

Modern African Conflicts and International Interventions: The Prospects of
Indigenous Peace-making Mechanisms
A Case of Darfur 2003-2014

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Abstract

This thesis empirically contributes to extant debates over the relevance of indigenous peace-making methods in modern African conflicts. Reliant on the on-going Darfur conflict as case study and contingent on the study's two embedded units of analysis being: African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Institution of the Native Administration respectively, the study advanced the notion of complementarity as propounded by authors in the field of conflict transformation. The contended inadequacy of mainstream methods of intervention in civil wars across the globe was contextually investigated side by side John Paul Lederach's postulations towards the adoption of the "reconciliation" component as the central focus of intervention in cases of prolonged violence.

To corroborate or refute the propositions underlying Lederach's comprehensive framework for intervention in protracted conflicts, the study, drawing from secondary as well as primary data derived from key informant interviews, group discussion and official UNAMID documents, employed the pattern matching technique to arrive at its findings: UNAMID does implement the authorised multidimensional mandate geared towards the actualization of durable peace for Darfur. The involvement of the Civil Affairs Section with the stakeholders on level 3 of the conflict, demonstrates a complementarity of efforts to douse tensions at all levels of the conflict, including on the level of intertribal rivalry on the grassroot. Darfur's indigenous system for reconciliation and its custodians (Judiyya and Ajaweed) constituted the selected stakeholder for this study. These actors have been incorporated into UNAMID's working framework for peace, albeit to the extent to which the GoS sanctions it. The thesis contends that regardless of a legitimacy crisis, indigenous methods maintain saliency at peace-making in a semi modern society like Darfur, notably, in the absence of reliable and effective formal peace-making arrangements. Nonetheless, the current politicised nature of the conflict constitutes an impediment to the effective use of indigenous methods on level three of the triadic conflict in Darfur. Accordingly, conflict transformation may be actualised based on the re-empowerment of contextual human resources and in conjunction with mainstream approaches, but most significantly also, contingent upon the unbiased support of the government of the day.

Present day Darfur



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List of acronyms and abbreviations

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
AU	African Union
AUPD	African Union High Panel on Darfur
CAS	Civil Affairs Section
CM	Conflict Management
CMC	Crisis Management Cell
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CR	Conflict Resolution
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DOP	Declaration of Principles
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FANT	Chadian National Armed Forces
FLNA	Front for the National Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FROLINAT	National Liberation Front of Chad
GoS	Government of Sudan
HCA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JEM	Justice and Equity Movement
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JMST	Joint Mediation Support Team
JRM	Joint Reconciliation Mechanism
LJM	Liberation and Justice Movement
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army

MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIF	National Islamic Front
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operation in Congo
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PCS	Peace and Conflict Studies
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
PSW	Problem Solving Workshop
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
RENAMO	The Mozambican National Resistance
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLM	Sudan Liberation Movement
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
STG	Sudan Task Group
UNAMID	African Union United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITA	The Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

Preface

In the year 2008, while studying for a master's degree in my home country Nigeria, one seminar course attracted my keen attention. My unrivalled interest in that subject, might have obtained from the manner in which the professor in charge presented his seminars. His name was Professor O.B Olaoba, the course was titled: African Approaches to Conflict Management (PCS 703). His lecture sessions exposed me to a part of the African peace-making heritage that I was indeed familiar with, but in a non-academic fashion. I knew that elders settled family issues back in the villages, but beyond that particular level of conflict, I was ignorant of the fact that elders, and particularly those of other African countries, demonstrated a certain capacity to settle conflicts on other related levels. I became excited about my newest reservoir of knowledge; I assumed that this must be the solution to Africa's plethora of conflicts: To commence with an exploration of the African method of conflict resolution as my own contribution towards the search for durable peace for the African continent. In fact, I became more captivated having become acquainted with the fact that the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict in the south-eastern part of Nigeria, as documented by yet another professor of mine, terminated only when indigenous peace-making mechanisms were applied. Incidentally, my master's program coincided with that phase in international history when the war in Darfur made the headlines and most notably when news about the failed 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement kept people asking why? What went wrong? At that point, I was also compelled to ask myself one major question: "If these indigenous mechanisms were indeed efficacious as my professors portrayed them, why then the intransigent nature of the conflict in Darfur? Are indigenous peace-making mechanisms in Darfur still extant?"

Chapter One

1.1 Introduction

Since the termination of the cold war, the international system, most prominently around the early 1990s, started to experience the escalation of a number of conflicts, the de-escalation of a few and the prolongation of a good number. The conflicts of Africa's sub-Saharan region specifically those of the Great Lakes, and the Horn of Africa recorded some of the continent's deadliest in the post-cold war era.¹ Monstrous conflict occurrences like those of Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia and Liberia to mention a few, have left indelible imprints on the socio-economic landscape of the continent to say the least. There is no gainsaying the fact that Africa needs a relief from endemic warfare as well as from the negative effects currently deriving from the conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and those of forgotten regions like the western part of Sudan.

While analysts and policy makers continue to tackle the ubiquity of conflict in the most pragmatic ways. A number of other issues have constituted topics for earnest debate within the field of peace and conflict studies. By now it has become commonplace that violent internal conflicts such as the ones prevalent in Africa, ostensibly defy similarity with those of interstate characterising. Their intransigence and protractedness constitute food for immense thought. Violent conflicts nonetheless represent a more mind-boggling phenomenon when regardless of a plethora of intervention instruments war tends to prevail over durable peace.

In 2005, the international community, contingent upon the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; stemmed Africa's longest lasting civil war. Several decades of fighting culminated with the secession, in 2011, of the present day South Sudanese state from the hegemonic control of the North. In the lead up to the signing of the Naivasha Agreement in 2005, war erupted in Sudan's western region. In early 2004 the international community hinted that the early 2003 Darfur crisis evinced a repeat of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. In 2008 UNAMID (African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur) arrived the scene as the international actor tasked with the obligation to restore stability to the province. That unprecedented peace mission is emblematic of a synergy between the United Nations and the African Union. It is regarded as the UN's

¹ Lysias D. Gilbert, "A Retrospective Examination of Post-Cold War Conflicts in Africa: Ended, Abated, and Prolonged Conflicts," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 4, no. 9 (July 2014): 154, accessed July 20, 2017, http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_4_No_9_July_2014/16.pdf.

largest and most expensive deployed peace support operation on African soil.² In UNAMID's nearly a decade outing, peace has almost eluded the region. Amid unremitted involvement, and the employment of a myriad of strategies, the region continues to experience the violent escalation of inter-tribal fights, as was documented in 2013. Small wonder that in May of 2017 news of civilian displacement, triggered by renewed fighting between government forces, its Janjaweed militia and the rebel movements, has begun to filter in.³ The UN Security Council envisages the exigency for UNAMID's continued stay in Darfur. It has therefore extended the mission's mandate until June 30, 2018, albeit with modifications.⁴ Before the end of 2017 UNAMID should commence with a two-phase transition from peacekeeping sanctioned with a multidimensional mandate to pure peace building.⁵ The new mandate will concentrate on grassroot peace building and probably engender greater prospects for indigenous peace-making in Darfur.

1.2 Historical Background to conflict intervention in Africa

The UN peace mission to Congo in 1960 was the institution's first peacekeeping operation to sub-Saharan Africa. The organization had ventured into the conflict terrain against the backdrop of guiding principles underlying chapter 1 article 1, of the UN Charter: to protect the fledgling Congolese state from the power tussle between the president Joseph Kasavubu and his Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.⁶ At this time, the cold war was underway and the blueprint for conflict intervention, still evolving, derived from an inter-state conflict environment where all threat to peace on the international system was addressed under a collective security arrangement.⁷

The unsuccessful outcome of that UN response to a sub-Saharan African conflict nonetheless, served to debunk as well as challenge the UN's intervention template, seemingly incompatible with Congo's conflict of intra-state characterizing. It turned out that the organization was not

² Eric Reeves, "UNAMID to be Gunned by UN Security Council, Creating Intolerable Risks for Civilians in Darfur," Eric Reeves, accessed June 20, 2017, <http://sudanreeves.org>

³ Ahmed H. Adam, "Amid silence, atrocities in Darfur has restarted," Sudan Tribune, accessed June 7, 2017, <http://www.sudantribune.com>.

⁴ Sudan Tribune, "Security Council to change Darfur UNAMID mandate and modify force structure," Sudan Tribune, accessed June 19, 2017, <http://sudantribune.com>

⁵ Sudan Tribune, "Security Council to change Darfur UNAMID"

⁶ Adekeye Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 69

⁷ Norrie MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960* (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 7 & 8

only ill prepared to confront the challenges emerging from that internal crisis, but also its underlying operational principle established in chapter 1 article 2(7), ostensibly placed a huge constraint on the institution's ability to interfere in the domestic affairs of the host state.⁸ In any case, that initial attempt at performing functions beyond its normative capacity furnished the organization with the necessary experience. After an almost three-decade recess from intervention on the African continent,⁹ the UN re-emerged with an operational framework that seemed appropriate to tackle intra-state conflicts now prevalent in the cold war's aftermath.

When the bipolar rivalry receded in 1989, Africa almost immediately emerged as the prototype of a conflict arena. A good number of African states began to implode for reasons that were not restricted to the withdrawal of super power interest in hitherto proxy states, but that included this factor. Post-cold war eruptions like those of Namibia, Angola as well as that of Mozambique, became the initial testing grounds for what ostensibly represented a novel model for addressing conflicts of internal bearing.

By now peacekeepers, hitherto confined to activities of peacekeeping in its traditional form, assumed other functions as authorized within a UN intervention model. Such aimed towards peace building and post-conflict recovery. In Namibia for example the UN endorsed a mandate, that gave peace keepers the license to supervise demobilization and disarmament, assist the return of refugees and oversee a political transition through a UN monitored election.¹⁰

This innovative UN intervention approach sought to establish stable peace. Indeed, these extended functions became a reflection of peace according to the liberal peace thesis. Intervention efforts were intended ultimately, to prevent a resurgence of violence by addressing the recovery needs of war-torn societies. Paris referred to this novel intervention style as the Wilsonian kind of peace building undergirded by the assumption that democratization and marketization can engender peaceful relations between states and most notably within states in the post-conflict recovery phase.¹¹

⁸ Norrie MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960* (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 9

⁹ Adekeye Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 70

¹⁰ Adekeye Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 110

¹¹ See, Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)

UN involvements on the continent prior to 1992 adopted this same “extended functions” pattern of peacekeeping, notably, on an ad hoc basis. It was not until 1992 that the UN officially unveiled its blueprint for peace building in a model tagged the “Agenda for Peace”. As declared by the then Secretary General: Boutros Ghali. The UN would from that point on, formally delineate peace building as:

“Action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.”¹²

In practice, this novel “Agenda” would be analogous to the liberal peace thesis. In fact, when the Secretary General announced that the operationalization of the peace building Agenda would include:

“...Monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, promoting formal and informal processes of political participation,”¹³

It became evident that the Agenda for peace normatively originated from the liberal peace thesis.

The outcome of peace support operations in the early aftermath of the cold war nonetheless, varied from outright success demonstrated in Namibia and Mozambique, to colossal failure as evidenced in the Angolan conflict and others earlier mentioned.

Authors like Roland Paris emerged promptly with a seminal scholarly attempt, to refute the potentiality of the UN’s novel intervention framework, which beginning with the Namibian conflict, as earlier mentioned, projected the ideals of democratization and marketization as antidotes to lasting peace in societies emerging from conflict.¹⁴ Since 1989 nonetheless, this strategy has remained fundamental to peace building activities in conflict riven societies.

With each unique conflict, the UN is noted to have adjusted these core peace-building principles to suit the needs of the society at war. Therefore, if the Congo conflict informed this newest strategy towards conflicts of the post-cold war era, and specifically those of intra-state characterizing, the 1991 Somali conflict similarly added a new dimension to the aims and

¹² Richard Jackson and Jacob Bercovitch, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches* (University of Michigan Press, 2009), 171.

¹³ Richard Jackson and Jacob Bercovitch, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches* (University of Michigan Press, 2009), 172 & 174

¹⁴ See, Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)

objectives of peacekeeping. When the Somali conflict erupted in 1988 and the subsequent status of statelessness emerged in 1991, the singular task of the UN on that conflict terrain, concentrated on humanitarian relief for thousands of Somali citizens at the mercy of the war.¹⁵

As the humanitarian approach to peacekeeping gradually unfolded and the Somali intervention also became a failure, Somaliland a seceded former British colony to the northwest of Somalia, commenced an inward assessment of its conflict resolution capacities, those from which it could derive peace and stability from the raging war¹⁶. Indeed “contextual resources” proved sufficient for positive peace and absolute stability in the land. In the case of Somalia, the international community exited from the conflict, without direct influence on the eventual termination of that conflict.

Around this time also, to the west of the African continent, the ECOMOG (The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) remarkably displayed gallant success in dousing the tensions of the Liberian conflict. That achievement drew new attention to the continent’s seemingly emerging security capabilities. In 1994 however, violent conflict erupted in the Rwandan state. That massacre lamentably occurred under the watchful eyes of the international community. Too overwhelmed by the bitter experience from the Somali conflict, international peace actors demonstrated ostensible incapacity in the face of ferocious bloodletting. Sadly, these horrific acts of carnage transpired under the OAU’s nose. Deeply enmeshed in its principle of non-interference¹⁷ and therefore too incapacitated, the organisation offered millions of Rwandese, caught in the heinous genocide, nothing substantial beyond a 50-member NMOG I (Neutral Military Observer Group) and a 130 personnel NMOG II¹⁸. It was probably at this juncture that, commentators, observers, policy makers and scholars reckoned

¹⁵ Norrie MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960* (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 98 and 197

¹⁶ Tim Murithi, "African indigenous and endogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution," in *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, ed. David J. Francis (London: Zed Books, 2013), Kindle Edition, 20-21

¹⁷ See, "The Experience of the OAU in Resolving Conflicts," accessed February 21, 2017, <http://Bujra.com> and Samuel G. Amoo, "The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives," Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. George Mason University, last modified May 1992, <http://scar.gmu.edu>.

¹⁸ See, United Nations, "International Tribunal for Rwanda: 1999 Independent Inquiry," United Nations, accessed February 21, 2017, <http://un.org>

that the time was ripe to advocate for a fine tuning of the lenses that prescribed mechanisms and approaches of intervention in internal conflict eruptions on the continent.¹⁹

1.3 Scholarly perspectives

These post-cold war occurrences in the sub-Saharan African region, fed into an emerging, western scholarly discourse around the 1990s. Emerging debates questioned specifically, the sufficiency of conventional approaches in the kinds of conflicts prevalent since the end of the cold war.²⁰ In fact this investigation traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, when initial insights drawn from a diverse pool of academic disciplines exposed, the deficiency embedded in the classical approach to peace interventions. Indeed, prominent scholars like Galtung repudiated conventional approaches for its failure to take cognizance of the structural violence that increasingly precipitates the escalation of social conflicts in the first place²¹. He opined that the quest to achieve positive peace must supersede mainstream guiding principles attuned to the conceptions of peace in terms that strictly promoted the actualization of negative peace.²²

In fact, within the same field of conflict resolution, interdisciplinary research underlined the need to deconstruct the notion of conflict and peace-making from within the purview of a statist conception. Scholars asserted that conflicts no longer predominantly assumed an inter-state posture. They averred that the incompatible interests; underlying the inclination towards inter-state rivalry, no longer aptly described the causes of a plethora of violent aggressions on the world's conflict terrains.²³

Conflict resolution theorists therefore propounded the overarching causal connection between social conflicts and the un-assuaged basic human needs that tended to constitute the root causes

¹⁹ "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, International panel of eminent personalities," accessed February 20, 2017, <http://refworld.org> and "The Experience of the OAU in Resolving Conflicts," accessed February 21, 2017, <http://Bujra.com>

²⁰ See, John Lederach, *Little Book of Conflict Transformation Clear Articulation of The Guiding Principles By A Pioneer In The Field* (New York: Good Books, 2003) and John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997)

²¹ See, Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 2 (1971)

²² Johan Galtung, "Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking," *Transcend*, accessed February 20, 2017, <http://transcend.org>.

²³ Louis Kriesberg, "The Conflict Resolution Field: Origins, Growth and Differentiation". in *Peace-making in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, I William Zartman ed. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007) 26

of contemporary conflicts. ²⁴These new insights ostensibly, mirrored the exact presence of oppression in its political, economic, social and cultural forms. In furtherance of a paradigm shift, the field of conflict resolution advocated for the espousal of a people to people approach to peace. This was to elicit attention to the saliency of track II actors in the resolution of contemporary conflicts.

In practice, this translated either to informal peace-making, as was the case with the conflict in Mozambique, where unofficial actors mediated, or to the facilitation of “Controlled Communication as expounded by John Burton,²⁵. Subsequently also, Herbert Kelman’s” Integrated Problem Solving²⁶” dubbed as Problem Solving Workshops became applicable in 1972, to a border conflict in Africa.²⁷ In the light of theoretical evolutions the practice of conflict resolution also became mainstream. Accordingly, the international community’s response to conflict reflected the underlying principles of the field of conflict management but also of conflict resolution.

In the post-cold war dispensation nonetheless, conflicts have been delineated as internal: They ensue between parties located within the conflict setting and are characterized by intractability and protractedness. Beyond that, victims and perpetrators, in the aftermath of war, become coaxed into embracing a common future. More so, within the same society where heinous crimes have begotten traumatic conditions, and where animosity and deep pain have prevailed. This is the platform on which the field of conflict transformation emerged. Its line of thought projects a trajectory of peace-building that articulates peace and conflict in a different light. Scholars like John Paul Lederach motivated by these occurrences, underscore the need to focus on structural change but most significantly underline the essence of relational change in societies embroiled in protracted conflicts. He avows that fear and hatred have bored deep into the coherent order of groups and communities, therefore the exigency for apt readjustments in models for intervention. ²⁸Lederach assumes that severed relationships can be rebuilt on the platform of reconciliation and that the apparatuses and actors relevant to relationship building

²⁴ See, John Wear Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (Basingstoke (Hampshire): MacMillan, 1995)

²⁵ See, Herbert C. Kelman, Werner Wintersteiner, and Wilfried Graf, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Interactive Problem-Solving* (London: Routledge, 2017)

²⁶ Herbert C. Kelman, “Interactive Problem Solving: Informal Mediation by the Scholar-Practitioner,” in *Studies in International Mediation: Essays in honour of Jeffrey Z. Rubin*, ed. J. Bercovitch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 202), 169

²⁷ Kelman, Wintersteiner, and Graf, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts*, 92-93

²⁸ Lederach, *Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, 18-33 and Lederach, *Building Peace*, 23

lay within the society itself. On that note, the conflict transformation scholars not only endorse a bottom-up approach to peace but also advocate for the integration of track III actors into intervention processes geared towards peace and stability in protracted internal conflicts.

1.4 African debates/ State of the Art.

On the African divide, the Somali and the Rwandan conflicts evoked the exigency for change in scholarly perspectives on the continent, as well as propelled decisive policy action. Durable peace for example as demonstrated by Somaliland's innovative feat, tended to ignite the initial flame towards the rediscovery of pragmatic aspects of peace-making within the African conception of it. Accordingly, African debates ensued that traced Somaliland's relative stability to its "hybrid political system"²⁹ That process evinced the "Council of Elders" as a constituent part of the state's political formation and ultimately drew recognition to the prospects of an "inclusive", bottom up approach to peace in Africa. In fact, Menkhaus later delineated the impact of Somaliland's success story in this manner:

*"Nowhere in Africa has the debate over the utility of traditional conflict management mechanisms been more pronounced and consequential than in the Somali crisis"*³⁰

In similar vein, the Rwandan incidence ostensibly provoked the AU's demonstrated capacity to effect monumental changes in its guiding policy. The principle of "non-interference" was reversed to avert the future re-occurrence of genocidal tendencies in conflict eruptions on the continent. Now operating from the standpoint of "non-indifference" the AU underscores the essence of self-reliance, responsibility, pride, ownership and indigeneity,³¹ to correspond with an emerging "minimal external interference" discourse geared towards promoting the initiative to adopt "African solutions to African problems."

Scholars on the continent have also sensed the significance for profound research into peace-making methods across African societies. Analysts have become motivated by on-going

²⁹ Haroon Yusuf and Robin Le Mare, "Clan Elders as Conflict Mediators: Somaliland," in *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*, Paul van Tongeren et al. (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 463.

³⁰ Ken Menkhaus, "Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia," in *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict "Medicine"*, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, Colo. [u.a.]: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 183.

³¹ Laurie Nathan, "African Solutions to African Problems: South Africa's Foreign Policy," *Welt Trends: Zeitschrift für internationale Politik*, accessed June 20, 2017, <http://www.up.ac.za>

western debates, but also perturbed by the endemic nature of conflict across the regions of Africa. The gruesome atrocities meted out on innocent civilians have become worrisome, but even worse, have precipitated mass displacements and triggered the emergence of gross humanitarian emergencies. The enormous loss of lives and the devastation that accrue from violent eruptions are better imagined than witnessed. As mentioned elsewhere, the Central African Republic, the eastern DRC and Mali, are fresh cases of escalations amid intransigent and prolonged conflicts like Darfur. These calamities beg for urgent attention and appropriate intervention tools. There is therefore the exigency for fresh empirically driven scholarly contributions towards the vision to create a more peaceful and stable continent.

In addition to the prevailing discourse, there is a budding perception among African authors to 'rectify the asymmetrical growth of knowledge within a conflict intervention industry seemingly dominated by western thought'³²

Omeje for example posits that:

*“Conflict resolution in practice is actually arbitrary contraptions and devices emanating from mainstream conceptions”*³³ derived from seemingly incompatible worldviews.

Thus, the need for in-depth knowledge into what the continent has to offer with respect to mitigating conflicts originating from within the frontiers of Africa. Furthermore, analysts contend that specific aspects of indigenous peace-making methods stand a chance at impacting positively on the post-conflict recovery stage of internal conflicts and therefore should be incorporated into processes designed by the international community for peace in Africa. Osaghae corroborates this stance by asserting that:

*“The incorporation of traditional systems helps to contextualise conflict management and facilitates the participation of local people”.*³⁴

Following in this line of argument Tim Murithi in his analysis of three cases of peace-making methods in modern African societies asserts that:

³² Tim Murithi, “African indigenous and endogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution,” in *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, ed. David J Francis (London: Zed Books, 2008), 18.

³³ Kenneth C. Omeje, “Understanding conflict resolution in Africa,” in *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, ed. David J Francis (London: Zed Books, 2008), 75

³⁴ Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Applying Traditional Methods to Modern Conflicts: Possibilities and Limits,” in *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine”*, I William Zartman (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 201

*“Indigenous and endogenous peace processes are endowed with valuable insights that can inform the rebuilding of social trust and restoration of the conditions for communal coexistence”*³⁵

The author therefore argues for the adoption of a “hybridised system” of peace-making on the continent. In so doing, both western and indigenous methods become relevant to contemporary kinds of conflict eruptions in Africa.

Conversely, other academics argue that the kinds of conflicts that have prevailed on the continent in recent times differ from the feuds, which existed between communities in pre-modern times.³⁶ The question therefore arises as to whether indeed indigenous methods can become applicable to vicious conflicts of this present age. In response, analysts concur. There is, a palpable transition: from pre-modern to semi modern societies. In like manner, societal progression has precipitated incompatibilities that diverge from conflict causalities associated with traditional societies. Correspondingly, peace-making mechanism have evolved but maintained its substance.

According to Murithi:

*“Customs and traditions are not static but dynamic and change overtime...as far as peace-making processes are concerned there is continuity and change”*³⁷

Mutisi substantiates the viewpoint on harnessing hybridised peace-making processes, by showcasing the role of “Abunzi” mediators in the post conflict reconciliation phase of the Rwandan conflict. As part of its policy to decentralise justice, the Rwandan government institutionalised the role of indigenous actors like the Abunzi, to promote restorative approaches to peace, and ensure the affordability and accessibility of conflict resolution.³⁸

The liberal peace project is another topic currently subjected to intense scrutiny on the continent. Critics question the compatibility of the project’s normative guidelines with the delineation of internal conflicts in the region. Albert for example contending in favour of a bottom up approach to peace, states that:

³⁵ “African indigenous and endogenous approaches”, 16

³⁶ I William. Zartman, “Introduction: African Traditional Conflict ‘Medicine’,” in *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine”*, I William Zartman (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 1-11

³⁷ “African indigenous and endogenous approaches”, 18

³⁸ Martha Mutisi, “Local conflict resolution in Rwanda: The case of Abunzi mediators,” in *Integrating Traditional and Modern Conflicts Resolution: Experiences from selected cases in Eastern and the Horn of Africa*, ed. Martha Mutisi and Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge (Durban: ACCORD, 2012), 41-75

*“The objective of the liberal peace project, which promotes retributive/ punitive justice, is the protection of the hegemonic and economic interest of the Western world in Africa... he adds that ...the emphasis of academic and policy analysts regarding peace in Africa, should in the continent’s interest, focus on how Africans provide peace for themselves”.*³⁹

Albert aligns his argument with previously mentioned authors. He avows that the current scope of tasks assigned to peacekeepers and civilians operating within the ambit of peace support missions in Africa, can be satisfactorily accomplished in conjunction with “local partners using indigenous knowledge”.⁴⁰

Kaarbo wraps up the debate by contending that:

*“The fundamental guiding principle in peace and peace-building activities in the African context is the precondition of relationship-building for effective peace-building.”*⁴¹

The African notion of peace building he avers, offers the point of exit from liberal peace approaches that prioritize the formula of: liberal democracy, good governance and economic liberalization and hinges on the logic of inclusion and exclusion. The liberal peace logic as it were, contradicts the African conception of peace, where the primary concern is to rebuild social relations and communal harmony. It is therefore conceived of as an “imposition” of peace-building and development intervention mechanisms on African conflict terrains.⁴²

Indeed, all of these happenings seem to have propelled the current burgeoning of externally bolstered institutional research into African indigenous conflict resolution and peace-making mechanism. It is worthy of note that the studies conducted by establishments like the United States Institute of Peace, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and the University of Peace to mention a few, demonstrate vividly the level of institutional involvement in the in-depth analysis of African indigenous conflict resolution and peace-making mechanisms.⁴³ Such

³⁹ Isaac O. Albert, "Understanding Peace in Africa," in *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, ed. David J. Francis (London: Zed Books, 2013), Kindle Edition, 31-45

⁴⁰ *ibid*, 33

⁴¹ Tony Karbo, "Peace-building in Africa," in *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, ed. David J. Francis (London: Zed Books, 2013), Kindle edition, 115

⁴² *ibid*

⁴³ See, Jerome Tubing, Victor Tanner, and Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, *Traditional Authorities' Peace-making Role in Darfur* (United States Institute of Peace, 2012), Martha Mutisi and Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, eds.

investigations have illuminated on the purported capacity and unexplored potentials of indigenous methods and the continued reconnoitre for durable peace in on-going African conflicts. These studies capture and project the notion of a preserved peace-making legacy as evinced in a good number of investigated African societies. They underscore the merits of culturally defined mechanisms in confronting the enormous challenge of reconciling adversaries in post conflict scenarios and confirm the efficacy of age-old practices in the goal to reinstate societal coherence. Interestingly also the diluted nature of so-called indigenous mechanisms, their inherent limitations and irreconcilability with contemporary discourses notably around the issue of human rights, gender, conflict and intervention have not been overlooked.⁴⁴ In the light of the foregoing there is no gainsaying the exigency for unremitting in-depth research that ushers in new understanding and knowledge.

1.5 Statement of Problem and Purpose

The Sudanese state, like the aforementioned post-cold war conflict afflicted states, is no stranger to war. As mentioned elsewhere, prior to gaining independence in 1956, the predominantly Muslim north of Sudan became embroiled in a war with the Christian dominated south. That war prevailed over peace and stability for more than a dozen years. The second civil war broke out shortly afterwards, also consuming a little over two decades of fighting. It terminated in 2005 and subsequently culminated with the independence of the south on July 9, 2011. While these major civil wars were yet on-going, Musa Abdul Jalil noted that to the west of Sudan, between 1932 and the year 2000, 41 major conflicts had occurred. Fighting was either intra-nomadic or intra-sedentary, but also inter group in nature, as exemplified in the ferocious war between the Fur and the Arabs in 1989.⁴⁵ Remarkably and notwithstanding a long history of nomadic/sedentary confrontations in the western region of Sudan, these conflicts never made international headlines. By some means inter and intra tribal rivalries received the necessary local response and were thus squelched out of the international spotlight.

Integrating Traditional and Modern Conflict Resolution Experiences from selected cases in Eastern and the Horn of Africa (Durban: ACCORD, 2012), Luc Huyse and Mark Salter, eds., *Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflicts: Learning from African Experiences* (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2008), University of Peace, "Indigenous Systems of Peace in Africa," *African Peace and Conflict Journal* 2, no. 1 (June 2009)

⁴⁴ See, Eghosa E. Osaghae, "Applying Traditional Methods to Modern Conflicts: Possibilities and Limits," in *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict "Medicine"*, ed. I. William Zartman (Colorado, London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 201-217.

⁴⁵ Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil: Nomad-sedentary relations and the question of land rights in Darfur: From complementarity to conflict.in: Richard Rottenburg (Hg.): Nomadic-sedentary relations and failing state institutions in Darfur and Kordofan (Sudan). Halle 2008 (Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte 26; Mitteilungen des SFB „Differenz und Integration“12) 1–24.

In 2003 nonetheless, intense fighting erupted. All eyes focused on Darfur, as rebel movements: SLM (Sudan Liberation Movement) and JEM (Justice and Equity Movement) cited years of inequality and marginalization as the underlying motivation for rebellion against the centre. The government responded by launching a counter-insurgency operation against the armed movements, who in February attacked government installations in northern Darfur. Between 2003 and late 2004 a complex humanitarian condition had emerged. The odious genocidal acts perpetrated by government backed Arab militias on villages of African descent could no longer be concealed. The debilitating carnage had precipitated a mass displacement of Darfuris and an appalling death toll exceeding tens of thousands by late 2004.⁴⁶ New waves spread across Africa and beyond: A devastating war threatening regional peace and generating international concern had been unleashed, to the west of Sudan.

The reinvigorated African body now going by the novel appellation: AU emerged promptly to quell the fighting and restore peace. That attempt at stabilizing Darfur failed. Consequently, in 2007 contingent upon resolution 1769, the UN Security Council replaced AMIS (African Mission in Sudan) with the African Union- United Nations hybrid peace support mission. (UNAMID). It has been 9 years since that robust deployment. Darfur has remained in active conflict and has become the recipient of a plethora of intervention strategies. Amidst the raging war, the international media seems oblivious of the status quo and the world probably heaved a sigh of relief with UNAMID's arrival in 2008. Nonetheless, analyst and observers conversant with current events within the region, recognize that peace has continued to elude Sudan's western region. This thesis asks the question: Why?

In developing this study's overarching research question, I connect to the incidence narrated in the preface of this book. Those unanswered questions have informed my scholarly adventure, but beyond that, deep research undergird sub questions as these: if between 1930 and year 2000, a number of 41 conflicts had occurred in Darfur without attracting international concern, what was the stemming force behind it? Also, why was there a need to deploy a robust hybrid operation to supplant the AU's response in Darfur? And what differentiates that initial style of intervention from the current approach to peace?

⁴⁶ Dr. Jan Coebergh, "Sudan: genocide has killed more than the tsunami," Sudan Tribune, last modified February 2005, <http://sudantribune.com>.

These questions and indeed Darfur's conflict, still on-going for nearly a decade, have inspired the thesis main research question below:

- What are the prospects of Darfur's indigenous peace-making methods in the current conflict?

It is also the objective of this dissertation to understand with respect to the tools applied:

- How international community has responded to the exigency for durable peace in Darfur, since the conflict erupted in 2003

And lastly:

- To garner insight into the practicability for conflict transformation, contingent on the formation of a synergy between the international peace actor and Darfur's indigenous peace-making institutions

The last objective accordingly, derives from the propositions underlying John Paul Lederach's "comprehensive framework" for intervention in protracted internal conflicts. His assumptions will be tested for validity and level of operationality in Darfur's conflict.

1.6 Justification and Significance of the study

This work, in the light of afore highlighted discourses, engages in a contextual analysis of one of Africa's protracted and intransigent conflicts: Darfur. It is a scholarly adventure that obtains from the academic boundaries of peace and conflict studies and therefore seeks to contribute to existing body of knowledge in the field. The thesis boards majorly on the fields of conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. In this regard, the dissertation's contribution will be:

1. To reveal the extent to which conflict management assumptions and attendant intervention approaches have contributed to the terminations of Darfur's conflict.
2. To disclose the relevance of identified conflict resolution strategies applied in the mitigation as well as the search for durable peace to the conflict.

The study also investigates the activity of building peace in Darfur, within the purview of the assumptions underlying the conflict transformation approach to building peace in protracted conflicts. Conflict transformation in a nutshell, underscores:

- The reconciliation of adversaries as the most significant theme in a peace building agenda.
- That sustainable peace may be attained contingent on human and material resources available within the conflict setting; and specifically, on re-empowered human resources.
- Human resources may be incorporated into the peace actor's working framework, so that local actors' function in partnership with conventional actors utilizing the most appropriate methods for peace.

Against this backdrop, the research will contribute to knowledge on conflict transformation by providing empirical evidence that either validates or negates these salient underpinnings.

The thesis also contextualises the notion of “indigenous empowerment” with the aim of unearthing its significance to the transformation of Darfur's prolonged conflict. The operationalization of grassroots peace-building is examined dependent on efforts to prioritize the component of “reconciliation,” reliant on a synergy that transcends the formation of hybrid organisations, to effectuate ultimately, a hybridization of peace-making mechanisms. Proponents of the field also claim that mainstream intervention strategies have become inadequate to the transformation of contemporary conflicts. This thesis checks to validate or debunk this assumption based on Darfur.

Furthermore, this research is an empirical contribution that aligns with the debates specifically documented in a book titled “Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts. That book, edited by I William Zartman, was the researcher's (me) initial encounter with debates around African indigenous peace-making institutions. It pools together authors from Africa and beyond, towards a deep reflection on the relevance of traditional peace-making in modern conflicts. Without going into further details about that study, this thesis without doubt, can be viewed as an endeavour to bridge the gap in the knowledge, which that book exhibited. I have provided based on Darfur, illumination on some of the research questions stated below, which guided that study:

1. What kind of conflicts did traditional conflict management practices handle best, and how do these kinds compare with contemporary conflicts.
2. Can traditional methods yield insights that can enrich the work either of African or international peacekeepers?⁴⁷

A section of that book by Francis Deng⁴⁸ examined conflict management practices in Sudan, but focused on mechanisms and actors associated with the Dinka people of the seceded South Sudan. This research investigates the peace-making institution of Sudan's ethnically diverse western region. Indeed, beyond the limits of Zartman's edited volume, this is an investigation that seeks empirical insight into an on-going contemporary conflict beyond extant literature.

Finally note must be taken that this research concentrates on the international community's response to conflict in Darfur, as directly linked to **level three**⁴⁹ of what Lederach delineates as the affected population. Analysts like Adam Azzain have outlined the Darfur conflict as triadic in nature. This denotes unhealthy relations on the national level, as exhibited in the centre periphery conflict between the government and the rebel movements. On the communal level between communal elites and on the grassroots level as evidenced in inter and intra-tribal conflicts. Tribal conflicts have putatively formed the basis for the other two conflicts.⁵⁰ Since the commencement of the war, a plethora of literature has fixated on detailing intervention on the political level, i.e. on either the mediation process or peacekeeping activities. There is therefore an ostensible paucity of documentation on the international community's response to Darfur's conflict on the grassroots level of inter-tribal wars. This research coalesces scholarship about intervention approaches in Darfur on the top level as in mediation and peacekeeping, on level 2 as in problem solving workshops and on level 3 as in tribal confrontations, into a single reader. It serves as a rare contribution into the status quo of Darfur's forgotten war.

⁴⁷ I. William Zartman, *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict "Medicine"* (Boulder, Colo. [u.a.]: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 9

⁴⁸ Francis M. Deng. 2000. "Reaching Out: A Dinka Principle of Conflict Management" Deng, "Reaching Out: A Dinka Principle of Conflict Management," in *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict "Medicine"*, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 96-125.

⁴⁹ See, John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 43, 157

⁵⁰ Adam A. Mohammed, "Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement," Department of Peace and Conflict Research. UPPSALA Universitet, last modified 2009, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18583_CAMP6-Adam_Muhamed.pdf. 17-18

See also, Johan Brosché and Daniel Rothbart, *Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding: The Continuing Crisis in Darfur* (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2013), 23

1.7 Chapter roadmap

The rest of the thesis will be structured into two major sections: A theoretical and an empirical. Chapter 2 delves into the discourse of war and conflict from pre-colonial Africa to contemporary times. The objective behind this investigation, is to expose some of the underlying motivations for conflict in Africa, while simultaneously outlining the kinds of conflict that have prevailed specifically on the sub-Saharan region of Africa. The main concern is to systematically introduce post-cold war conflicts for their internally configured nature, their features of intractability, as well as the longevity that characterize them. The chapter introduces Edward Azar's framework on protracted social conflicts. His hypothetical considerations constitute the basis for the study's analysis of underlying factors responsible for prolonged fighting in Darfur.

Chapter 3 examines underpinning theoretical assumptions of the fields of conflict management and conflict resolution. The conception of conflict and intervention according to proponents of the conflict management field tends to differ from those of conflict resolution scholars. This has in-turn influenced the kinds of tools and actors that each field of inquiry deems appropriate in the handling of protracted social conflicts. In this chapter, the researcher (I) presents attendant tools for intervention from each field with the aim to understand the extent to which these instruments have become relevant to peace within the context of the Darfur conflict.

In Chapter 4, I probe into the emerging field of conflict transformation. I intend to identify the point of divergence when placed side by side other aforementioned fields of inquiry. I contend that added value may be derived from the conflict transformation's approach to peace in protracted conflicts. These merits are traceable to a recommended inclusive approach to peace and the emphasis placed on complementarity. I introduce one of conflict transformation's prominent scholars, whose "comprehensive framework" is adopted in the study as an investigative tool into the operationalization of UNAMID's mandate in Darfur.

Chapter 5 explores into peace-making institutions of three selected cases on the sub-Saharan African continent. Chapter five is critical to the entire thesis as it the foundation on which the empirical chapters will be developed. The selected cases serve the purpose of substantiating

conflict transformation views on reconciliation, track III actors, and cultural sensitivity to mention a few.

The chapter introduces the Acholi people's mechanism called Mato-Oput, employed in the reintegration of defaulters into the society. I Specifically pay attention to the tensions between western (ICC) and indigenous (Mato-Oput) trajectories for eliciting justice and accountability for victims in that conflict scenario.

The case of the Aguleri and Umuleri of south east Nigeria is introduced to corroborate the growing assumption of African scholars now accentuating the exigency to revive pragmatic aspects of peace-making in African societies.⁵¹ The third example being the Somali experience, lays bare the case of an African state where homogenous indigenous practices have engendered varied outcomes. The main objective for delving into the Somali case is to underscore the merits of a synergy between indigenous actors, their strategies and conventional tools and approaches of peace-making.

Chapter 6 illuminates on the methodological trajectory of the research. First and foremost, the dissertation relies on the single case study design to achieve its main objective. Nonetheless, it is a single case study, which examines two analytical units within the selected case. The Darfur conflict represents the case. The embedded unit one and two are UNAMID, with special focus on Civil Affairs Sector North and Darfur's peace-making institutions respectively, with emphasis on the Judiyya. The research tools applied to data sourcing included key informant interviews and focused group discussion with Darfuri youths and staff of CAS SN. A relevant technique in the data collection phase was: snowballing. It is important to state that the selected case consists of five states. The researcher (I) relied on the northern Darfur state as the main study location. The findings going by the homogeneity of the analytical units may therefore be relatively generalised. Finally, the chapter discusses the dissertation's major limitation.

