesis that accounts for the same data but is subject to less (or less severe) counter-evidence. Yacobi (1981; 1987), in particular, considers alternative hypotheses concerning the ascription of unreliability; for a discussion of her proposals cf. Diengott 1990. – On a side note: We do not

due to flaws in the explication. First of all, they can be said to lie to a certain extent in the object under discussion. As we have pointed out, it may be part of the very composition strategy of a work that it is hard or impossible to determine whether the fictional narrator is to be trusted. Fictional facts can be hard to detect, and fictional facts concerning the existence and characteristics of fictional narrators do not make for exceptions from this.[23] Second, our explication to some extent takes up, and explains, the uncertainties of literary critics' practice of ascribing the term.[24] Critics sometimes argue about the unreliability of a fictional narrative, and this indicates that the ascription of narrative unreliability leaves room for reasoned debate. What is more, we should ask whether a more precise term that cuts off this debate would be a desirable thing to have. We are not sure about this. In our opinion, the term ›unreliable narration‹ first and foremost should be taken to possess a heuristic value in that it guides our interpretation of certain texts. Hence it is important to *interpret* a text in light of the category rather than to merely classify it. UN_{mim}–A fully performs this heuristic function despite (and maybe, in some cases, actually because of) the uncertainties in ascription described above.[25]

Finally, let us briefly consider the issue of text-type classification. Does UN_{mim}–A imply that a literary *text* can be more or less unreliable? In other words, is ›narrative unreliability‹, when it comes to text-types, a classificatory or a gradable (comparative) term? – In some sense, we have evaded this question so far by proposing that ›unreliability‹ is predicated of a fictional narrative *expressed* by a literary work, rather than of a literary work itself. The term ›narrative unreliability‹, thus defined, is not meant to be used for text-type classification. If, by extension of the term, we characterize a literary work as narrated reliably or unreliably, we tend toward understanding ›narrative unreliability‹ as a classificatory term (and not as a gradable or comparative term). This is because the terminology used for the classification of text genres generally features a classificatory structure.[26] Gradable terms, by contrast, are only helpful if we have a rough idea of what this gradability is based upon, and how it is measured.[27] In any case, the fact that narrative texts can invite us to imagine the most diverse things concerning

---

believe that the ascription of unreliable narration should be described as a »naturalization process« (cf. Wall 1994, 30; Nünning 1998, 26; 1999, 67 or Fludernik 2005, 52 f.) unless ›naturalization‹ is to be understood as meaning interpretation. Taken in this sense, the ascription of unreliable narration is a ›naturalization‹ (as it is an interpretation); but the term ›naturalization‹ loses its putatively distinctive character and becomes basically void.

[23] Cf. above, fn. 10.

[24] One might see this as an advantage of the explication. It indicates that we have actually defined the current notion of unreliable narration, rather than a streamlined stipulated version of it; cf. Carnap 1950, § 3, on the criterion of ›conservativism‹ in the assessment of explications.

[25] On the fruitfulness of explications, cf. Carnap 1950, § 3.

[26] Cf. Brinker 2001; on the structure of classificatory terms in general cf. Kutschera 1972, ch. 1.

[27] Cf. Birke/Köppe 2008 as a commentary on recent attempts to understand the term ›narrative‹ as gradable.

the reliability of fictional narrators does not settle the question if the narrative text as a whole should be classified as narrated unreliably or reliably. Ultimately, though, we have to emphasize that we must make a *decision* as to whether we want to use ›unreliable narration‹ as a term for the classification of text-types, and whether we want to have a gradable or a classificatory scheme. And what is more, in the framework of an explication we search for an advisable – that is, reasonable – terminology, and sometimes a strong case can be made for multiple explications of one term. Maybe, then, there is room for both a gradable and a non-gradable notion of narrative unreliability.[28]

Now let us turn to the second subtype of mimetically unreliable narration (B). A first attempt to define mimetically unreliable narration without a fictional narrator could be:

$(UN_{mim}–B^*)$ The narration expressed by a literary work W is mimetically unreliable if, and only if, W does not authorize imagining that there is a narrator; instead W authorizes imagining states of affairs that are not completely accurate.