I commence chapter 7 with an analysis of the underlying causes of the Darfur conflict reliant on Edward Azar's framework. I argue that his framework suffices in providing illumination albeit insufficiently. Underlying his "Genesis"⁵² pre-condition for the emergence of protracted

⁵¹ See, Eghosa E. Osaghae, "Applying Traditional Methods to Modern Conflicts: Possibilities and Limits," in *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict "Medicine"*, ed. I William Zartman (Colorado, London: Lynne Rienner, 2000)

⁵² See, Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990)

social conflicts are four components. His assertions on the communal content pre-condition cannot be applied to the Darfur conflict. My standpoint is rested on the fact that the ethnic configuration of Darfur cannot be traced to its British colonial experience. Furthermore, I engage in the analysis of the peace-making tools and actors associated with the different fields (management, resolution and transformation), which have been applied to the Darfur conflict. I examine the relevance of state-centric approaches to peace in Darfur and argue that the outcome derived from a purely military response and those elicited from administering formal mediation in Darfur, largely buttress assertions from the conflict transformation school. They suggest that the employment of mainstream approaches in internal conflicts have left a void which the conflict transformation approach intends to fill, based on the notion of interdependence.

No intervention method claims to be the panacea to protracted internal conflicts however in this chapter I contend that the incorporation of track III actors can be conceived as validating the concerns of the marginalized population and elevating attendant peace actors into a peace process that directly affects their future and well-being. In this manner, a wide variety of mechanisms become available to the search for durable peace. This chapter also introduces UNAMID's peace building structure for level 3 interventions in Darfur, as evidenced in the partnership between CAS and the numerous stakeholders on the grassroots.

Chapter 8 narrows down completely on Darfur as the case study of this research. I delve into the region's indigenous peace-making institution as christened Native Administration by the British colonial master. The main point that I set out to advance here is that Darfur evinces a competent institution for governance and peace-making traceable to era of the sultans. I maintain that in the post-colonial era, regardless of an evident diminishing authority, indigenous actors and methods have remained germane to Darfur's rural configuration specifically within the context of conflict resolution and peace-making. My line of argumentation hinges on empirical data gathered during my research visit to northern Darfur. The rare opportunity to discuss with Sudanese in Khartoum and with Ajaweed mediators, addressees largely the growing controversy over the diminishing potency of the Judiyya reconciliation mechanism in modern day conflicts like the on-going one.

Against the backdrop of Lederach's three propositions outlined in chapter 4 and validated as a constituent aspect of UNAMID's operational strategy in fulfilment of the mission's "multidimensional" mandate captured in chapter 7, I seek in chapter 9, to develop on these

established analytical discussions, by testing for the applicability of Lederach's model in five cases of inter-tribal confrontations within the selected study location. These are conflicts that have erupted on the terrains of northern Darfur since 2003. I have also selected cases of fresh tribal violence between 2012 and April 2013 because they substantiate the emergence of renewed inter-tribal conflicts, but also reveals the additional dimension of recent intra tribal fights on Darfur's grassroots. These conflicts have occurred under the jurisdiction of the authorized external peace actor: UNAMID. I focus on determining the extent to which CAS seeks to actualize the task of "indigenous empowerment", "space creation" " cultural sensitivity" and ultimately " reconciliation" which according to Lederach demonstrates the external actor's endorsement of the host state's contextual resources but also as in the case under scrutiny, discloses the magnitude to which sustainability based on the partnership between CAS and Darfur's indigenous actors: Ajaweed and reconciliation mechanism: Judiyya may be deemed feasible and efficient . Contingent on this line of probing I will be addressing the study's third question. Ultimately, I will rely on findings from the analysis of the five conflicts to reveal some of the factors that have militated against experiencing both the full potentials of the Native Administration and its integral parts and the merits of the partnership between CAS and indigenous actors in the search for peace and stability in a modern conflict like Darfur.

Chapter Two

2.1 African Conflicts: Focus Sub-Saharan Region

Introduction:

The main aim here is to provide background knowledge of conflicts in Africa dating back to the era of decolonization. However, I shall be focusing on those wars occurring in the aftermath of the war on ideology: Post-Cold War Conflicts. These wars occurred from the 90s onwards. They continue to elicit major concern, as analyst and theorist alike, remain bereft of theoretical understanding and panacea to these conflict realities. Although the termination of the cold war had in many ways brought to a halt some of Africa's violent conflicts, it simultaneously ushered in a phase in which Africa experienced some of its bloodiest conflicts. It was a period in its history where the continent counted the cost and attendant consequences of grave violence, some of which continue to hunt its current pace of development. The complexity arising from a combination of triggers and underlying factors, have further engendered the protraction and intractability of these wars as evidenced in a number of conflicts still ongoing in the African sub-Saharan region. Delving into the typologies of African wars provides illumination on some underlying drivers. The investigation touches on some perspectives projected as viewpoint on the root causes of African conflicts. I conclude with Azar's theoretical framework on "Protracted Social Conflict". The major objective here is to understand the underlying factors responsible for prolonged violence especially in the developing world. His early insight on protracted conflicts is adopted to guide our understanding of why conflicts linger on for years often without a foreseeable end.

2.2 Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa

An early analysis of wars in Africa categorized them into three major periods: Pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial,⁵³ prompts the investigation into wars according to these classifications.

2.2.1 Pre-Colonial Wars: West Africa

The pre-colonial era constituted wars between ancient African empires. Robert Smith provides insight into the nature and characteristics of Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-colonial West

⁵³ See Stephen Ellis, "Africa's wars of liberation: Some historiographical reflections", <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl> (accessed September 17, 2014)

Africa. Although his account cannot be construed as a representation of warfare throughout pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, it nonetheless provides some comprehension of warfare among West Africans and some of her neighbours. From his analysis, wars of the 18th and 19th centuries differed to some extent from those of contemporary times. War etiologies were driven by vast motives that included “territorial expansion, competition over scarce resources, access to trade and the control of trade routes”. For example, it was Morocco’s motivation to dominate the source of gold and salt that precipitated its invasion of Songhai at the end of the 16th century. Others like the Ijaiye wars of the 19th century were occasioned on the premise of furnishing the slave markets. The after effects of these wars were usually minimal to the extent that people could go about their daily business unperturbed by the goings on of war.

A “formal declaration of war”⁵⁴ usually signalled the onset of war. Surprise attacks were avoided, so as to give the enemy room for discussions and for sending weak citizens to safe havens. In like manner, an army never ventured into war except by some assuredness of victory as pronounced by the spiritual ancestors. Warfare notably became revolutionized around the 17th century when West Africans began importing arms from Europe. Also, wars were avoided during the rainy season. This allowed soldiers return to their farms to cultivate food for their families. Protracted wars were less frequent, some rare examples of long-term wars occurred between the Kagoro and the Ibos over “ill-treated travellers, stolen women and hunting accident”⁵⁵. Be that as it may, wars of pre-colonial Africa had attracted less attention. They were regarded as primitive and posing no threat to international peace and security.

2.2.2 Colonial wars

With the scramble for Africa came the occupation of vast areas of the continent by European colonizers. The partitioning of Africa occasioned the creation of African states and cleared the pathway towards its initiation into the international system of states. Some of the consequences: the drawing of international frontiers, have remained an albatross around the continent ‘s neck, even long after the colonizers exit. During colonial rule Africans either fought against any form of colonial occupation or fought for freedom from years of colonial domination. Dependent upon guerrilla warfare, a number of both state and stateless societies were known to have put

⁵⁴ Robert S. Smith, “*Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-colonial West Africa*” (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989)

⁵⁵ *ibid*

up tough resistance against colonial rule and indeed resolute in the fight to surrender to any form of defeat.

Others persevered till the only option became to cede their homelands. Emperor Menelik II in 1896 battled and defeated the Italian intruders in Adwa.⁵⁶ Although Ethiopia came under Italian rule for a short period between 1935 and 1941, Ethiopia succeeded in retaining its independence and regaining complete freedom from colonial domination. Similarly, Samori Toure of the Wassoulou Empire, in what is today known as Guinea, using the scorched earth strategy, was accounted to have put up a gallant and long resistant fight against French occupation.⁵⁷ Other wars in the West African region transpired between the British and the Yoruba kingdom 1892-1893⁵⁸ and the Sokoto Caliphate⁵⁹ that capitulated in 1903 both in present day Nigeria, and the Benin Kingdom in 1897. In similar vein, both the British and French engaged in long duration battles to gain control over acephalous societies such as those of the Ibo of South –eastern Nigeria and the Tiv of Benue⁶⁰ and Cote d'Ivoire respectively. Other colonial wars of resistance in regions such as those of Angola and Somalia lingered on for yet another decade from commencement until defeat became imminent.

2.2.3 Africa's Liberation Wars

By the time Africa was fully partitioned, another set of wars began to brew. They were the wars of liberation from colonial conquest and exploitation. For the most part, the transition from colonialism to African leadership, for many African states proved to have been a smooth one. Nonetheless, for a few others, independence could not be achieved on a platter of gold. Former Portuguese colonies Angola and Mozambique clinching on a decade later, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Kenya and South Africa were all to pay the price for independence on a platter of brutal and atrocious wars.⁶¹ Prior to European invasions, Africans possessed a distinct manner of

⁵⁶ See, Raymond Jonas, *The Battle of Adwa African Victory in the Age of Empire* (Berlin: De Gruyter [u.a.]œ, 2011)

⁵⁷ "Samory," New World Encyclopedia, last modified May 8, 2013, <http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org>.

⁵⁸ See, Robert Sydney Smith, *Kingdoms of the Yoruba* (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988),

⁵⁹ J.F Ade Ajayi, *General History of Africa. VI, VI* (Paris: Unesco, 1998),

⁶⁰ David C. Forward, "The Development of the British Colonial Administration among the Tiv, 1900-1949," in *African Affairs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society, 1969), 316-333, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/720655>.

⁶¹ See, David J Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006)

See, Paul Tiyambe. 2007. "The Causes & Costs of War in Africa: From Liberation Struggles to the "War on Terror" Zeleza, *The Roots of African Conflicts*. (-35)

living: politically, socially, culturally and as already mentioned elsewhere, Africans had a pattern to warfare; those that to a large extent dictated the warriors conduct in times of war. Africa was endowed with culturally rich and diverse ethnic groups. From as early as 16th century, it had exhibited trading skills with traders from across Europe. Politically Africans coexisted either as confederated or decentralized societies. The coming of colonial rule introduced a way of life inconsistent with the values, norms and tradition known to indigenous African societies.

Colonial leadership was most of all characterized by authoritarian rule, a system which disallowed for indigenous participation in most sectors of government. Africans became educated in a new manner. They mirrored the mentality of their colonizers and relegated traditional knowledge to the background. It was the clash of two divergent political, social and cultural systems and the challenge to imbibe a new way of life coupled with years of exploitation and oppression which precipitated the nationalist quest for freedom. In Zimbabwe for example, years of oppression by white settlers triggered an armed struggle by both ethnically polarized Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Both movements had from 1964 fought against colonial oppression contingent upon guerrilla tactics. These attacks targeted white peasant farmers as well as settlers destroying both lives and property. Finally, in 1980 Zimbabwe embraced its freedom.⁶²

Algeria on its part had experienced complete marginalization and deprivation in the hands of French settlers. By 1954 agitated nationalists began the push for freedom from colonialism. It resulted in Algeria's war of liberation. It was organized by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and ended in 1962. After six long years, sovereignty was finally achieved but not without gruesome bloodletting. The war, which was financially boosted by Algerians in Diaspora, had in exchange for the supposed joy of freedom, witnessed the extermination of about a million Algerians.⁶³

In similar manner, armed resistance for liberation from colonial rule in Kenya⁶⁴ took the form of guerrilla warfare, it was popularly known as the 1952 Mau Mau uprising and lasted eight

⁶² See, Dhazi Chiwapu, *Struggle for Liberation in Zimbabwe: The Eye of War Collaborator (Mujibha)* (Trafford Publishing, 2013)

⁶³ See, "Algerian National Liberation (1954-1962)," Global Security, last modified July 11, 2011, <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.

⁶⁴ Samuel Kobe, "Violence in Africa," Echoes, accessed May 12, 2014, <http://www.wcc-coe.org>.

long years till colonial military counter attacks caved in to pave way in 1960, for its independence. By the 1960s, the entire decolonization process had been concluded, with the exception of Portuguese colonies like Angola and Mozambique

In Angola,⁶⁵ it was complete war fought for 14 years against Portuguese rule. The joint input of 3 major independence movements: The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)- Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola, the Front for National Liberation of Angola (FLNA) and the National Union for Total independence, had produced the fruits of liberation in 1975. Armed resistance was similarly replicated in the case of Mozambique's struggle against colonial rule. In 1964 precisely on the 25th of September, FRELIMO (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) began the war which led to its national freedom on the 25th of June 1975. It is the eruption of these kinds of wars around the 50s, in the African part of the third world, which prompted "new world" analyst to describe them as "guerrilla warfare" i.e.: Battles located in underdeveloped regions, which tend to amass local support for the task ahead and relies on the external to finance its mission of war.

2.3 Post-colonial African conflicts

With the decolonization phase of Africa's history concluded, the continent made its supposed gallant entry into the post-colonial era and its first debut on the world stage of an international system of states. However, it seemed that the air of freedom had not yet come to stay, as Africa began to prepare itself for another round of conflicts. Commentators have argued that the continent had witnessed a derailing of the visions nursed in the battles for liberation. Some claim the obvious was to be expected from the very nationalist who received grooming under the mentorship of its colonial masters. Kieh, in line with this assumption re-echoes Onimode as contending, that

"The nature of the colonial disengagement from most of Africa... ensured that the independent state would become a neo-colonial state, in order to preserve the same basic colonial relationship of dominion and exploitation".⁶⁶

⁶⁵ See, W. Martin James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990* (New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers, 1992)

⁶⁶ Bade Onimode, *The Political Economy of the African Crisis* (London: Zed Press, 1988) 130 in George KlayKieh, Jnr and Ida Rousseau Mukenge, *Zones of Conflict in Africa* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002) P25

Africa seemed to be living in the shadows of the colonial era, cuddled to and driven by the models, which defined the era of colonialism. Kieh confirms in Mbakus reflections, that

“The rules adopted at independence were weak, inefficient and not designed to reflect African realities, needs, aspirations, interests and values”⁶⁷

thus, as Zeleza rightly observed:

“Independence had brought little respite from the ravages of war”.⁶⁸

Ellis corroborates this assertion, as he observes that a couple of years into independence a number of African states had commenced another kind of liberation struggle, these conflicts were hinged on armed resistance. Citing examples from the Chadian and Ugandan experience, he recounts the manner in which violence had engulfed the Chadian state up until around the early 80s when FROLINAT a local resistance movement led by Hissene Habre finally usurped power from Francois Tombalbaye, Chad’s first independence leader. In like manner, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda on the platform of the (NRA) National Resistance Army in Uganda was known to have been on the frontline to liberate the Ugandan state from the clutches of Idi Amin’s dictatorship. The initiators of this second phase struggles he argues sought:

“Freedom from the set of relationships known as neo-colonialism”⁶⁹. It was a renewed struggle to gain national liberation from internal oppression effected by the visionless governance of the very nationalists who secured the freedom from colonial rule.

Norrie MacQueen projects two fundamental underlying arguments that may have precipitated the unleashing of the spate of wars in post-colonial Africa. These are embedded first in the arguments pioneered by dependency theorists. While the dependency theory explains itself in a configuration where Africa as a result of western policies remains latched onto the economic garments of the global north, a separate underlying argument may be associated with the challenges of statehood. Underlying assumptions depict statehood as a “western construct” vehemently opposed to African patrimonial systems, a system which supports patron clientele relationships. MacQueen posits that “these interconnected factors – economic dependency and

⁶⁷ John Mbaku, “Bureaucratic Corruption and Reforms in Africa,” in *Multi-Party Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratization in Africa*, ed. John Mbaku and Julius Ihonvbere (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), 75 in George Klay Kieh, “The Context of Civil Conflict in Africa” in *ibid*

⁶⁸ Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, “*The Causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberation Struggles to the ‘War on Terror’*” in Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs*. (Addis Ababa: Ossa, 2008)

⁶⁹ Stephen Ellis, *Africa’s Wars of Liberation*

friction between underlying political culture and imposed form of governance produced a propensity for conflict throughout post-colonial Africa.”⁷⁰

The post independent scenario seemed to present a clash of two governing systems, one in which patrimonial arrangements proved inseparable from the tenets of genuine state building. Other analysts of both African and western orientations have argued out several other underlying factors responsible for the decades of conflict which besieged the continent in the aftermath of its independence. Be that as it may, the objective of this chapter is to examine the context in which these conflicts may have erupted as well as explore some typologies of conflicts or wars that defined the post-colonial conflict terrain in Africa.

2.2.5 Post- Colonial Conflict: Typologies

By now it has become common knowledge at least to those conversant with peace and conflict studies that internal intra-state conflict has been on the increase since the end of the Second World War. A number of datasets give credence to this assertion. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research for example, documented the number of ongoing inter and intra-state conflicts in the year 2012. “The amount of intra-state conflicts increased from 303 to 314, while the number of interstate conflicts decreased from 84 to 82. While five intra-state conflicts had ended in 2011, sixteen new domestic conflicts erupted in 2012, thereby marking an increase by eleven.”⁷¹ It concludes by suggesting that there had been an 80 percent increase, which was nothing short of the statistics from the previous years.

They equally reported about the two most recent occurrences of inter-state conflict on sub-Saharan soil, between Sudan and South Sudan majorly over the oil region of Heglig and those between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda contesting the control of Kivu. However, as catalogued by them, the same 2012 saw the conflict between the two Sudan de-escalate from a full-blown war to violent crises.⁷² There is therefore no gainsaying the fact that in contrast to the 17th and 18th centuries, the late 20th century has recorded an upshot in internal crisis.

⁷⁰ Norrie MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 182

⁷¹ Conflict Barometer 2012, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research: disputes, non-violent crises, violent crises, limited wars, wars. no 21, 7

⁷² *Ibid*, 2013. 16

Africa has indeed catalogued its own fair share of terminated and on-going internal conflicts. As I have narrated in preceding sections, the African continent whether directly or indirectly affected by war, cannot boast of knowing sustained peace, neither have the unabated occurrences of war helped to accelerate the level of development on the continent. The costs and consequences are burdening to the extent that it is hardly possible to turn a blind eye to their prevalence. In terms of the number of displaced persons, the flow of refugee, the outbreak of sickness and disease, and worse still, the spill over effect on neighbouring countries, leave enough to be imagined. Observers would have thought that the breath of freedom from pre-independent oppression, spelt peace and stability. The reverse has since then been the case. It is therefore in line to unearth the source and causes of these conflict eruptions or at least the underlying factors which unabatedly sow the seed of conflict within tribes, communities, societies or states, to the extent that they escalate and therefore precipitate international concern and third-party intervention.

Post-colonial wars have been internal in nature. They may be categorized as follows: a. secessionist wars, b. wars of devolution, c. irredentist wars, d. wars of regime change, e. wars of social banditry, f. armed Intercommunal insurrection.⁷³

2.2.4.1 Secession wars

There have been a handful of African states- Angola, Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia to mention a few, with the experience of war, that results from the strong desire of a group of people to disengage from an amalgamation initiated under colonial rule, to independence. Of them all, the most recent has been the secession of South Sudan from Sudan on July of 2011. Paul D. Williams has argued that the lumping of people together to create the forced coexistence of a heterogeneous group cannot be seen as accountable for the number of secession wars in Africa.⁷⁴ Certain proximate factors tend to contribute to conflict eruption. However, on the ground experience in some cases indicate the reverse, as such forced living pose serious difficulties for a people with disparate orientation, culture, religion, norms and values. In other cases, it has provided the enabling environment for unruly leaders to exploit ethnic loyalties.

⁷³ Paul Tiyambe Zeleza “*The Causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberation Struggles to the ‘War on Terror’*” in *The Roots of Africa Conflicts: The Causes & Costs* by Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008)

⁷⁴ Paul D Williams, *War & Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011)

2.2.4.2 Irredentist wars

In this case, it is not the intention of a group of people, who have found themselves citizens of a particular nation, to seek sovereignty nor become independent from an already existing state. Such people's motivation is to be reunited to lost tribes or clans in a different country from the one in which they are habiting. These wars majorly accrue from issues of boundary. Although in 1964 there was a unanimous consensus by African leaders to accept each frontier as drawn since colonial times, some ethnic groups remain haunted by the very thought of being separated from their ancestral linkages in other countries. The yearning of Somalis in both Ethiopia and Kenya, to be reunited with their tribes in the Somalian state, evidences a typical example of irredentist wars.

2.2.4.3 Wars of devolution

These wars have occurred in Africa when a discontented and aggrieved group of people within a state, seek improvement in its general well-being and existence. Under the circumstance access to power has more or less been denied them, to the extent that they seek political redress and equity in wealth distribution. A typical example was Sudan's protracted conflict with the South, which at its height resulted in the secession of South Sudan from the north. Long years of marginalization and deprivation culminated in renewed resurgence of conflict between the north and the south in 1983. It lingered till 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. This helped create quasi peace between the two adversaries till the South broke away in 2011.

2.2.4.4 Wars of regime change:

The manifestations of these kinds of wars in Africa can be ascribed to the contestation of an incumbent government's legitimacy. The resistance movements who initiate these wars as was typified during the initial years into the independence of both Chad and Uganda, seek liberation from what they perceive as internal oppression by the leaders to whom the state was bequeathed at independence. Probably taking a cue from the success stories of Chad and Uganda, a host of other resistance movements have emerged in Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, in Somalia as well as in Ethiopia. Contingent upon varied grievances, these movements seek the deposition

of their country's leadership. However, as in the Somalian case, state disintegration and failure became the consequence of such resistance battles.

Other kinds of violent eruptions manifesting tendencies to blow out of proportion have accrued from social unrests.

According to Zeleza, the underpinning motivation is not that of

“capturing state power... but of creating chaotic conditions that are conducive to predatory accumulation”⁷⁵.

Although such social disturbances hardly degenerate to complete warfare, if unchecked may result in unnecessary mayhem.

2.2.4.5 Intertribal wars

In similar manner, Intercommunal rivalries or as many prefer to address them, intertribal wars, have been on the increase especially since the early 90s. Rwanda, Darfur, Nigeria and a number of other African states have been witnesses to these kinds of wars. Like in the case of both Rwanda and Darfur, these kinds of violent rifts, are capable of effecting critical humanitarian conditions that attract international attention and military intervention

2.3 Perspectives on the causes of Conflict in the Post-Colonial African State Ethnic Diversity, a blessing or a curse?

“There are no simple and easy explanations for the conflicts in Africa, and the theories that have been advanced are both numerous and contradicting”.⁷⁶

With these opening words from Ali Mazuri, I proceed to examine some underlying factors that have contributed to unstable times in postcolonial Africa. As will be examined subsequently, a host of commentators both Western and African alike, attribute conflicts of Post- colonial Africa to a number of causes.

⁷⁵ Paul Tiyambe Zeleza “*The Causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberation Struggles to the ‘War on Terror’*” in *The Roots of Africa Conflicts: The Causes & Costs* by Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008) P. 1-35

⁷⁶ Ali A. Mazrui, “*Conflict in Africa: An Overview*” in *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs* by Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008) P, 36-50

A slew of scholarly works provides detailed analysis of conflicts in the postcolonial era. One school of thought surmises that the sources of Africa's postcolonial wars accrue from its heterogeneous ethnic composition. This claim proved somewhat correct as a number of ethnic groups in the wake of Africa's occupation, either became physically disconnected from their roots, i.e. ancestral homesteads or became lumped together. Being forced to co-exist within a single territorial space with groups possessing disparate customs and values. Arguing in line, Ali Mazuri posits that such arbitrary amalgamation, bound together diverse groups who had no "tradition of shared authority nor shared a similar system of dispute settlement"⁷⁷. Interestingly, advocates of this line of argument postulate two underlying factors to corroborate the claim of a causal link between ethnic dissimilarity and violence in the post-colonial state. One the one hand, a high conflict propensity seems ineluctable under instances where contrasting ethnic groups coexist. On the other hand, historical explanations, presumably pre-colonial ethnic hatreds substantiate the ethnic rivalry discourse. Africa's sub-Saharan ethnic configuration seemed to pose a significant example, especially as occurrences of ethnic rivalry became prevalent in the early postcolonial years. In the early 90s, ground evidences clearly portrayed acute ethnic contestations, also considering the lethal magnitude of their occurrence. Be that as it may, inverse proposition of this framework of analysis tends to debunk these views as utterly shallow and myopic. Analysts refute extreme provocations as derivatives of social diversity. In their opinion, they may be depicted as products of imperialist construction. Havlik for example, perceived this as a colonial ploy. Re-echoing Snyder he holds that the strategy of pitting one ethnic group against the other, became tantamount to the advancement of imperialist goals. This was the case especially when certain ethnic groups posed some foreseeable threat to the colonial minority.⁷⁸ Collier and Hoeffler on their part, suggest that the tendency for violence under heterogeneous configurations largely depends on the numerical strength of one group over the other. This interprets as 45 to 90 percent of the entire citizenry.⁷⁹ Henderson citing the two authors and illuminating on the above assertion further, holds, that the African states which may be predisposed to conflict eruptions on the platform of ethnic cleavage, may be identified as possessing:

⁷⁷ Ali A. Mazrui, "Conflict in Africa: An Overview" in *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs* by Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008) P, 36-50

⁷⁸ Matt Havlik, *Weak States and Weak Economies: The Problem of Post-Colonial Conflict in West Africa*, <http://www.creighton.edu/fileadmin/user/CCAS/departments/.../MVJ/.../havlik.pdf>

⁷⁹ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War* CSAE WPS/2002-01 (March 13, 2002) economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12055/1/2002-01_text.pdf

“two relatively equal but distinct cultural groups accounting for most of the state’s population”.⁸⁰

Moreover, they perceive a more compelling causal link between poverty and conflict; I.e. poverty may be a more exacerbating factor for the eruption of conflict in Africa, than the claims against its social diversity. They conclude that “social fractionalization, measured as religious and ethnic diversity *lowers the risk of conflict*”. In conclusion, Elbadawi and Sambanis found, that under the right economic and political atmosphere, the seeds of conflict might not have germinated on Africa’s soil in the first place. For them, Africa’s diverse composition is more of “a deterrent rather than a cause of civil war”⁸¹

2.4 Africa’s weak institutional capacity

The next school of thought blames violent eruption of conflicts in the early decades of the post-colonial era, on the institutional legacies bequeathed to African nationalists on acceptance of leadership from the imperialist regime. This line of thinking traces Africa’s poor leadership sense and attendant instability and underdevelopment to colonialist selfish and exploitative policies of both exclusion and political repression and to a legacy characterized by a paucity of governing structures needed to bolster the emerging African states. These commentators insist that although pre-colonial African societies aligned more towards patrimonial tendencies, the idea of authoritarianism for example, may have stemmed from its colonial experience. Thus, with the demise of the imperial regime, African leaders were abandoned without the self-sufficiency to construct the real image of the Westphalian state.⁸² Araoye for example, claims that “the African state was designed by its foreign creators as an instrument for the articulation of the interest of hegemonic forces” arguing further, he stated that the lack of appropriate governing institutions on the part of the African state derives from the “patterns of engagement imposed on the state by their original colonizers”. He assertively concludes: “The major institutions of the post-colonial African state were designed to protect the interest of their colonizers rather than to serve the new state”.⁸³

⁸⁰ Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 50 (October): 563-73 in Errol A. Henderson, “When States implode: Africa’s Civil Wars 1950-1992” in *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Cost* by Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008) P.58

⁸¹ Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict” December 2000. Accessed 2nd October 2014

⁸² Ademola Araoye, *Sources of Conflict in the Post-Colonial African State* (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2014) P. xxxiv

⁸³ Ibid

Commentators posit for one, that the idea of statehood and its management had proved to be a huge challenge with which African leaders had grappled in the early years. The idea of state building became a new phenomenon to which African leaders were found playing the games of trial and error. Leadership of the state was therefore carried out in the manner perceived by these new leaders to be most fitting. George Klay Kieh, Jr confirms in line with Araoye's reflections, suggest that the colonial state was characterized by authoritarianism. Colonial administrators had resorted to the use of coercion to achieve its parochial objectives. Africans were marginalized out of leadership positions while laws enacted were meant to be adhered to without considerations for the colonized.⁸⁴ The mere exclusion of Africans from running the affairs of the colonial state could have been an indicator that the state was inherited by a bunch of inexperienced hands with a partial sense of state management. In reality, little was to be expected from these fledglings. As they in turn, began to exert the same manner of brutal force on its populace, in order to maintain leadership status. The battle for legitimacy further precipitated the use, in Kiehs words of "divide and rule,"⁸⁵ a tactics probably acquired during imperialist regime. He noted further, that this strategy was explored to foment trouble between constituent groups helping to exacerbate the already fragile nature of the new states.

The pervasiveness of warfare more than four decades into independence stands to question the validity of these assertions. The saddening reality that long after the exit of colonialism the continent remains a zone of gross underdevelopment and instability seems to corroborate such claims of inherited weak or lacking institution. In the unfolding decades, the hopes of onlookers may have been dashed when the continent failed to evolve into a near stable region, considering the existence of a number of African states with up to five decades experience of self-governance. It seemed that the continent grappled with the creation of consistent and appropriate democratic institutions and processes to facilitate the full experience of statehood. Indeed, almost a farfetched venture with hope on the brink of collapse. Analysts have added that most African contemporary conflicts have remained some sort of "unfinished business" initiated right after the years of independence.

⁸⁴ George Klay Kieh, Jr, "*The Context of Civil Conflict in Africa*" in *Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and Case*, Edited by George Klay Kieh, Jr and Ida Rousseau Mukenge (Westport C: Praeger Publishers, 2002) P, 22-33

⁸⁵ *ibid*

The aforementioned perceptions assume a more balanced form when Masilela recounting Fanon's ideas, contends that African leaders themselves lacked the knowledge to pursue the appropriate "ideology"⁸⁶. A clear ideology constitutes an important ingredient in building nations from societies characterized by diversity. It may probably suggest the reason why Henderson contends that independent African governments not only faced the challenge of building suitable institutional apparatuses for state governance, but also seemed deficient in the relevant skills and expertise required for the additional task of nation building.⁸⁷ This burden which may have outstretched the capability of the newcomers in the arena of the international system of states, proved also to be a tough terrain for today's developed nations. Nonetheless, reference is made to the fact that these conflicts were precipitated as well by "domestic factors." Citing Stedman Henderson concludes that the origin of these conflicts may be traced to "the policies pursued by elites to gain and consolidate power". Araoye further suggest that the inability of nationalist to realize the significance of the binary task of "nation and state building" engendered a sense of regional consciousness over national loyalty and in turn precipitated the use of ethnic identity as a platform for the creation of societal instability. Although the aforementioned assumptions of conflict etiologies in Africa's early postcolonial landscape cannot be totally dismissed as irrelevant and unsubstantial to the entire discourse, they equally represent over simplistic views of why independent African states imploded in the early decades of post-colonialism.

A plethora of authors have further investigated thoroughly into these matters. They conclude that ethno-linguistic or political factors in isolation of other causal factors cannot exhaustively encapsulate the underlying sources of post-colonial conflicts. On the platform of further probing therefore, other conjectures connecting to political and economic factors⁸⁸ provide a near comprehensive analysis and a deeper understanding especially of the salient issues associated with civil conflicts in African states in the aftermath of colonialism. It is against this backdrop that I intend to examine, in the next section, some of the pertinent considerations in the entire rhetoric of post-colonial African conflicts.

⁸⁶ Ntongela Masilela, "Mapping the Genesis and Structure of the Crisis of the Post-Colonial African State" in Sources of Conflict in the Post-Colonial African State, Ademola Araoye (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2014) P. XXIII

⁸⁷ Errol A. Henderson "When States Implode Africa's Civil Wars 1950-1992" in The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes & Costs, Alfred Nhema & Tiyamba Zeleza, (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008)

⁸⁸ *ibid*

2.5 Reflections within the context of Post-Colonial Conflicts

“...The crisis in the post-colonial states began almost immediately as these political units emerged by fiat in the global inter-state system as independent political actors claiming the attributes of statehood and its implied sovereignty”⁸⁹

In this section I intend to rely on the intellectual reflections of a number of authors, to delineate those significant aspects surrounding African conflicts in the early decades of post-colonialism. The opening assertion from Araoye confirms assertively that Africa has since known no respite but continued to ravage in gruesome internal complexities, identified to have commenced immediately after, and extending into the years of independence. A number of African states: The Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Chad, Liberia, and Ethiopia for example, had begun to experience intense violence in the unfolding years after the exit of their respective colonial administrators.

Angola:

The conflict in Angola for instance, which had basically flourished on the platform of superpower rivalry, had not fully terminated in the aftermath of the cold war and subsequent withdrawal of both America and the Soviets support to respective ideologically coupled armed movements. The conflict had lingered into the early years after its liberation from Portuguese administrators effectuating a deeper corrosion of relations among the diverse ethnic groups extant in Angola's newly created independent state. Angola had remained entangled in such prolonged internal instability orchestrated by its two warring factions: MPLA and UNITA. Both adversaries had become submerged in a heated contest over power, one that endured for nearly three decades into its early years of sovereignty.

Nigeria:

Seven years into independence, Nigeria became engulfed in a civil war lasting three years. Claims of marginalization by the Ibos in the southeast had culminated in the desire to seek the sovereignty of the “*Biafran*” people from the newly created Nigerian state.

Insurgent rivalry in Chad was to be held accountable for the long years of unrest in the aftermath of its independence from French imperialism.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Ademola Araoye, *Sources of Conflict in the Post-Colonial African State* (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2014) 4

⁹⁰ Ademola Araoye, *Sources of Conflict in the Post-Colonial African State* (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2014).

Ethiopia:

The Ethiopian state also struggled to keep its head above troubled waters, as the region of Ogaden bequeathed to Ethiopia by the British in 1954 generated violent confrontations. The conflict emerged over territorial ownership between both Somalia and Ethiopia and intensified with claims of ethnic affiliations.

DRC:

The Democratic Republic of Congo in the wake of its independence experienced similar inter-ethnic violent aggression stoked by Belgian manipulative strategy towards selfish aggrandizement. The conflict had persisted three decades into its Independence ⁹¹.

Sudan:

The Sudan, whose western region: Darfur, remains the analytical focal point in this thesis, for its history of prolonged violence, is not forgotten among the number of African states recorded to have experienced turmoil in the early years of independence. In fact, starting from the end of colonisation in 1956 and predicated on a number of complex realities, the Sudan has failed to embrace complete stability regardless of the secession of the southern part from the north in July 2011. By the early 1990s the Sudan had witnessed two catastrophic wars. Darfur's war has intermittently gained momentum since its initial eruption in 2003. To a large extent, these examples portray the turbulence that had characterized and engulfed the African terrain shortly after independence. A number of the afore mentioned African states remain polarized along ethnic and religious lines. However, as examined in previous chapters, propositions linking the eruptions of violent conflicts in Africa to ethno-linguistic or political fragmentations have long been debunked. The question as to why these states imploded at the very time they did, remain multifaceted and beyond the scope of this study.

Unearthing a number of root causes

Henderson amongst other authors has conducted a study into the underlying roots of conflicts in Africa. Against strong empirical observation, Henderson tested a number of salient variables strongly associated with the outbreak of internal conflicts in the post-colonial era. Causative factors range from excessive *military spending and semi-democratic* governance to underdevelopment, colonial legacy and cultural cleavage. The author avers that Africa's internal wars are traceable largely to the political colonial legacy inherited by her leaders in wake of independence. His model tests the propensity for war in African states colonized by

⁹¹ *ibid*

the French, British or Portuguese. His conclusion: “non-French colonies were less prone to conflict in comparison to other colonies. This argument hinged on the system of governance of each of these colonial administrations. The British indirect rule for example, precipitated deep ethnic consciousness. In most cases, fractionalized societies were transferred to leaders bereft of sufficient experience to produce successful and viable independent states. Colonial legacy he avers:

*“Left a destructive legacy that had a deleterious impact on African state building and nation building initiatives”.*⁹²

African leaders faced the dual challenge of building a cohesive state from amongst its extant diversity, and in a number of states experiencing colonially instigated fragmented ethnic groups, it was confronted with the responsibility also, of instituting functioning state machinery, to put in check activities of dissent groups or aggrieved parties. The required instruments for the resolution of conflict were notably found lacking. Although a number of emergent states across third world countries had experienced similar challenges, Henderson posits that African leaders were specifically saddled with the obligation to actualize this task *“simultaneously”*⁹³ The incapacity to concurrently conquer the dual obligation and buttressed by failed policies became the fertile soil on which the seeds of internal wars germinated. Even after the departure of the colonial regime, a number of African states maintained a somewhat exploitative relationship with their former colonizers, an action that plunged the state into deeper decadence.

Fondo Sikod found that in the early post-colonial years a number of African states witnessed an intense period of coup d'état more often traceable to the prolonged stay of power drunk leaders in office and the attendant:

“lack of freedom and opportunity for the people to express themselves and change leadership through the ballot box”.

⁹² Errol A. Henderson, “When States Implode: Africa’s Civil Wars 1950-92” in *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs* by Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyabme Zeleza eds (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008) P.56

⁹³ *ibid*

The consequence according to the author was the formation and proliferation of rebel activity or the performances of coups that positioned the military at the centre of authority.⁹⁴ The militarization of several African states thus contributed to gross internal instability. Military leaders ostensibly deviated from the vision of actualizing a progressive state. Clearly, such leadership was characterized by myopic and dictatorial ideology and exacerbated by excessive military expenditure, usually to secure and maintain their most often corrupt grip on the mantle of leadership. The resultant effect: a decaying economy, downward turn towards underdevelopment and an upsurge in the poverty levels of its citizenry.

A large number of African states have continued to suffer under the burden of huge debts accrued during these military regimes. The poverty level of its citizenry and most especially of youths whose hope for a decent means of survival usually come crashing as a result, has equally given room for the easy conscription into insurgent groups whose involvement have either been described as quest for equity or the selfish desire for personal gain. In similar vein, the already conflagrant terrain was seen to have taken a turn for the worse as African states suddenly assumed geo-strategic importance to hegemonic ideological power rivalry. Most times the Super power support for such repressive leadership heightened tensions and with their withdrawal, reignited a hitherto suppressed discontent against the governing authority and violent aggression, construed as ethnically motivated.

In furtherance of considerations within the postcolonial context, I shall at this juncture rely on Ademola Araoye, author to the 2014 published literature titled “sources of conflict in the post-colonial African state.”

He provides in-depth background information to the root of Africa’s dilemmas. However, the main reason for identifying his study as significant to this work stems from the fact that his line of argumentation aligns with the underlying causal factors associated with the ongoing conflict in Darfur.

Araoye’s tends to re-echo the opinion of authors already mentioned in this chapter. His views nonetheless are presented from a slightly diverging angle. He reaffirms in the following statement that:

⁹⁴ Fondo Sikod, *Conflicts & Implications for Poverty and Security Policies in Africa* (Addis Ababa: OSSREA, 2008) P.202 in Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs* (Addis Ababa: OSSREA and James Currey Oxford, 2008)

*“the crisis in the post-colonial African states began almost immediately as these political units emerged by fiat in the global interstate system as independent political actors claiming the attributes of statehood and its implied sovereignty”.*⁹⁵

The inference, which may be made from this statement, is that African societies were hardly ready for a “western model” of statehood and therefore lacked the requisite for state success. The disorderliness and concurrent devastation in which the African state found and continues to find itself traces back to its acceptance into the international system of states, and as he reemphasizes originates from “*the pattern of engagement imposed on the state by their original colonizers*”⁹⁶ such institutions as already highlighted were geared not towards the advancement of the African states but became nurtured for the benefit of imperialist activity.

The author discovers the missing brick in the series of assumptions surrounding the discourse on post-colonial African conflict and argues that the over flogged state centric conceptualizations of the characteristics of conflicts in the post-colonial state, tends to blur a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play on the African conflict terrain, especially since the state assumed the status of independence. He illuminates the readers mind beyond the usual perception which causally links African conflicts to internal political deficiencies exhibited by the state and its corollaries.

It seems that the defining features of the postcolonial state poses great challenges to the state as well as impedes its natural development. The African state which had thrived for centuries on its unique and distinct systems for social co-existence and cohesion, is confronted with the challenge to merge pre-existing (pre-colonial) “indigenous” structures with those imposed on it by the international system of states. On the one hand, pre-colonial African states are deficient in those characteristic features superimposed on the international system of states by the Westphalian conception of statehood and the

“ very nature of the post-colonial African state is under theorized... The post-colonial African state is treated just like every other state in the global inter-state system, even if most of its vital attributes and internal dynamics, including the logic governing its internal and external

⁹⁵ Araoye, “sources of conflicts”,5

⁹⁶ Ibid xxxiv

*security and role in the international system, deviate significantly from those of the original Westphalian state”*⁹⁷.

On the other hand the “interconnectedness of conflicts” which derives from the nagging reality of ethnic and cultural affiliations spread across the frontiers of a number of African states plays a salient role in the explication of Africa’s post-colonial conflicts. This line of thought tends to reemphasize the impact of colonial frontiers on the entire postcolonial African history. Amidst efforts to downplay the consequences thereof, the repercussions accrued from such actions have continued to resonate. His study stresses the imperativeness for postcolonial conflict causative factors to be interfaced with “extra-territorial or transnational linkages. These linkages capture those ideas embedded in the “tribes, *clans or religious faiths*” phenomenon which tends to defy the sacredness of sovereign territories to meddle in the affairs of states where known loyalties of “tribes, clans or religious faiths” are evident. Some examples are evident in Sudan’s neighbouring Chad or of Somalis spread across Ethiopian and Kenya. This hitherto missing aspect he opines tends to provide clarity and deep comprehension of conflicts in the postcolonial African state. Such that post-colonial conflicts are no longer construed as merely internally driven but as bearing in Araoye’s words an “intermestic” character understood as the interplay of internal and external issues as reflected in the exact words quoting the author:

*“The conflicts in Angola, linked communities and elicited partisan influences if not interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville and Zambia. The Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo implicates active interested parties in Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Uganda, Congo Brazzaville, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The irredentism in Casamance in Senegal cannot be treated in isolation of developments in the Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry. The transnational complexities of the conflicts that, on the face of it look internal to post-colonial African states points at the structural incongruities of the post-colonial state as well as of the inter-state system constituted by those states”*⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Ademola Araoye, *Sources of Conflict in the Post-Colonial African State* (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2014)

⁹⁸ Ademola Araoye, *Sources of Conflict in the Post-Colonial African State* (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2014), 14

In precise terms therefore, post-colonial conflicts have derived from two major sources - domestic actors working in tandem with actors of perceived shared identity across territorial sovereign frontiers and external international actors seeking to maintain dominance over erstwhile territorial domains.

The post-colonial African state also found itself plagued by a number of conflicts emanating from issues of disparate religious inclinations. Worldviews originating from either Islam or Christianity and handed down to the post-colonial state, has more often plunged the African state into periods of instability and unrest, as adherents dwelling within what Araoye calls the same “political space”⁹⁹ lack the needed tolerance to appreciate and respect each groups values, thus resulting in a “dissonance of values”¹⁰⁰. Where each group views its own values as superior to the other and in most cases, seek to forcefully proselytize members of other believes or superimpose on them codes of conduct or values that are counter to those of the other group. Such issues if inadequately handled have the propensity to disintegrate whole states, as witnessed by nations like the Sudan prior the South’s secession in 2011 and Nigeria viewed to be on the brink of disintegration. The northern regions of both nations have been historically predominated by Muslims compared to a larger Christian population in the south. In like manner, the unity of the Nigerian state seems threatened by a “dissonance of values”¹⁰¹ deriving from divergent worldviews observable between the north and the south.

2.6 Post-cold war conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa

In preceding sections, I attempted an examination of those salient issues which tended to dominate the discourse on violent escalations of conflicts in the sub- Saharan African region, specifically in the early years of post-colonialism. This section delves into another significant phase in African history. Analyst, scholars and commentators delineate an era where during the apogee years of the early 90s, conflicts were characterized as some of the bloodiest of internal conflicts ever known to the continent.¹⁰² Did the kinds of conflicts experienced in the post-cold war era mutate when compared with those of early post colonialism? Did they display any unique features? The myriad of scholarship in this regard attests to a continuum in

⁹⁹ Ademola Araoye, *Sources of Conflict in the Post-Colonial African State*, (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2014) 154

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² See, Theo Neethling and Heidi Hudson, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa Concepts, Role-Players, Policy and Practice* (Tokyo [u.a.]: United Nations Univ. Press [u.a.], 2013)

contemporary postcolonial years, of those underlying factors that contributed to violent internal conflicts in the immediate aftermath of colonial imperialism.¹⁰³ This highpoint in conflict eruptions lasted for a few years. It then gave way to a declining tendency, so that analysts and scholars documenting that phase, describe the occurrence of conflicts in for example Ethiopia, Angola, the Congo, Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia as a period in African history where the most heinous crimes, such as the one in the Rwandan state in the early 90s, had been committed.¹⁰⁴ The nagging question remains nonetheless, as to why that era became the climax point for the occurrence of violent internal conflicts in a good number of states on the continent.

Scholars like Collier and Hoeffler had attributed them to political causes. They maintained, that Africa's daunting conflict scenarios were causally linked to economic causes. The authors dismiss blatantly, claims of ethnicity and religious diversity as undergirding factors with the propensity to engender conflict. I will explore the claim which based on the "greed grievance" thesis assumes that conflicts are conducted on the basis of greed as opposed to propositions from political scientists whose grievance thesis embedded in underlying inequality, political repression, discontentment provides the causal relationship between grievance and the eruption of conflicts on the continent.

2.6.1 A plethora of conflicts in post-cold war Africa: Economic causes?

Around the late 1990s while the flames from escalated conflicts across Africa continued to rage, two World Bank economists sought to deviate from the popular scholarship surrounding the causes of internal conflicts. They examined diverse motivations for the endemic outbreak of conflicts on the continent. Against the assumption that African conflicts-with special emphasis on the sub-Saharan region, were invincibly rooted in political underlying factors, the duo tended to underscore the need to recognize what for them were substantial indications that the emergence of the region's conflicts was undoubtedly linked to economic factors. Specifically, they negated political scientist postulations assuming a higher proclivity to conflicts in ethnically diversified societies than homogenous ones.

¹⁰³ See, Adebayo Oyebo and Abiodun Alao, *Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives on Security* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998)

¹⁰⁴ See, Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013)

Theirs was a thesis that demonstrated a complete rebuttal of ethnically induced conflicts. It basically drifted towards economically underpinned motivations. Both authors underscored a reduction in the propensity towards conflict in societies with palpable ethnic and religious divisions. They averred similarly, that there are interactions between a country's moderate to high dependence on natural resources and the outburst of conflict. Also, rebellion becomes appropriate based on the underlying revenue, which ostensibly accrues from the initiation of rebel activity. Given the asymmetrical characteristic feature of conflicts since the end of the Second World War, both writers insist that rebellion against a sitting government may occur, if compared to the costs which accrue from rebellion, higher benefits of "secession or state capture" are foreseen.

Secession for example became a most plausible motivation for rebellion when the state was seen as rich in resources. Having tested their thesis upon four variables of income, population, amount of natural resources and ethno-linguistic diversity, their conjectures presumably provided the missing link as enumerated below and perhaps policy recommendation on the best approach to international intervention in Africa and the search for a sustainable end to wars on the continent.

1. Civil wars were overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low-income countries
2. Countries with larger population have a higher risk of war and these wars last longer
3. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization poses no greater risk of conflict to its societies.
4. They indicated a higher inclination to conflict especially based on resource wealth.

In summary, they contended that Africa's hideous wars were traceable to the level of abject poverty extant on nearly the entire continent.

In 2000 and 2006 the dyad made even greater claims to prior assumptions of discernible linkages between African conflicts and underlying economic causes. At the time of a subsequent update on their initial findings, intra-state conflicts had become more of the rule than the exception. The sub-Saharan region now played host to a number of escalations in several locations across Africa.

In a developing update, they introduced the "rational choice model of greed-rebellion model"¹⁰⁵. Based on their investigation, a greater propensity to conflict as predicated on greed factors of financial and military gain can be envisaged. Rebels tend to conceal their greed-

¹⁰⁵ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Policy Research Working Paper 2355. [Http://openknowledge.worldbank.org](http://openknowledge.worldbank.org). Assessed: 22.02.2015

motivated rebellion under some forged grievance. When such groups eventually capture power, they may turn out worse than the government they intend to depose.¹⁰⁶ In like manner, there is almost zero correlation between the grievance factors, corollary undergirding assumptions of inequality, political oppression, ethnic cum religious polarity, and the outburst of conflict. The presence of a certain amount of primary export commodity became for them a high motivator towards the readiness to conduct conflict.¹⁰⁷ Recruitment into rebellion is enhanced in poor countries with high rates of unskilled persons and particularly young men between the ages of 15 and 24 years of age.¹⁰⁸ Should such countries lack the capacity to provide an attractive substitute to deter the preference for involvement in violent activities, a higher risk towards rebellion cannot be overruled.

Collier and Hoeffler made recommendations towards achieving a sustainable end to conflicts on the continent: the pursuit of economic development. Their thesis appeared to have become creditable among policy makers, as African countries grew more and more dependent on loans and aid from the west. In similar vein, the greed theory seemed to have found strong endorsement in the African sub-Saharan region as the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Angola and Darfur manifested the purported features of greed motivated violence by jobless youths, whose activities palpably negated the quest for social justice. David Keen agrees with Collier and his colleagues when he quotes Carl von Clausewitz as stating that war “has increasingly become the continuations of economics by other means, on his part; he confirms the quotation by positing:

“... war is a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection”

The validity of the “ancient hatreds” argument and its linkage to “the violent eruption of conflict is therefore questioned. Keen disputes arguments that allude to the outburst of conflict among “a people who have lived in peace for longer periods.”¹⁰⁹

Soysa reinforces the argument further by contending that countries experiencing scarcity would be less prone to conflict than those endowed with some proportion of abundance. In his opinion, conflicts re-emerge on account of the underlying and perceived opportunities for financial gain, regardless of the grave accompanying humanitarian catastrophes by which define these

¹⁰⁶ Paul Collier, “*Doing Well out of War*” in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000) P.99

¹⁰⁷ Ibid 97

¹⁰⁸ Ibid P. 94

¹⁰⁹ David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1998) P.11, 12

conflicts.¹¹⁰ Although the author claims to corroborate his argument from a social science perspective, it leaves his readers wondering what to make of the “human needs theory”. How do you explain human response to deprivation? How do humans react when forced to languish under distributional inequality and a total disregard cum insensitivity to the basic human needs? This is not to suggest that all grievance triggered by deprivation must lead to violent conflicts, yet humans require some channel to be heard.

A case in point is that of the Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria. There is no gainsaying the obvious trend that multinational oil companies constantly derive profit from the natural endowment of the region, which is oil. These profit-oriented corporations make little returns to the community in terms of development. At the same time and on account of their drilling activities, the means of sustenance available to able-bodied young men is sabotaged. Sadly, the entire situation is aggravated by government’s gross insensitivity and failure to protect the community against external exploitation, coupled with the incapacity to provide social security to serve as some form of cushioning effect. Under the scenario what would be expected of young energetic men whose means of survival is under jeopardy? How best do the youth respond to disenfranchisement in an environment where elite aggrandizement is equally the order of the day? After all an entire community cannot seek greener pastures in foreign lands. Should rebellions that accrue from such inconsideration be swiftly dismissed as motivated by economic agendas, or more precisely by criminal agendas, greed or the opportunity to loot oil?

Regardless of whether these postulations hold an iota of fact or not, the issue remains that deprivation and discontent have the tendency to beget violent manifestations of various forms, and these do not exclude conflict and rebellion. After all, Gurr two decades before the upsurge of the 90s, expounded the “relative deprivation theory” Defining it as the:

*“The discrepancy between what people think they deserve and what they actually think they get.”*¹¹¹

He alluded to the probability of violent expressions based on “prolonged” deprivation. Indeed, a number of the escalated conflicts on the continent, record long histories of one form of discontentment cum grievance or the other. Some grievances over decades of

¹¹⁰ Indra de Soysa, *“The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?”* in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, (London: Lynne Rienner,2000) P.115

¹¹¹ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970) 24 cited in Pau D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa*, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011)

disenfranchisement were traceable to the years of imperialism, they further stretched into present day autocratic and repressive regimes. Seen from a divergent angle nonetheless, it should also be established that when some writers commit to paper, they project arguments nicely put together from an outsider perspective. In so doing, they demonstrate scant knowledge of the web of complex dynamics that precipitate the outbreak of the conflicts.

2.6.2 Counter Perspectives...

Arowobusoye for example, provides a divergent opinion based on occurrences in the West African region. The arguments underlying the greed thesis are in his view “reductionist” and utterly undermine the realities of those involved in conflicts.¹¹²

His position aligns with Ballentine and Nitzschke viewpoint. The writers suggest an inherent inappropriateness in conjecturing combatant motivation based on mathematical theories. The entire political economy analysis seems to remarkably concentrate on rebel activity, while neglecting the role of government as is evident in a number of cases.¹¹³ Arguing accordingly, Murshed and Tadjoeeddin cite Humpherys analysis of the greed thesis. He insists that Colliers postulations linking rebel activity to some form of hidden economic agenda, has failed to critically examine greed from yet another angle. The floodlights tend to exonerate the greedy outsider. He states as follows:

*“The existence of natural resources may be an incentive for third parties-states and corporations -to engage in or indeed foster civil conflict”.*¹¹⁴

In fact, for the duo, neither of the two main underlying factors putatively responsible for African conflicts, seems sufficient to justify the eruptions of violent conflicts. Arowobusoye does not see it differently, in fact he underscores the importance of factoring in the “*international dimension*”. In his opinion, scholars have paid greater attention to the “*supply side*” of natural resource while overlooking the “*demand side*”. He caps it up by insisting that diamond consumption is minimal on the continent and Africa produces less of the arms with which it fights its wars.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Olu Arowobusoye, why they fight: An Alternative View on the Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation, (Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.) <http://berghof-foundation.org>. Assessed 22.02.2015

¹¹³ Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation, (Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.) <http://berghof-foundation.org>. Assessed: 20.02.2015

¹¹⁴ Macartan Humphery, “Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict Resolution. Uncovering the Mechanisms”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4) P 508-37 cited in Syed M. Murshed and Mohammed Z. Tadjoeeddin, Revisiting the Greed and Grievance explanations for Violent Internal Conflict, (A paper written as part of the European Union (EU) funded MICROCON research project on conflict.

¹¹⁵ In Olu Arowobusoye, 6

Grant, examining the Sierra Leonean context insists on an analysis that delineates the so called underlying financial agendas in Africa's civil wars, as efforts towards societal transformation, and in search of liberations from political oppression, economic inequality and marginalization traceable to the era of imperial administration. A rebel-centric analysis of Africa's war causality amounts to a complete misrepresentation of the interconnected factors at the root of its wars. Deviating from Colliers stance on heterogeneous societies and a lesser risk of conflicts, Grant maintains that within the Sierra Leonean context "the ethnicity factor cannot be ignored". More so, a closer examination of the Sierra Leonean situation, indicates the interplay of diverse actors; this evidently vitiates a central focus on greed motivated rebellion, which is purportedly made feasible by the opportunities rebels perceive may be derivable from the availability of *lootable* natural resources.¹¹⁶ In fact, an explanation of the causes of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa especially after the termination of the cold war, which consistently links violent eruptions to some group of criminals seeking to trigger conflicts within naturally endowed states, based on the accumulation of some envisaged financial benefit, seems far from the truth. Findings based on qualitative research showed that between 1946 and 2005, of the twenty conflicts putatively linked to diamonds around the world, only the conflicts in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) and Angola (1993-2002) occurring after the 90s and in sub-Saharan Africa, were depicted to have had compelling links to diamonds.¹¹⁷

Investigating closely, Paul Williams insists that it is misleading to describe both conflicts as originating from either RUF (Revolutionary United Front) or UNITA's rapacious motives to amass wealth from diamonds. In actual fact, diamonds did not cause either of the wars; instead they served the dual purpose of sustaining an already erupted war, as well as provided justification for the expression of grievance traceable to the unequal apportionment of diamonds-accrued revenue. Substantiating the grievance claim, Grant draws attention to the air of resentment and discontent, which had beclouded the Sierra Leonean state especially tracing back to the colonial era. Subsequent years of autocratic and corrupt leadership were equally said to have instigated the violent eruptions of the 90s. As it were, this was literarily comprehended as the long overdue expression of anger and frustration on the part of its

¹¹⁶ J. Andrew Grant, " *Salone's Sorrow: The Ominous Legacy of Diamonds in Sierra Leone* " in Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler (eds), *Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Hamburg: Hamburg African Studies, Institute for African Affairs, 2005) 251-271

¹¹⁷ Le Billon, "Diamond wars? 350 cited in Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) 72-93

citizenry. At the most, predatory interests far from depict the core motivation for war in Sierra Leone, instead the country's *lootable* natural resource, (diamond) had contributed the protraction of that conflict.¹¹⁸

Indeed, in the case of Angola, the detection of diamonds since 1912 and its exploitation dating back to the 1930s, had remained inconsequential to the understanding of conflict, until protagonists of the fresh conflicts of 1992, began seeking new avenues to sustain their violence. The Cold War's termination had engendered Angola's geo-political irrelevance, spawned the corollary withdrawal of all political and economic support and set in motion an alleged self-financing mechanism.¹¹⁹

Abdalla Bujra arguing from his standpoint contends that the surge in cases of internal conflicts could not have occurred in a void; he observes some major issues as enumerated below. He posits that these underlying factors, prepared the ground for the conflicts of the 1990s. If indeed his claims are to be counted as valid and strong, then the arguments from the World Bank economists may not be easily regarded as unfounded. The eruptions of conflicts and corollary rebellion may have been a backlash against the untold economic hardship that befell the African people on account of stringent programs introduced by western financial institution to supposedly enable African states to surmount the threats of complete economic collapse. Put differently economic hardship effectuated by declining economies may have produced more jobless people and probably the larger number being youths, who as suggested by Collier et al, become easy prey for recruitment into rebellious groups.¹²⁰

Although the first issue observed by Bujra has overtime become a readily acceptable argument linked to the occurrence of conflict after the cold war, items 2-7 suggest other issues that should be seriously considered.

1. The withdrawal of financial and military support that had bolstered authoritarian African governments.
2. The rapid globalization of the world trade, the tightening of loans, the dependence of African countries on private investment and the non-competitiveness of most African economies

¹¹⁸ Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) P. 72-93

¹¹⁹ Ibid in Paul Williams 72-93

¹²⁰ Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner, *Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War*, <http://csae.ox.ac.uk>. Accessed: 04 February 2015

3. The imposition by the World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund) on African economies of tough political conditionality: democratization and good governance.
4. The increasing role of many different types of organizations, both foreign and local, in monitoring the governance and human rights record of African governments especially in situations of tension and conflicts.
5. The effects of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the attendant rise in poverty in both urban and rural areas. An increase in population and a resultant heightening of tensions deriving from competition over depleting resources.
6. The proliferation and easy access to small arms. Small arms acquired from international arms dealers and or from the rebellions of the 70s and 80s of for example Uganda and Mozambique as well as from African arms dealers.
7. The unresolved issues of the 80s, emerging ones from the 90s all contributing to a volatile environment in the aftermath of the cold war.

In reaction to item 3, African scholars in particular, insist that the relationship between African economies and the aforementioned western financial institutions have engendered greater levels of poverty on the continent. While the objective was to facilitate a declining tendency in the rate of poverty, the reverse seemed the case as nations sunk into deeper penury. The mismanagement of such loans by a number of African head of states was allegedly to blame. Unfortunately, the citizenry has borne the brunt of such mismanagement, as economic adversity tends to define and over burden the everyday life of the ordinary man. The tendency to produce resentment and discontent and the propensity towards volatile environments and subsequent implosion under the circumstance cannot be entirely ruled out.

Ohanwe insists similarly, that the ordinary Congolese continues to suffer hardship on account of Mobutu's squandering of IMF and World Bank loans amounting to \$8.5 billion. Mozambique in its early post conflict phase also exemplifies the level of poverty that may accrue from the strain of repaying IMF loans. As documented by the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative in 1998, Mozambique's debt accumulation had reached \$ 5.62 billion. Similarly, as at 1998, the country according to UNDP documentation, ranked 166th out of 174 countries in terms of Human Development. Yet at that level of poverty, the country continued

to languish under the intense heat of a 20 percent debt repayment, which it generated from exportation.¹²¹

A closer look at item 5 suggests the creation of conflict prone environments based on austerity measures such as the SAP (Structural Adjustment Policy) as introduced to developing third world nations like those in Africa, by the IMF and World Bank. Attendant policies such as privatization, currency devaluation and deregulation aimed basically at a total restructure of the economy as well as a reduction in inflation and standard of living, have inadvertently but certainly contributed to increased levels of hardship, poverty and instances of uprisings which although have not been documented as degenerating into violent armed conflicts, but which exhibited discernible tendencies to blow out of proportion and into high level security dilemmas. For example, it was noted that during the tenure of Kenneth Kaunda, between 1985 and 86, Zambia's mining region also known as its Copperbelt province, witnessed a number of riots on account of IMF introduced policies. In 1981 uprisings that were in some ways an upshot of such austerity measure was noted to have occurred in the Central African Republic and 1988 and 1989 in the West African region of Nigeria¹²²

That been said, other writers have taken a near emphatic stance to attest to some correlation between the introduction of austerity measures in Africa and the onset in some ways, of the violent eruptions of the 1990s in Africa. For example, Arowobusoye refers to Chossudovsky as suggesting, against the popular belief of an underlying "ancient hatred" some linkage between IMF and World Bank economic reformations policies and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The removal of economic bolsters was accounted to have adversely affected the Rwandan economy and coinciding with the period of a drastic decline in the international coffee market. The entire economic crisis resulted in the devaluation of the country's currency as well as created for its citizenry harsh living conditions, which the author believes, contributed to and engendered the hatred upon which the genocide was conducted.¹²³

¹²¹ Augustine C. Ohanwe, *Post-Cold War Conflicts in Africa, Case Studies of Liberia and Somalia*, (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, 2009) 46

¹²² Ibid 47

¹²³ Michel Chossudovsky, *Global Poverty: IMF, Macro-economic Reform and the Exacerbation of Poverty*, (London: Zed Books) in Olu Arowobusoye, *Why they fight: An Alternative View on the Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation*, <http://www.berghof-foundation.org>. Assessed: 21.02.2015

Andrew Grant observes some link between SAP's negative impact, gross mismanagement on the part of Strasser's government and the war in which the country became embroiled around the 90s. The discontent that ensued had initially encouraged local support for what became one of sub-Saharan Africa's most notorious rebel group- RUF. The resultant domino effect, cannot be attributed majorly to some underlying vested interest on the part of RUF's hardliners but as Grant opines occurrences as evidenced by the implosion of the Sierra Leonean state, are in many ways ascribable to the "political and economic marginalization of the Sierra Leonean people, languishing under the weight of a colonially inherited repressive and clientelistic system of governance."¹²⁴ The implosions of the 90s were most probably a sign that the continent was ripe for a "reordering of its societies"¹²⁵ or as transformation scholars prefer to envision, ready for some transformative "change".

Conclusion

In recent history, writers have become overly polarized on the underlying causes of conflicts in Africa at the end of the bipolar rivalry around the late 80s. The larger majority contends nonetheless that the conflicts, which occurred in the aftermath of the cold war, were being induced by a number of issues. They were a combination of political, social and economic factors. In concrete terms scholars surmise that they included the struggle over depleting resources, they were conflicts among religious identities, inequality, ethnic intolerance and repressive governments to mention a few. While these conflicts became similar in nature, having originated from within the frontiers of these nations, they also possessed unique features: they were fought on different terrains on the continent, for a myriad of contrasting underlying factors and divergent triggers, seen to have uniquely distinguished one from the other. On account of such development, a number of scholars have disapproved the scholarship in the habit of stereotyping post-cold war African conflicts and therefore lacking the academic prowess to take into cognizance contextual underlying motivations, which as is historically evident diverge in most of the conflict scenarios across the African continent. To this effect, scholars like Adedeji have stressed that:

"...Africa is a vast and varied continent made up countries and specific histories and geographical conditions as well as uneven levels of economic development. The causes

¹²⁴ J. Andrew Grant, "Salone's Sorrow: *The Ominous Legacy of Diamonds in Sierra Leone*" in Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler (eds) *Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Hamburg: Hamburg African Studies, 2005) 14

¹²⁵ David Keen, *The Political Economy of War: The Social and Economic Costs of Conflicts in Developing Countries*, (London: ESCOR, 1997) cited in J Andrew Grant 255

*of conflicts in Africa reflect the continent's diversity and complexity. While some causes are purely internal and portray specific sub-regional dynamics, others have a significant international dimension. ...*¹²⁶

As a final note, suffice it to say that the domestic constitution of conflicts occurrences within the African state was seen to be in alignment with the rising trend of intra-state conflicts in regions around the world. Report in the year 2000 of the trend in major armed conflicts by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, showed that out of 25 major armed conflicts, 23 were intra-state while two met the description of interstate rivalry. Also, of the 57 major armed conflicts recorded between 1990 and 2001, all excluding 3 were described as internal conflicts. In its year 2002 Yearbook, it was quoted to have said: "...Africa is the most conflict-ridden region with the greatest number of conflicts"¹²⁷ Although the conflicts of the 1990s were unequivocally internal to their host state, they in addition, displayed the ferocious tendency to engender regional insecurity based on across border spillages, constituting huge refugee problems and in some cases attracting international concern on account of human violations and complex humanitarian conditions.

Be that as it may, there is no gainsaying the fact that Africa recorded tumultuous times in the aftermath of the cold war. The search for stable peace continues to elude it. Although Collier and other rational theory scholars remain adamant about an apparent correlation between African conflicts and the greed thesis, scholarship prior to the end of the war on ideology, drew conclusions from divergent perspectives such as have been depicted by Edward Azar's analytical framework on Protracted Social Conflict.

In delving into the author's thesis, the dissertation underscores one nagging feature of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa: prolonged violence, protractedness or intransigence as the case may be. The discussion is significant to understanding the characteristic feature of the dissertation's case study: Darfur and the underlying causative factors that may apply to the conflict in question.

¹²⁶Adebayo Adedeji, *Comprehending and Mastering African conflicts*, (London: Zed Books, 1999), 364 in Abdalla Bujra, *African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment*, (Ethiopia: Development Policy Management Forum Occasional Paper, No 4, 2002), 15

¹²⁷ John C. Anyanwu, *Economic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some Econometric Results*. <http://www.afdb.org>. Assessed: 10 February 2015

2.7 Protracted Social Conflicts: Reflections according to Edward Azar

Edward Azar never lived to witness the unfolding events that occurred on the world's conflict terrains. His work nonetheless, received much attention for its contribution to the discourse on the conflicts that resemble those of the African sub-Saharan region. He presented an analytical tool that explains why prolonged conflicts may occur within a society. Unlike scholarship from a decade after the cold war and beyond, which attributes Africa conflicts to some predatory motive and by inference blames Africa's woes strictly on economic factors generated by actors from within the conflict terrain; Azar's reflections seem to have diverged so much as to have understood the handwriting on the wall. Azar perceived the evolving characteristics of conflicts just as we began to see them after the termination of the cold war.

First, he discerned some salient aspects of conflicts. For example, the emerging conflicts he posited, were:

*“Characterized by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors, actors and targets.”*¹²⁸ Secondly:

*“these conflicts showed no clear starting or terminating points”*¹²⁹

and thirdly that the one feature which characterizes a number of conflicts in the sub-Saharan African region was the issue of “prolonged violence”, also dubbed intractable conflicts. Most importantly also, he understood that such conflicts could not be linked to a single causal factor but emerged as a result of “multiple causal factors and dynamics”¹³⁰. Similarly, Azar had observed how conflicts most inappropriately received attention at the level of escalation. He observed the total disregard on conflict inclinations at the latent stage, where the dreaded consequences of violent eruptions can be averted.

Edward Azar's analytical framework covers a wide terrain within the prolonged violence discourse. His contribution nonetheless may not be comprehensive enough to explain each and every underlying basis for the eruption or sustenance of prolonged violence. While this study as earlier indicated, employs his reflections as an investigative tool into Darfur's prolonged conflict, it refrains from projecting his framework as exhaustive. Indeed, no two prolonged

¹²⁸ Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990) 6

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 6

¹³⁰ *ibid*

conflicts will exhibit the exact same dynamics of war. This study nevertheless, finds his work largely adequate in explaining the conflict dynamics of Sudan's war in the western province.

Contingent upon the theoretical framework on Protracted Social Conflicts, Azar identifies three components: Genesis, Dynamics and Outcomes. He presents detailed insight into nature of protracted social conflicts. This study will rely on the first component (Genesis) to examine Darfur's conflict. For Azar, the Genesis component:

*" identifies a set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones "*¹³¹

The Genesis component is regarded as most relevant because it tends to provide comprehension into a number of issues which set the stage for the eruption of Darfur's conflict in 2003. In developing sections I shall examine the four clusters of variables (communal content, needs, governance and the role of the state, and international linkages) that underpin the Genesis component. Azar considers them to be the preconditions for Protracted Social Conflicts to occur.

Defining Protracted Social Conflicts

At this point, an understanding of Protracted Social Conflicts as presented by Azar would suffice. According to the author, PSC represents

*"the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation "*¹³²

Some basic characteristics of what Azar referred to as PSC may be deduced from his definition. These kinds of conflicts are violent. They persist for a long period of time. They depict rivalry between identity groups, over needs that are basic to the survival of such groups. Azar beyond providing a concise definition drew his reader's attention to *four clusters of variables*. Once present, especially in the political configuration of a state, these variables: communal content, human needs, the state's role and leadership style and international linkage, became preconditions for the emergence of violent and prolonged conflicts.

¹³¹ Azar, "The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts ", 7

¹³² Edward Azar, "The analysis and management of protracted social conflict", in J. Volkan et al., (eds) The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, vol. 2. Lexington, M.A: D.C. Heath, P. 93

2.7.1 Communal content

The communal composition of a state is the central point around which other variables revolved. Heterogeneity based on ethnicity, religion, language or cultural identities tended to fuel or create the enabling environment for all other variables to manifest. To this extent, “non-conflictual situations become transformed into conflictual ones”. According to Azar, the distorted nature of the state’s communal composition-” *the state’s artificial incorporation of a multitude of communal groups*”¹³³ is traceable to the colonial era. Communal rivalry is being attributed to imperialist style of administration: the “divide and rule”, and, to long histories of contestations among groups. The precipitated domino effect hinges on an imperialist constructed mismatch of diverse groups. In fact, according to Azar, the amalgamation of groups into a single territorial space, precipitates a “*disarticulation between state and society*”¹³⁴ and equally leads to the state being “*dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of groups*”¹³⁵ More so, as evidenced in contemporary times, such constructed diversity tends to reinforce an undiluted loyalty to ethnic groupings and undermines the state’s path towards nationhood. Azar suggests that, ethnic ascendancy engenders an “*unresponsive*” disposition towards the needs of other groups within the society. It therefore: “*strains the social fabric and breeds fragmentation,*” all of which culminates in the eruption of protracted social conflicts.

2.7.2 Human needs

The human needs theory tends to play a significant role in Azar’s framework for understanding the underpinning sources of Protracted Social conflicts. Azar notes that central to the physical survival and wellbeing of individuals and groups, is the satisfaction of material needs. Unfortunately, most heterogeneous societies are characterized by uneven and unjust distribution of physical needs. Marginalized groups are thus compelled to air their grievances. In most cases the demand for change falls on deaf ears. Prolonged insensitivity to the demand for change may precipitate violent action. However, as Azar maintains, the deprivation of physical needs, do not necessarily induce conflict. It is the denial of access to the means of satisfying that need that engenders conflict. When groups are denied access to political and

¹³³ Azar, “The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts “, 7

¹³⁴ *ibid*

¹³⁵ *ibid*

economic power, they are more or less disconnected from the means through which to assuage their basic needs.

In addition, communities participate in the political authority of the state, if they at least enjoy some *measure of acceptance* by the dominant group. It is this participation that may provide the link to “economic decision making” Azar contends as follows:

*“If the ruling political elites were to recognize and politically accommodate alienated communities, then discords over the distribution of political and economic power could be managed satisfactorily.”*¹³⁶

Having identified different kinds of developmental needs: access needs, acceptance needs and security needs, the author has identified that “*acceptance*” is pivotal. Contrary to this, the physical needs of estranged groups within PSC prone societies remain unfulfilled.

2.7.3 Governance and State’s role

It is in the state’s right to “regulate society” “protect citizens” and “to provide collective goods”. In that light, the state is obliged to assume an intervening role, to ensure the delivery of equity and fairness in the distribution of state resources. However, countries prone to Protracted Social Conflicts fall short of achieving successful and fair governance because a *single identity group* or a *coalition of groups*, whose major focus is tilted towards its own people, monopolizes the polity for group aggrandizement. The lack of neutrality in mode of governance and the domination of state by certain groups tend to undermine the state’s capacity to exhibit the qualities of an ideal democratic state, known to function as the “*impartial arbiter of conflicts among constituent parts*”¹³⁷. Based on palpable variation in modes of governance, Azar posits that societies prone to PSC tend to be “*characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs*”. Furthermore, Azar contends that dominant groups circumscribe other groups “access to social institutions”, thereby effectuating *crises of legitimacy*.¹³⁸ Moreover, Azar finds some significant causal relationship between regime type and an attendant contested legitimacy on the one hand, needs and protracted social conflicts on the other.

¹³⁶ Azar, “The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts “, 7-10

¹³⁷ Azar, “The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts “, 10-11

¹³⁸ *ibid*

2.7.4 International linkage:

The last of the four variables indicates that protracted social conflicts are not entirely a product of internal engineering.: “*of political power configuration underlying the authority structure and regime type.*” In the view of Azar, it is likewise connected to the influence exerted on the internal by the international system. Azar suggests two factors: economic dependency and political cum military clientele relationship. These factors underlie the international linkages variable and may set the scene for prolonged conflicts to occur within societies. In both cases, the autonomy of the state is encroached upon, to the extent that the state demonstrates greater insensitivity to the needs of its citizens while ample attention is diverted to cementing economic, political and military relationships with “*stronger*” states.

Even though Azar identifies the already elucidated four variables as preconditions for the occurrence of protracted social conflicts, he indicates that *overt* conflict may not occur until certain other factors underlying the “process dynamics” are triggered.

Chapter Three

3.1 International Third-Party Approach to African Sub-Saharan Conflicts

Introduction

This chapter seeks to investigate two major approaches of third-party intervention in intra-state conflicts. It highlights the utilization of these approaches in past and ongoing conflicts on the African continent and examines the strengths and weaknesses of such approaches in contemporary African conflicts. The preceding chapter captured the nature and characteristics of contemporary conflicts as waged on the African continent and most specifically since the demise of the cold war. This chapter develops on the discourse by examining salient concepts largely undergirding efforts at conflict intervention. In focusing on the applicability of mainstream approaches on sub-Saharan African conflicts, I introduce two trajectories in international intervention: Conflict Management and Conflict resolution. They represent two fields of inquiry that for decades, have informed international third-party efforts at limiting violence as well as stabilizing and preserving international peace and security. Both fields will be critically examined in terms of historical origin. Core elements and underlying assumptions-guiding operations on conflict terrains will be analysed

What is the core objective of this chapter? I seek to establish whether vacuums have been created by each method, which may have imposed on scholars the exigency to pursue the re-conceptualization of intervention methods and probably the comprehension of conflict itself. I intend to unravel those normative deficiencies, that may have precipitated the search for other strategies to complement the current peace building activity. An examination of the underlying theories guiding the practice of conflict management and resolution is seen as pertinent to this study. This is especially so because the writer understands the extent to which theory dictates the lenses through which conflicts are discerned. More so, they determine the choice for tools and methods for intervention and conflict handling. Much of conflict management understanding and strategy as will be discussed in this chapter traces its roots to International relations realist thinking. Its underlying assumptions revolve around the statist understanding of security as emerging under the Westphalia kind of arrangement. Based on such realist assumptions, conflict is understood as originating from the strong motivation of the state to pursue its national interest.

3.2 International Conflict Management

In speaking of international conflicts management, I will be focusing on the management of such conflicts that have attracted international recognition and concern. By this I mean those conflicts, which have concurrently magnetized concerted third-party efforts that seek to stabilize conflict behaviour that manifest diverse conflict zones of the world

3.2.1 Conflict Management as a Sub-field

A plethora of literatures tend to interchange concepts within the field when explaining the processes and approaches employed in contemporary conflicts. Such terms as conflict settlement and conflict management have either delineated the classical model of conflict intervention, also known as the statist approach or have been adopted by a few others as a generic term which encapsulates the ideas captured by all other mechanisms for intervention known to the field of conflict and peace research.

For the purpose of this study, conflict management will be conceptualized as one of the existing models of third-party intervention. It will be conceived as a statist official approach, guided by its unique principles of intervention in conflict situations and possessing approaches and underlying theories exclusive to it. It will be presented as synonymous with Track I diplomacy and as drawing strong motivations from realist line of thoughts

3.2.2 What is Conflict Management? underlying assumptions for conflict intervention

I begin with an investigation into conflict management as a concept and framework for the analysis of conflict. I cull from definitions of three selected authors as captured below.

Butler:

He describes CM as:

All efforts of third parties in concert with disputants to limit the spread or escalation of a conflict, to minimize suffering, and to create an environment for interaction without resorting to violence ¹³⁹

His description basically depicts a form of third-party consensus directed towards restraining the negative effects of a conflict, to ameliorate the suffering meted out on the population

¹³⁹ Butler Michael, *International Conflict Management* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009) 15

affected by the conflict, and with a view to eliminating violent behaviour among the parties in conflict

In the same vein, Miall terms CM as, “an art of appropriate intervention” whose ultimate goal is focused on the attainment of a “political settlement.” In his definition, eligible intermediaries in a conflict require “power and resources” which they employ in the exertion of a certain amount of “pressure” on the adversaries. These intermediaries are guided by the sole purpose of “inducing a settlement”. His definition tends to shift attention to the display of some form of coercion toward the conflictants aimed at achieving the desired result.¹⁴⁰

Bloomfield and Reilly’s definition is aligned in some ways with that of Butlers. They view CM in this light:

*Conflict management is the positive and constructive handling of differences and divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, (it) addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict: how do deal with it in a constructive way, how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process, how to design a practical, achievable, cooperative system for the constructive management of difference.*¹⁴¹

For these two authors, the seemingly feasible approach to conflict situations would be: to channel more energy into exploring appropriate ways of “managing” disagreements in contrast to venturing into the rigor that might be associated with a “removal”. Butler holds that the focal point of conflict management efforts is to manage the deleterious effects of a conflict. The author describes it as being “less ambitious in objective” and as remaining closer to the surface of issues regarding the conflict.

Some of the defining features of this model of third- party intervention have been captured in the aforementioned definitions. They confirm that the major focus of the statist approach to conflict is that of “managing” and “limiting” the negative effects of war and conflict. The next section traces its origin and effectiveness in the conflicts of the international system.