Nevertheless, the mentioning in $UN_{mim}–B^*$ of a literary work *authorizing* to imagine states of affairs that are »not completely accurate« is problematic. Since authorized imaginings as defined above constitute fictional facts, one cannot say that a text authorizes p, but p is not a fact in the fictional world (and hence imagining that p is not accurate). We might say, though, that in unreliable narration there is a difference between *seemingly*, or *prima facie*, authorized imaginings and *actually* authorized ones. It is only in the course of our reading and, eventually, on the basis of an elaborate interpretation that we come to realize that not all seemingly authorized imaginings are actually authorized. (This of course echoes the point already made above that sometimes a complex interpretation is required in order to determine whether a fictional narrative is unreliable or not.) On the basis of this explanation we can refine the definition as follows:

---

[28] Having decided that the term is to be understood as classificatory, the questions arise: (1) whether the classification is *complete*, i. e. whether each narrative text is narrated either reliably or unreliably (or whether there is a third option); (2) whether the classification is *exclusive*, i. e. whether no text can be narrated reliably *and* unreliably; (3) whether there are cases of irresolvable *vagueness*, i. e. cases in which we cannot assign the text to one of the classes. We suggest the following answers to these questions: (1) the classification is not complete. A narrative text does not fall simply into two categories of unreliable and reliable. (2) the classification is not exclusive. A text can be narrated reliably for the most part or in many respects, and unreliably in other parts or respects. (3) there are cases of irresolvable vagueness. This is because the ascription of narrative unreliability rests on interpretations that might in some instances not arrive at clear results.

(UN$_{mim}$–B)   The narration expressed by a literary work W is mimetically
                  unreliable if, and only if, W does not authorize imagining that
                  there is a narrator; instead W seemingly, or *prima facie*, authorizes
                  imagining states of affairs that are not completely accurate.

We also face the problem that UN$_{mim}$–A and UN$_{mim}$–B offer two different expli-
cations for the same explicandum (»The narration expressed by a literary work«).
We can easily free ourselves from this predicament by linking the explications with
a disjunctive:

(UN$_{mim}$–C)   The narration expressed by a literary work W is mimetically
                  unreliable if, and only if, W authorizes imagining that the narrator
                  does not provide completely accurate information, *or* W does not
                  authorize imagining that there is a narrator; instead W seemingly,
                  or *prima facie*, authorizes imagining states of affairs that are not
                  completely accurate.

In closing, we shall briefly draw attention to the fact that in explaining unreliable
narration one has to take into account three (›ontologically‹) different features of
literary works. First, and obviously, we are dealing with textual properties of lit-
erary works. Second, there are fictional facts, concerning a fictional world and,
sometimes, a fictional narrator. Fictional facts are representational properties of
literary works. They are what we are authorized to imagine on the basis of a
given literary work. Finally, we need to take into account the conventions of
the institution of fiction which serve as a ›link‹ between textual and representation-
al properties of fictional texts. This is why, in our view, narrative unreliability is a
complex phenomenon that can only be explained on the basis of a theory of fic-
tion.[29]

Tilmann Köppe
Courant Research Centre › Text Structures‹
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen

Tom Kindt
Institut für germanistische Literaturwissenschaft
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

References

Anz, Thomas, Spannung, in: Jan-Dirk Müller et al. (ed.), *Reallexikon der deutschen Litera-turwissenschaft*, vol. 3, Berlin/New York 2003, 464–467.

Bal, Mieke, *Narratology. Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* [1992], Toronto ²1997.

Banfield, Ann, *Unspeakable Sentences. Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction*, Boston 1982.

–, No-Narrator Theory, in: David Herman/Manfred Jahn/Marie-Laure Ryan (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory*, London/New York 2005, 396–397.

Birke, Dorothee/Tilmann Köppe, On Narrative Theory and Its Uses (Review of: David Her-man (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative Theory*, Cambridge 2007), *IASLonline* (2008), http://www.iaslonline.de/index.php?vorgang_id=2926 (20.2.2011).

Booth, Wayne C., *The Rhetoric of Fiction,* Chicago/London 1961.

Brinker, Klaus, *Linguistische Textanalyse. Eine Einführung in Grundbegriffe und Methoden* [1985], Berlin ⁵2001.

Carnap, Rudolf, *Logical Foundations of Probability*, Chicago/London 1950.