¹⁴⁰ Hugh Miall, *Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task*. [http: www.berghof-handbook.net](http://www.berghof-handbook.net) (2004) 3

¹⁴¹ D Bloomfield and Ben Reilly, “The Changing Nature of Conflict and Conflict Management” *ibid* 3

3.2.3 Origin of the traditional approach to intervention

Conflict management has basically been a mechanism of state and its attendant actors. It dates back to the treaty of Westphalia in the year 1648, when the terms for state sovereignty were defined. The state had become identified with the role of Chief Security Officer. Its resources and military stamina were channelled towards the defence of the state against foreseeable threats and employed in the pursuit of its national interest. On account of this, the state became the sole institution with the legitimate power to wield “violence” on levels it so decided. Butler termed this kind of violence “organized”. Violence as established by Butler, was used to “thwart potential internal challenges to the ruling elite. In addition, it served to crush dissent or avert potential challenges to government”¹⁴²

With the demise of the First World War, world leaders began to conceive of strategies geared towards curbing all aggression to world peace. The emergent resolution was the creation of the League of Nations. The establishment of such an organization signalled coalesced effort to tackle wars that emanated from incompatibility between states in their pursuit of interest. The formation of the League of Nations became an event in history. It was defined by a positive agenda that ostensibly failed to deliver on its promises. The challenges that bedevilled the organization proved insurmountable. In the course of time, signs of incapability began to emerge. Japan’s incursion into Manchuria in 1931 and in 1935 the aggression on Ethiopia, were two occasions evident of its frailty¹⁴³.

Since providing security had become a shared responsibility of a conglomeration of states, it also followed that the modus operandi captures theoretical underpinnings consistent with the style adopted by independent states. A set of approaches for addressing international conflicts therefore began to emerge. Practices such as classical peacekeeping, mediation and the use of extreme force became ready tools in the hands of the League of Nations. In the years following its demise, its successor the UN and subsequently in the unfolding centuries, other organizations on regional levels in Europe, Africa and Asia, took a cue from its parent body, to employ such approaches for the containment of international conflicts

¹⁴² Butler Michael, *International Conflict Management* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009) 57

¹⁴³ Ibid 18

3.2.4 Theoretical assumptions...

Theoretical assumptions, which underlie the classical model of intervention in modern conflicts, as already mentioned, largely borrowed inspiration from the realist school of thought. Its assertions underscore the centrality of state. That conflict is delineated as ensuing from incompatible interest, and a reliance on economic and military strength as a defence against all security threats. In the same vein, Weber, a protagonist of sociological writings further strengthened the field's theoretical base. He in line with Butler, delineated the state as possessing the singular authority to employ "organized violence" within its territorial confines as well as on an international terrain. Such monopoly as conferred on the state, simply accords it with the legitimacy to utilize violence in "defence of national interest, in the advancement of national objectives", or other areas it deems fit. ¹⁴⁴

Therefore, the analysis of conflict was based on the understanding that conflicts were not only driven by the security demands of the state and by its perceived obligations to uphold her status but also by the state's strong inclination to actualize its foreign policy aspirations.¹⁴⁵ Such were the underlying motivations of single nation states in war scenario. They equally informed the Supers Powers inter-state interventionist activities during the cold war era and more recently, tend to underlie governmental third-party interventionist efforts in modern day conflicts. Under such arrangements, a return to status quo achieved through negotiated settlements was viewed as the best possible outcome in any conflict situation. Some examples of settlements which have been achieved based on realist principles are Sinai I (1974), and Sinai II (September 1975), the Camp David accord whose actualization was contingent upon cease-fire agreements (September 1978) in addition, the Egypt- Israel Peace Treaty (1975) ¹⁴⁶

As the study proceeds, the reader is drawn to the understanding of how this inter-state approach for conflict intervention filtered into the twenty first century and how it became a vital method geared towards the curbing intra-state aggression, especially in the African region.

¹⁴⁴ Butler Michael, *International Conflict Management* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009) 57

¹⁴⁵ K, Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) P. 20-1 cited in Ramsbotham et al, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) P.96

¹⁴⁶ John W. Burton and Dennis J. D. Sandole cited in Stewart Mills, *Conflict Resolution Theory*.
<http://palestineisraelresolution.blogspot.com>

3.3 Selected tools of Conflict Management applied to African Conflict: Peacekeeping, Mediation and Peace-enforcement.

This section seeks to examine some of the conventional apparatuses of conflict management: peacekeeping, peace enforcement and formal mediation. An attempt will be made to provide a historical background to their emergence. These selected conflict management tools will be situated within the context of past and ongoing conflicts on sub-Saharan Africa. The objective is to analyse the efficacy and relevance of these strategies in the search for solutions to protracted violent conflicts on the continent. While a larger portion of peacekeeping missions after the Second World War occurred under the aegis of the UN, some others were initiated and operated by regional and sub regional powers like the AU and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) for example. It is the focus of this study nonetheless, to concentrate analysis on the role of the UN body as the intervening international peace actor in the plethora of conflicts manifesting on the continent's conflict terrains.

3.3.1 Military Intervention, a tool of Conflict Management

Introduction

This sub section on peacekeeping examines the role of military intervention as a conflict management approach in pursuance of peace in zones of conflict. It traces historical origins in the form of multilateralism under the different forms of security arrangements as far back as the concert of Europe. Beyond probing into the underlying principles guiding peacekeeping missions across zones of conflict, selected definitions of the peacekeeping concept will also be delved into.

3.3.2 A historical evolution of the peacekeeping activity

Though peacekeeping has become synonymous with the United Nations, the interposition of contingencies aimed towards the management of international relations predates the formation of the UN. Multilateral interventions had been evident under the auspices of institutions such as the defunct League of Nations. A number of its functions paralleled those of what in the years of UN establishment became referred to as peacekeeping. It had become apparent at each point in world post war history for the international system to seek ways of managing excessive

aggression seen as detrimental to the entire system of states. Pockets of military interventions trace back to the period of the thirty years of war and the Napoleonic wars. Both wars had terminated with the Treaty of Westphalia and the Concert of Europe respectively. Post war arrangements such as these, were tailored towards managing international relations, albeit devoid of multilateral security agendas at conflict management. Their very emergence in the aftermath of each of the war scenarios nonetheless, were perceived to have set the precedence for ideas to what in the years of the League became known as collective security.

The League of Nations had introduced the concept of collective security. Under such arrangement conflict was conceived as ensuing from without the territorial confines of a state, while a parochial perception of security defined around statist understanding of defence against territorial integrity prevailed. To a large extent this arrangement underscored principles of non-interference and state sovereignty and most specifically heralded the emergence of combined military intervention for curbing all forms of excesses accruing from interstate relations. Regardless of the League's unsuccessful outing most of its institutional structures became foundations for its successor years later.

Dating as far back as the 1920s and 1930s, traces of what would eventually map out the path for today's conceptions of peacekeeping had emerged. Plebiscites conducted in a number of territories around Europe to determine future borders had triggered new security challenges. As such, military interposition to monitor activities and ensures stability had gone underway. A number of such activities had been conducted under the supervision of the League of Nations. In the Saar territory for example an international force was interposed to monitor the plebiscite and maintain the peace. The Saar mission eventually comprising 3,300 military forces became the League largest ever-peacekeeping venture.¹⁴⁷ Peacekeeping emerged a significant tool of conflict management, its utility turned even more imperative, on account of the effectiveness it displayed at preserving the peace and stability of the international system. As I probe further the reader is illuminated on how peacekeeping was employed in the dampening of tensions erupting across the globe, at the end of the Second World War and especially in Africa in the aftermath of the cold war.

¹⁴⁷ Norrie MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System*. (Abingdon: Routledge,2006)

By the 50s the UN had completely assumed responsibility over the world's security concerns. The organisation was the most recognised under which peacekeeping may be conducted. It also manifested its central objective as stated in Article one of its Charter to "maintain international peace and security" through "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of all threats to peace". The 1956 deployment of the United Nation Emergency Force in Egypt's Suez was its very first attempt at peacekeeping. Some scholars nonetheless, cite two prior observer missions in both Palestine and Kashmir, conducted under the UN in the late 40s as the organisation's premier attempt at curbing international aggression. The Suez mission nonetheless was known to be its first experience at troop deployment and may have further informed the development of other principles guiding peacekeeping activities in the years that followed.

3.3.3 Peacekeeping

Over the years scholars began to assemble together some of the activities of collective security, traditional peacekeeping and peace support operation. The underlying objective was tailored towards the formulation of a nutshell conception of peacekeeping at first glance. Although collective security is quite different from both peacekeeping and peace operations, they tend to exhibit one uniting factor which is; military intervention. Collective security may therefore be viewed as a precursor to the other two methods of conflict management. To provide a concise and clear comprehension of what peacekeeping entails, I shall proceed to examine selected definitions of the activity of peace keeping. I identify some of its defining features and probe into core underlying principles. It is imperative to discuss the underpinning tenets of peacekeeping, especially because they have determined the mode of operation in past peacekeeping mission of the UN. These principles have also dictated the operational line of action exhibited in the course of armed intervention organized by African regional bodies from the late 1980s and into the early 1990s. The continued relevance of these principles in twenty first century peacekeeping activities cannot be undermined. Military intervention in the form of peacekeeping basically remains an activity of conflict management linked to the Westphalia construct of states

3.3.4 Defining peacekeeping

Adebayo defines peacekeeping as

“one mission that brings peace and stability to a particular case by implementing the key tasks of its mandate (e.g., ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation; elections) even if these are not fully completed before the mission concludes”.¹⁴⁸

Examining this definition, the reader becomes cognizant of the fact that a peacekeeping mission operates mostly in conformity with framework of its mandate. Similarly, one is familiarized with some of the functions of a peacekeeping mission. The functions captured in the definition have been identified as extended function of peacekeeping since the early 90s. However, the definition propels us to question the extent to which peacekeeping may claim, based on its history, to be an instrument which has successfully brought about peace and stability to conflict zones where it has been applied. If peacekeeping is tantamount to the provision of peace and stability to a particular case, then to what extent will it be correct to refer to both Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf and the International Security Assistance Force deployed to Afghanistan as peacekeeping in the pursuit of peace and stability.

The mode of operation associated with these deployments both defied the notion of peacekeeping as an instrument tailored towards peace and security. It exposes the ambiguity of the concept and questions the accuracy in pronouncing peacekeeping as a non-coercive instrument of conflict management. Yet in the real sense of it, peacekeeping in its traditional form as depicted by its guiding principles: the minimum use of force, presents this approach as a non-coercive one. The “peace” phenomenon under the circumstance remains questionable, as scholars have identified it as negative, especially when administered in its traditional form.

Similarly, Diehl has defined peacekeeping as:

“The imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are

¹⁴⁸ Adebayo Adekeye, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts. (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011) 7

deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved”¹⁴⁹.

Diehl’s definition introduces some of the underlying principles of peacekeeping. First, Peacekeepers are under the obligation to maintain a neutral stance in the conflict to which they are deployed. Simply put, side taking undermines the initial credibility bestowed on the contingent at the time of consent. Secondly peacekeepers are required to be lightly armed. Since their duty, as traditional peacekeeping dictates, is to monitor or implement a ceasefire agreement after hostilities have ceased. An interposition between adversaries, of heavily armed peacekeepers would tend to portray a peace mission in converse light. As such forces remain lightly armed. Diehl’s definition further suggests that an interposition is based on the consent of the state. The state as it were, may decide to adhere strictly to its rights of non-interference and state sovereignty. To this we again question, at what point the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) clause comes to play in the event of a state’s complete failure to guaranty security to its citizens in the face of violence. Is it politically correct to give way to the principles of peacekeeping, so that they supersede the urgency for intervention under instances of grave humanitarian emergencies?

Bellamy and Williams tend to project what seems to be the right answer to that question, they assert that the

“post-Westphalian understanding of international security recognizes the sovereignty of a state only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens” the most significant of these obligations being the *“protection of civilians against arbitrary killing”¹⁵⁰*

The Post-Westphalian order however remains an issue of debate as much as peacekeeping missions have largely remained driven by the tenets of the Westphalian state formation. The concluding line of definition under analysis, presents peacekeeping as a tool, which makes way for other forms of third-party strategies. We may infer, that peacekeeping cannot and does not resolve conflict, but controls it to the extent that durable solutions are achieved using other mechanisms.

¹⁴⁹ Paul F Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*. (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1994) 13 cited in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) 174

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 40

This last definition culled from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, defines peacekeeping as:

“A technique designed to preserve peace. However fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars to incorporate a complex model of many elements-military, police and civilian working together to help lay the foundation of sustainable peace”¹⁵¹

From this definition, it may be extrapolated that: An evolution has occurred. This evolution ostensibly demonstrates the transitioning from a traditional form (that initially engaged mainly the services of the military) to the current activity of peacekeeping, involving other forces like the police. Similarly, other duties have been introduced to attract civilian competence. As already observed in Diehl’s definition, and further corroborated by this definition, peacekeeping in its traditional form was not created to delve into the resolution of the conflict for which it is interposed. As rightly observed by Bercovitch, peacekeeping remains “an adjunct process to the diplomatic efforts-negotiation, mediation...”¹⁵² Finally “it is a technique designed to preserve peace, however fragile...” we decipher, therefore, that peacekeeping is a technique which strives towards that peace which does not address underlying structures perpetuating the conflict, but seeks the negative peace (cessation of violent attacks) to pave way for positive peace. It implies thus: if the peacemakers are unable to achieve a favourable compromise or if underlying structures remain conflict prone and root causes are left unaddressed, peace achieved is fragile and the likelihood of a re-eruption of conflict may not be farfetched.

The definitions highlighted above have allowed for an initial glimpse into what peacekeeping operations especially in its traditional form, may constitute. Diehl’s definition especially, encapsulates three important principles associated with traditional peacekeeping. Although the evolution of peacekeeping unto the third and fourth generations tend to have challenged some

¹⁵¹ Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. (New York: United Nations) P.18

¹⁵² Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), .75

of these guiding tenets, they have remained at the base of any attempt at keeping the peace in zones of conflict, even in contemporary times.

3.3.5 21st century peacekeeping

In its traditional form and as a tool of interstate rivalry, peacekeeping activities when placed side by side its role in the 21st century, seemed to include a narrow range of responsibilities: Overseeing a cease fire, acting as an interposition force and supervising the demarcation of the international border between two states.¹⁵³ Since 1989, peace operations have included extended functions such as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, maintenance of law and order, election monitoring, human rights protection and the repatriation of refugees and, conflict resolution and reconciliation, to mention a few. Although peacekeeping has for decades remained the sole prerogative of the UN, traces of peacekeeping conducted independent of the UN have been evident since the 70s. Organizations other than the UN carried out similar functions of traditional peacekeeping often with the authorization, and sometimes under the supervision of the parent body.

Between 1979 and 1980, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) was deployed to oversee the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe and between 1987 and 1990, an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) was tasked with the responsibility of implementing the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on Sri Lankan soil.¹⁵⁴ Peacekeeping operations have also been conducted as joint efforts between the UN and other regional security apparatuses such as the AU. An ongoing example would be the presence of both AU and UN personnel under the UNAMID mandate (UN-AU joint mission in Darfur.) Similarly, sub-regional organizations like the ECOWAS have made positive incursions into war zones of the West African region. That mission operated outside of UN tutelage. Interventions on this level have been motivated by the occurrence of gross humanitarian emergencies and the exigency to suppress violent aggression. Most probably, an amateur regional alertness to forestall the replication of the Rwandan experience. Regardless of what motivations linger behind each regional or sub-regional action, there is a palpable re-awakening to heed the call for human security according to the order and nature of the 21st century kind of conflicts.

¹⁵³ Ibid 79

¹⁵⁴ Heldt, Birger and Peter Wallensteen, *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2004*. Research Report no.2. (Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy) cited in Butler, 96

3.3.6 Peace Support Operations in Africa: A brief overview of the UN experience...

This section provides succinct investigation into four conflicts in Africa's sub-Saharan region: Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia. Some significance has been attached to these UN interventions for the manner in which they influenced the modus operandi of what came to be referred to peace support operations. The term "peace support operations"¹⁵⁵ has been adopted to showcase the activity of peacekeeping in Africa but also to demonstrate the gradual transition from traditional peacekeeping to the period after the cold war when the activity of peacebuilding became more pronounced on the African continent.

3.3.6.1 The Congo Mission

A sub-Saharan African experience of peacekeeping commenced in the early 60s. That peace mission was intended to douse political tensions (on an inter-state capacity) originating from within the frontiers of the newly independent Democratic Republic of Congo. The fledgling state had become enmeshed in conflict with its erstwhile Belgian colonizers and on that basis sought the assistance of the UN. Unprepared for the trajectory of conflict that would be evoked as a result, the UN soon headed the call to respond to the growing insecurity on Congolese soil. Unfortunately, the organization became confronted with the exigency to interfere in the internal politics of the state. This unprecedented line of action precipitated the UN's entanglement in the web of cold war politics and imprinted on the organization one of its grimmest experiences in military intervention since its inception.

The complexities surrounding the conflict on ground, left the ONUC (United Nations Operation in the Congo) mission entrapped in the conflict, while compelling the UN to embrace intervention on a level that negated the underlying peacekeeping principles it had hitherto been acquainted, as well as associated with and over years committed to uphold. As such an interstate mission as it seemed metamorphosed into an activity of intra-state bearing.¹⁵⁶ The Congo mission vigorously challenged the phase in international politics, where traditional peacekeeping had effectively curbed interstate rivalry on the international conflict terrain.

¹⁵⁵ Peace Support Operations (PSO) is a military term used to denote multi-functional and multinational operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate involving diplomatic efforts, humanitarian organization/agencies and military forces. They are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. They include conflict prevention, peace-making, peace building, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. See, Headquarters Multinational Peace Force. South-Eastern Europe Brigade, *Peace Support Operations Handbook* (South-Eastern Europe Brigade, 2000)

¹⁵⁶ See, Norrie MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960* (London: Routledge, 2014),

Reflecting on that UN mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it might be correct to assume that the arduous task of quelling the conflagration as well as the bitter experience it engendered, leveraged the organization's almost three-decade recess from peacekeeping activities on the African continent. A recouped UN nonetheless re-emerged in the post-cold war order, fortified with a redefined approach towards tackling the kinds of conflicts that were to prevail on the continent following the termination of the war on ideologies. As a number of conflicts soon began rearing their ugly heads, it was time for the organization to showcase its refurbished self. In Namibia, Angola and the Mozambique the growing instability soon attracted the organization's renewed interest for peace intervention in Africa, one that unveiled a reworked framework for intervention in conflicts characterized by acts of insurgency, intransigence and longevity.

3.3.6.2 The Namibian experience

The deployment of UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group) for example, mandated to monitor elections in Namibia and accomplish the liberation of the future independent Namibian state from South Africa's over seven decades firm grip, became the UN's first multidimensional task. A redefinition of the UN's underlying assumptions tended to match emerging realities, especially as the Security Council authorized intervention on a level that superseded traditional peacekeeping. It also licensed peacekeepers and civilians alike, to engage in activities that had never been associated with tradition peace keeping. That is to say, that it became legal going by the new order, for the mission to be involved in supervising the demobilization and disarmament of the belligerents and also to engage in the repatriation of refugees and in monitoring elections that were tailored towards the political freedom of Namibia.¹⁵⁷

UNTAG became a successful venture. Nonetheless, that mission in hindsight, happened to be "a welcome on board" experience for the organization in the era of post-cold was politics. Unknown to it, grave and unfamiliar challenges, were in the offing, as the Angolan conflict began to gradually emerge. In some way, the Angolan conflict as it unfolded, proved to the international peace actor that the panacea for intervention in African internal conflicts remained

¹⁵⁷ Adekeye Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts* (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 110

a work in progress. It demonstrated that no two conflicts are akin to each other and that the framework for a successful outing in Namibia would become inapplicable in Angola's own version of internal strife. Ultimately it exposed the exigency for the in-depth and meticulous analysis of the kinds of conflict occurring on the continent and provoked the quest for the most viable and efficient intervention tools and strategy in conflicts now began to exhibit dissimilar dynamics.

The Angolan crises erupted fully around the same post-cold war era. Dos Santos's MPLA and Savimbi's UNITA had become embroiled in what ostensibly manifested as a ferocious struggle for political supremacy.¹⁵⁸ An earlier UN contingent specifically concentrated on the ejection of Cuban troops from the Angolan soil. This initial deployment assumed the responsibility of peacekeeping in its vey pristine form. UNAVEM I (United Nations Angola Verification Mission) as this initial deployment was dubbed, came into existence on the basis of peace settlements, which aimed at stripping both warring parties of their respective international alliances. UNAVEM I successfully accomplished its task. According to MacQueen:

“UNAMVEM succeeded because the basic elements of ‘host-state consent and prior commitment by the parties to the maintenance of peace they had already established were fully present”

Subsequent UN mandates: UNAVEM II and III deriving ratification for intervention from both the Bicesse Accord and the Lusaka Protocol came into existence on Angolan territory. Both deployments ultimately targeted the reinstatement of order and stability adopting almost the same blueprint for envisaged success from the Namibian experience. UNAVEM II was authorized to monitor the elections and accomplish the demobilization of MPLA fighters as well as Savimbi's armed group. Unfortunately, the mission's under resourced nature, served to expose its efforts to tough insurmountable challenges. UNAVEM II gave way to UNAVEM III. The numerically upgraded contingent attempted to match the realities on ground. That mission sadly concluded without accomplishing the agenda to restore sustainable peace in Angola. The intractability of the conflict was to precipitate a fourth deployment: The UN Observer mission in Angola (MONUA). The mission's outing proved ineffective in halting the conflict, leaving the UN with no option than to exit the conflict terrain admits continued fighting between the belligerent groups. It seemed that the UN had exhausted its tools; so that the organisation could not be linked to the conflict, which eventually terminated in 2002. It was

¹⁵⁸ See, Adekeye Adebajo, 115-124 for detailed insight into the conflict.

certain, nonetheless that the organization had gleaned a lesson from that mission, as it proceeded to curb another threat to international peace, emerging from the warring parties in the Mozambique.

3.3.6.3 The UN in Mozambique

The experience in Mozambique could be regarded as the cooling effect for the complex conflict dynamics that posed as an impediment to accomplishing the envisaged task in the Angolan conflict. Like the UNITA in Angola, the RENAMO (REsistencia NAcional de MOZambique rebel group struggled to unseat the incumbent FRELIMO government, which it considered illegitimate to the vision of the independent state of Mozambique. Ostensibly, the initial effort to intervene in the conflict on the platform of unofficial mediation, (See chapter 3) proved effective in transforming the conflict to the level where the deployment of a peace support mission sufficed. That peaceful settlement allowed for the effective conduct of elections, the disarmament of armed groups and the transition to peace, which also remained sustained long after the deployed peace mission: ONUMOZ (Operagao das Nagoes Unidas em Mogambique, in English: United Nations Operation in Mozambique) exited in 1994.

3.3.6.4

The Mission to Somalia

A fourth conflict presented the organization with yet another hard nut to crack. The Somalian conflict¹⁵⁹ had gained momentum around early 1991 leaving its political terrain devoid of any form of central configuration. When the UN arrived, its mission to the millions of Somalis at the war's mercy, was purely humanitarian. Contingent on a ceasefire agreement, UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia) was authorized to monitor the truce, but most significantly to effectuate the smooth passage of relief on grounds marred by intensified gun battle between clan war lords: Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah. The escalating conflict unfortunately overwhelmed the capacity of the mission's 500 men observer group, as both

¹⁵⁹ See, Augustine C Ohanwe, *Post-Cold War Conflicts in Africa: Case Studies of Liberia and Somalia* (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2009), 135-194.

belligerents continued to hijack relief material for economic aggrandizement.¹⁶⁰ Once again the UN's deployment failed to match with the realities on ground. This in any case necessitated the deployment of a larger contingent with the anticipated objective to tackle the war's complexities as well as bolster UNOSOM I's dwindling impact on the conflict.

It was amid the rapidly unfolding on-ground complications that the United States intervened with the force it tagged: Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF (United Task Force) arrived with fortified manpower albeit with strict orders that confined its operation to the distribution of aid within a limited period of time, and an obscure mandate that seemed to have shunned the exigency to disarm warring parties.¹⁶¹ Regardless of the restraining nature of the mandate that underlay the operation, a good measure of success was initially recorded to the glory of UNITAF. Adekeye noted that:

*“The mission started well enough with the presence of peacekeepers ensuring the delivery of food, reducing looting and banditry, rebuilding roads and bridges and facilitating the repatriation of Somali refugees from neighbouring countries”*¹⁶²

Identifying the non-disarmament agenda nonetheless, as one of the mission's lapses, Norrie MacQueen observed similarly, that:

“While the initial ‘shock’ of UNITAF's deployment had...beneficial effects, there was an inevitable erosion of its impact...” “This gained pace” as the author, mentions further “when it became clear that, however provoked the intervention force would not undertake the disarmament of the various warlords' militias”¹⁶³

The continued disinclination on the part of the authorizers of UNITAF, to take weapons out of the hands of the perpetrators of the heinous acts, tended to furnish the intransigent warring parties with the unabated impetus to advance with the perpetuation of brutal aggression. Heightened tensions and ostensibly the lack of any foreseeable improvements to deteriorating security conditions, was to subsequently occasion the transition back to peacekeeping operation under UN tutelage. UNOSOM II afterwards, was upgraded with the mandate for disarmament and fortified with chapter VII of the UN charter, authorizing the use of “all necessary measures

¹⁶⁰ Norrie MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960* (London: Routledge, 2014), 206-210. Adekeye Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts* (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 174-176.

¹⁶¹ MacQueen, “United Nation's Peace keeping in Africa 219.

¹⁶² MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, 210.

¹⁶³ Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping*, 174

against those responsible for the attacks... including those responsible for publicly inciting attacks” ...¹⁶⁴.

Despite UNOSOM II's level of reinforcement, the protagonists on ground (with specific reference to the Aideed camp) continued to hamper the delivery of aid, attack peacekeepers as well as thwart the disarmament process. The aggression on peacekeepers ostensibly reached its crescendo with the attack on and killing of eighteen Americans whose leaders in Washington now began to develop cold feet over the mission to bring peace to Somalia. The gruesome incident ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of the American contingent and precipitated the exit as well of other western contingents. On the flip side, Somalis also began to lose confidence in the mission, as civilians now became casualties in the hands of the ones assigned to protect them.¹⁶⁵ Finally, UNOSOM II followed suit and took a bow without any trace of positive peace, to say the least a termination of the violent aggression, which had attracted international intervention in the first place.

Once again and in the similitude of the experience in the Congo, the Somalian ordeal seemed to have taken its toll on the organization's continued interest in peace intervention on the African continent.¹⁶⁶ This waning interest would be evidenced by the lackadaisical handling and feet-dragging attitude towards the exigency of deploying a formidable interposition force, to quell the aggression that ultimately resulted in the annihilation of millions of Rwandans in 1994.

Concluding reflections

Some undermining factors as noted by Chris Alden¹⁶⁷ have continued to plague the UN's effective intervention in conflicts on the African continent. These have hampered the anticipated impact of the organization's peacekeeping deployment primarily in areas where the nature of the mandate was ostensibly enabled to serve as a multidimensional and/ or humanitarian variant of peacekeeping. Ranging from the lack of sufficient funds to actualize the mandate and inadequate mandates incapable of terminating violence, the African continent, despite the above-delineated experiences in the immediate aftermath of the cold war, has remained a recipient of peace support missions till date. 22 UN missions have been completed

¹⁶⁴ United Nations Document S/RES/837, 5 June 1992, cited in MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa*, 214

¹⁶⁵ See, Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping*, 175

¹⁶⁶ See, MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, 67

¹⁶⁷ See, Chris Alden, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa: Lessons for the OAU and SADC," *ACCORD*, no. 1/97 (n.d.), 1-8, accessed December 20, 2016, www.pdf.usaid.gov.

on the continent while 9 are on-going including the peace support mission under investigation in this study.¹⁶⁸

Notably, the end of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, presented the world of conflict intervention with a gradually unfolding trend to share the responsibility of peace support operations between regional and sub-regional organization. While is its still in it embryonic stages, this innovative approach to security on the continent is definitely beginning to gain momentum, a motivation that may have derived from ECOMOG successful intervention in the Liberian conflict of the 1990s. In like manner, such emerging gravitation towards burden sharing may have informed the current hybrid mission to the conflict in Darfur. While echoes of the mission's inability to secure civilian lives continue to filter in, it is indeed premature to characterize UNAMID's presence in Darfur as an outright success or failure.

3.4 Mediation in Internal Conflicts

3.4.1 A brief historical journey...

It is crucial to consider this next apparatus of conflict management, especially for its fundamental role in seeking settlements between or among warring parties in contemporary internal and protracted conflicts. Mediation according to Bercovitch et al enjoys a long history dating back in time to (2000 BC.) A myriad of countries in Asia as well as Africa relied on mediation as the preferable way out of most of its conflict.¹⁶⁹ Such reliance on mediation was based on the argument that only compromises achieved on the basis of free volition, understanding and the agreement of parties in conflict may well possesses the capacity to pave the way for durable and sustained peace.

Butler provides historical insights into the relevance of Mediation among “Greek City States” whose predilection for mediation outweighed the option for military hostilities.¹⁷⁰ Likewise, Mediation secured some measure of importance during the renaissance as well as during the tumultuous times encountered in many parts of Europe. Crocker et al suggest that mediation has been on high demand since 1945. This may have been an upshot from the apparent changes in conflict trends on the international scene, occurring under the auspices of the United Nations and consistent with the dictates of Article 33(1) of its charter, in which mediation is

¹⁶⁸ See, past and current peace keeping operations. www.un.org

¹⁶⁹ Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffery Z. Rubin, *Mediation in International Relations* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992) 1

¹⁷⁰ Michael J Butler, *International Conflict Management* (London: Routledge, 2009), 122

recommended as one of the strategies to be given utmost priority in the settlement of disputes among members.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, mediation was considered applicable in instances of disputes among the Superpowers during the cold war as prompted by ideological cleavages.

Within the context of modern international conflicts, mediation has similarly become relevant in abating and containing conflict in deeply polarized societies. The complex nature of contemporary conflicts, characterized by longevity, squabbles over identity and intractability seem to promote an inclination to mediation as a non-violent third-party approach to the settlement of conflict. Such new developments as determined by “the new order”, further contributed to the use of mediation outside the confines of the UN. As such, mediation became prominent under the tutelage of regional, sub regional state and non-state actors.

Having entertained a brief historical journey into the significance of mediation as a tool for addressing conflicts, a definition, which outlines or portrays its defining features would suffice.

3.4.2 Defining Mediation

Oran Young defines mediation as

“Any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of bargaining relationship, and therefore to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself”¹⁷²

Young’s description presents the scenario of a conciliator. His status is ostensibly detached from those of the parties to the conflict. This third actor does not share the adversarial status of the other two actors. His definition elucidates the efforts by an intermediary to facilitate a complete termination of conflict.

In another definition by Moore, he delineates mediation as:

“The intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral party who has authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute.”¹⁷³

Some of the defining qualities of a mediator become explicit in Moor’s definition: acceptability, impartiality and neutrality. His definition suggests acceptability on the part of

¹⁷¹ Crocker et al “Is More Better? The Pros and Cons of Multiparty Mediation” in Crocker et al, ed. *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington: USIP, 2001) 497-513

¹⁷² Oran Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1967) 34

¹⁷³ Christopher Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986) 14

the parties in conflict. I.e. adversaries have the right to decide on a mediator with whom they are content, in addition, a right to one who enjoys the confidence of both parties. Neutrality and impartiality demand a high level of objectivity and the ability to circumvent the taking of sides during negotiating session.

Bercovitch provides a more expansive summary of what he refers to as mediation. He holds that mediation:

“Is a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behaviour, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.”¹⁷⁴

His definition reveals that efforts at altering the negative image created as a result of conflict, may supersede the intention to terminate the conflict, or may simply be a means to an end. Bercovitch’s assertion is akin to one of the central themes embedded in the conflict transformation paradigm, which will be discussed subsequently. The model captures the unforeseeable change in a conflict situation without psychologically recasting the conflictants. A second dimension from his definition, points to mediation as a non-coercive form of conflict intervention.

Outside the ambit of the UN, diverse actors may be seen to undertake mediation. The players may range from private persons and government representatives to regional intergovernmental representatives emerging for organizations like the EU, AU, OAS or sub-regional like the ECOWAS. Interest tends to play a major role in mediation. With respect to individual governments, the fervour for mediation may either be borne out of an undeviating quest to accomplish foreign policy objectives or driven by the motive of maintaining stability within or outside of its geographical boundary. Libya’s for example, maintained consistent mediatory efforts in conflicts of the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998-1999, the Eritrea- Ethiopia crisis from between 1998 and 2000 and the on-going Dafurian conflict since 2003.¹⁷⁵ .

¹⁷⁴ Jacob Bercovitch et al, *Mediation in International Relations* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992) 8

¹⁷⁵ Butler, “International Conflict Management”, 132

Touval points to the US as ranking highest on mediatory intervention dating back from 1945.¹⁷⁶ While mediatory proceedings by individual persons are graced with the desire to satisfy personal interests, the objectives, of non-state actors: civil society groups or other groups operating on the basis of track two diplomacy, may be founded on much more favourable intentions for peace and stability within the conflict. Mediation becomes central to international conflicts under instances of prolonged aggression embroiled in multifarious dimensions, under circumstances of the disputants' incapability of a self-engineered compromise, i.e. parties have reached a deadlock, where the negative impact of the conflict has attained unbearable points for either sides and under conditions of a displayed readiness to view the conflict from other perspectives and consequently find solutions to them. Zartman buttresses these points in a concept of "ripeness". He states that accurate timing is crucial to the success of third-party mediation in any conflict. Such accuracy in timing is measured by the evidence of "a mutually hurting stalemate." According to Butler, this is

*"a point in which neither sides perceive it can win; the conflict appears to both sides as if it will stretch out indefinitely into the future, with no possibility of escape and no hope of victory"*¹⁷⁷

3.4.3 Strategies in formal mediation

Mediation may be approached in various ways. It involves traversing multiple conflict areas for an opportunity to meet with each side of the parties in conflict and to act as go between. It includes facilitating initial efforts to re-establish broken down communication. *Shuttle Mediation* for example is conceived as the prerogative of top-ranking government officials, albeit derived from diverse levels of the civil society groups such as practitioners, prominent men and women of the clergy, relief organizations e.tc, whose initiatives may be to the detriment or to the advantage of the entire process. One example of such back and forth movements in line with obligations accrued from mediation, may be derived from the India and Pakistan dispute which saw former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and others deeply engaged in Shuttle Mediation. In similar vein, the power aligned to such notable men

¹⁷⁶ Saadia Touval and I William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory", in *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* ed. Saadia Touval and I William Zartman, (Boulder CO: West View Press, 1985) 7-17

¹⁷⁷ I William Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond", in *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman eds. (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 2000) cited in Butler, "International Conflict Management", 135

and woman who involve in mediation becomes relevant at certain stages of mediation: where it is apparent that the obduracy of either party may thwart mediation efforts. Mediators endeavour to coax such parties into some measure of flexibility.¹⁷⁸

Mediation in conflict may be conducted by series of actors in succession of one another or at coinciding periods. This was the case when a plethora of nations: South Africa, Kenya and Canada in conjunction with the UN and the then OAU sought to douse the effects of the civil unrest in Zaire, by bombarding an already splintered conflict terrain with chains of seemingly unattainable targets using mediation. In addition, the strategy employed by each mediator is seen as pivotal to the conflict. Touval and Zartmann have captioned such approaches as “communication-facilitation; formulation and manipulation”, all of which tend to influence or alter the entire conflict. One significant element entrenched in the communication and facilitation procedure, has been identified as the implicit capacity to make room for conflictants interests to be aired and deliberated upon, while laying the foundation on which seeds of trust may be sown. Such activities tend to engender an unperturbed atmosphere during the entire process.¹⁷⁹

3.4.4 Formal mediation in African conflicts

Whether administered by international or regional actors, formal mediation has consistently found relevance in a myriad of conflict on the African soil. Nonetheless, how effective have the attempts at a mediated settlement elicited durable peace in African conflicts characterized by protraction and intractability. Authors like Bercovitch have recorded a number of international third-party attempts at settling a notable number of African conflicts facilitated on the leverage of a track I inspired mediation. Ostensibly, official mediation either led to a truce connoting fragile peace or attained mere settlements. In 1992 fresh conflict resurged in Angola undermining the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord. The conflict persisted and only ceased with the demise of Jonas Savimbi the then UNITA Chief. The US and the UN also conducted frequent mediation sessions between 1993 and 1994 to reinstate peace for the people of Somalia. Bercovitch notes that this attempt at peace “collapsed in ignominy”¹⁸⁰. In like manner, the 1993 Arusha Accord documented a colossal failure owing to its incompetency in averting the

¹⁷⁸ Butler, “International Conflict Management”, 137

¹⁷⁹ See, Saadia Touval and I William Zartman, “*Introduction: Mediation in Theory*”. in *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* ed. Saadia Touval and I William Zartman, (Boulder CO: West View Press, 1985)

¹⁸⁰ Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods and Approaches* (USA: The University of Michigan Press, 2009) 139

extermination of millions of Rwandans in its early 1990s crises. Between 1993 and 1995, three detached agreements had been signed, in Cotonou and the two others in Abuja, (I and II). The initial two were considered absolute failures, while the third was noted to have resulted in fragile peace.

Mitchell in like manner observed that mediated settlements organized according to international relations theorizing hardly engenders a final end to conflict and as such cannot be termed “genuine resolution”. Under such circumstances, underlying causes have remained unaddressed and relationships remain antagonistic. Conflicts defined either by a cessation of hostilities or mere settlements have in most cases documented resumed aggressions. Mitchell perceives such conflicts as “*arrangements, which involve a compromise and abandonment of goals*” in which parties remain somewhat unsatisfied.¹⁸¹ He asserts further that in such circumstances adversaries operate under the assumption that a *settlement* will, to an extent produce better relationships among parties. Nonetheless such hopes turn out dashed in the final analysis.

The mediated settlement geared towards the termination of the 1972 Sudanese conflict that subsequently resumed, corroborates instances of resurgence after settlement. Despite numerous failed attempts at resolving African conflicts contingent on formal mediation, this mechanism of conflict management has found significance with international peace actors in Sudan, whose resolve it has been to achieve stable peace for the people of Darfur. This has been the case for a decade and counting.

3.5 Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement is understood to be a modern technique of conflict management. It is employed in contemporary intra-state conflict with the major purpose of dousing the debilitating effects of violent armed conflicts. Peace enforcement is designed to forcefully achieve the cessation of aggression and for the central purpose of ensuring the safety of the populace directly affected by a conflict. Prior to the 21st century, the conduct of peace-enforcement was premised on defining features that formed the bedrock for accomplishing the elimination of escalated violent conflicts. The forceful imposition of peace aided by heavy but authorized arms was conceived on the premise of the restrictive guiding principles underlying

¹⁸¹ Christopher Mitchell, “*Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions About Basic Human Needs Theory*” in *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* John Burton ed, (Great Britain: The Macmillan Press, 1990) 151

the peacekeeping theory. Where a nation fails to secure the lives of innocent citizens at the mercy of an ongoing war, the international community may rely on peace enforcement as a means to reinstate order and safe lives. This assertion draws specifically from the 2005 World Summit where the state's overriding responsibility to protect its own citizens against all forms of atrocious crimes was solidly underscored. In a firm statement, World leaders confirmed their stance in this manner:

*“The international community has a responsibility to act when governments neglect to protect the most vulnerable members of state”*¹⁸²

Peace Enforcement conceptually overrides the precondition of seeking the consent of parties in conflict, legitimizing a high level of combat readiness for troops operating under such mandate. Peace-enforcement becomes relevant in violent conflicts to impose security in conflict terrains exhibiting obvious threat to human life. Combatants operating within the defining lines of an imposed operation are duly equipped with arms for the purpose of protecting weak citizens of war, as well as in self-defence.

Similarly, the legitimacy associated with peace-enforcement intervention have been clearly defined under Article 42 of the UN Charter and further accentuated in Boutros's Ghali's “Agenda for Peace”.

“The Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security”.

It basically alludes to a Plan B action under circumstance of failed peacekeeping attempts. Articles 43 and 44 of that manuscript explicitly delineate some of the defining features of “peace-enforcement”. It suggests that troops:

“Would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and

¹⁸² This commitment was strengthened when the UNSC unanimously endorsed Resolution 1674 in 2006, which reaffirmed the responsibility to protect doctrine (see the responsibility to protect: report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001 cited in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: The potential contribution of a UN Emergency Peace Service, Annie Herro, Wendy Lambourne and David Penklis. African Security Review 18.1. Institute for Security Studies. Sydney

See, Robert I Rotberg, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000)

would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General.”¹⁸³

Under the peacekeeping framework, combatants became susceptible to violent attacks perpetrated by hostile and intransigent belligerents. On the basis of this, it became pivotal if the tenet of its mandate were to be accomplished, to prioritize the security of contingents and to view such as being tantamount to the enhancement of its capacity to terminate the depredation and atrocious crimes perpetrated on fragile victims of war. Butler posits that the Agenda for Peace may have clearly diagnosed some of the blatant deficiencies within the framework of UN Peace Operations; nonetheless, it failed to adduce effective solutions to them.¹⁸⁴ Two of some of the major hindrances that militated against its effectiveness in eliminating violent aggression within a peace enforcement framework, was the shortage of resources and the lack of political will. Such incapacity became most evident in the early 1990s. When UN operations such as UNOSOM (1991) (United Nations Protection Force) UNPROFOR (Feb 21 1992) and (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) UNAMIR (October 1993), commissioned to address extreme hostility in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda respectively, recorded humongous failures, it became explicit that the concept of enforcing peace needed proper definition. Following from the infamous occurrences marked by UN incapacity to deliver, it was time again to re-conceptualize the idea of imposing peace.

During the year 2000 “UN Millennium Summit” the Brahimi report noted that peace operations was an integral function of the UN and as such had become a “the yardstick with which the Organization is judged”.¹⁸⁵ It stated in effect that those challenges, which contravened the organization’s proper, timely and effective intervention, needed urgent attention. On this note it called on members to embrace the challenge with the vigour to surmount the obstacles in a manner that can engender prompt solutions especially under the conditions where they serve to be decisive. It further redefined some of its guiding principles to the degree that prioritizing the safety of victims of war above an adherence to its norms became imperative.

When in 1989 the guiding principles of peace keeping failed to terminate the violent eruption of the Liberian war, the (The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group)

¹⁸³ Butler, “International Conflict Management”, 166

¹⁸⁴ *ibid*

¹⁸⁵ *ibid*, 171

ECOMOG with the firm objective to avert the occurrence of the Rwandan genocide, launched what it called “a limited offensive”.¹⁸⁶ Though this intervention was void of a clearly defined mandate, and became undermined by a display of nonchalance on the part of francophone Africa, coupled with the lack of sufficient funds, this counter attack on aggression, which transited from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement became capable in the final analysis of eliminating the atrocious acts meted out on the victims of that war. It also signified an evident ripeness for regional organization to take on the responsibility of conflict intervention in the face of an ostensible dwindling involvement on the part of its international boss. Following from this, it becomes evident that not all peace-enforcements missions of recent times fall under UN operation; nevertheless, missions outside UN tutelage would require UN sanctioning.

Conclusion

Africa has experienced and continues to experience her fair share of the “novel conflicts” known to our modern world. Protraction and intractability have found unending comfort on the African soil. Accordingly, conflict management tools examined in this section, have found profound relevance in their mitigation. Coercive and non-coercive methods alike have become apparatuses for quick solutions to the eruption of conflict on the continent. International and regional bodies have relied on actors and their attendant instruments and methods with the aim of securing a cessation of hostilities as well as mediated settlements. Notwithstanding efforts aligned with the field of conflict management, a palpable vacuum seems evident in renewed escalations that have prevailed on the continent. For this reason, I am propelled to proceed towards a close examination of the efficacy that may be embedded in the next approach to conflict intervention. I ask the question: to what extent have citizen-based approaches successfully addressed protraction and intractability on world conflict terrains.

¹⁸⁶ Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*. (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002) 121

3.6 Conflict Resolution: Theories, assumptions, historical evolution and methods

3.6.1 Introduction

This sub-section intends to capture some of the basic ideas, theories and assumptions known to differentiate *conflict resolution* from the methods of conflict handling consistent with the field of *conflict management*. Most of these assumptions have translated to normative principles known to dictate the field's practice in modern day conflict. I seek to historically trace its growth and development over a period leading up to the 21st century. As well as provide an analysis of the perspectives from which its views of conflict diverge from the traditional or classical international approach already discussed in the preceding section. It considers theories by major theorists, whose works have greatly impacted on the field. Some contributions from founding fathers in the field would be acknowledged. Their scholarly work as well as established institutions forms the basis on which the (Conflict Resolution) CR field finds its scholarly bearing in discourses concerning the nature and characteristics of conflict, the sources of conflict as well as its mitigation. I further provide a clear definition of conflict resolution as a field of enquiry and introduce some of the methods it employs in resolving conflicts. Conflict resolution also termed "track II diplomacy", will be analysed as an international, non-statist, unofficial, citizens-based approach to modern conflicts, backed by interdisciplinary dimensions to conflict understanding and discerned as possessing exceptional, distinctive and pragmatic methods known to the practice of conflict resolution

3.6.2 From Management to Resolution: A new perception of conflict

In seeking to design a novel approach to handling conflict, scholars of the field of CR initially influenced by perspectives from the international relations field but not confined to it, sought to discern the nature and source of conflicts from divergent notions. CR became inspired by the various disciplines from which these initial progenitors emerged. Major concerns tilted towards underscoring a shift in focus from realist inspired traditional understanding of conflicts: wherein conflict was conceptualized on the basis of power politics, was seen to emerge due to incompatible interests of states governed by symmetric relationships and where negotiated interests engendered zero-sum outcomes to conflict expressions triggered on the basis of unmet needs. Such were manifest on interpersonal, intrapersonal, intergroup organizational and societal levels.

Bercovitch observed that the new approach to conflict is founded upon “*the shortcomings of the traditional methods*”¹⁸⁷. Statist apparatuses operating from a framework employed in the mitigation of objective causes, have displayed extensive insufficiency in the multiple complexities associated with modern day conflict. Coercive methods are fastened to achieving negative peace yet the expected message for positive peace undermined by unfulfilled needs, has created the vacuum which conflict resolution from inception intended to fill. It sought to operate from a paradigm that gave competence to a critical examination of the root causes and with the objective of providing the methods for its resolution. Tidwell opines that coercive methods have never stood in the way of hardliners ready to shed blood in the mere pursuit of its needs.¹⁸⁸ Meaning that regardless of the international community’s commitment to coercive action in conflict intervention, humans desperately seeking the fulfilment of their needs would eschew the consequences of violent aggression to pursue a change in the status quo that sponsors the denial of basic needs.

Following from this, conflict management was construed as neither possessing strategies adequate “to address intangible issues,”¹⁸⁹ now originating on the basis of identity, nor did its methods take cognizance of underlying causes of conflict. It failed to provide solutions to deeply entrenched, intractable and protracted conflicts. In the light of this, conflict resolution searches out a path void of traditional thinking to carve out an interdisciplinary perspective towards the understanding of conflict. Governed by a wide conception regarding the human behaviour, the emergence of conflict based on that, will take root from unmet human needs as captured by theorist like Maslow, Sites and Burton, or be viewed as an innate characteristic of human nature as propounded by the likes of Thomas Hobbes and Edmund Burke or expressed on the basis of external interaction as explained by theorist like Karl Marx and John Dollard et al.¹⁹⁰ Conflict may also be determined on the basis of rationality following explanations from game theorists or conceived as either constructive or destructive or spawned by subjective causes and seen as a functional tool for constructive societal change. In a nutshell, conflict resolution theorists observe conflict as having the capacity to erupt from divergent sources, for

¹⁸⁷ See, Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century*. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2009)

¹⁸⁸ Alan C. Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*. (London: Pinter, 1998)

¹⁸⁹ See, Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century*. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2009)

¹⁹⁰ Alan C. Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*. (London: Pinter, 1998)

a multiplicity of causes and occurring on the micro as well as the macro levels within social formations.

3.6.3 Defining Conflict Resolution

To provide an all-encompassing and suitable definition of what conflict resolution entails, I draw inspiration from a number of scholars whose extensive intellectual work is capable of presenting some clarity to theories, techniques and practices consistent with the field.

Against the backdrop of delineating some of the basic features of conflict management, those as earlier mentioned: limitation, management and containment, Miall projects some of the principles guiding conflict resolution thinking, as culled from the work of Azar and Burton (1986).

*“Conflict resolution theorists, in contrast, (to International Relations thinking) reject the power political view of conflict, arguing instead that in communal and identity conflicts, **people cannot compromise on their fundamental needs**. They argue that it is possible to **transcend conflicts** if parties can be helped to explore, analyse, question and reframe their positions and interests. Conflict resolution therefore emphasizes intervention by **skilled but powerless third-parties** working unofficially with the parties to foster new thinking and new relationships. **They seek to explore what the roots of the conflict really is and to identify creative solutions** that the parties may have missed in their commitment to entrenched positions. Conflict resolution is about how parties can **move from zero-sum, destructive patterns of conflict to positive-sum constructive outcomes**. The aim is to develop „Processes of conflict resolution that appear to be acceptable to parties in dispute, and effective in resolving conflict”¹⁹¹*

In analysing the above definition, we are confronted with a striking contrast between the two fields of enquiry. I elaborate on some of the highlighted elements. The scope of observation here is confined to communal conflicts and conflicts which are triggered by the desire to actualize the needs of identity. Such needs though not elaborated upon, may be identified as ethnic, religious or resource based. Needs bordering on identity is viewed as crucial and non-negotiable. Parties in a bid to find ways of addressing unmet needs sometimes display aggressive behaviour. When unchecked such aggression may progress to violence eruptions

¹⁹¹ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999),3

and most times to a full-blown war. Conflict resolution in contrast to traditional statist diplomacy, confronts such conflicts, with optimism: believing in the ability of parties to rise above the matters at stake. Under the circumstance, unofficial practitioners assist adversaries to the level of realizing that continued aggression may not presuppose a win –lose, or a lose win outcome rather chances of a loose-loose outcome were higher if parties shunned co-operative avenues for resolution.¹⁹²

Unofficial diplomacy operates under the assumption that cooperative strategies promise a higher probability of attaining a positive sum payoff. Sequel to such assumptions, they seek to unearth the underlying root causes, which for them is a prerequisite for a deep running resolution. In addition, suggested methods become applicable towards the realization of the goal for durable peace. Some of such methods as Burton’s controlled communication also known as problem –solving workshops suffice as opportunity for the airing of grievances under less tensed unofficial atmospheres. I would expatiate on such methods subsequently. If parties in conflict find some form of assistance, it engenders a re-examination of parties’ perspectives of the conflict and pushes for a possible shift from tightly held standpoints, those which abet the conflict. Furthermore, an alteration of false perceptions is likely to emerge to the extent that atmosphere for new relationships are created. In similar vein, the emphasis placed on *skilled but powerless* in the definition, presents the case of a non-coercive strategy conducted under an unofficial guise and motivated not by selfish interests but by a somewhat genuine drive to terminate conflict.

According to Carolyn Manning,

*“conflicts resolution can be viewed as a problem-solving process, which is designed to offer parties an opportunity to resolve their difference collaboratively, it is a process which involves third parties, who employ techniques and methods that are aimed at facilitating communication between parties engaged in conflict.”*¹⁹³

This second definition depicts the resolution field as one whose major preoccupation is that of solving problems which emerge from conflict. It suggests further, the need for a central focus on facilitating joint ways (parties and third-party) of mitigating the issues on ground as much

¹⁹² *ibid*, 18

¹⁹³ Carolyn Manning, Defining Conflict Resolution. www.carolynmanningconsultingservices.com accessed, 28.07.2013

as seeking ways to restore communication among adversaries. This definition sheds little light on exactly what these techniques and methods may be. I.e. Communication

From Wallensteen's point of observation, conflict resolution presents the forum for "*the conflicting parties to enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other*".¹⁹⁴

From his perspective, a resolution of conflict is contingent upon an agreement between parties. Such agreements quoting him:

*"Refer to situations in which the fighting parties accept each other also as parties in future dealings with one another. He goes further; it means that nobody wins all that there is to win, but nobody losses all that there is to lose either."*¹⁹⁵

His idea further underscores an available incompatibility, which triggers competition to the extent that parties adopt measures and display behaviours that interfere with the continued existence of each party. His definition connotes a different dimension to the other two definitions earlier examined. Here, conflict resolution strategies seem to only become effective or applicable on the basis of agreements facilitated by the traditional/ statist methods of intervention. In a further analysis of what conflict resolution entails, Wallensteen states *that conflict resolution is not analogous to peace described as the absence of war*.¹⁹⁶ Meaning that conflict resolution is not satisfied with just "war termination" but seeks peace in the positive sense, where peace is defined beyond an end to direct violence, but conceived also, as an end to structural and cultural violence.

For Bercovitch, conflict resolution is

"a range of formal and informal activities undertaken by parties to a conflict, or outsiders, designed to limit and reduce the level of violence in conflict, and to achieve some understanding on the key issues of conflict, a political agreement, or a jointly acceptable decision on future interaction and distribution of resources. Conflict resolution is about accepting a conflict, recognizing that there are ways out of it, and

¹⁹⁴ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*. (London: Sage, 2007) 9

¹⁹⁵ Ibid,10

¹⁹⁶ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*. (London: Sage, 2007) 9

engaging in some tacit or explicit co-ordination, without which none of these goals can be achieved” ¹⁹⁷

From Bercovitch viewpoint, conflict resolution approaches and strategies may be complementary to some of the techniques from the power-politics approach. First, the aspect of achieving a political agreement is seen as being consistent with conflict management strategies. On the other hand, “accepting a conflict so as to establish ways out of it” realized not by violent means but involving “explicit co-ordination” This remains within the theoretical framework of the resolution approach by which explicit coordination may also be construed as interdependency between conflict management and resolution. In similar vein conflict resolution here addresses conflict from objective causes. In such instances problems arising from disparate resource distribution viz a vie the key issues are tackled

3.6.4 Conflict Resolution: Historical evolution, ideas, assumptions and theories

The evolution of the field of conflict resolution, owes its vastness, multidisciplinary base, repertoire of knowledge and theoretical foundation to the consistent and tireless intellectual involvement and established institutions of a plethora of scholars and practitioners and founders, whose ideas, works and understanding, have formed the basic theories, concepts and approaches associated with the field. These have been catalogued over a period of decades, preceding the Second World Wars and into the 21st century. Initial considerations towards advancing the field stemmed from a strong propelling to avert the reoccurrence of war. Subsequent activities in the course of actualizing the goal to halt wars, culminated in the development of intellectual trajectories for understanding war and enabling peace. These initial foundations were laid by academic influences from the International Relations, political science, economics, psychology and sociology that capped with the development of the robust field and practice of conflict resolution.

3.6.5 Developments in the First and Second World War Era

Early contribution from the field of political science came from Crane Brinton’s scholarly work. His research centred on four revolutions: English, American, French and Russian. Brinton analysed some of the stages that lead up to a revolution. Drawing from his analysis was

¹⁹⁷ Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009) 1

an early insight into causes of conflict.¹⁹⁸ Similarly, the well-known Frustration –Aggression theory as propounded by John Dollard, Neal Miller and Leonard Doob in 1939 enabled conflict analysis from the perspectives of psychologists. They elaborated on the link between frustration and aggression, suggesting, that the expression of aggressive behaviour is contingent upon an existing frustration.¹⁹⁹

Also, Kurt Lewin (1890- 1947) a psychologist who helped to found the social psychology discipline, left his mark on the field of conflict resolution. From his perspective, behavioural expressions are contingent upon external forces. His assertion negated notions of conflict as understood by mainstream psychology. His “Field Theory” principle explains conflict expressions in terms of how a person perceives himself and his environment, he suggested that a proper understanding of human behaviour rested on discerning the entire “life space” such as family, school, work, within which a person operated.²⁰⁰ Mary Parker Follet was one of the pioneering academicians in the field of management who advocated for a positive sum solution to conflict. Her early contribution to the development of the organizational theory and organizational behaviour promoted early insights into conflicts that occur within organizations.²⁰¹

Furthermore, contributions from German philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel and American Sociologist Lewis Coser provided a strong influence on the field. Their work projected a contrary opinion of conflict usually conceived of in negative terms. Conflict had the capacity to produce evil as well as good. Similarly, conflict could be put to functional use within a society. According to Simmel, “conflict integrates disparate members of a group into a group and is a source of social cohesion and creativity”.²⁰² For Coser, conflict was integral to preserving human relationships.

Morton Deutsch contributing to the field delineated and categorized conflicts into constructive and destructive types. While destructive conflicts were characterized by escalation, constructive ones were perceived as less expressive and probably latent. Elaborating on competitive and cooperative relationships in conflict he suggested the ability on the basis of such relationship

¹⁹⁸ Brinton Crane, *The Anatomy of Revolution*. (New York: WW. Norton, 1938)

¹⁹⁹ John Dollard et al, *Frustration and Aggression*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936)

²⁰⁰ Mark K. Smith, *Kurt Lewin: Groups, Experimental Learning and Action Research*. (2001 June: www.infed.org)

²⁰¹ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999) 38 and Louis Kriesberg, “The Conflict Resolution Field: Origins, Growth and Differentiation”. in *Peace-making in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, I William Zartman ed. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007) 26

²⁰² Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*. (New York: The Free Press, 1955) Cited in Tidwell, 62.

to predict conflicts with the destructive and constructive potencies “In similar vein, Morton emphasized a subjective view of conflict. As much as conflicts originate from objective causes, conflict emanates for subjective reasons, such as perception, cognition and values.”²⁰³

3.6.6 Post World Wars Proponents and Contributions

The ideological repository of the conflict resolution field found further nourishment from traditions whose values underscore non-violence. Structural violence may be contested albeit by peaceful means. In like manner, such traditions of peace as consistent with those of the Quakers and Mennonites strongly support the mitigation of conflict as reliant on pacifist conception, which countermand coercive strategies. Furthermore, inspirations from Gandhi’s peace advocacy, more precisely the “satyagraha” have been spurred within the conflict resolution framework of understanding. Such ideas have deeply impressed upon Burtons “Needs based” principle for conflict analysis as well as aligning conflict mitigations techniques like the “problem solving workshops” tailored towards cooperative payoffs as propounded by the likes of Burton, Doob and Kelman.²⁰⁴

As the field continued to record immense development, global politics witnessed the tragic decimation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Following closely in 1945 and prompted by that occurrence was the establishment of a Laboratory for Peace Research by Theodore Lenz, whose motivation was premised upon his believe that findings from an in-depth study of human behaviour could engender strategies tantamount to human peaceful co-existence. While this development may be viewed as a milestone to the credit of the field’s continued growth, it also heralded in the subsequent establishment of institutions for further research into the analysis of human behaviour as well as an investigation into plausible means for averting wars.

In the light of this Kenneth Boulding and his team of academicians at the University of Michigan founded a Centre for Research and Conflict Resolution in 1959. Included in the list was mathematician cum biologist Anatol Rapport whose assumptions bordered on game theories, also social psychologist Herbert Kelman who later introduced the “integrative problem solving” tactics to the field and Robert Cooley. Preceding the establishment of that centre was their 1957 publication titled the “Journal of Peace Research” which was induced by a longing

²⁰³ Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973) cited in Tidwell, 67 and Morton Deutsch, “The Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution” in Raimo Väyrynen (Ed), *New Directions in Conflict Theory*. (London: Sage, 1991) 26-56

²⁰⁴ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999), 41-42

to prevent wars as well as conceptualize them outside the confines of realist perceptions. They assumed that facts accumulated from such scientific research would aid the prediction of hitherto unforeseeable threat to global peace and stability.²⁰⁵

In examining contributions to the development of the conflict resolution, the immense impact of Norwegian philosopher, sociologist and mathematician Johan Galtung cannot be overemphasized. He was widely known for conceptualizing peace in negative and positive terms, delineating negative peace as an absence of war characterized by an underlying structural and cultural violence. Conversely positive peace was construed on the basis addressing structural deficiencies. His distinction between direct and structural violence viewed the former as inflicted on the physical human body, while the latter is rooted in inadequacies of social and institutional structures.²⁰⁶

3.6.7 Theorists, Theories and Tools

3.6.7.1 John Burton: Human Needs Theory and the surrounding discourse

John Burton the 1915 Australian born scholar is regarded as a significant contributor to the field of CR. His rich repository of knowledge left an indelible mark on the advancement of the field. The myriad of his scholarly contributions is today understood as a major component in the analysis and resolution of stubborn and prolonged conflicts. Having concluded a fruitful career at the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Burton is today recognized as the most prominent proponent of the Human Needs theory in line with predecessors Abraham Maslow and Paul Sites. His extensive study of the Human Needs approach, as a means of understanding the sources of most deep seated and prolonged international conflicts has engendered renewed understanding that conflicts whose underlying causes have been identified are assumedly a step away from being resolved. Such assumptions tend to ridicule those from the field of International relations. According to Burton:

“Deep rooted” conflicts are those which tend to resist conventional efforts at finding a solution”.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 42-43

²⁰⁶ Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *“Contemporary Conflict Resolution”*, 44

With time, they protract because improper strategies for resolution have been employed. Furthermore, the incapacity to provide concrete solutions to any conflict in Burton's view is largely traceable to:

“An inability on the part of both protagonist and third parties to recognize that deep rooted conflicts are caused by the denial of basic, inalienable values or the frustration of basic human needs” ²⁰⁷

Burton made the case of a paradigm shift in which he identified the loopholes created by traditional diplomacy as opportunity to rethink the resolution of conflict, based on approaches which facilitated a reassessment of parties' perception, enhanced communication and supported efforts to facilitate mutually acceptable conflict outcomes.

3.6.7.2 The Human Needs Theory

The theory of human needs within conflict resolution theorizing is viewed as a generic theory aiding the analysis of most international conflict. Knowledge inspired by such assumption tends to contradict Hobbesian perception depicting man as hostile and barbaric. Human behaviour as already examined, may be triggered by the denial of its basic needs, so that human behaviour is best ascertained on the basis of a causal link between unsatisfied basic needs and aggressive expression. Such assumption negates all assertions of aggression being an innate feature of the human organism. According to the Hobbesian line of argument, humans are better christened *“necessitous”*. Mitchell endorses this claim by observing that *“man's natural and universal needs are the fundamental, first causes of conflict and dispute”* regardless of whatever level conflict is considered. ²⁰⁸

Needs of identity, recognition security, which are fundamental to man, though intangible play an important role in the wellbeing and development of the human being as much as the need for food, clothing and shelter. Burton as confirmed by Tidwell listed a set of *“knowable basic needs”*. They include *recognition, security, role defence, control and meaning*. Burton conceives of these needs as vital to the extent that they provide insight into human behaviour.

²⁰⁷ John Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts: A Handbook*. (Lanham M.D: University Press of America, 1987) cited in Christopher Mitchell, *“Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions About Basic Human Needs Theory”* in John Burton(ed), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*. (Hampshire: The Macmillan Press, 1990) P. 152

²⁰⁸ Christopher Mitchell, *“Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions About Basic Human Needs Theory”* in *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* John Burton ed, (Great Britain: The Macmillan Press, 1990, 153

They serve as a guide toward the realization that undermining the basic human need can be tantamount to advancing conflict. Therefore, policies should be enacted with much consideration and sensitivity so as not to counteract the fulfilment thereof. He further corroborated this assertion by contending that institutions will be confronted with enormous challenges if the needs of the masses are denied. Such institutions rarely enjoy the support of its people. In his opinion assuaging everyone's needs are synonymous with averting conflict ²⁰⁹

However, the question remains, can all human needs be fulfilled? How can we determine needs in order of the most pressing priority? Are there some needs that are unimportant? Which can wait momentarily? Mitchell identifies the need of "identity" as an addition to the list, stating that Burton views this need as superseding, all other human needs on his list. Furthermore, it is paramount to the proper resolution of any conflict to identify those needs which have remained neglected as much as "deduce *what alterations in structures, institutions and policies are required to enable the fulfilment of needs*"²¹⁰.

Social psychologists whose concern it is to explain intra as well as inter-group behaviour insist that such groups crave both physical and psychological need such as identity, participation and adequate control over their own destiny²¹¹. On the basis of this, human beings tend to hold fast to their identity as a source from which they derive meaning to their very existence. Group identity is seen to enhance self-confidence, as much as provides some form of emotional stability to its members. Identity may be defined along the lines of nationality, religion, or even ethnicity. During the cold war lines of identity were drawn on ideological assumptions. Klineberg in studying group behaviour suggests, from a social-psychological perspective, a clear element of universality embedded in gratification derived from the satisfaction of the identity need. His analysis depicts a clear causal link between deprivation experienced within a group and the emergence of a myriad of social conflicts. People generally encounter the longing to identify, and be identified with a group. The need for identity therefore becomes extremely vital to the wellbeing of a group to the extent that:

²⁰⁹ Tidwell, Conflict Resolved? ,79 and John Burton, "from strategic deterrence to problem solving" in Kevin Clements(ed) *Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region*. (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 1993) cited in Tidwell,80

²¹⁰ Christopher Mitchell, "*Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions About Basic Human Needs Theory*" 153

²¹¹ Ronald J Fischer, "Third Party Consultation: A Problem-Solving Approach for De-escalating International Conflict", in J.P Maas and R. A. C Stewart (ed) *Toward A World of Peace: People Create Alternatives*. (Suva, Fiji: The University of South Pacific, 1986 cited in Ronald J Fischer,94

*“Human beings are willing to suffer immeasurably and to sacrifice even their lives in the struggle for the protection of their identity”*²¹²

Similarly, the need for identity propels group relations on varying levels, such that the tendency for conflict not to ensue becomes improbable and inescapable.

Burton and Azar²¹³ have buttressed this assertion by arguing that the needs for *recognition, identity, security and participation* form vital facets of a group’s wellbeing. An attempt thus, to prevent its fulfilment tends to precipitate *a push for redress and satisfaction*. Intergroup conflicts in addition, are triggered on the perception that an opposing group poses a threat to the satisfaction of its needs, especially when the satisfiers for such needs are somewhat scarce. In the light of this, the analysis of intergroup aggression based on human needs theorizing, is perceived as possessing the propensity for conflict.

Fisher contends that while the need for security and freedom present the case for national responsibility, the satisfaction of the “identity need” is exclusively achieved through identity groups, by which he infers an inextricable connection between the individual and the group with which it identifies. And since group identity tends to promote the self- confidence of its members as underscored earlier, an attack on the group’s identity is naturally transferred to its individual members and may be construed negatively. Thus, the viewpoint that individual and groups are ready to die in the defence of their identity becomes validated. Sequel to the aforementioned considerations, a conclusion may be established on the assumption that a myriad of group conflict tends to originate from a denial of the need for identity. To this extent it becomes valid and coherent to suggest that such conflicts may begin to portray signs of intractability and protraction as a result of prolonged denial or unsatisfied needs.

The field of conflict resolution seems to lack coherence when it comes to a consensus of what may be conceived as the universally acceptable list to which conflict resolvers may refer to when identifying those needs to be met for peace and harmony to be restored to any given

²¹² O Klineberg, “Human Needs: A Social-Psychological Approach” in Lederer(ed) *Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate*. (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn&Hain, 1980) cited in Ronald Fisher, *Needs Theory, Social Identity and an Eclectic Model of Conflict* P.95

²¹³ E.E Azar, “Protracted International Conflict: Ten Propositions” *International Interactions* 12 in E. E Azar and J. W Burton (eds) *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*. (Brington, England: Wheatsheaf, 1986); J. W Burton, *Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*. (New York: St Martin Press, 1979); J. W Burton, “The History of International Conflict Resolution,” *International Interactions*, 12, 45-70 cited in Ronald Fisher, 104

conflict. Previously I enumerated some of the needs on Burton's list. Burton is however not alone in capturing some of the needs perceived to be paramount to the social and physical advancement of human beings. Scholars like Johan Galtung, James Davis, Banks²¹⁴ and a host of others have from their perspectives presented a list of their own, which they believe constitutes the basic needs important for the full development of any individual. In like manner, Abraham Maslow a progenitor in "Human Needs" theorizing notes that a list of human needs is similarly defined in a certain order. He therefore presented a hierarchy of human needs from the less important to the most important. Below is a version as compiled and explained by Ronald Fischer

- *Self-actualization needs: the ultimate motivation, involving the need to fulfil one's unique potential*
- *Esteem needs: the need for achievement, competence and mastery, as well as motives for recognition, prestige and status*
- *Cognitive needs: the desire to know, to understand and to satisfy one's curiosity*
- *Belongingness and Love needs: needs that are satisfied by social relationships*
- *Safety needs: needs that must be met to protect the individual from danger*
- *Physiological needs: basic internal deficit conditions that must be satisfied to maintain bodily processes*²¹⁵

One may extrapolate from his assertions, a greater emphasis on the lower need; even though he made it quite clear that both higher and lower needs play a significant role in the total wellbeing of the individual. Lower needs may be grasped in terms of material satisfiers.

Abraham Maslow²¹⁶ was a psychologist, therefore his analysis focused on understanding individual behaviour in connection with unsatisfied need. This excluded an analysis of group or intergroup relations. He identified higher needs as posing no fundamental threat to human survival; they are those needs whose fulfilment may not be regarded as craving urgent attention. He held that between the need for food and safety for example, the necessity tag would definitely be placed on the food need, albeit the safety need if satisfied affords the individual a greater sense of "relief and relaxation". He argued that "*the deprivation of higher needs does*

²¹⁴ Christopher Mitchell, "*Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions About Basic Human Needs Theory*" 159

²¹⁵ Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* in Ronald J. Fischer, *Needs Theory, Social Identity and an Eclectic Model of Conflict* in John Burton(ed), *Conflict Human Needs Theory*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 91

²¹⁶ Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (3rd Edition). (USA: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1970), 56-61

not produce so desperate a defence and emergency reaction as is produced by lower deprivation”, nonetheless people whose needs have managed to transcend those of the basic needs, to the extent of craving higher needs as “love” and “respect” for example, such persons display enhanced physical and psychological contentment and produce fruits of “loyalty, friendliness, civic consciousness, they even become better parents, husbands, teachers, public servants etc.”. Placing the need for “safety” over “respect”, he stated that “*Respect is a dispensable luxury when compared with safety*” therefore the fulfilment of the higher need may be realized on a later basis or may just fade away.

Maslow nonetheless is perceived to have been guided by Western thinking, his arguments of what may constitute the human need have been regarded as falling short of the universal human need margin and therefore cannot be considered comprehensive. They however serve a significant purpose in the analysis of a myriad of international conflict.

Some scholars posit that unmet needs may not necessarily engender conflict. By which they suggest that conflict occurs, when satisfiers of needs are perceived to be scarce or insufficient. Therefore, the conflict emerges out of a scramble for satisfiers with limited availability. On the premise of this argument, it may be inappropriate to project “A theory of Human Needs” as platform for identifying the underlying causes of all conflicts. In a conflict between farmers and herders as exemplified in the Darfur crisis, what may be understood as the conflict trigger as postulated by this school of thought is not the frustration arising from the inability to farm on a land occupied by herders, but the scarcity of land as provoked by the conflict. In this context, the resolution will be to address the land scarcity by other solutions as suggested in Fisher’s book “Getting to Yes”. The author elaborates on a different conflict resolution strategy he terms “principled negotiation”. However, one begins to wonder how this argument may be reconciled with the argument from John Dollard et al.²¹⁷ in which an obvious link between frustration and aggression is underscored.

In light of the context under discussion, aggression is discerned as emanating from a frustration (the inability to farm or graze). Therefore aggression (conflict) is triggered from a state of frustration. In Mitchell’s version of this assertion, he opines by arguing from the viewpoint of other scholars: the phenomenon of Basic Human Needs as the starting point for a theory of conflict resolution might be erroneous. A theory of conflict resolution should begin with the

²¹⁷ Stephen Ademola Faleti, "Theories of Social Conflict," in *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books, 2006), 35-60

satisfiers available to fulfil those needs and overtly pursued by individual, groups and hence parties in conflict, therefore it is not the needs themselves but the choice of means for fulfilment (satisfiers) that can create the conflict.

Following the analysis of the one generic theory which informs the analysis of a plethora of conflict on several landscapes, I proceed to elaborate on some of the methods and approaches applied to the resolution of conflicts.

3.6.7.3 Tools of Conflict Resolution

Problem Solving Workshops:

Controlled Communication and Integrative Problem Solving (Analytical Problem Solving)

Burton's controlled communication and Kelman's integrative problem solving have become prominent through the various "Problem Solving Workshops" organized by them. Other scholars like Leonard Doob, Stephen Cohen, Levi and Benjamin have either themselves organized Workshops in conjunction with other partners or served as invited scientist on other workshops. Extant literature documenting experiences from Workshops refer back to the ones organized between the 60s and early 90s. The ideas, assumptions and style adopted in the Problem-Solving approach back then remain consistent with those organized to solve the problems of present-day conflicts albeit with slight difference.

3.6.7.3a Controlled Communication

"Controlled communication is primarily a social-psychological device for altering the attitudes and perceptions of the representatives of states in conflict, so that on the basis of reduced hostility and tensions they may be able to come together for serious and productive negotiations. It may be employed academically as a means of generating hypotheses about the analysis and resolution of international conflict."²¹⁸

One element of this definition (coming together for serious and productive negotiation) suggests that Problem –Solving is not directly a tool for the resolution of conflict but serves as a complimentary process to official negotiations. Kelman terms it a *transfer of the changes*

²¹⁸ Ronald J. Yalem, "Controlled Communication and Conflict Resolution" in Journal of Peace Research. (1971 8: 263), 263

facilitated during the workshop. A transfer of enhanced communications altered perceptions and changed attitudes, which help to hasten the more official processes. Kelman interactive approach to problem solving will be examined in subsequent sections of this chapter.

In 1966 John Burton and his associates conducted a Problem-Solving Workshop at the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict at the University College London. It was administered to initiate the resolution of the conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Conducted in a purely academic setting and consisting of participants who enjoyed some measure of closeness to foreign policy decision makers. The workshop demonstrated in terms of structure, process and content, some approaches for dealing with conflicts resulting from collapsed communication. Burton's "Controlled Communication" received much inspiration from the systems theory. Within that framework, conflict is basically analysed on the macro level and a deficiency on the part of international capacity to sufficiently and satisfactorily address conflict. In this regard, states are perceived as demonstrating minimal contribution to the emergence of conflict.

Regardless of foundational ties to the Systems theory, Burton was able to carve out his own conception of conflict. Burton conceived of international conflicts as spill overs from internal or communal strife²¹⁹. Based on Burton's conception, it is in line, to infer that conflict triggers are embedded within the state. Similarly, Burton argued, that the seeds of conflict may be found within the decision-making process of the state.²²⁰ He inferred that states usually exhibit a deficient capability in appropriate decision-making and organization to the level of perpetuating conflict. Consequently, decision-making, the selection of foreign policy goals and the assessment of the means to achieve these goals engender distorted perceptions and perspectives of decision makers.²²¹ This assumption is understood to have influenced his criteria for selecting participants who participated in the London Workshop organized on behalf of the conflict between Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. For him the selection of participants, who enjoyed strong ties with decision makers on foreign policy matters, played a decisive role in the final analysis of official negotiation. Some of Burton's assumptions played a

²¹⁹ John Burton, *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations*. (London: Macmillan, 1969) 17, cited in Herbert C. Kelman "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution" Chapter 7 in Richard L. Merritt (ed) *Communication in International Politics*. (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1972) 179

²²⁰ John Burton, *Controlled Communication*, 23 cited in Ronald J. Yalem, "Controlled Communication and Conflict Resolution" in *Journal of Peace Research*. (1971 8: 263) 266

²²¹ Yalem, "Controlled Communication and Conflict Resolution", 265

decisive role in the defining structure and principles for organizing future workshops. Workshop proceedings had to clearly negate the application of soft coercion manifested in conflict management strategies of mediation and conciliation.

Traditional diplomacy involved some measure of imposed solution by the intervening third parties. They are conducted on official capacity and characterized by diplomatic formalities. On the basis of this, workshops were convened on an unofficial capacity, in an academic environment and by scholars who were knowledgeable in conflict theory, but whose role excluded the imposition of solutions on participants. Burton's sheds light on the extent of social scientists' involvement in problem –solving workshops by referring to his controlled communication approach. He states that their duty is to “explain conflict, its origin, and its escalation... within the context of a continuing discussion between the parties...”²²² Problem Solving Workshop's therefore provides the enabling environment for face to face communication participants also to become knowledgeable in conflict theories to the extent that such insight provides a clearer understanding of their own conflict.

On the basis of improved communication, participants become capable of discerning mutually acceptable outcome and other ways of achieving their objectives without having to bear the high cost a continued aggression. Chadwick Alger one of the organizing participants in Burton's workshop had this to say, “it was remarkable to see how quickly...insights about conflict escalation processes helped parties to understand more deeply the ways in which they had unwittingly escalated the conflict in which they were involved”²²³. Similarly, controlled communication affords participants the opportunity for self-engendered mutually acceptable solutions to the conflict. Kelman in his 1972 analysis on Burton's (Problem Solving Workshops) PSW underscored the effect of organizing such workshops in isolation of the public or official glare. He states: “the environments were designed to create an informal atmosphere in which participants were free to express their views openly and to get to know and respect each other as individuals. Ultimately, the atmosphere fostered mutual trust, a sense of shared values and commitment to a common task”²²⁴ - joint problem solving.

²²² John Burton, in Yalem, 61-62

²²³ Personal communication between Chadwick Alger and Ronald J Yalem in June 1971.

²²⁴ Herbert Kelman, “Contribution of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Breakthrough” in *Negotiation Journal*, 11, 19-27 and Herbert Kelman, “Some determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough” in *International Negotiations*, 2, P. 183-194 cited in Herbert Kelman *Interactive Problem-Solving: Informal Mediation by the Scholar-Practitioner*, 176

Levi and Benjamin have provided some insight into the proceedings of typical workshops. It commences with a definition of conflict from the perspectives of the parties highlighting the key issues associated with the conflict. Secondly information is gathered and dispersed regarding processes in general and processes of the particular conflict under scrutiny. The third stage consists of an evaluation of the options for a mutually acceptable outcome, available to the parties. Flowing from the three stages will be a redefinition of the conflict, fact finding and the search for best possible solutions.²²⁵ The main crux of Burton's PSW was directed towards enhanced communication among parties whose level of communication was low or completely non-existent. He opined that conflicts might be close to resolution if effective communication can be restored among conflicting parties.

The emergence of conflict for him, is also predicated on the assumption that communication between parties in conflict has collapsed. A resolution thereof should therefore emerge from processes with the capacity to enhance as much as re-establish such communication. As such controlled communication serves as an apparatus, which facilitates the restoration of communication through the process of an unstructured agenda in which parties air their perceptions of the conflict of themselves and those of their adversary. In Burton's opinion, controlled communication is not to be conceived as a procedure for the resolution of conflict between adversaries; they are viewed more as preparatory to official negotiation.