Chatman, Seymour, *Story and Discourse. Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film*, Ithaca, NY/London 1978.

Cohn, Dorrit, Discordant Narration, *Style* 34:2 (2000), 307–316.

Currie, Gregory, Unreliability Refigured: Narrative in Literature and Film, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53 (1995), 19–29.

–, Interpreting the Unreliable, in: G.C., *Arts and Minds*, Oxford 2004, 134–152.

–, *Narratives and Narrators. A Philosophy of Stories*, Oxford/New York 2010.

De Reuck, Jenny, Etching ›Inconscience‹: Unreliability as a Function in Narrative Situations, *Journal of Literary Studies* 6 (1990), 289–303.

Diengott, Nilli, Reliability in Narrative: Some Theoretical Issues, *Language and Style: An International Journal* 23 (1990), 369–378.

Føllesdal, Dagfinn, Hermeneutics and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method, *Dialectica* 33: 3–4 (1979), 319–336.

Fludernik, Monika, *Unreliability* vs. *Discordance*. Kritische Betrachtungen zum literatur-wissenschaftlichen Konzept der erzählerischen Unzuverlässigkeit, in: Fabienne Liptay/Yvonne Wolf (ed.), *Was stimmt denn jetzt? Unzuverlässiges Erzählen in Literatur und Film*, München 2005, 39–59.

Gaut, Berys, The Philosophy of the Movies. Cinematic Narration, in: Peter Kivy (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics*, Malden, MA 2004, 230–253.

Gertken, Jan/Tilmann Köppe, Fiktionalität, in: Fotis Jannidis/Gerhard Lauer/Simone Winko (ed.), *Grenzen der Literatur. Zu Begriff und Phänomen des Literarischen*, Berlin/New York 2009, 228–266.

Hansen, Per Krogh, Reconsidering the Unreliable Narrator, *Semiotica* 165:1 (2007), 227–246.

Heyd, Theresa, Understanding and Handling Unreliable Narratives: A Pragmatic Model and Method, *Semiotica* 162 (2006), 217–243.

Hillebrandt, Claudia, Emotional Functions of Unreliable Narratives. An Outline for Future Research, *Journal of Literary Theory* 5:1 (2011), 19–36.

Jahn, Manfred, Package Deals, Exklusionen, Randzonen: Das Phänomen der Unver-läßlichkeit in der Erzählsituation, in: Ansgar Nünning (ed.), *Unreliable Narration.*

Studien zur Theorie und Praxis unglaubwürdigen Erzählens in der englischsprachigen Er-zählliteratur, Trier 1998, 81–106.

Kania, Andrew, Against the Ubiquity of Fictional Narrators, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 63 (2005), 47–54.

Kindt, Tom, *Unzuverlässiges Erzählen und literarische Moderne. Eine Untersuchung der Ro-mane von Ernst Weiß*, Tübingen 2008.

Kindt, Tom/Tilmann Köppe, Moderne Interpretationstheorien. Eine Einleitung, in: T.K./ T.K. (ed.), *Moderne Interpretationstheorien. Ein Reader*, Göttingen 2008, 7–26.

Köppe, Tilmann/Jan Stühring, Against Pan-Narrator Theories, *Journal of Literary Semantics* 40 (2011) 59–80.

Köppe, Tilmann/Simone Winko, *Neuere Literaturtheorien. Eine Einführung*, Stuttgart/Wei-mar 2008.

–, Methoden der analytischen Literaturwissenschaft, in: Ansgar Nünning/Vera Nünning (ed.), *Methoden der literatur- und kulturwissenschaftlichen Textanalyse. Ansätze – Grund-lagen – Modellanalysen*, Stuttgart/Weimar 2010, 133–154.

Kutschera, Franz von, *Wissenschaftstheorie I. Grundzüge der allgemeinen Methodologie der em-pirischen Wissenschaften*, München 1972.

Lamarque, Peter/Stein H. Olsen, *Truth, Fiction, and Literature. A Philosophical Perspective*, Oxford 1994.

Lanser, Susan S., *The Narrative Act*, Princeton, NJ 1981.

Mackie, John Leslie, *Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong*, London 1977.

Martínez, Matías/Michael Scheffel, *Einführung in die Erzähltheorie*, München 1999.