Considering the changes in perceptions and attitudes that have already occurred in the parties during these pre-negotiation sessions, parties are better prepared to negotiate mutually acceptable outcomes. He clearly asserted that the major purpose for facilitating controlled communication among parties was to "expose their perceptions of each other, their motivations and goals, their internal political problem... Not for the purpose of settling the conflict but on the assumption that such communication would be helpful to the parties in providing a basis for resolution"²²⁶ Also Burton saw these workshops as added value to the academia. Scholars were afforded a chance at analysing the drivers of an on-going conflict. Nonetheless, one thing remains unclear, since the participants of his workshop were not policy makers themselves but enjoyed close ties to them, one begins to wonder to what extent these participants were able to

²²⁵ Levi, A. M. and A Benjamin, "Focus and Flexibility in a Model of Conflict Resolution" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21, 3: 405 -425 cited in Barbra J. Hill, "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques: From Problem-Solving to Theory" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1982 26: 109, 115-117

²²⁶ John Burton, x, xi cited in Yalem, 266

transfer the changes which occurred in them to the conflict at large or to its final resolution. There is however a high probability that the experience, information and insights would be passed on to the decision makers, at least as a way of feedback. Burton had this to say regarding the outcome of his workshop

*“All that can be said is that communication was established where previously it did not exist, perceptions and attitudes of participants were altered during the exercise”*²²⁷

Some of the discrepancies observed, and experiences gathered from Burton’s problem-solving workshops, later aided Kelman, who was one of the academic participants, to fashion out his own conception of problem-solving workshops which he tagged *interactive problem solving*.

3.6.7.3b Evaluating Controlled Communication

Yalem has gone ahead to criticize Burton on a number of issues. He argued that there has been no evidence of the use of controlled communication since the London workshop in 1966, nor does the approach provide any concrete proof of its efficacy in the resolution of international conflicts. He dismisses Burton’s assertions regarding the positive impact of controlled communication as a mere hypothesis, which needs testing. He further contended that not all conflicts can be resolved on the basis of enhancing communication among parties especially when the emergence of conflict is attributed to “objective incompatibilities and subjective distortions”²²⁸. Controlled communication may further fuel hostility than make a positive impact. The author goes on to suggest that in such cases, a resolution of conflict via effective communication, may be achievable only on the premise that parties have realized that their interests are better achieved by a resolution than by continued aggression. He argues further, that not all compromise result in zero-sum outcomes especially, when such conflict is defined along lines of symmetric relationships.

A certain level of compromise is required to attain the level of mutual satisfaction; both parties under such condition tend to realize that a little compromise of interest on each side is likely to yield a win-win payoff. Yalem questions Burton’s underlying assumptions for the application of controlled communication in international conflict as “Analogous reasoning”²²⁹ and lacking

²²⁷ Ibid, 268

²²⁸ Burton cited in Yalem, 268

²²⁹ Ibid, 270

in empirical evidence and proof enough to validate his propositions. He holds that controlled communication may prove effective to a larger extent if participants constituted the decision makers themselves. On the basis of this, resolution of conflict stood a better chance, if changed perceptions would occur in the very individuals who possessed the power to influence a de-escalation of conflict.

Yalem's critical analysis of the efficacy of controlled communication as a vital unofficial instrument to achieving a mutually acceptable settlement in the final analysis of official negotiation propels further testing and investigation. Yalem however argued from a standpoint of interstate conflict. Within such framework of understanding parties involved operate on symmetric relationships, where the national interest of state is at stake, where a focus on enhancing communication may more or less be dismissed as irrelevant to the grand purpose, and where parties can afford to consider compromise especially when it serves the purpose of mutual satisfaction in the final analysis. Considering Yalem's point of departure, the relevant and significant argument would be, to examine the efficacy of controlled communication in intra-state conflicts. To what extent can controlled communication be found applicable in modern day conflicts whose emergence is connected to subjective causes? Is controlled communication effective where compromise and dissatisfaction is likely to precipitate a resurgence of conflict? More so, how effective is controlled communication in conflicts characterized by asymmetry, where it becomes a serious challenge for the stronger party to yield to any of its objectives. The stronger party hardly thinks rationally especially when guided by the perception that it possesses the power to achieve a win. On the basis of this, conflict as much as progresses without a consideration of cost incurred.

The faulted assumptions underlying Burton's controlled communication, may have informed a restructuring and change of perspective and approach in Kelman. He considered that his interactive format for workshops are applicable to conflicts of modern-day characterizing. Till this day, problems solving workshops remain an integral part of conflict resolution. Small wonder the George Mason team from the USA, found it relevant to the on-going crisis in Darfur. Whether problem-solving workshops manifest in form of controlled communication, interactive problem solving or as a synthesis of both, the point remains that its application has found consistency in internal conflicts of international concern. However, it is still somewhat impossible to validate its relevance in contemporary kinds of conflicts.

Having examined the controlled communication approach to problem-solving workshops, I now recount the first attempt at applying problem solving to an African conflict.

3.6.7.4c Interactive Problem-Solving: An approach to Conflict Resolution

Herbert Kelman became the proponent of “interactive problem solving”. His workshops provided participants with the fora for an analytical analysis of the opposing perspectives, which may be sustaining conflict aggression. After a critical analysis of Burton and Doob’s approach to Problem-Solving Workshops, Kelman designed his own unique method of applying PSW to real time conflicts. He personally admits that most of the basic defining features manifested in typical PSW, form part of the structure of his own approach. However, the point of divergence is evidenced in the assumptions underlying his own approach to some of the PSW he organized. In his opinion, not all types of conflicts were suitable for the application of “interactive problem solving”.

3.6.7.4d Examining the Interactive approach to Problem Solving

Kelman defined interactive problem solving as “an academically based, unofficial third-party approach, bringing together representatives of parties in conflict for direct communication” This definition depicts clearly an approach conducted on unofficial capacity, which facilitates “direct” communication between party representatives. It nonetheless presents a certain level of ambiguity in the sense that it is difficult to detect one element of differentiation between his approach to problem-solving and those of his predecessors. Therefore, an elaborate examination of the underlying assumption, which inspires his approach, becomes relevant at this point.

Kelman and Stephen Cohen organized three preliminary workshops at the Harvard University. The first one investigated the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, while the 1972 and 1979 workshops examined the Bangladeshi conflict, and the conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots respectively. These workshops were basically one-time events until 1990 when Kelman and Rouhana conducted follow- up workshop, which according to him hosted high level, politically influential Israelis’, and Palestinians.²³⁰

²³⁰ Herbert C. Kelman, “Interactive Problem Solving: Informal Mediation by the Scholar-Practitioner,” in *Studies in International Mediation: Essays in honour of Jeffrey Z. Rubin*, ed. J. Bercovitch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 202), 169

At this juncture, an insight is gained into Kelman's criteria for the selection of participants in his workshop. His suggestion on the calibre of workshop participants is perceived to be in strict opposition to the stringent and compulsory criteria for the selection of participants exhibited in Burton's Workshops. As already highlighted in the previous sections, Burton underscored a distinct connection of participants to the decision makers of their home countries. For Kelman, it was significant that participants were politically involved individuals, who at the same time enjoyed popularity and credibility in their communities and whose active involvement in political debates and perhaps movements can positively impact on the given conflict.²³¹

Kelman disputed the assumption that most international conflicts emerged from ineffective communication. As such his workshops were not tailored toward the mere achievement of enhanced communication but towards the broader picture of an effective *transfer of changes* to the political landscape and most especially towards a transformation of the underlying broken relationships, which define the kinds of conflict he proposed. Kelman suggested that his workshops were characterized by an *analytical* approach to problem solving which afforded the participants the opportunity to acquire an improved and changed understanding of their opponent, and provided a forum for the tabling of *concerns, needs, fears, priorities and constraints*.²³² Similarly his workshops provided "opportunities for the parties to interact, to become acquainted with each other and to humanize their mutual images, not as ends in themselves, but as means to producing new leanings that can be fed into the political process."²³³

A maintained level of confidentiality and the non-binding characteristic of such workshops engendered a relaxed atmosphere and a freedom to air grievances. Participants maintained the calmness of operating within an "off the record" framework, which is more likely to facilitate the desired result for change.

Problem-solving workshops in its interactive form is meant to progress on a "*no fault*"²³⁴ basis. By which the organizing participants assist parties to refrain from apportioning blame, and organizers themselves refrain from proposing or imposing a solution to the conflict under scrutiny. Such interaction is therefore geared toward engendering self-produced solutions to the problems the participants have before them. Kelman conducted workshops up till the early

²³¹ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving: Informal Mediation by Scholar-Practitioner*, 177

²³² *Ibid.* 175

²³³ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving: Informal Mediation by Scholar-Practitioner*, 175

²³⁴ *ibid.*, 175

90s, when the world scene had started to record evident changes in conflict dynamics and features. At this point, conflicts began showing signs of intractability and protraction. Conflicts as already discussed earlier, became more of internally generated which triggered international concern and action. It is no wonder that Kelman suggests that his approach to workshops focused on solving identity-based conflicts using the interactive approach.

Appropriate conflicts in his opinion constituted those, where official negotiations have reached a deadlock, such that there are slim chances for continued negotiation. Therefore, he stated that interactive problem solving is irrelevant “*if there are no profound barriers to negotiations,*”²³⁵ these barriers he opined were more of psychological. If they were non-existent, then interactive problem solving became irrelevant. However, he noted that “psychological barriers” are more often than not manifested in protracted identity conflict. On account of this, interactive problem solving becomes relevant as a preparatory exercise to facilitate improved official deliberations. The Workshop concept was therefore not construed as a method that has a come to supplant official mechanisms. Kelman corroborates this with this assertion:

*“Our work on the Israeli –Palestinian conflict during the pre-negotiation and early negotiations phases helped lay the groundwork for the Oslo agreement by contributing to the development of the cadres, the ideas, and the political atmosphere required for movement to the table and productive negotiations ”*²³⁶

The focus of interactive problem solving therefore facilitates a smooth transfer as much as creates new relationships among participants who need to learn not only to relate better on the official negotiating table but to peacefully co-exist in their various communities, regardless of the damaging effect a war may have inflicted on them.

Since one of the characteristics of modern conflicts is the problem of imbalance in power; evidenced by asymmetrical relations, interactive problem solving tends to induce participants to interact on an equal basis. In Kelman’s opinion, “Participants from the stronger party must be able and *willing* to deal with the other on the basis of equality, while the participants from

²³⁵ Ibid .187

²³⁶ Herbert Kelman, “Contribution of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Breakthrough” in *Negotiation Journal*, 11, 19-27 and Herbert Kelman, “Some determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough” in *International Negotiations*, 2, P. 183-194 cited in Herbert Kelman *Interactive Problem-Solving: Informal Mediation by the Scholar-Practitioner*, 188

the weaker must be *able* to deal with the other on the basis of equality.” Therefore, willingness and ability on the part of the stronger and the weaker participant is seen to play a vital role in achieving the purpose of such an exercise.

3.6.8 Applying PSW to African Conflicts

In 1969 Leonard Doob and William Foltz organized a Problem-Solving Workshop (Fermeda Workshop) to investigate the border conflict between Somalia and two of her neighbours: Ethiopia and Kenya. The organizing participants were experts in the area of group dynamics, sensitivity training and third-party conflict resolution. They similarly demonstrated sizable knowledge about a number of issues concerning Africa. Representatives from Kenya and Ethiopia were scholars drawn from a wide range of academic disciplines. Somalis were picked from within and without decision-making. The 18 participants from the three countries were divided into two groups of 9. Each group had a participant from each of the three representing countries. This analysis is based on Walton who was one of the social scientists on that workshop. According to Walton, the organizers aimed “*to achieve a consensus for some proposal to solve the border dispute*”²³⁷.

As with Burton’s workshop, the session followed an unstructured agenda. Discussions were held, which included the role of the OAU (now AU) in the dispute under consideration. Some participants perceived the organization as powerless in the de-escalation of the conflict; a separate group countered the opinion. Participants were educated in the area of politics and culture of each country. The session progressed on a learning mode and exhibited a consolidating undertone that reinforced interpersonal relations among parties.²³⁸ The organizers interfered in proceedings when it was evidently called for. In instances such as when communication seemed to derail from the focus or when the atmosphere seemed heated up due to conflicting opinions and ideas. The workshop initially progressed without any form of chairmanship. It was a deliberate effort to engender group cohesion, which almost became detrimental to the organizer’s efforts. With time however, the group learned of its own to manage discrepancies resulting from the structure of the workshop. Walton notes: “there was a discernible increase in the ease with which participants interacted with one another”²³⁹.

²³⁷ Richard E. Walton, “A Problem-Solving Workshop on Border Conflicts in East Africa” in *The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science*. Sage, 1970 6: 453. <http://www.sagepublication.com>. 458-459

²³⁸ *ibid*

²³⁹ Walton, “A Problem-Solving Workshop”, 462

At some point participants began to freely voice out their fears and concerns. This was greeted with empathy by other members and in-turn triggered mutual respect and understanding. In the course of the session's discussions, participants gained ideas into each country's perception, of the common concern: the conflict. Each country's representatives had the chance to air its views of the conflict while other country representatives took notes of what they perceived to be the issues of contention as expressed. It was later given as a presentation to the whole workshop group. The idea of the exercise was to stimulate the capacity to view conflict from an opponent's perception as well.

Issues to be discussed followed a more structured mode. It also saw the creation of committees from among the participants and organizers, and an agenda tailored towards the discussion of major issues. The idea was for each committee headed by a chairman, to preside over issues for discussion as well as to facilitate a smooth transition into the discussion of the more sensitive issues regarding the conflict.

At this point, the participants deliberated over issues concerning the conflict in the format below as provided by Walton:

1. *What is?*
 - *A nation?*
 - *A nation –state?*
 - *The principle of self-determination?*
 - *What is the nature of the problem*
 - *What are the implications of redrawing the map of northwest Africa?*
2. *How do these disputes hinder*
 - *Internal development?*
 - *Regional development?*
3. *External influences on these disputes:*
 - *Role of “great” powers*
 - *Role of other nation states*
4. *What is the significance of the disputed areas to the parties concerned?*²⁴⁰

These issues were intensely discussed, and the house sought joint solutions to them.

²⁴⁰ Walton, “A Problem-Solving Workshop”, 467

As discussions progressed it became clear that the participant's perspective of the conflict was largely diverse and most of them held doggedly to their views without signs for a shift. In the course of events the Biafra war that was on-going at the time, was examined and joint solutions to it were sought using the technique of "brainstorming". The idea was to help participants apply the same technique, to finding joint solutions to their own conflict. When finally, the technique was applied to the issue of contention, (their own conflict) the group according to Walton, came up with 150 ideas to be developed. At this juncture, smaller working groups were created to seek concrete solutions under different topics: Political, Economic, Military and social. Afterwards, all proposals gathered from the groups were collated and deliberated upon, arousing sentiments and disagreements from parties with opposing perspectives and in some instances name-calling. It may be important at this point, to add that this workshop was conducted as an experimental exercise, in the hope that some unofficial method for addressing future conflicts emerges from it. Even though according to Walton, the workshop ended on a distasteful note and lacking a unanimous proposition for solutions to the conflict, posterity stood to glean some lessons from its strengths and failures.

3.6.8.1 The Outcome

The effect of the workshop may be viewed from some positive angles; it no doubt made an effective impact on the participants. Walton finds it somewhat impossible to ascertain the effect of any workshop on a conflict in the short term. However, the organizers were able to make some deduction from questionnaires filled out by participants at the conclusion of the workshop as well as from loopholes and discrepancies made by mere observation of the entire process. The two weeks Workshop organized in a secluded area became for the participants a platform for learning. New and fresh insights were gathered about the conflict from other perspectives and perceptions. Novel techniques and skills for collaborative problem-solving and brainstorming were learned and acquired. Cross-cultural understanding and sensitivity became enhanced, so that participants were able to discern an opponent's perception from a cultural standpoint. Based on the location, participants displayed an ample freedom of expression and also shared personal perceptions to a level that negated a representation of their government's views, opinions, beliefs and concerns. Openness was enhanced, albeit varied from participant to participant. Mutual trust and interpersonal relationship was fostered as a result. The organizers criteria for the selection of participants in the Fermeda workshop, was clearly different from Burton's. The organizers seemed to have achieved more than a mere enhanced

communication in the parties. Their style tailored participants towards the path of learning how to solve problems via interactions.

3.6.8.2 The Impact of PSW on the Conflict

Whether these changes became relevant to the official negotiations is something there is hardly any information about. However, Walton confirms that the workshop representatives were debriefed by the officials of their various countries.

*“Also, during the month following the Workshop a meeting occurred in Addis Ababa between the Prime Minister of Somalia and the Emperor of Ethiopia”*²⁴¹ There was no documented direct impact of PSW on the conflict especially since such workshops were basically created to serve the purpose of transferring changes to the official negotiations. Walton nonetheless suggested that future workshops should concentrate on producing a document instead of effecting a mere change in attitudes and perceptions. In this way, workshops are able to contribute meaningfully on the level of official negotiations and on the conflict, itself in the final analysis. Future workshops can learn from the consequences of splitting nationals into groups consisting of other nationalities, as this move tended to undermine subsequently, the final outcome of success of the entire exercise. Participants had developed relationships with other nationals, when however, participants were brought together on the basis of their different nationalities; an air of avoidance and distrust became obvious to the organizers. That tactic according to Walton sent the wrong signals when participants returned to their home countries. In conclusion, the Workshop seemed to have laid the foundation on which future workshops will build. Lesson from it may even produce newer and more innovative approaches to problem solving.

In the empirical chapter of this study, I shall briefly examine the role of Problem-Solving Workshops within the context of the war in Darfur, as organized by the Sudan Task Group

3.6.8 Track Two Diplomacy (unofficial Mediation)

The courage exhibited by the progenitors of the workshop approach to solving problems of international conflicts, shows the extent to which actors in the field of conflict resolution seek to create state of the art approaches as well as incorporate hitherto excluded actors into the handling of conflicts of the dimension exhibited in contemporary times. The strive towards non-

²⁴¹ Walton, “A Problem-Solving Workshop”, 475

coercive methods of mitigation in modern wars and the firm conviction in the ability to produce mutual acceptance and cooperative outcomes in any conflict has propelled the search for more and more methods to drive home that point. It is paramount to underscore, that the concept of Problem-Solving Workshops and its attendant actors is not to be viewed as the sole approach available to the conflict resolution field and applicable to the mitigation of conflicts. Also, efforts to resolve international conflicts on unofficial basis have not remained the solitary effort and contribution of scholars and practitioners.

On this note, this next section on track II diplomacy, introduces the one framework which encapsulates the activities of actors operating on unofficial capacity. It introduces other informal actors working to sustain what Joseph Montville tagged track II diplomacy.²⁴² Within the field, authors have designed other tracks and christened them Multi-Track Diplomacy.²⁴³ In like manner other writers suggest the possible hybridization of tracks II and I. This may be referred to as track I.5 diplomacy.²⁴⁴ Ostensibly, actors within this framework operate on unofficial capacity and refrain from promoting the interest of any government while exercising their conflict intervention skills.

Joseph Montville has defined Track II diplomacy as:

“Unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict”²⁴⁵

Other scholars like Bercovitch have described track II diplomacy as:

“Activities of private, non-governmental actors, seeking to prevent, resolve, or ameliorate violent political conflicts.”²⁴⁶

²⁴² Joseph Montville, “Track Two Diplomacy: The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A case for Track Two Diplomacy.” In, V.D Volkan, M.D, J. Montville, and D.A Julius (eds), *The Psychodynamics of International Relations: Vol 2. Unofficial Diplomacy at work*. (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991) P. 161-175 cited in Culture of Peace Online Journal, 2(1), 66-81,
www.peacemaker.un.org/.../TrackOneandaHalfDiplomacy_Mapendere.pdf

²⁴³ Louise Diamond and John McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1996)

²⁴⁴ Jeffrey Mapendere, “Consequential Conflict Transformation Model, and the Complementarity of Track One, Track One and a Half, and Track Two Diplomacy” written for and presented at The Carter Centre in summer 2000, cited in COPOJ

²⁴⁵ Joseph Montville cited in Culture of Peace Online Journal, 68

²⁴⁶ Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches*. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2009, 140

From the two definitions, it is possible to deduce some of the defining features and characteristics of track II actors, as much as gain some insight into their functions in international conflicts. As delineated in the definitions, the role of track II actors includes the creation of strategies and the provision of human and material resources that will assist in one way or the other in abating the debilitating effect of the conflict. This description tends to fit into the characterizing features of humanitarian and conflict resolution NGOs.

NGOs as track II actors...

NGOs have become increasingly relevant in conflict intervention. Their unflinching role in modern day conflicts cannot be overemphasized. They have remained an integral part in alleviating the suffering of war victims as well as in some cases served on levels that hitherto surpassed the ambit of their operation. NGO activities have basically included the provision of humanitarian relief, mitigation in cases of human rights abuses and efforts tailored towards post-conflict reconstruction. However most recently NGOs are being established with the sole purpose of conflict resolution. Since the 1980s, there has been a rise in NGO intervention in conflicts on the globe. According to mid-1990s records from the Carter Centre based in the US, over eighty international NGOs are preoccupied with the prevention and resolution of international conflicts. Similarly, 100 non-governmental organizations putatively engaged in the conflict prevention as well as peace building in Africa.²⁴⁷

Most NGOs enjoy the advantage of being stationed on ground of conflict zones. Their timely intervention therefore prevents the eruption of violence and even facilitates urgent relief in cases of humanitarian emergencies. NGOs have therefore become significant actors in several conflict settings around the world. At the onset of the Rwandan crisis in 1994 for example, there were 3 international NGOs engaged in humanitarian activities. By the time the war intensified, the number shot up to 106 the same year.²⁴⁸ This indicates the level of urgency with which NGOs respond to conflicts requiring prompt attention. Unofficial diplomacy also enjoys the efforts of actors within civil society. Actors range from retired civil and military officials, journalists, religious groups, elders etc. One significant case in point is the Pope's²⁴⁹ intervention in the Beagle Channel dispute. President Jimmy Carter's mediation on unofficial

²⁴⁷ Ibid, 137

²⁴⁸ Pamel Aall, Daniel Miltenberger and Thomas G. Weiss, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and relief Operations*. (Washington, Dc: United States Institute of Peace, 2000 P. 93) cited in Bercovitch and Jackson,140

²⁴⁹ Ibid, 142

capacity in the Haiti, Bosnia and the Sudan Conflict also comes to mind. The interventionist activities of journalists in the Vietnam War and in the Cuban Missile Crisis are more examples.

Track- Two informal actors were found useful in some prominent intervention cases in the early 1990s. Informal mediators in 1992 secured the Rome Agreement between the Mozambique rebel groups RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional de Mozambique and the FRELIMO government. Similarly, the Oslo Accord between the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) and the Israeli government and the Inter-Tajik Dialogue in 1993 and 1994 respectively, were facilitated on unofficial capacity.²⁵⁰ The efficacy of the unofficial form of mediation as demonstrated In the Mozambique crisis also successfully attracted much recognition for the application of track-two diplomacy (unofficial mediation) in the resolution of contemporary prolonged intra-state conflicts. This is especially so because mediation in that form warrants the incorporations of several other elements which conspicuously contrast it from the official form of mediation. In Jackson's 2005²⁵¹ account of the significance of unofficial diplomacy in current kinds of conflicts, the role of unofficial mediators in the Mozambique crisis was strongly highlighted. The peace actors (The Community of Sant'Egidio) who had been stationed in Mozambique since the 1970s facilitated renewed dialogue between the adversaries, following an unsuccessful Track-one attempt to intervene in the conflict. The involvement of Track-two actors engendered peaceful deliberations and was in October 1992 capped with the signing of the Rome Peace Agreement.

In this scholarly write-up for the Journal of Conflict Studies (The GREGG CENTRE For the Study of War and Society), Jackson underscored a certain kind of wisdom associated with the inclusion of mediators of unofficial capacity, into frameworks for peace. Unofficial mediators assumedly enjoy some prominent level of conversance with the adversaries and over time due to their prolonged presence on conflict terrains, become furnished with the trust and confidence of the belligerents. It may not be out of line therefore to argue that mediators are inclined to demonstrate a learned knowledge of the conflict. This attribute affords them the upper hand over official mediations plunged into the scene from the outside.

²⁵⁰ Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches*. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2009)

²⁵¹ Richard Jackson, "Internal War, International Mediation, and Non-Official Diplomacy: Lessons from Mozambique" in *The Journal of Conflict Studies*. (The GREGG CENTRE for the Study of War and Society, Vol 25, No 1. 2005) **Invalid source specified.**

Posterity stands to learn from the Mozambique experience with Track-two actors. The relevance of unofficial diplomacy in modern types of conflicts cannot be over-emphasized. Since their debut at resolution in intra-state conflict, Track-two actors have left an indelible mark on the search for solutions to violent conflicts. Actors tend to exhibit some of the most appropriate qualities and skills needed to adequately permeate the stubborn conflicts of our contemporary times. Track-two actors demonstrate an edge over official actors, as the weaker conflict party may perceive them as more reliable and neutral. It is assumed that their focus is to pursue an agreement of mutual benefit to the parties without favouritism.

Track-two actors also possess other strategies which are paramount to achieving lasting peace and which do not include coercive methods in the forms, manifested by Track-one actors. Track-two actors are presumably better positioned to access both Track-one and Track-three actors in a combined effort at resolution. Track-two actors better connect to what Jackson refers to as “insider intermediary”²⁵² or grass-root actors, to engender the collaborated effort needed to help the parties’ re-open communication and to effectuate the transformation at the least of the distorted perceptions and attitudes underlying the conflict. As was the case in the Mozambique crisis, Sant’ Egidio’s established links with the local Catholic Church and provided the platform for its intervention in that conflict. In similar vein, unofficial mediators usually operate on high-level secrecy; this affords them freedom to navigate their genuine opinion back and forth mediatory sessions without the fear of being accountable to anyone. On the other hand, a relaxed atmosphere provides the appropriate mood for parties to freely air their perceptions and grievances.

Challenges...

The exceeding relevance of Track-two actors cannot be seen as properly painted without mentioning some of the challenges they are confronted with, working within this particular framework of operation. One of the problems facing Track-two unofficial actors, as noted by Bercovitch, is the unavailability of guiding normative principles of operation. This compels mediators to carry out their functions on the basis of personal discretion. Similarly, unofficial

²⁵² Richard Jackson, “Internal War, International Mediation, and Non-Official Diplomacy: Lessons from Mozambique” in *The Journal of Conflict Studies*. (The GREGG CENTRE For the Study of War and Society, Vol 25, No 1. 2005)

players tend to face the problem of been perceived as operating within the defining lines of what Lederach described as the „prescriptive model”²⁵³. Training of locals and grass root actors has become a familiar strategy for ensuring local participation in conflict resolution. Under the circumstance when a trainer adopts the prescriptive model of training participants, he or she suggests a superiority of ideas and values, which he passes on to his participants as good knowledge to be applied to their conflict situation, yet such trainers are discerned, as somewhat imposing their cultural orientations on trainees. Similarly, the provision of aid relief tends to either aggravate the conflict or reduce it. *In terms of resource transfers, for example the provision of aid can reinforce and prolong conflict through the looting of aid supplies by combatants or through an inconsistent method of distribution.*²⁵⁴ Other challenges facing the Unofficial form of intervention in modern conflict, is a palpable deficiency in diplomatic ability and experience, the lack of physical resources, zero diplomatic immunity and the lack of good financial capability, especially on the part of NGOs, torn between accepting governmental funding and standing the risk of showing allegiance on the basis of such provision²⁵⁵

3.6.9 Building Peace in the aftermath of war.

The preceding sections have afforded an acquaintance with some of the methods of third party conflict intervention consistent with both the fields’ conflict management and conflict resolution. At this point, and prior to an assessment of the concept and underlying assumptions of conflict transformation, I shall examine the idea of building peace in societies emerging from war. Conflict and Peace are two sides of the same coin. The ability to subdue conflict allows for the entrance of peace. Each of the approaches we have examined seeks to achieve the goal of peace. Whether through initial efforts made on the bargaining table towards a negotiated settlement, the interposition of troops to separate warring factions and the implementation of peace accords or a total reconstruction of the ruins from war, all of these efforts have been tailored towards the actualization of a certain kind of peace. The question is, what kind of peace can hinder the re-eruption of conflict? The ability to achieve negative peace on the platform of peacekeeping or peace enforcement is a much welcome step towards efforts at positive peace. Nonetheless, the sole dependence on negative peace approaches makes the vision towards sustained peace exceedingly farfetched and unrealistic. The kinds of wars fought in the

²⁵³ John Paul Lederach, *Preparing For Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995) 47-54

²⁵⁴ Bercovitch and Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century*, 147

²⁵⁵ F Mawlawi, “New Conflicts, New Challenges: The Evolving Role for Non-Governmental Actors” in *Journal of International Affairs*, 46(2) 1993, 391-413 cited in Bercovitch *ibid*

aftermath of the cold war coupled with its attendant consequences, have set apart the instrument of inter-state rivalry especially in its traditional form, as most inadequate and deficient in the search for sustainable peace.

Since 1989 therefore and with its initial debut on African soil the practice of peace building is understood to be the final stage of the evolution of traditional peacekeeping. Its proposed activities ranging from humanitarian assistance to security and development according to erstwhile UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan, was “to create the conditions necessary for sustainable peace in war-torn societies”²⁵⁶ Although peace building is carried out by a wide range of actors who go about the business of building peace the way that they best understand, the one uniting factor is the objective to halt violent internal conflicts and to achieve peace.

The controversy as to whether the peace envisaged by the myriad of actors involved, leads towards a sustainable one remains to be determined by the vision, perception and principles guiding each of the intervening actors. When peace is construed as negative, in which case such outcome is viewed as desirable but arguably insufficient to restrain a resurgence of war, analysts insist that such peace regardless, helps facilitate the needed transition from war to that kind of peace that is positive and sustainable.

Edward Newman for example argues in line, by pointing to the conceptual construction of the actors, as playing a significant role in the objectives to be pursued in a particular peace building activity. In many cases, the achievement of a truce was thought to be the most realistic venture and purpose for engaging in peace building activity. When actors however envisioned peace building beyond the cessation of hostilities, it encompassed additional functions tailored towards a more constructive vision of sustainable peace and reconciliation.²⁵⁷ Be that as it may, the objective and motivation behind stretching the functions associated with traditional peacekeeping beyond its precepts, as highlighted by Boutros Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, was to undertake:

“Action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”.

²⁵⁶ Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

²⁵⁷ Edward Newman, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peace building*

Prior to this pronouncement, and during the cold war, the UN, the major international organization responsible for curbing all threats to international security, played the very neutral role of adhering strictly to its principles of non-interference. In more contemporary times though and as the cold war terminated, peace operations as it was dubbed, became an embodiment of two-fold activities: peace-making, peacekeeping, and culminated with the activity of peace building. While peace-making and peacekeeping fall under activities of the field of conflict management, peace building may be perceived as an approach newly introduced and consistent with the field of conflict resolution. It is identified as an approach of conflict resolution because it sets out to address underlying grievances and injustices perceived by the adversaries.²⁵⁸

This sub-section deals with the search for positive peace in internal conflicts as predicated on the activity of building peace in societies just emerging from conflict. It investigates into the origins of peace building, introduces some of its tasks especially in contemporary times as well as probes into the underlying principles and assumptions guiding the peace building activity. It then proceeds to examine the manner in which the search for positive peace has been conducted in the post conflict phase of Africa's conflicts, specifically in the aftermath of the cold war when post-conflict peace building began to gather full momentum as an integral part of UN missions across the world and especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The section sheds light on the liberal peace building as that singular model, whose guiding principles dominates and dictates the activities pursued by collateral actors in the search for peace in post conflict societies

3.6.9a Peace Building: Tracing the origin and defining the Peace Building activity

Even though authors like Paris have identified the Namibian war as the first UN peace building mission,²⁵⁹ others have preferred to mark out the UN Congo mission as the one mission conducted between 1960 and 1964 to have presented peacekeepers as performing other activities not associated with traditional peacekeeping.

²⁵⁸Mark J. Mullenbach, *"Reconstructing strife-torn societies: Third-party peacebuilding in intra-state disputes"* in T. David Mason and James D. Meernik, *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the peace.* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 59

²⁵⁹ Roland Paris, *At Wars End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

*“In some ways, ONUC was a precedent setting operation. It established that the United Nations could intervene in civil conflicts and that UN peacekeepers could perform functions far beyond those connected to ceasefire monitoring”*²⁶⁰

Diehl similarly tracing the initial deployment of actors to pursue peace building functions, argues that although the Namibian mission preceded the Somalian peace building intervention, peacekeepers were involved in a lot more activities identified today under dimensions of peace building, than the situations demanded in the Namibian crises. He maintains further, that the Namibian war could have passed for an inter-state rivalry, while the “Somalian crisis was purely internal“, requiring troops to engage in activities such as the maintenance of law and order and the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, establishing the location of initial peace building activities, does not yet answer the question as to why it became pertinent to introduce additional tasks to those the peacekeepers had hitherto performed and were confined to, going by the doctrine of traditional peace keeping.

Scholars have pointed the end of the cold war as paving the way for an increased involvement of peace actors in the internal affairs of warring states. With the demise of the cold war, erstwhile super power opponents: USA and Russia’s withdrawal of hegemonic and ideological control over client states around the world and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, seemed to have precipitated as already discussed in chapter two, the onslaught of a number of latent internal conflicts while terminating a good number as a result. The erupted conflicts, which were predominantly internally fomented, left behind signs of huge devastation as evidenced in the colossal destruction of the host country’s infrastructure. These catastrophes also engendered a breakdown of governing institutions and unleashed an enormous number of internally displaced persons in need of reintegration and rehabilitation. They equally precipitated a gross humanitarian crisis that in addition created a massive security dilemma. To this end, post-conflict peace building could not have originated for any reason other than to aid states emerging from conflict, so as to enable it stand on its feet again. Even though a number of commentators view the idea, based on initial experiences, as renewed form of western intrusion and subtle imposition of its values, the fact remains that its initial motivation was to prevent a

²⁶⁰ Paul. F Diehl, *“Paths to Peacebuilding: the transformation of peace operations”* in T David Mason and James D. Meernik. Op cit ,21

relapse into conflict as well as an action to deter possible threats to international peace and stability.²⁶¹

In contemporary times, the initial activities associated with post conflict peace building continues to contrast greatly with the mere monitoring of a cease fire and corollary activities of cold war peacekeeping. Also, the aftermath of interstate rivalry did not seem to warrant any deeper engagement with the states involved in conflict, since the style of warfare also usually followed certain internationally defined rules of engagement that contrasted it from the debilitating humanitarian disaster accrued from these new kinds of wars. An upsurge in internal conflicts as associated with the post-cold war era prompted the imperativeness for a deeper involvement of peace actors. Such were tuned to supporting post-conflict societies with efforts tailored towards surmounting humanitarian, security, development and governance challenges.

In line, Boutros Ghali announced that, UN activities in post-conflict societies would include:

“Disarming previously warring parties, the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, the repatriation of refugees, the provision of advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring of elections, efforts at protecting human rights, a reformation and strengthening of governmental institutions and the promotion of formal and informal processes of political participation”.²⁶²

Sub-Saharan African countries like Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Burundi, Central African Republic, Somalia, the Congo and Sudan have experienced such peace building activities performed majorly by the UN body. A number of the aforementioned African nations can attest to some form of peace elicited on the platform of a peace building agenda, yet in some other, conflicts have prevailed or re-erupted after a supposed consolidation of peace. The question is why? Critics have faulted the modus operandi and the guiding principles of the entire peace building activity, associating its practice with underlying assumptions aligned with the liberal peace theory. This form of peace building focuses majorly on the promotion of both democracy and an open market economy and perceives the pursuit of these and other of its values as panacea to the incessant civil wars on the African continent. In the light of such assumptions

²⁶¹ Tony Karbo, "Peace building in Africa," in *Peace and Conflict in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2008), 113-130

See, Kenneth C. Omeje and Tricia M. Redeker Hepner, *Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region* (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2013)

²⁶² Boutros-Ghali B, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peacekeeping*, Report of the General-Secretary (New York: United Nations 1992 in Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*

scholars like Tony Karbo contribute to the discourse especially as it touches on the African continent by arguing in this light:

*“Peace building should be much more than designing interventions as the political and economic levels; peace-building must be designed with a view to addressing the fundamental causes and conditions of the conflict”.*²⁶³

He caps his assertion with a closing contending statement:

*“The ultimate goal of peace-building in the African context, or in any context... is the rebuilding of relationships, asserting communal responsibility and solidarity”.*²⁶⁴

In the next section I shall touch on peace building as a concept, however in unfolding sections I propose to provide insight into the liberal peace kind of peace building and the manner in which its normative principles have played out in a number of sub-Saharan African post conflict and conflict societies mentioned elsewhere in this section.

3.6.9b The Peace Building concept

As mentioned elsewhere, the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, summarized the concept of peacebuilding as:

*“action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”*²⁶⁵

He went further to suggest that peacebuilding is that one activity amidst preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace keeping, which wraps up the whole idea of third-party intervention in violent conflicts. Prior to Ghali’s pronouncement on peacebuilding, prominent sociologist and peace researcher Johan Galtung had conceived of peacebuilding as:

²⁶³ Tony Karbo, "Peace building in Africa," in *Peace and Conflict in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2008),

²⁶⁴ Karbo, *Peace-building in Africa*, 114

²⁶⁵ Boutros-Ghali B, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making, and Peacekeeping*, Report of the Secretary –General. (New York: United Nations, 1992)

*“The practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development”.*²⁶⁶

He identified peace-making and peacekeeping as efforts to be combined with peacebuilding in order to achieve that peace which supersedes the mere absence of physical violence. Subsequently, other scholars have sought to provide conceptual insight into the idea of peacebuilding. For example, Mullenbach’s definition provides a good summary at first glance of some significant components of a large number of peacebuilding missions. He delineates peacebuilding to be:

*“Efforts by third-party actors during crisis phases or post-conflict phases of intra-state disputes which are initiated to deal with underlying problems or basic needs of the parties to the dispute, to foster conditions that enhance the likelihood that dispute will not escalate or re-escalate to military hostilities, and to enhance the likelihood that the dispute will be peacefully settled by the parties”*²⁶⁷

From his definition, we are able to deduce, that peacebuilding is a tool for intervention in intra-state rivalry and is not an activity restricted to the aftermath of war. Similarly, we gather that it is most probable that the risk of slipping back into war is reduced especially when peacebuilding sets out to address “the *basic needs of the parties*”

In similar vein, The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee explains peacebuilding from a different perspective. For them, peacebuilding refers to:

*“The effort to promote human security in societies marked by conflict. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict without violence, as a means to achieving sustainable human security”*²⁶⁸

This definition introduces the element of humanitarian assistance as one of the functions of peacebuilding. In their opinion, this dimension should be considered central to any peacebuilding mission.

²⁶⁶ Johan Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peace-making and Peacebuilding” in Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research II. (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1976) P. 292-304

²⁶⁷ T. David Mason and James David Meernik, *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace* (London: Routledge, 2006), 56

²⁶⁸ David Last, Organizing for Effective Peace building. *International peacekeeping* 7, no 1: 80-96 cited in Bercovitch and Jackson. .171

Lastly, Bercovitch and Jackson have propounded a much more encompassing conception of peacebuilding. They hold that:

“Peacebuilding entails concerted actions by international third parties working in both a military and civilian capacity, employing a hybrid of short-term and long-term political and development activities that are aimed at recovery from war, preventing a relapse into violent conflict, strengthening local capacities for peaceful conflict resolution, and creating the conditions for genuine long-term human security”. ²⁶⁹

From their definition, it is clear that unlike peacekeeping, which was majorly a military affair, peace building employs the services of civilians. This helps to tone down the preconception of an all-combatant activity, to one that may simultaneously provide the opportunity for a softer non-coercive engagement involving non-uniformed personnel. Similarly, as a deviation from initial criticisms which had depicted the peace building venture as not investing enough time to actualize its mission in totality, the duo suggests from their definition, the possibility of some form of adjustment in timing, probably based on more contemporary attempts at consolidating peace in post conflict societies. Although some of the components in their definition do not exactly suggest anything unfamiliar, one element tends to stand out as strikingly different. Bercovitch and Jackson indicate as part of the tasks of building peace, the *“strengthening of local capacities for peaceful conflict resolution”*. This assertion seems to refer to the capacity for peaceful resolutions reliant on a synergy between external peace actors and the custodians of indigenous peace-making institutions.

In developing chapters, I shall examine the prospects of incorporating local actors in activities tailored towards durable peace and harmony as demonstrated in the hybrid peace operations carried out in Darfur by the African Union and the United Nations.

3.6.9c Liberal Peace building in Africa

The African continent among others seemed to be the initial testing ground for the peace building agenda. With its initial involvement on the Namibian soil in 1989, peace actors were found executing other duties as stipulated within a framework for peace building in post-

²⁶⁹ Bercovitch and Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the 21st Century*, 172

conflict societies.²⁷⁰ From that time on, peace building has continued to play a pivotal role in the search for lasting solutions to Africa's incessant wars and in the desire to effect sustainable peace on the continent. Regardless of a seemingly benevolent gesture of total reconstruction by the international community towards societies emerging from war, the peace building activity has steadily and especially in its initial years, come under immense scrutiny.

Commentators insist that behind the curtain is a ploy to impose both democratization and free market economies on societies whose internal arrangement lacked the capacity according to western standards to uphold the underlying elements of the liberal kind of peace building.²⁷¹ The liberal peace theory from the point of view of the international community, held the answer to Africa's nightmare of endless wars. The institution of the liberal peace agenda was intended to translate into sustainable peace for states emerging from violent conflict. It upheld the application of its underlying tenets as the viable means towards the complete termination of internal conflicts, to the extent that the chances for a resurgence of conflict were either completely ruled out or became minimal.

Roland Paris in his book titled: "At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict,"²⁷² provides a good starting point for comprehending the discourse on liberal peace building as it obtained on the Sub-Saharan continent in the initial years. The author acknowledges that liberal peace played a role in the case of both Namibia and Mozambique. Ostensibly, these nations continued to experience stable peace in the aftermath of the 'liberal kind' of peace building. Paris nonetheless, was quick to remind his readers that: while one of the actors associated with the Namibian conflict was external to it, the Mozambique liberal peace experience attracted economic and political liberalization but escaped renewed violence on the premise that the conflict did not originate from actors within the conflict terrain. The reverse was nonetheless the case for instances of resurged conflict recorded in Angola and regrettably Rwanda. The experiences in these examples imprinted an unforgettable memory of genocide on its citizens as well as the continent at large.

²⁷⁰ See, chapter 3.3.6 for insight into the operation of peace building in selected cases of the sub-Saharan African region

²⁷¹ Mark Hoffman, "What is left of the 'liberal peace'?" LSE Connect, last modified 2009, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/alumni/LSEConnect/pdf/winter2009/LiberalPeace.pdf>.

²⁷² Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Tony Karbo turned to criticize the manner in which the liberal peace activity has so far been conducted in Africa using the following words as culled from Robin Luckham he states that:

“... Reforms tend to be conceived in terms dictated by the major donors and the international agencies, prioritizing the usual formula of liberal democracy, good governance and economic liberalization. Whilst elements of this formula are desirable in themselves, the entire package, and the manner in which it is promoted or imposed from the outside, tends to inhibit the fundamental rethinking that post-conflict states require the nature and purpose of political authority.”

He argues that the trajectory towards initiating the peace building agenda in Africa must be one that recognizes the imperative to target significant underlying components such as “rebuilding broken relationships and ensuring harmony”²⁷³

In similar manner, Albert corroborates Karbo’s stance arguing that the liberal peace agenda as demonstrated on terrains of conflict in Africa, tend to be motivated by normative assumptions and objectives that diverge from the African conception of peace building as represented in the norms and culture of African societies. In his opinion, the liberal peace agenda promotes a top-down approach to peace to the extent that the local ownership and indigenous participation becomes undermined.²⁷⁴

The underlining approach to sustainable peace in Africa cannot independently emerge from either side of the divide. As will become evident in the developing chapters.

The trajectory towards sustainability may derive from a fusion of the underlying salient components associated with each of the available external and internal mechanisms for peace.

²⁷³ Karbo, *Peace-building in Africa*, 117

²⁷⁴ Isaac O. Albert, "Understanding Peace in Africa," in *Peace and Conflict in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2008), 31

See, Gwinyayi Albert Dzinesa and Devon Curtis, *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012)

Chapter Four

4.1 From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Transformation: what prospects?

This chapter sets out to examine the “state of the art in the conflict transformation model”. I shall be exploring current literature from authors whose perception of durable solution in war ravaged societies, are hinged on a thorough investigation into the possible gains and prospects of seeking a transformation of conflict above its resolution or management. I shall identify some of the premises on which they tend to argue in favour of the transformation model. I shall conclude with a deep examination of the central message of conflict transformation based on core elements underscored in the seminal contribution of the field’s major proponents: John Paul Lederach. The author contemplates his position on the transformation approach from his religious background as an Anabaptist- Mennonite. Such religious convictions as well as years of experience on the field, place him at the vantage point from where he conceives of justice, mercy and reconciliation as vital and integral parts of his conceptions of transformation. In the final analysis, the chapter should furnish the reader with scholarship of the conception of conflict according to the school of conflict transformation. Central elements and actors perceived to possess the capacity to play vital roles in the realization of the vision towards durable peace will be identified.

As delineated in earlier sections, the field of conflict resolution emerged out of the vacuum created by the field of conflict management. Corroborating this assertion, Ryan drives home this point with this emphatic statement from Leatherman:

“The limitation of diplomacy to achieve durable peace outcomes to contemporary conflicts and to prevent others from turning violent, means there needs to be innovation in traditional ideas and practice. We need to go beyond the containment of violence and negotiation, to transform social injustices, perceptions, cultural tensions, deep rooted hatred and issues of institutional legitimacy”²⁷⁵

As discussed in previous sections the field of conflict resolution contingent on the Human Needs theory, deviated from classical statist methods involving coercive mechanisms, to pursue a distinct conflict analysis tactics, which to its progenitors, should serve to solve the problems

²⁷⁵ See, Janie Leatherman, *Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises* (West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian, 1999)

of contemporary kinds of conflicts. Yet, the whole idea of addressing modern conflicts from a different perspective, seemed insufficient in addressing other vital issues embedded in modern conflicts as captured in the last two lines of Leatherman's argument.

This state of affairs further compelled other scholars to view available methods as blinded to the need for deep structural and relational change. Small wonder Ryan contributed to the discourse by stating:

*"Some bitter conflicts appear to be so immune to existing tried and tested approaches to peace that only a radical change seems likely to jolt the parties out of their destructive interactions"*²⁷⁶

It is the palpable destructive energy that continues to define modern day conflicts that the school of conflict transformation views as the motivation for that deep change that may be engendered on the basis of a transformative approach to sustainable peace.

With respect to African conflicts and its attendant problems of identity: ethnic and religious cleavage, prolonged and stubborn types of conflict are seen to have defied strategies from the conflict resolution model. As a result, the resolution model seems likewise, to have left a vacuum, which the transformation model proposes to fill.

I shall subsequently examine why the transformation model tends to emphasize healthy relationships²⁷⁷ as paramount to averting a resurgence in conflict. The researcher is of the opinion that the transformation model especially as put forward by Lederach, presents a framework which has created "space" for the incorporation of a set of disenfranchised actors (Track III actors) their wisdom and resources. These hitherto inconsequential indigenous peace actors, who also happen to be the direct recipients of the war, have remained in the background, probably perceived more as the problem than prospective contributors on matters directly involving their own well-being and development.

The researcher further assumes that the transformation model mirrors two important elements of conflict resolution and peace-making in traditional societies of Sub-Saharan Africa. In pre-colonial traditional societies, inter and intra group feuds saw a transformation of underlying disputes after the ritual of reconciliation. As such reconciliation was seen as tantamount to

²⁷⁶ Stephen Ryan, *The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict*. (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007. 22

²⁷⁷ See, John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*. (PA: Good Books, 2003.)

absolute peace and constituted a significant and ineluctable aspect of the peace-making process in traditional societies. Within other societies, the obligation to pay compensation as a way of avoiding acts of vengeance from victims of conflict, tended to mark the conflict as completely resolved. Compensation was therefore a tool of transformation applied within the context of restorative justice.

Ryan argues that the move towards transformation is usually guided by several peace traditions ranging from Liberalists to Feminists; as such transformation connotes for each peace initiator something different.²⁷⁸ The transformation model from a religious perspective is ultimately linked to reconciliation and justice paralleling also the end goal of conflict resolution in societies of sub-Saharan. The transformation model according to Lederach preaches “constructive change”²⁷⁹ via justice and reconciliation as is defined along religious lines of Christianity. It advocates deep changes in the relationships, which have gone sour during the process of pursuing change through destructive means. The need to pave way for the reconciliation of parties becomes imperative in internal violent conflicts, where victims and perpetrators require in the aftermath of conflict to return to their communities and be reintegrated into a society of mutual coexistence. The sub section outlining Lederach’s work investigates this stance further.

A true transformation of individuals and relations therefore involves the healing of deep hurts and traumas. After forgiveness has been asked and received the reconciliation process initiated by the intervening parties and concluded according to the community’s conception of reconciliation, allows for brothers torn apart by conflict to move past grudges and grievances to become brothers²⁸⁰ again. Going by the assumptions of the transformative approach, conflictants are taught to accept one fact: that co-existence under peaceful conditions in the same old communities, with renewed and restructured minds is imperative to lasting peace. At the same time, distorted perceptions require the transition from foes to friends. As much as conflict holds the potential for change, change may not be achieved through the use of violence.

²⁷⁸ Ryan, “The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict”, 32-57

²⁷⁹ Lederach, “The Little Book of Conflict Transformation”, 4

²⁸⁰ Africans refer to fellow Africans as brothers even when there are no existing family ties. The belief that Africans have originated from a common ancestry tends to support this view.

Lastly, the transformation model as a framework for the analysis of and intervention in conflicts seems to have set the ball rolling based on propositions that suggest a somewhat clearer path towards the vision for durable peace on the African continent.

Durable solutions may be in the offing should Africa make the move to resuscitate its indigenous methods and institutions as well as empower its custodians to swing back into action, maintain peace, prevent and resolve conflicts on the grass-roots, most notably in semi-modern societies, where traditions and norms continue to dominate the state of affairs in times of peace and conflict. To this end, Africa might be on the verge of breaking free from the strong grip of endemic wars and the debilitating effects of prolonged and stubborn conflicts.

Although track III grass-root actors have been identified as significant players complementing the role of top level and middle level actors in any peace initiative, it is not quite clear within the African context of conflict resolution and peace-making who these group tagged “grassroot actors” might specifically refer to. Would they be local NGOs whose stamped presence have manifested in the several efforts at resolution and peace? Would they be local religious leaders? Or probably a set of prominent players tasked with the sole responsibility to restore peace and harmony in traditional African societies? We shall seek answers to these questions as an investigation into the transformation model progresses.

Transformation is perceived as thorough and absolute when major changes have occurred on the structural and relational levels. This study tends to concentrate on those results that are likely to occur if reconciliation in the African context is introduced as a significant element towards sustainable peace. What has prompted the strong advocacy for the revival of indigenous structures and strategies of peace-making and peace keeping in traditional African societies? Do indigenous structures still possess the capacity to hold together societal harmony, as was the case in numerous societies in pre-colonial Africa? How reliable are assertions such as “If given the chance, Native Administration ²⁸¹ may still manifest those capabilities to uphold peace, prevent, as well as resolve conflicts in today’s traditional Sub-Saharan African societies”.

²⁸¹ Adam Azzain Mohammed, “Indigenous Institutions and Practices Promoting Peace and/or Mitigating Conflicts: The Case of Southern Darfur of Western Sudan”. In *Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur*. (Conference Paper) Conference held in Khartoum, December 2004. Published by the University of Peace for the UN, 2006

Having examined these important points, what exactly does conflict transformation bring to the table? What distinguishes it from the conflict resolution model? What concepts, principles and assumptions underlie the call to seek the transformation of protracted intractable conflicts rather than the resolution thereof? What should the transformation model be doing better than the conflict resolution approach, with respect to modern conflicts? Diana Francis book titled *“People Peace and Power, Conflict Transformation in Action”*, challenges the supposed distinctness of the conflict transformation approach to peace. She submits:

*“If conflict transformation is to be worthy of its name, it must address the limitations of conflict resolution and must have something radical to offer in conflicts where power asymmetry is not incidental but of the essence.”*²⁸²

In the light of Francis’s assertion what should be construed as that “radical something” which the transformation model has to offer?

4.2 Understanding Conflict Transformation: An assessment of scholarly contributions to the transformation concept

In previous sections, I attempted to provide definitions to conflict management and conflict resolution. Both definitions provided insight into the basic characteristics of these approaches to internal conflict. I delineated some consistent underlying assumptions, provided each field’s perception of the origins of conflict and rendered a glimpse into the methods it applies in the mitigation of conflict.

In the light of this, it becomes pertinent, also, to seek an elaborate understanding of the concept and a perception of “conflict based on ideas projected from the conflict transformation framework of analysis via authors whose established preference for the transformation model have been evidenced in scholarly articles and literatures.

In the early 1990s a number of authors contributed to the development of the transformation discourse however in recent times several others have attempted to contribute their unique perspective for an enhanced comprehension of what the transformation approach has to offer.

Contributing to the Transformation discourse, 21-century author Miall opines that,

²⁸² Diana Francis, *People, Peace and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action*. (London: Pluto Press, 2002) 40

*“A theory of conflict transformation is emerging”*²⁸³.

The author elaborating further, seemed less convinced about any novelty attached to this emerging theory. His conclusion is founded on the premise that some underlying assumptions and conceptions from the Management and Resolution perspectives are analogous to those from the transformation’s perspective. As such for him, the transformation model is better conceived as:

*“A re-conceptualization of the field in order to make it more relevant to contemporary conflicts”*²⁸⁴

Mitchell views the concept of transformation as:

“Involving some kind of major change- a qualitative shift, as opposed to a quantitative alteration in degree”.

He however seemed to have corroborated Maill’s assertion by illuminating the work of John Burton and Frank Duke. In that book titled “Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution”, the goals of the resolution model were conceived as being in consonance with those proposed by the transformation model. That notion may have occasioned the pronouncement that the supposed shift from resolution to transformation might just be a change in terminology. Mitchell wrote:

“John Burton and Dukes in the early 1990’s wrote about conflict resolution processes as being those that seek to also examine needs and options, and reach agreements that not only satisfy those needs but which can also bring about changes in existing systems and patterns of relations giving rise to the conflicts in the first place”

Miall may have perceived the transformation model as a mere re-conceptualization. Major proponents nonetheless, confirm the transformative approach as a significant motivation towards the adoption of efficient and effective strategies capable of addressing the protraction and intractability characterizing modern day internal conflicts. The protagonists of the transformation model insist that the concept constitutes processes, which are geared towards the contemplation of deeper levels of change in contrast to antecedent approaches of conflict mitigation. Such emphasis on profound change seeks to pay unabated attention to the

²⁸³ Hugh Miall, “Conflict Transformation: A Multi- Dimensional Task” <http://www.berghof-handbook.net>

²⁸⁴ *ibid*

transformation of conflict predicated on the restoration of party's relations to the state of peaceful and balanced.

Lederach, who has since become recognized as its principal proponent, approaches the transformation discourse from a much more optimistic stance. His work will be thoroughly examined in the concluding part of this section. This slant however, culled from one of his scholarly contribution delineates some of the core elements of the transformation model, and emphatically projects an axiomatic shift in paradigm, necessitated by the current nature of contemporary conflicts. He states:

*“The conceptual paradigm and praxis of peace building must shift significantly away from the traditional framework and activities that make up statist diplomacy.... This pragmatic shift is articulated in the movement away from a concern with the resolution of issues toward a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships”*²⁸⁵

While underscoring the “restoration and rebuilding of relationships” as relevant components of the transformation model, he emphatically proposes the occurrence of a shift and the emergence of a novel strategy that will address conflicts beyond the limits of the other two approaches.
”²⁸⁶

Christopher Mitchell further summarizes the aim of the transformation model in a manner that tends to negate insinuations of a mere shift from one terminology to the other. He postulates in favour of a strategy capable of engendering change far beyond the existing conventional approaches to conflict.

Transformation he suggests:

“Takes the business of coping with destructive protracted conflicts beyond the cessation of violence, the achievement of a compromise settlements or even the joint creation of an acceptable solution to the issues currently in conflict between the adversaries-in other words” he concludes... *“Beyond resolution”*

²⁸⁵ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 27

²⁸⁶ *ibid*

I shall subsequently view some of the contrasting features between the resolution and transformation model as expatiated on by other writers.

At the core of the transformation model as already indicated, is the emphasis on relational change. It accentuates the assumption that relationships un-peaceful and peaceful play a decisive role in the formation and transformation of conflicts. This anticipated state of “peacefulness in unequal relations between adversaries, construed as the end-state; “transformed relations” is what Adam Curle defines as a state in which “*neither domination nor imposition exist, but where there is mutual assistance, mutual understanding, mutual concern and collaboration founded on this mutuality*”.²⁸⁷

In 1990 Adam Curle adduced some tools for the transformation of conflicts based on his experience as a mediator in Nigeria’s Biafra War. They included mediation, development and education.

In an earlier 1971 publication, he corroborated the field’s emphasis on relationships by arguing that:

*“The process of peace-making consists in making changes in relationships so that they may be brought to a point where developments can occur”*²⁸⁸.

Development here is understood as the growth of relations in “harmony and productiveness” He further suggest a few ways in which vertical relationships may be altered; by promoting the transmutation from unbalanced to balanced relationships, contingent on six elements including confrontation and development.

Bush and Folger,²⁸⁹ in the early 1990s, expounded the transformative approach to mediation. They contend that constructive change can be achieved within the society when conflict is approached through the lenses of the transformation model. In contrast to the consciousness of “solving problems” which has informed mediation in modern conflicts, these scholars suggest that change may become imminent when a mediator’s expectation is majorly focused on achieving the transformation of parties against a mere solving of the issue at hand. By their judgment, change is confirmed by a transformation of the parties from “fearful or self-centred

²⁸⁷ Adam Curle, *Making Peace*. (London: Tavistock Publication, 1971)

²⁸⁸ *ibid*

²⁸⁹ Robert A. Baruch Bush, Joseph P. Folger, *The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition*. (California: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1994), 55-112

beings into confident responsive caring individuals”. Transformative mediation sets out to engender individual change.

Bush and Folger interpreted this change in individuals as a step towards or akin to change in the society at large. A full grasp of the tenets of transformative mediation tends to spur the mediator into “bringing out the intrinsic goodness that lies within the parties as human being” According to the two authors, conflict may be perceived as an opportunity for “moral growth and transformation” Their study points to the gross inadequacy inherent in the job of mediators whose approach to conflict and mediation is hinged upon the problem-solving perspective, where conflict is construed in terms of problems requiring solution. In their opinion, mediators who are guided by the problem solving “orientation” “tend to steer parties in a certain direction. Such mediators remain clued to their own values and biases and tend to pursue a settlement they perceive to be satisfactory.

Such influence putatively produces “dissatisfaction or unfairness in parties”. A faulty “orientation” to conflict tends to induce in the mediator, the dire need to find solutions. However, considering the nature of current conflicts, such perception of conflict only leaves the parties discontented. In contrast to problem-solving mediation, transformative mediation is meant to engender empowerment and recognition in the parties. To this extent, parties become aware of their own capacity to deal with conflicts and are able to find a genuine responsiveness to the opponent’s situation and humanness. Bush and Folger underscored that the transformative approach to mediation leaves room for proper articulation. Their optimistic stance regardless provides a platform on which the inadequacies of current approaches to mediation in internal conflicts may be re-examined. A more efficient approach may be embedded in the transformative model. It may demonstrate the capacity for constructive change.

In 1996, the Institute for Multi- Track Diplomacy headed by Notter and Diamond, summarized conflict transformation in a paper using the following words.

“Conflict transformation refers to the process of moving from conflict –habituated systems to peace –systems. This process is distinguished by the more common term of conflict resolution because of its focus on systemic change. Social conflicts that are deep-rooted or intractable get these names because the conflict has created patterns that have become part of the social system. With the social system as the unit of analysis,

*the term “resolution” becomes less appropriate. Transforming deep-rooted conflicts is only partly about “resolving” the issue of the conflict-the central issue is systemic change or transformation. Systems cannot be “resolved” but they can be transformed, thus we use the term transformation”*²⁹⁰

The above assertion may be understood both as a clear definition and an emphatic statement of preference for the transformation model. It clearly presents one of the major differences between conflict resolution and conflict transformation. While the resolution model underscores the fulfilment of basic needs, the transformation approach emphasizes systemic change. By this we understand that certain changes precipitated by conflict have occurred on the social, political and economic terrains within society. These adverse effects emanating from within a conflict environment, have burrowed so deep, so that conflicts as these, solely witness deep levels of positive change if a gradual transformation and a re-learning from conflict-habituated systems to peace-systems is introduced contrary to the pursuit for a resolution thereof.

Galtung who has written extensively in the broader field of conflict studies presents the Transcendence model of conflict transformation. Transcendence depicts the “creation of a new type of reality and an opening of new landscapes”²⁹¹ Conflict transformation as interpreted by him, means:

*“To transplant conflict to that new reality”*²⁹² created by the concept of Transcendence. He further opines that “to transform a conflict would mean to transcend the goals of the conflict parties, defining some other goals, lifting a conflict (“disembedding”) out of the bed the parties have prepared for that conflict, including the discourses to ensure that the incompatibility looks insurmountable (the contradiction non-transcendable) embedding it at a more promising place.”²⁹³

²⁹⁰ James Notter and Louise Diamond, *Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice*. Published as Occasional Paper 7, for the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. Washington, DC. October 1996.

²⁹¹ Johan Galtung, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (The Transcend method) Participants/ Trainers Manual*, United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme

²⁹² *Ibid*

²⁹³ Johan Galtung, *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (The Transcend method) Participants/ Trainers Manual*, United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme.

By this Galtung suggests that the contradictions (conflict), which emerge from incompatibilities between parties, are surely transcendable. This perception tends to negate the concept of Management where such contradictions are discerned as better managed in order to ameliorate its depredating effect. Attitudes and behaviours that are the products of unhealthy and unjust relations are better tackled from a transformative perspective, where a change in parties' relations is central.

Similarly, Kumar Rupesinghe has argued for the application of a more appropriate approach in the search for answers to the complexities associated with modern day conflicts. His assertions also suggest an axiomatic contrast between a resolution and a transformation approach to conflict. He reaffirms that the transformation model holds better promises for the analysis and mitigation of protracted internal conflicts.

“I would suggest that a more promising approach for deep-seated internal conflicts could be a predominantly transformative process, where coming to an agreement on outstanding issues as quickly as possible is of secondary importance to addressing the overall conflict process and coming to terms with the temporal aspects of conflict.”²⁹⁴

Furthermore, he contends that the conditions for structural and attitudinal changes must be fulfilled, to enable transformation in its totality. His contribution to the transformation discourse touched on several other aspects that will be discussed in subsequent chapters where the emphasis will be on assessing some of the vital elements playing an integral role in the formulation of a framework for durable peace in deeply polarized societies.

Raimo Väyrynen²⁹⁵ sees the conflict transformation as a framework suitable for the analysis of the dynamics of conflicts. He has provided four categorizations in which transformation may occur within the course of a conflict. He states:

“Conflicts are continuously transformed even if efforts to resolve them explicitly have not made any visible progress. As a matter of fact, many intractable conflicts of interests

²⁹⁴ Kumar Rupesinghe, “Conflict Transformation” in Kumar Rupesinghe, ed, *Conflict Transformation* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 65-90

²⁹⁵ Raimo Väyrynen, “To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts” in Raimo Väyrynen, ed, *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation* (California: Sage Publication, 1991),1-25

or values may find their solution only through the process of transformation. Conflict transformation happens in several different ways” ²⁹⁶

Väyrynen’s understanding of conflict transformation initially depicts transformation as a continuous process occurring within the life cycle of a conflict and depicts changes that have manifested in the dynamic of a conflict. His standpoint is suggestive of a conception of transformation contrasting those of other writers on the transformation model who view the model of intervention also as an end-state to be achieved over a prolonged period of its initiation. Transformation as enumerated by Väyrynen may occur in the following areas:

1. Actor transformation may occur when “there are internal changes in major parts of the conflict or the appearance and recognition of new actors”
2. Issue transformation is evidenced by an “alteration in the political agenda of the conflict” on this level of transformation, a shift occurs to make manifest a redefinition of issues and an emphasis is placed on issues enhancing mutuality. Furthermore, a link between actor transformation is connoted with the following statement:
“The issue transformation means that the political constellation supporting the previous agenda will have to change; in other words, the transformation concerns simultaneously several actors and connects issues and actors with each other”
3. A third transformation is presented in the area of “rules”. It denotes a change in the actor’s modus operandi. “A rule transformation may be associated with a re-examination of the norms guiding actor’s common relations”
4. The fourth level of transformation delineated by Väyrynen constitutes one of the core elements of the transformation perspective. As well as a point of convergence for the majority of the writers on conflict transformation: “structural transformation” Although his perception of structural change differs from that of Lederach, it undoubtedly re-echoes Curle’s recommendation for a transformation in the structure of relations between parties; from unbalanced to balance and a corollary transition from un-peaceful to peaceful.

From Väyrynen point of observation, structural transformation is evidenced by a change in the relations between conflictants. By which the author suggests a qualitative change in the party’s mutual relations or a reduced or enhanced level of communication. Finally, Väyrynen refers to transformation which may be intended as well as unintended.

²⁹⁶ Väyrynen, “To settle or to Transform”, 4

In like manner, Spencer and Spencer have contributed their quota to the thinking on conflict transformation. In their scholarly piece, which addressed the role of third-party mediation in conflict transformation processes and the effects of a new strategy for intervention in internal wars, their viewpoint on the transformation model is made explicitly clear. They have based their argument on experiences gathered in three African conflicts: Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan and Liberia. Following in Väyrynen's footsteps they assert:

*“Conflict transformation is a continuous process which may be enhanced by third parties having the capacity to create conditions to develop political will”*²⁹⁷

They contend further, that the transformation process may involve the following elements: cultural, political, economic, psychological, regional and international, which may be combined and focused to empower parties to reframe their differences”

Going by their assertion and a general analysis of their scholarly contribution, it may be inferred that the job of transforming rests majorly on third-party mediators and as it seems “outsider” third parties. However as opined by Rupesinghe who underscores the relevance of the “insider partial” kind of third-party mediation:

*“Outsider neutral model of third-party mediation has proven invaluable in resolving many conflict situations, it has also demonstrated serious flaws and clearly is not applicable in all circumstances”.*²⁹⁸

By this the author cautions that an overreliance on external mediators tends to undermine the whole peace process and therefore suggests the inclusion of “insider partials”. Each of these actors cannot deliver the desired end-state of transformation in isolation. What is advised is a synergy between insiders and outsiders in a long-term framework for sustainable peace.

Even though Spencer and Spencer had attempted to contribute to the discourse on transformation, their modus-operandi in the three conflicts demonstrated the same third-party form of mediation captured by Bush and Folger which emphasized on a shift from a “problem solving orientation” to a focus on changing or transforming individuals. In the final analysis,

²⁹⁷Dayle E. Spencer and William J. Spencer, “Third-Party Mediation and Conflict Transformation: Experiences in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Liberia” in Kumar Rupesinghe, *Conflict Transformation* ,162-199

²⁹⁸ Rupesinghe, “conflict transformation”, 86

the authors make the conclusion that “there is not only one “right way” to manage or resolve conflict, the psychological dimensions of conflict and the changing nature of circumstance on the ground in internal wars preclude the development of such generalizations”.²⁹⁹ They have also stressed that part of their failure especially in the Sudanese war may be attributed to the challenges facing the transformation model. They underscore a flaw in its strategies and methodologies, these they contend, may need future attention if the model is to be found applicable to modern kinds of conflicts.

Kriesberg³⁰⁰ has further elaborated on what he perceives to be some of the challenges facing the transformation approach to conflict. He underscores the inappropriate employment and the underutilization of its ideas and illuminates some of the errors and grey areas in the approach. He contends that the approach seems applicable to very few conflict scenarios. Furthermore, he stresses that the ideas for transforming any conflict should emanate from “the people on the contending side”, rather than allow external intermediaries to impose their own perception of transformation on conflicts, which they discern from an outsider perspective. It may be the reason why some authors like Lederach, stress the importance of cultural sensitivity and local empowerment. We will look deeply into those concepts in subsequent chapters.

In this section, an attempt has been made to examine some contributions to the developing discourse of applying a transformative approach to modern day conflicts. Spencer and Spencer’s contributions seemed to raise some doubt about the appropriateness of transforming in contrast to managing and resolving. To this end one may wonder what the merits are that may accrue from the transformation model as an embodiment of some of the ideas needed to initiate durable peace in Darfur’s on-going war. Writing in early 1990s, could it have been that Spencer and Spencer missed out on some important elements? Or was the Sudan conflict one of such cases as suggested by Kriesberg, where attendant assumptions became inapplicable? Why has this work chosen some of the components from the transformation model as captured by Lederach as suitable for initiating peace in a protracted ten-year on-going internal war like that of Darfur? What are those significant elements that may be relevant in the transformation

²⁹⁹ Dayle E. Spencer and William J. Spencer, “Third-Party Mediation and Conflict Transformation: Experiences in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Liberia” in Kumar Rupesinghe, *Conflict Transformation*, 162-199

³⁰⁰ Louis Kriesberg, The State of the Art in Conflict Transformation in Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.

framework for peace in Darfur? Subsequent chapters would attempt to provide answers to these questions.

4.3 Conflict and its Transformation: ideas and perspectives according to John Paul Lederach.

This study chooses to reflect deeply on John Paul Lederach's contribution to the transformation model. Why is this so? The author's perceptions on conflict are especially insightful. They highlight some core elements that may contribute to the occurrence of structural and relational change within societies experiencing protracted internal conflicts. Thus, his work would guide investigations seeking to understand the prospects embedded within a transformations framework, which may precipitate relational change within societies marred by long years of conflict.

Contingent upon a peace process which demonstrates a significant measure of sensitivity to the local Peace-making mechanisms, Lederach recommends the inclusion of "grassroots actors", especially the local custodians of such methods whose central focus it is to reconcile both victims and perpetrators of conflicts alike. It is assumed that a peace process that ignores the imperative for reconciliation, with time may be inclined to contend with the reoccurrence of violence. In developing subsections i shall examine the significance of reconciliation within the transformation framework for durable peace.

It must be clearly understood that the adoption of this model does not suggest the endorsement of a panacea towards the problem of internal violence but serves to illuminate the essential ingredients in the quest for lasting peace. It seeks to underscore the relevance and supposed importance of a set of actors it has dubbed "indigenous actors". His reflections have boarded on a number of important aspects that have hitherto remained inconsequential to the entire conflict intervention agenda. I intend to embark on this assignment with a view to explore the efficacy of the underlying principles of the transformation model when applied to Darfur's decade old conflict. John Paul Lederach happens to be that scholar and practitioner lauded for his seminal contribution to the development and practice of the transformation approach. Several of his ideas, which have already received our attention in preceding sections, form the bedrock on which the empirical chapters of this thesis will be developed and analysed.

Lederach opines, that interventions inspired by a transformation perspective, better enhances the chances for durable peace. He suggests a fusion of the transformation strategies with mainstream approaches for intervention in modern day conflicts. In an initial comparison with the resolution approach, in which the author delineates conflict resolution strategies for intervention as focused on addressing “presenting issues”, he summarizes his understanding of the transformation approach with the following words:

“Not satisfied with a quick solution that may seem to solve the immediate problem, transformation seeks to create a framework to address the content, the context and the structure of the relationship. Transformation as an approach aspires to create constructive change processes through conflict. Those processes provide opportunity to learn about patterns and to address relationship structures while providing concrete solutions to presenting issues”³⁰¹

Some defining characteristics of the Transformation approach to conflict intervention may be inferred from the statement above. Peaceful and balanced relationships are tantamount to a harmonious co-existence, both on international and national levels. The approach tends to unravel escalated conflicts beyond those immediate issues, which may have triggered its outbreak. It seeks to investigate into deeper relationship patterns existing between parties to a conflict.

“The issues over which people fight are important and require creative response. However, relationships represent a web of connections that form the larger context” ... Deeper than what is manifested, lays underlying issues which are as well embedded in long histories³⁰²

The approach embraces conflict as a relevant ingredient in the stew of change. “It is a normal and continuous dynamic within human relationships”³⁰³ Rather than regard conflict as a source of menace to whatever it comes in contact with, from a vision to transform, it may be perceived as a catalyst for constructive change. The transformation perspective therefore provides the

³⁰¹ John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2003), 12

³⁰² *ibid*

³⁰³ Lederach, “*The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*”, 15

suitable platform for addressing the content as well as the context of conflict, with the major objective of engendering profound change.

In pre-colonial Africa, peaceful relations played a significant role in preserving peace and harmony at all levels of the society,³⁰⁴ from the lowest to the highest of levels of interaction; either within a family, among group of families, within or between communities. Peace-making institutions and practices became relevant to this effect. In the light of this, we see embedded in the transformational approach an inherent connection between core component-emphasis of relational patterns and those essential elements underscored during the process of conflict resolution in indigenous pre-colonial African societies.

From a transformational perspective, the focus on relationships may be analysed from dual angles: A restoration of broken relations on an interpersonal level, and intervention aimed at precipitating change in social, political cultural and economic relations (Structural or Systemic Change) On the personal level, Lederach holds that the focus of the transformational approach would involve:

*“grief and trauma work, as well as dealing with deep feelings of fear, anger and bitterness”*³⁰⁵

associated with all forms of loss experienced in prolonged violent conflicts

From Lederach’s definition below, we are further able to draw on other important aspects considered in an analysis and response to conflict defined by the transformation approach.

*“Conflict Transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and responds to real –life problems in human relationships.”*³⁰⁶

Although the transformation approach seeks to concentrate on conflict as possessing the potentials for change, it strongly abhors the use of violent means. Therefore, as the above

³⁰⁴ Adam Curle, *Tools for Transformation: A Personal Study* (Stroud: Hawthorn Press, 1990)

³⁰⁵ John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 20

³⁰⁶ John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 20

definition captures, included in the transformation agenda is the objective to set in motion the processes for tackling violence and addressing injustice both at structural and relational levels. Justice as an integral part of peace-making connotes the following:

“Doing justice is the pursuit of restoration, or rectifying wrongs, of creating right relationships based on equity and fairness, advocacy for the harmed, facilitating the forum for an open acknowledgement of the wrongs committed and for making them right...”³⁰⁷

The focus on justice tends to connect with the need to show mercy and forgiveness. These elements are found to exist within the context of reconciliation. Hence, we highlight the preference for, and an emphasis on restorative justice in contrast to retributive justice.

“Reconciliation is focused on restoring broken relationships between adversaries. Seeing reconciliation as an integral part of peace-making involves, creating time and a place within various levels of the affected population, to address, integrate, and embrace the painful past and the necessary shared future as a means of dealing with the present”³⁰⁸

4. 4 Levels of transformation

It is commonplace understanding that conflict has the capacity to engender some form of change on different levels. These changes have been identified as unpalatable and most times undesirable. Yet the manifestation of such changes in any conflict characterized by violence, are often times unavoidable. Ryan has identified as negative transformation: altered perceptions and attitudes, negative images, distrust. To this he adds changes on the economic, social, and political terrains. Knowledge of the occurrence of negative transformation in conflict terrains, occasioned by violence, has received the scholarly preoccupation of several authors. Deutsch for example, extensively discussed such negative changes in terms of “destructive processes”.³⁰⁹ Pruitt and Fry in like manner, catalogued five types of such changes, which may occur in a conflict situation. Ryan captures them in the following manner: “from

³⁰⁷ *ibid*

³⁰⁸ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 34

³⁰⁹ Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*. (Yale University Press: Haven, 1973) cited in Stephen Ryan, *The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict*. (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007) ,60

light to heavy, from doing well to hurting the other, from small to large issues, from specific to general issues and from few to many actors”.

Lederach has developed on the discourse further by describing some levels on which negative transformation may occur. He analyses these levels of change from a prescriptive and descriptive perspective. We observe his unremitting emphasis on those changes occurring in relationships and structures. As has been underscored in several aspects of this work, these two levels constitute the core message of the transformation approach. The incapacity of any process of change to incorporate these cardinal levels of change into its operational framework can be seen as tantamount to the resurgence of any conflict. Since the process of transformation can only be initiated when these areas have been identified where negative transformation has occurred or is evident, it becomes important to examine some of these levels of transformation as delineated and inspired by Lederach.

In his opinion, the escalation of a conflict may occasion changes on the following levels. These changes help to illuminate the path on which constructive transformation may be initiated.

1. **Personal:** A conflict may negatively affect the physical well-being of an individual, and their capacity for accurate perception. It may trigger a decline in self-esteem as well as emotional stability. Positive transformation would entail a restoration of the human individual to the level where the full potential for physical, emotional, and spiritual growth can be maximized.
2. **Cultural:** Is conceived of as changes that as a result of the conflict have provoked changes in the cultural behaviours of a people. The transformation process seeks in this regard, to resuscitate and revive those resources and mechanism possessing the capacity to effect the positive transformation of conflict. In a conflict like that of Darfur, a transformation-oriented intervention, would seek to identify the destruction induced on its cultural life with the emergence and protraction of its conflict.
3. **Structural changes:** Structural changes include those changes, which have occurred in the political, social and economic environments, which have affected the entire wellbeing, development and growth of a society. Most often, changes on this level are envisioned in connection with how governments have built political and economic structures, which have, either infringed on the basic needs of its populations or exhibited inequity in resource distribution. The evidence of structural decay within a society also constitutes one of the root causes of prolonged strife. As such a transformation approach

strongly underscores changes in social, political and economic structures as tantamount to durable peace in societies experiencing deep-seated cleavage. An emphasis on structural change suggests that the re-occurrence of the same conflict is averted, and the future of a people is completely altered for good. It connotes the manifestation of deep level change.

4. **Relationship changes:** Relationships can be manifested on different levels: interpersonal, intergroup or even international. They involve some demonstrated interaction between two parties and an exhibited pattern of exchange, which may be measured in terms of content and quality. Relationships are also connected to memories and often include an assessment and reassessment of parties' expectations from a relationship.³¹⁰

When relationships are confronted with conflict situations, those relationships are transformed negatively. Friends become foes and even brothers³¹¹ begin to see each other as enemies. Communications is broken, while negative perceptions begin to sprout, and attitudes change. A number of writers have underscored a change in the subjective causes of conflict, usually embedded within parties' relationships, as relevant to effective and enduring change. Similarly, within the transformation framework, it becomes paramount to seek changes in relational patterns which underlie a conflict, without which a conflict is threatened by re-eruption. Thus, the transformation approach set in motion change processes to improve communication, as well as help parties transcend distorted relations and more importantly help parties overcome deep seated grievances, fears and hurts evident between parties and precipitated by aggression.

Mitchell has hinted on the difficulty involved in changing distorted perceptions and enemy images created over a long period of time, and probably passed on from generation to generation.³¹² It may be for reasons like this that the transformation approach insists on developing change processes within a long-term framework and underscores the wisdom in indigenous mechanisms of peace and resolution. Theorist within the field contend that such measures will endure long after the external actors of conflict transformation have exited the conflict domain.

³¹⁰ Christopher Mitchell, Beyond Resolution: What Does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform? <http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/CM83PCS.htm> accessed 01.02.2013

³¹¹ "Brothers" Based on an African understanding.