Morreall, John, The Myth of the Omniscient Narrator, in: *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 52 (1994), 429–435.

Müller, Hans-Harald, Literarische Phantastik oder Interpretationsprobleme? Zur Erzähl-konzeption von Leo Perutz dargestellt an der Novelle »Nur ein Druck auf den Knopf«, in: Thomas Eicher (ed.), *Grenzüberschreitungen um 1900. Österreichische Lite-ratur im Übergang*, Oberhausen 2000, 177–191.

Nünning, Ansgar, ›Unreliable Narration‹ zur Einführung: Grundzüge einer kognitiv-narra-tologischen Theorie und Analyse unglaubwürdigen Erzählens, in: A.N. (ed.), *Unreliable Narration. Studien zur Theorie und Praxis unglaubwürdigen Erzählens in der englischspra-chigen Erzählliteratur*, Trier 1998, 3–39.

–, Unreliable, Compared to What? Towards a Cognitive Theory of ›Unreliable Narration‹: Prolegomena and Hypotheses, in: Walter Grünzweig/Andreas Solbach (ed.), *Grenzüber-schreitungen: Narratologie im Kontext. Transcending Boundaries: Narratology in Context*, Tübingen 1999, 53–73.

–, Reconceptualizing Unreliable Narration. Synthesizing Cognitive and Rhetorical Ap-proaches, in: James Phelan/Peter J. Rabinowitz (ed.), *A Companion to Narrative Theory*, Oxford 2005, 89–107.

–, Reliability/Unreliable Narration, in: David Herman/Manfred Jahn/Marie-Laure Ryan (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory*, New York 2005, 495–497 (Nünning 2005b).

Olson, Greta, Reconsidering Unreliability: Fallible and Untrustworthy, *Narrative* 11 (2003), 93–109.

Patron, Sylvie, On the Epistemology of Narrative Theory. Narratology and Other Theories of Fictional Narrative, in: Matty Hyvärinen/Anu Korhonen/Juri Mykkänen (ed.), *The Travelling Concept of Narrative*, Helsinki 2006, 118–133.

Phelan, James, *Living to Tell about It. A Rhetoric and Ethics of Character Narration*, Ithaca, NY/London 2005.

–, Rhetoric/Ethics, in: David Herman (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative*, Cambridge 2007, 203–216.

Phelan, James/Wayne C. Booth, Narrator, in: David Herman/Manfred Jahn/Marie-Laure Ryan (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory*, London/New York 2005, 388–392.

Phelan, James/Mary Patricia Martin, The Lessons of »Weymouth«: Homodiegesis, Unreliability, Ethics, and *The Remains of the Day*, in: David Herman (ed.), *Narratologies: New Perspectives on Narrative Analysis*, Columbus 1999, 88–109.

Riggan, William, *Picaros, Madmen, Naïfs, and Clowns. The Unreliable First-Person-Narrator*, Oklahoma 1981.

Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith, *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics*, London/New York 1983.

Shen, Dan, Unreliability and Characterization, *Style* 23:2 (1989), 300–311.

Stühring, Jan, Unreliability, Deception, and Fictional Facts, *Journal of Literary Theory* 5:1 (2011), 95–108.

Toolan, Michael, *Narrative. A Critical Linguistic Introduction* [1988], London/New York ²2001.

Wall, Kathleen, The Remains of the Day and its Challenges to Theories of Unreliable Narration, *The Journal of Narrative Technique* 24 (1994), 18–42.

Walsh, Richard, Who Is the Narrator?, *Poetics Today* 18 (1997), 495–513.

–, *The Rhetoric of Fictionality*, Columbus 2007.

Walton, Kendall L., *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts*, Cambridge 1990.

Yacobi, Tamar, Fictional Reliability as a Communicative Problem, *Poetics Today* 2:2 (1981), 113–126.

–, Narrative and Normative Pattern: On Interpreting Fiction, *Journal of Literary Studies* 3:2 (1987), 18–41.

–, Package Deals in Fictional Narrative: The Case of the Narrator's (Un)Reliability, *Narrative* (2001), 223–229.

Zerweck, Bruno, Historicizing Unreliable Narration. Unreliability and Cultural Discourse in Narrative Fiction, *Style* 35 (2001), 151–178.