³¹² Mitchell *ibid*,12

In developing chapters, we shall understand how pre-colonial African societies maintained and reconciled inter-communal relationships on the platform of indigenous institutions and its custodians. From the outset, attendant actors have come to terms with need to reconcile parties and groups, as a way of preventing the re-occurrence of the same conflicts. We shall understand the wisdom behind processes of reconciliation and attendant reconciliation ceremonies as a means of mending broken relationships and reinstating peace and harmony within the community

4.5 A transformation framework: building peace in protracted African conflicts. An overview of Lederach's comprehensive framework

Somewhere in this study, Edward Azar's theory of protracted social conflicts will be adopted in the analysis of some underlying conditions, which accounted for fresh violence in Darfur, more than a decade ago. In like manner, Lederach's "comprehensive framework for intervention in protracted internal conflicts"³¹³ will provide the investigative elements which this study will depend on to examine the manner in which the international community has responded to Darfur's conflict on the track III level of intervention. Specifically, the framework will aid the enquiry into the role of UNAMID as sole international peacemaker currently supporting the transformation of violent conflict in Sudan's western region. In the empirical chapters of this study, I shall examine the extent to which the propositions underlying the author's framework can become operational in real time protracted conflicts like that of Darfur's. This section however introduces the reader to these propositions and forms the basis on which the findings from the field will be analysed. Although some of the elements underpinning his comprehensive framework have been mentioned elsewhere in preceding sections of this chapter, this section outlines these components in ways that seeks to delineate more deeply the essence of incorporating these factors into mainstream approaches geared towards sustainable peace in protracted internal conflicts.

I underscore the relevance of three salient elements found within Lederach comprehensive framework for intervention in protracted internal conflicts'

³¹³ John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 201-222

4.5.1 Adoption of longer time frames for intervention in protracted internal conflicts.

Lederach accentuates the basis on which a peace process must have to incorporate broader timeframes. This is to accommodate a number of other tasks that should in the long run engender an internally engineered process that targets the sustainability of an externally initiated peace process. Aside from the focus on attaining short-term goals, which basically set out to achieve a truce between warring parties, a longer timeframe according to Lederach allows for deeper involvement with the host society. This tends to propel efforts tailored towards “broader transformation, reconciliation and social reconstruction”

In developing sections, we shall explore much deeper, the concept of reconciliation. The concept is viewed as the core assumptions underlying of the transformation framework. The idea of embracing the task of reconciliation is perceived as cardinal to the reengineering of society. This may engender peaceful co-existence between victims and perpetrators. It presents the platform on which local peace-making mechanisms may be integrated into modern approaches for peace. A synergy between both conventional and indigenous methods of conflict handling may hold the prospects for sustainable peace within societies riven by protracted internal conflicts. It should be noted that at the core of Africa’s peace-making efforts, lies the significance of capping conflict resolution with attendant rituals or ceremonies for reconciliation, intended to symbolize the end of war and the acceptance of lasting peace.

4.5.2 Fusing multiple approaches and actors within a single framework for peace.

The idea behind merging together different forms of peace-making tools within societies marred by the protractedness of a conflict, cannot be over emphasized, especially because it allows for the application of multiple instruments within a working framework of peace, and blends in actors from different levels of society, ranging from top to bottom. Lederach suggest the creation of an infrastructure of peace. It represents the hybridization of peace-making methods and principles inherent to the fields of conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation, emblematic of strategies such as ceasefire negotiations, problem solving workshops and for example “Judiyya, within the Darfur context, respectively. An infrastructure of peace should enable a fusion of top, middle and grassroot actors “mutually dependent” and aligned towards the search for durable peace.

4. 5. 3 Building on Cultural Resources³¹⁴

Lederach avows that it is imperative for the international peace actor to “*build on the cultural and contextual resources for peace and conflict resolution within the setting*” In his opinion the international community may be on the right trajectory towards peace with the adoption of “a new mind set” as it conducts intervention on terrains of violent aggression. He illuminates further on the notion of a new mind-set with a reflection cited from Anderson:

That it rests on the shoulders of the international community to “*move beyond a simple prescription of answers and modalities for dealing with conflict that come from the outside the setting and focus at least as much attention on discovering and empowering the resources, modalities, and mechanisms for building peace that exist within the context*”³¹⁵

Contingent on this assertion the author underscores the relevance attached to the role of local custodians of peace-making mechanisms, such as those of the elders, and local conflict mediators, who within the African context are recognized as the repertoire of that knowledge guiding the resolution of conflict and peace-making in traditional African societies. Lederach posits:³¹⁶ that the motivations of a culturally sensitive approach “is based on the idea that all cultures and groups develop ways for handling conflict” Therefore the exigency to tap into the cultural repository within the conflict setting, for “resources and roles”, which tend to activate the ownership and concrete involvement of a people affected by war. To this end the “setting and its people” ceases to be perceived as the “problem” but through an inclusionary framework for intervention, become part of the solution to the problem.

In the light of this, a culturally sensitive approach should in addition, take the step to assist and encourage the revival of indigenous strategies capable of effecting positive change within societies burdened by conflict. Finally, Lederach contends that peace actors must steadily

³¹⁴ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997) 95,

³¹⁵ Lederach, “Building Peace”, 95

³¹⁶ John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 201-222

demonstrate the readiness to deviate from a biased perspective, such as assumes that enduring peace lies solely within the outsider's conception, approach or tools for durable peace.

4. 5. 4 The Propositions:

The propositions utilized in this study are those, which underpin Lederach's "comprehensive framework." They border on the knowledge already highlighted above. However, when presented as "propositions" they expatiate on the said ideas and assumptions to develop the analytical framework employed by this thesis to investigate into their practicability in Darfur's conflict.

Proposition one makes the case for "establishing an Infrastructure for Peace"³¹⁷.

In Lederach's words:

"The comprehensive framework builds on the view that an infrastructure is needed, an infrastructure that **legitimizes and integrates multiple levels of the population affected**, in terms of both input in the peace process and its implementation..." **"An adequate transformative framework must explicitly and intentionally devise mechanisms for integrating and coordinating high- middle- and grassroots level strategies, ensuring they are given space and are legitimated and coordinated"**³¹⁸

The diagram one (see prefix) represents members of the affected population in a protracted internal conflict as expounded by Lederach. The empirical section investigating the validity of the framework will identify Darfur's affected population based on this example.

Proposition two: Building a Peace Constituency

Lederach avers that:

a. "Most of today's armed conflicts are carried out between groups with longstanding animosities and mistrust. The division and polarization are often so sharp and deep between these groups that most observers of the conflict, whether within or outside the setting, share the belief that peace efforts can emerge only if outsiders are involved. There is an inclination in international peace endeavours to seek help from the outside, especially in terms of mediators and peacemakers..."³¹⁹

³¹⁷ Lederach, "Conflict Transformation," 207-211

³¹⁸ *ibid*, 207, 211

³¹⁹ Lederach, "Conflict Transformation," 211

b. “A comprehensive transformative perspective on the conflict must raise a number of key concerns around the issue of **who participates in peace-making, how various actors are understood and coordinated, what unique resources each brings, and when they are to be incorporated into the peace process**”³²⁰

Proposition 3: Long-term and short-term perspective

Lederach states:

“A comprehensive framework for peace builds from a vision for both long-term transformation and pragmatic short-term steps.... In other words, even from the beginning we recognize that a peace process is not merely the short-term challenge of getting people to the ‘table’ nor of achieving a ceasefire, but must include task like a broader transformation, reconciliation and social reconstruction”³²¹

4.6 Reconciliation, the core element in protracted internal conflicts?

Having examined some of the salient assumptions underlying Lederach’s analytical framework for intervention in protracted internal conflicts, I proceed to elucidate the concept of reconciliation. Reconciliation in its broader understanding is viewed as the kernel of the conflict transformation approach to conflict. Lederach describes reconciliation as the place where “Truth, Mercy, Justice and Peace meet. It is a social space, a locus where people and things come together.”³²² Mapping out the path towards achieving durable peace, contingent upon the components underlying the concept of reconciliation as highlighted by Lederach, means to address as well, the subjective aspects of the aftermath of any conflict. Adopting the reconciliation approach, serves to prepare victims and survivors for the process of internal healing, from trauma, hatreds, and fears. It embraces the reintegration of perpetrators into society.

Truth is understood as: *“the longing for the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and the validation of painful loss and experiences”* However when associated with the “Mercy” component, an avenue for “letting go” is created, which may precipitate a renewed

³²⁰ *ibid*

³²¹ Lederach, "Conflict Transformation," 203

³²² Lederach, "Building Peace", 29

consciousness.³²³ The need for Justice cannot be overlooked; as such it forms part of the underlying elements aligned with the idea of reconciliation. For many, the ability to achieve justice for wrongdoing brings closure and the ability to move on with their lives. The legal approach to justice would be to seek the prosecution of the perpetrators of injustice. Retributive justice seems most ideal especially since it tends to be compliant with international standards for investigating and eventually punishing the offender. Such approaches are adopted with the hope that future atrocities can be prevented. However, some analysts are of the opinion that such an approach has the tendency to focus more on the perpetrator denying the victims and survivor the much needed time to undergo inner healing and transformation.³²⁴ As opposed to retribution, Lederach addresses the notion of justice from an angle that focuses on restoring broken relationships:

*“Doing justice is the pursuit of restoration, of rectifying wrongs, of creating right relationships based on equity and fairness. Justice involves advocacy for those harmed... for making things right”*³²⁵

His definition of justice tends to tone down the aspect of punishment for the offender, to seek to the revival of right relationship based on equity and fairness.

Also, Assefa recognizes that “there cannot be reconciliation without justice” he insists that both justice and equity form important aspects of reconciliation. Most important to the idea of carrying out justice is the manner in which justice is conducted. He argues that justice must be carried out in ways that will eventually restore the broken relations existing between parties. In conclusion, therefore justice is understood as a necessary but not sufficient condition of reconciliation.³²⁶

Desmond Tutu is also quoted as corroborating the essence of Justice within the context of reconciliation, but from an African perspective. He contends that justice is aimed at “healing

³²³ *ibid*

³²⁴ Luc Huyse, “Introduction: tradition-based approaches in peace-making, transitional justice and reconciliation policies”, *Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflicts: Learning from African Experiences*, eds, Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2008)

³²⁵ John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Culture* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 20

³²⁶ See, Hizkias Assefa, *Peace and Reconciliation As a Paradigm: A Philosophy of Peace and Its Implications on Conflict, Governance, and Economic Growth in Africa* (Nairobi, Kenya: Nairobi Peace Initiative, 1993), 44

breaches, redressing imbalances and restoring broken relationships”.³²⁷ Finally the peace element in conjunction with the above elucidated, represents: harmony, unity well-being security and respect, which form integral parts to be considered in the pursuit of reconciliation between parties.

The conception of reconciliation according to Lederach, as both a focus and a locus, is seen as synonymous with the African approach to reconciliation as we shall see subsequently.

Furthermore, Assefa posits that the objective of reconciling adversaries is to ensure that a transformation occurs in the antagonistic attitudes and relationships of adversaries. That is, from negative to positive. The essence of reconciliation lies in the willingness of both parties to acknowledge their responsibility as well as their guilt. Furthermore, their ability to confront the truth and recount the hideous events of the past, straightens out the path towards a healthier co-existence. Reconciliation therefore follows a process: of an honest acknowledgement of the harm or injury each party has inflicted on the other; a sincere regret and remorse for the injury done, a readiness to apologize for one’s role in inflicting the injury as well as a readiness of the conflicting parties to let go of the anger and bitterness caused by the conflict and injury. The offender must similarly show commitment not to repeat the injury. There must be sincere effort to redress past grievance that caused the conflict and also compensate the damage caused to the extent possible; finally, reconciliation should make way for parties to enter into a new mutually enriching relationship.³²⁸

Unlike the case of interstate conflicts where adversaries may remain territorially distanced from each other, internal conflicts tend to deny both victims and perpetrators the comfort of evading one another, as both parties seem compelled, by virtue of extant ties, to a relearning of harmonious and peaceful living regardless of the experience of a painful past. Bercovitch citing Hartwell indicates the probability of a deadlock, on the part of both parties in conflict to achieve reconciliation should either one refuse to tow the difficult path of surrendering past hurt, on the platform of forgiveness.

In the African context, reconciliation is perceived as synonymous with the act of resolving conflict. It is the end target of all efforts aimed at achieving societal harmony. At every level of

³²⁷ Desmond Tutu, Chair of South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, cited by Luc Huyse in Luc Huyse and Mark Salter ed., 5

³²⁸ See, Hizkias Assefa, "Reconciliation: Challenges, Responses, and the Role of Civil Society," in *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society* (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 637-653

human interaction within traditional African societies, reconciliation becomes central to the pursuit of enduring peace. It serves as an avenue for mending and restoring broken relationships. The traditional African society tends to hugely underscore the notion of healthy relationships, viewed as pivotal to peaceful co-existence on all levels within the society. Citing Assefa, Witty and Deng, Malan asserts that priority is given to restoration, whenever kinship or social relationships are disturbed by dispute.

*“When the disputing parties, their supporters and the elders concerned engage in talking a matter through, it is usually the issue of relationship which receives prime attention. The relationship of the past is reviewed, the tense relationships of the current conflict are investigated, and the settlement is sought that would improve future relationships”*³²⁹

This means that the endeavour to mitigate conflict naturally ends with reconciliation. In seeking to reconcile a victim and a perpetrator for example, the process of reconciliation may involve entire family members. In line with the principle of collective responsibility, the guilt of one is usually seen as the guilt of all. Also, reconciliation may take the form of ceremonies or rituals conducted according to ancient beliefs and practices, which the people can relate to.

As much as traditional African societies strongly underscore the need for reconciliation, there is scarcely any attempt to water down or diminish the gravity of offenses committed. Assefa contends that reconciliation *“does not mean that offenders are just pardoned”*³³⁰ the focus is for the offender to realize, acknowledge guilt and show remorse. A process, which is tailored towards restoration more than it, seeks to punish or apportion guilt or blame. In contrast to international standards where punitive actions are taken against perpetrators of human rights atrocities in internal conflicts, the predominant African indigenous approach would be, to focus on reintegrating and rehabilitating not just victims but offenders back into society.

Assessing local reconciliation in Sierra Leone, Joe Alie arrived at the conclusion that:

“local reconciliation activities are often focused on the return of ex-combatants”

³²⁹ Jannie Malan, “Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa”. (Durban: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 1997), 21

³³⁰ Ibid

In Mozambique, similar practices of reliance on indigenous reconciliation is identified in the traditional healing powers vested on the “Curandeiros” whose duty it is to:

*“conduct reintegration rituals for ex-soldiers”*³³¹. In like manner, the Mato Oput as I shall examine in the first empirical chapter of this thesis, is a peace-making mechanism associated with the people of northern Uganda. At its core is the reconciliation of both victims and perpetrators.³³²

As indicated elsewhere in this section reconciliation therefore serves as the bridge between conventional conflict handling methods and indigenous strategies extant within a conflict setting. It serves as the platform on which indigenous peace-making actors may be incorporated into an initiated peace process, especially those on whom the power to mediate and reconcile has been bestowed. And specifically, in the handling of conflicts that occur in traditional societies where mechanisms and underlying elements continue to prevail and integral aspects of peace-making. Once reconciliation is adopted as an important aspect of a peace process, it should, according to Assefa *“stop a cycle of violence and hatred that sometimes transcends generations”*³³³.

In developing chapters, I shall venture into providing an overview of some peace-making mechanisms across sub-Saharan Africa. A number of such practices date back in time and may be understood as part of the cultural heritage of a number of African societies. These practices have been relied on to maintain peace and harmony and to restore sanity and cohesion within their societies. Although a number of commentators³³⁴ have argued that owing to colonialism and modernization a number of such practices have lost originality, it remains a fact that these strategies still exist and have remained an indispensable part of Africa’s traditional and semi-modern societies.

Conclusion

This chapter’s central theme examined the prospects of a transformative approach to peace over the conflict resolution framework for intervention in cases of protracted internal conflicts. I

³³¹ Luc Huyse in Luc Huyse and Mark Salter ed., 11

³³² *ibid*

³³³ Hizkias Assefa, “The Meaning of Reconciliation” in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*. (Amsterdam: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999)

³³⁴ See, William Zartman, *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict "Medicine"* (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000)

state that there are clear similarities between the resolution and transformative approach to peace. It would be largely improper to dismiss the resolution approach as blinded to the needs for structural change as a precondition for durable peace. In fact, Lederach and several other authors have emphasized the inability of the transformation approach to initiate change in isolation and calls for interdependence and complementarity between the three approaches. Nonetheless, I contend, that the transformation approach holds more for cases of protraction and intractability as evidenced in today's conflicts. With respect to structural change, I see a striking difference in the level of emphasis for a change in economic and political structures. Mitchell reinforces this opinion stating that:

“For transformationist, the central objective is structural change...” “However, within a conflict resolution framework, it is also quite conceivable for a resolution to be achieved without necessarily involving major structural changes” ³³⁵

An intervention predicated on a transformation approach is driven by the vision to move beyond the immediate issues to unearth underlying patterns as well as stress the fundamental need for change on structural and relational levels.

Similarly, Lederach observed, that the orientation of a resolution approach to conflict is to seek ways of ending a conflict, while the transformation approach in contrast, views conflict as natural and a catalyst for change and development. On one hand, the resolution approach, within a conflict situation asks the question

*“How can we end what is not desired “. The transformation approach in contrast will seek to answer the question “how do we end what is not desired and build what is desired”*³³⁶

On the other hand, the process of transformation examines the content as well as the context of the conflict and investigates them in terms of long histories of aggression.³³⁷ Lastly, a transformation process seeks change at multiple levels and includes hitherto marginalized actors as fundamental to the success of an initiated peace process. I perceive this point to be less salient within the resolution framework.

³³⁵ Christopher Mitchell, Beyond Resolution: What Does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform? <http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcc/CM83PCS.htm> accessed 01.02.2013

³³⁶ Lederach, *“The Little Book of Conflict Transformation”*, 33

³³⁷ *ibid*

Chapter Five

5.1 An Overview of selected indigenous Peace-making Methods across sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

The empirical part of this thesis commences from this chapter (five). It specifically develops on and provides the connection between the framework's (conflict transformation) underlying elements as highlighted in chapter four and the empirical analysis. The chapter renders accounts of specific cases of real-time conflict terrains and recounts the process of peace-making in the aftermath of conflict. The overarching motive is to buttress and lend weight to the assertions that relational change actualized on vehicle of reconciliation, may in many ways be perceived as tantamount to stable peace.

The three selected cases furnish the reader with insight into peace-making mechanisms across sub-Saharan Africa. The selected cases, which are not chosen randomly, include narratives from authors who have performed in-depth research on the selected cases and tell their stories first hand. This chapter draws on these accounts to introduce specific tools and practices, in most cases a pre-colonial heritage is described, traceable to societies within the region, which have remained burdened by or have emerged from protracted conflicts. These peace-making practices relied upon in pre-colonial times, for the preservation of law and order seem to have acquired some relevance in contemporary efforts at making peace.

In preceding chapters, this study examined some of the theoretical assumptions that inform conventional approaches to conflict intervention around the world and specifically as applied to conflict occurrences on the sub-Saharan African region. Correspondingly, it becomes significant to delve into knowledge about non-conventional methods associated with the people directly affected by conflict. Such an inquiry sheds light on extant practices that continue to play a significant role both in conflict resolution and the preservation of law and order. It is also enlightening for readers not conversant with African indigenous methods to understand that merits may accrue from indigenous practices when applied to contemporary conflicts. This notion tends to correspond with on-going propositions to advance and adopt a track three method of intervention in internal conflicts-one that creates space or incorporates hitherto marginalized peace actors and processes, into a working framework for durable peace.

The conflict transformation approach to internal conflicts is regarded as the singular field of inquiry to have initiated considerations for an extensive approach towards sustainable peace. Over the years proponents of the field have solicited for and supported the notion of an "inclusionary approach" as a way of complementing the management and resolution of internal conflicts occurring across the globe. As the chapter on conflict transformation has evidenced, the current nature of contemporary conflicts, begs for the adoption of a culturally sensitive approach to internal conflicts. That view ultimately underscores the inclusion or acknowledgement of the positive role of "local actors" "contextual resources" or what commentators may refer to as "insider involvement" or "indigenous processes". It is a perspective that takes cognizance of the subjective aspects that have endured in the course of the conflict and focuses on other adverse conditions that threaten the restoration of societal harmony. Such unaddressed conditions have the propensity to reignite those conflicts that seem non-existent.

The Mato Oput is a peace-making practice associated with the people of Acholiland. It was accorded reasonable significance when it became almost indisputable that the ICC's debut task of investigating into the long-standing conflict between the government of Uganda and the LRA in the northern part of the country would aggravate the conflict instead of dousing tensions. The case of the Acholi's people's reconciliation mechanism especially within the context of the yet ongoing war is germane to the task this chapter sets out to achieve. It captures the essence of "cultural sensitivity". In which case the international community, learns to approach peace-making within the region, as a process that acknowledges the inclusion of pragmatic aspects of indigenous practices associated with the people directly affected by conflict. This assumption ostensibly lies in stark opposition to approaches whose underlying convictions underscore the sole reliance on punitive measures associated with the likes of ICC and its affiliates.

In similar vein, the oath system is examined for its effectiveness across a number of societies within the sub-Saharan region and specifically for its efficacy in the conflict between the Aguleri and Umuleri people of southeast Nigeria. Historical accounts substantiate the failure to achieve peace via conventional means, ostensibly dating back to colonial times. The oat taking system proved to be an efficient mechanism in the reconciliation of both communities and a platform on which societal harmony became re-established. This study adopts this example with the intention to corroborate the existence of peace-making tools that foster reconciliation

in sub-Saharan Africa. The selected case in question equally aims at bolstering assumptions from the conflict transformation scholarship, which suggests that reconciliation may indeed hinder the resurgence of conflicts within societies emergent from war. Especially when such processes generate inner healing and mend broken relationships.

Examining these selected practices should not be misinterpreted as an effort to romanticize African peace-making mechanisms, to this end, the chapter includes an account from the Somali experience in the south-central region, where the desired results hardly engendered the much-desired reality or even translated to peace of some sort. The chapter will briefly delve into the conflicts for which these mechanisms became relevant.

5.2 Contextualizing the term ‘Indigenous’

At this point it suffices to illuminate on the chapter’s usage of the term ‘indigenous’. A simple definition of the term as offered by the oxford dictionary defines the word to be anything ‘originating or occurring naturally in a particular place’. When the chapter refers to ‘indigenous practices, institutions, processes and actors’ it is suggesting that such mechanisms, strategies and actors originate from within the contexts focused on in this chapter- those of northern Uganda, southeast Nigeria and of the Somalis in their various regions and they occur naturally within these stipulated regions. Therefore, whether or not such practices or mechanism assume an adulterated, transformed or restructured and/ or reorganized form, due to colonization or modernization, neglect or other factors as the case may be, so long as they are known to have originated from within, they are occurring naturally within the locus of its origination and are not considered as an import on the context in question, such strategies in this chapter, will be regarded as indigenous to a people.

Indigenous because a people employ and rely on such strategies and may genuinely relate to such practices in their search for peace, reconciliation and the ultimate goal of societal harmony.

5.3 The conflict between the government of Uganda and the LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army)

Without going into full details of the complexities surrounding the Ugandan conflict, it is important to note that this nearly 30-year-old conflict is understood to be causally linked to issues of ethnic domination, regional marginalization, underdevelopment and a host of other complex issues. Since Uganda’s post-independence era, aggrieved groups have sought redress

contingent on aggressive and violent means. Such overt expressions of discontentment were not unconnected to the legacies of divide and rule (north and south) inherited from the British colonial era. Successive leaderships beginning with the country's first prime minister, Milton Obote and leading up to the current administration had witnessed one form of resistance after another, successfully changing the country's leadership to its current one. Yoweri Museveni the incumbent, is also known to have ascended power on the platform of a resistance movement known as the NRA (National Resistance Army).

Since 1986 the Museveni administration has remained in power and in conflict with the last rebel group standing known as the LRA. Emerging after 1988, the LRA had initially portrayed itself as a voice representing its people to speak up against the gruesome acts meted out on innocent citizens of the Acholi region of northern Uganda. In the unfolding years however, the LRA and its commander in the person of Joseph Kony, have engaged in hideous crimes of all kinds, ranging from killings, abductions and maiming of varying degrees. The history of the past 29 years has been that of searching for justice and peace via the most appropriate means.³³⁸ Strong controversies had ensued in the academic world over the most suitable approach to peace in the conflict of Northern Uganda.³³⁹ The debate gained significance given the unyielding coercive means adopted by the government in her quest to crush rebel activity. A military option had become detrimental to the lives of innocent citizens and also began to undermine the entire peace process.

The Amnesty act of 2000 and the referral of the conflict by Museveni, in 2003 to the ICC, seemed to have complicated issues further and added a new dimension to the quest for peace, one that had remained farfetched even in the negative sense of it.³⁴⁰ It was the desperate search for viable tools and the vociferous call for peace that engendered both the propositions to

³³⁸ See, Ted Dagne, *Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda* (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Centre, 2010)

See, Peter H Eichstaedt, *First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army* (Chicago, Ill: Lawrence Hill Books, 2009)

See, Ogenga Otunnu, "Causes and consequences of the war in Acholiland. Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda," Conciliation Resources, last modified 2002, <http://www.c-r.org>

³³⁹ See, Susan Allen Nan, Zachariah Mampilly, and Andrea Bartoli, *Peace-making: From Practice to Theory* (Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2012)

³⁴⁰ United Nations, "President of Uganda refers situation concerning Lord's Resistance Army to International Criminal Court," United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, last modified January 29, 2004, <http://www.un.org>.

incorporate indigenous tools and the quasi-international recognition of a reconciliatory mechanism associated with the Acholi people of northern Uganda.³⁴¹

5.4 The people of Acholiland

Acholi's are located in the northern Ugandan districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Padar, Amuru, Nwoya, Lamwo and Agago. The people of Acholiland take pride in a cultural heritage responsible for preserving the social fabric of its entire communities. Although its traditional structures had been rearranged to suit colonial purpose, indigenous peace-making mechanisms had played an important role in maintaining the peace and stability of its people back then. Acholi's have also been described as a people who basked in the constructed glory of the colonial era. This was specifically evidenced by their huge representation in both the military and civilian service.³⁴² When the implosion of northern Uganda occurred, the Acholis became the worse known recipients of the legacies of that war. Hate and prejudice had become traceable to the era of colonial favouritism.

5.5 The peace trajectory for northern Uganda

In April of 2007, the LRA had acceded to continued talks. In the previous year, peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA had been underway in Juba, South Sudan. This however ended in a deadlock.³⁴³ The growing humanitarian crisis also began attracting international concern, and the call to end the suffering of innocent lives became even more forceful. On the one hand, the conflict had grossly degenerated even with the adoption of seemingly appropriate tools for intervention. On the other hand, the propositions to incorporate indigenous mechanisms had begun to resonate especially on the grass root levels.

³⁴¹ University of Peace, "Rediscovering Mato Opus: The Acholi Justice System and the Conflict in Northern Uganda," *African Peace and Conflict Journal* 2, no. 1 (June 2009): 27-38, accessed July 10, 2015, <http://www.aocj.upeace.org>

See, Ultimate Media Consult, "Acholi Want More Prominent Role for Mato Oput," UGPulse, last modified December 9, 2008, <http://www.ugpulse>.

³⁴² Mills, Kurt. "(Local) Peace vs. (International) Justice in Uganda? Mato Oput, the ICC and the Conundrums of Transitional Justice in the Middle of Conflict." <http://www.ecpr.eu> (accessed 15 07, 2015).

³⁴³ Mark Kersten, "International Justice and the Prevention of Atrocities Case Study: Peace, Justice and Politics in Northern Uganda," European Council on Foreign Relations, last modified November 2013, <http://www.ecfr.eu>, 4

The 2007 renewed deliberations had seen a reawakening of those initial calls for the empowerment of indigenous methods available to the people of Acholi in times of conflict. One of such vehement statements calling for the consideration of other options of peace emerged from Ruhakana Ruyanda. He was the minister for internal affairs and also the head of delegations to the Juba talks. Ruhakana Ruyanda allegedly alluded to the Mato Oput, as a substitute to ICC trials.³⁴⁴ In giving credence to such indigenous peace-making mechanisms, he underscored the following:

“The traditional methods are both symbolic and real. They have worked. Instead of rushing for Western solutions, it is good we revived them”³⁴⁵.

Nonetheless, he pointed out that such methods should be revived to comply with international standards. By the end of the second quarter of 2007, the LRA and the Ugandan government had agreed among other things to utilize available traditional mechanisms in the search for lasting peace to the conflict. Article 3.1 of the memorandum stated as follows

“Traditional Justice Mechanisms such as Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Ailuc and Tonu ci Koka and others as practiced in the communities affected by the conflict, shall be promoted, with necessary modifications, as a central part of the framework for accountability and reconciliation”³⁴⁶

Such recommendations had equally assumed a bottom up approach. In the grassroots, highly spirited local and religious leaders had been actively involved in advocating for the incorporation of the Mato Oput, into existing strategies for peace. In the opinion of one of such local leaders, the strategies of the ICC connoted sheer insensitivity towards a people who had the right to exercise their beliefs in the ways that best suit them. After all they have been the

³⁴⁴ Allen, Tim. *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army*. London: Zed books, 2006.

³⁴⁵ *ibid*

³⁴⁶ Latigo, James Ojera. "Northern Uganda: Traditional based practices in the Acholi region." In *Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. Learning from African Experiences*, by Luc Huyse and Mark Salter, 100 -105. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2008.

direct recipients of the conflict and all that came with it.³⁴⁷ To superimpose strange conceptions of justice on communities who themselves operated under their own unique cultural beliefs, norms, and understanding of justice tended to promote injustice of a certain kind.

Below, a documented interview with the Acholi Paramount Chief Elect Rwot Onen David Acana II. His opinion on the conflict of approaches captures a number of significant issues.

“...We have the traditional culture. When someone kills we have the system to stop the killing. That is why we did not have death as a punishment. Nor did we have jail sentences. Rather we had reconciliation- Mato Oput... Does the ICC not value community values of people? Does the ICC override all other systems? Even if Kony is taken to The Hague, that will not be a punishment. The prisons there are air-conditioned! Rather he should be in the community. He should see the suffering he has caused. Here people look in your eyes and say I forgive you. Then he will understand and recognize what he has done.”

His strong assertions explicitly underscored the essence of a culturally sensitive approach to peace, and made allusions to a salient principle of the Acholis, one that totally repudiates the death sentence, while embracing forgiveness as a vital element of complete reconciliation. The Mato Oput seemed to have elicited international recognition for the purported principles underlying its conception of justice. Such embedded elements of acknowledging wrong doing and granting forgiveness became integral aspects of the journey towards the reconciliation of victims and perpetrators. Mato Oput specifically aimed at the re-integration of ex-combatants into their various communities. It sought the revival of societal cohesion.

5.6 Understanding the Mato Oput approach to peace

The Mato Oput has always been an Acholi way of dealing with instances of both intentional and unintentional killing within the community. The Acholi's are said to be a people deeply ingrained in their religious customs and beliefs. Although the war had taken its toll on the people of Acholiland, a number of its cultural practices, like the spilling of an innocent blood have remained repugnant to community life. A crime as the spilling of innocent blood promptly severs cordial ties between the families of the victim and those of the offender, one that required

³⁴⁷ Allen, Tim. *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army*. London: Zed books, 2006.

the performance of the Mato Oput reconciliation rites to reinstate harmonious co-existence between the affected families.

The characteristic nature of the Acholi's is believed to be that of possessing a high capacity to forgive.³⁴⁸ Such inclinations derive from their cultural beliefs. As much as the Acholi people's capacity to forgive might remain inconceivable to the outside world, it should not be misconstrued as condoning injustice nor misinterpreted as portraying a people with the capacity to be superhuman. The emphasis here is on relational change and the revitalization of communal order. The Acholi's for example believe in Jok, the divine spirit of ancestors who guide the Acholi moral order. When a wrong is committed, it is the Acholi believe that the ancestors send *cen*, the spirit of the dead person in form of misfortune. Unless the elders and offender take appropriate action to restore the broken relations the conflict prevails.³⁴⁹ In similar vein, relevant actions are undertaken once an act of killing has occurred. The offender is promptly banished from his community probably as a way of averting reprisal attacks. This symbolizes disassociation from the evil act of killing until the spirit of the dead has been appeased and the land cleansed. Ancient beliefs allude to the altering in the realm of the spirits, of some harmonious bond, shared by both families, only to be corrected by compensating the loss.³⁵⁰

5.6.1 Mato Oput: The process of reconciliation

The reconciliation ceremony and the path towards peace commence with the payment of the blood money. However, like many observers reiterate, such payments and ceremonies are to no avail and do not achieve its full purpose without the mental preparedness of the receiving community, the victims and the perpetrators alike. Wasonga echoing one of his interviewee's notes that the Acholi base the cleaning process on certain fundamental values like reconciliation and acceptance of responsibility, repentance, forgiveness, and compensation, these values tend to hold the fabric of the Acholi society together.³⁵¹ Perpetrators accordingly are enjoined to

³⁴⁸ See, Tim Allen, *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army* (London, England: Zed, 2012) chapter six.

³⁴⁹ Liu Institute for Global Issues, Gulu District NGO Forum, Ker Kwaro Acholi, 'Roco Wati Acoli' cited in Joseph Wasonga, "Rediscovering Mato Oput: The Acholi Justice System and the Conflict in Northern Uganda," *African Peace and Conflict Journal* 2, no. 1 (June 2009): 27-38, accessed July 10, 2015,

³⁵⁰ Latigo, James Ojera. "Northern Uganda: Traditional based practices in the Acholi region." In *Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. Learning from African Experiences*, by Luc Huyse and Mark Salter, 100 -105. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2008.

³⁵¹ Interview, Callisto Otim, Gula, 10 January 2008 in Wasonga, "Rediscovering Mato Oput", 33,

acknowledge their guilt in conformity with the presented evidence. Before the eyes of the gathering community called *Kacoke Madit*, and the mediating elders, the perpetrator demonstrates a readiness to proceed by exhibiting genuine remorse for the atrocity in question. It is then followed by a plea to the victims for forgiveness and mercy. Victims are usually encouraged to let go and grant forgiveness in order to experience the true healing power of the Mato Oput.³⁵²

Once that stage is successfully completed, the process is allowed to advance to the level of payments. The blood money is payment made by the family members of the perpetrator. While these payments may take the form of cash, the blood money does not in any way suggest compensation for the loss of life. It is a necessary requirement to be fulfilled prior to the onset of the ceremony. It signifies the readiness on the part of the paying community to partake in the restoration of cordial relations and societal harmony. According to Latigo:

*“The payment of blood money is preferable since the money paid to the bereaved family can be used to marry another woman who, in turn will produce children to replace the dead person- a form of reparation”*³⁵³

In preparation for the reconciliation rites, certain items were required to be provided by both families. Representatives from the victim’s family provided a goat. The killer himself was to provide a ram and a bull. New bowls and beer were also a requirement for the ceremony. The ceremony was attended by family members of both the offender and the victim as well as by mediating elders; a local master of ceremony anchored the ceremony.³⁵⁴ Once the invocations³⁵⁵ were completed the killer and a representative from the victim’s family both kneel facing each other the new bowl is placed in between them. Both parties are then made to share a bitter drink, made from an alcoholic brew and the roots of the Oput tree.³⁵⁶ Some versions describe the concoction’s mix to include the blood from the animals provided. According to Menanga:

³⁵² Murithi, Tim. "African Indigenous and endogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution." In *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, edited by David J Francis, 23-24. London: Zed Books, 2008.

³⁵³ Latigo, James Ojera. "Northern Uganda: Traditional based practices in the Acholi region.", 104

³⁵⁴ Ibid

³⁵⁵ See, Latigo, James Ojera. "Northern Uganda: Traditional based practices in the Acholi region.", 104 for details on invocations

³⁵⁶ Latigo, James Ojera. "Northern Uganda: Traditional based practices in the Acholi region.", 105

“Drinking the bitter potion symbolizes the acceptance by the two communities of the bitterness of the conflict they had gone through, and their resolution not to taste such bitterness again. The red colour of the potion, coming from the blood of a slaughtered lamb... symbolizes the blood shed during the conflict.”³⁵⁷

After the symbolic rites have been performed, both families then share meals together, which had hitherto remained estranged from each other as a result of the killing. The hugs as well as the shared meals thus represent the commencement of peaceful and harmonious relations between them.

5. 6. 2 The significance of Mato Oput

Since the Acholi culture rejects the penalty of death for an offender, regardless of the crime, the performance of the Mato Oput ritual maintains its potency as the community’s symbolic way of finding closure under such circumstances. To the people of Acholi, restoration of communal harmony was and remains paramount. Regardless of the fact that an individual commits the crime, the entire community as well as the family members of the perpetrator gathered together to assume collective responsibility. One offender’s group acknowledged guilt and showed remorse while the other accepted and granted forgiveness. To this end the notion of accountability in the eyes of the Acholi, was accorded its due position while the ultimate goal for peace and reconciliation was achieved. The Mato Oput afforded offenders the opportunity of being reintegrated into society, and to pick up the pieces of their lives in pursuit of fresh beginnings.

Contentions over Mato-Oput

The efficacy of the Mato Oput is highly contested.³⁵⁸ Such contentions have become even more prominent since the Ugandan conflict and the demand to seek justice for its victims. The ICC indictments and the exigency to prosecute offenders and perpetrators of injustice exacerbated an already tense situation. The controversies over the proposed synergy of methods have further generated heated debates along the following lines. Commentators contend that the Mato Oput

³⁵⁷ Menanga, Kizito. "Ethical Foundations for African Traditional Reconciliation Mechanisms. A case study of the Ugandan Mato Oput Process." Catholic University of East Africa, 2008.

³⁵⁸ Dominica Dipio, Lene Johannessen, and Stuart Sillars, *Performing Community: Essays on Ugandan Oral Culture* (Novus Press, 2008)

ritual may be applicable to conflicts of a lesser scale and not to the massive killings by which the conflict is characterized. Mato Oput, they contend lacks the capacity to deliver accountability for the victims of the atrocities committed in war.³⁵⁹ Can a mere ceremony ease the pain of the bereaved? How much blood money is able to compensate for all the dead? How can such rituals bring healing under conditions of trauma? How is Mato Oput able to conform to international standards of justice and to what extent can such mechanisms address salient issues like impunity and finally, to suggest that the Acholi people have an extra ordinary inclination to forgive defies theoretical thinking. It is hardly conceived as practicable.³⁶⁰

In response, advocates for the revival of African indigenous methods, African scholars and commentators alike, seek to shed light on the potentials of the Mato Oput and its guiding principles, while lending voice to the significance of an approach which best suits the worldview of the direct recipients of that war.

Menanga avers:

“The preoccupation of justice with reference to the African worldview is the restoration of the broken relationship, and the search for the harmony with all beings. It is a restorative justice, which is concerned with victims, survivors and the entire community, in the quest for repair, trust building, reconciliation, and reintegration of the offender within the community. This means restoring one’s humanness, be s/he victim or perpetrator, rendering back to both the perpetrator and victim their dignity as human beings.”³⁶¹

Hear Latigo:

“Mato Oput embodies the principle that society and perpetrator contribute to the extents possible to the emotional restoration and repair of the physical and material well-being of the victim. The embedded principles underlying it, which the Acholi have used successfully in conflict management for generations, are actually the very principles of transitional justice mechanisms now paraded in

³⁵⁹ See, Joseph Y. Katshung, "The Paradox of Peace and Justice: Mato-Oput versus the ICC in Uganda," facing history and ourselves, accessed March 10, 2016, <http://www.facinghistory.org>

³⁶⁰ See, David-Ngendo Toshiba, "Beyond the Mato Oput Tradition: embedded contestations in transitional justice for post-massacre Pajong, northern Uganda," Scholar Commons: University of South Florida, last modified November/December 2015, <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu>

³⁶¹ Kizito Menanga, "Ethical Foundations for African Traditional Reconciliation Mechanisms: A case stud of the Ugandan Mato Oput Process," Urban Leadership Foundation, last modified March 2008, <http://www.urbanleaders.org>.

modern studies as 'models', encompassing the same principles of truth, accountability, compensation, and the restoration of relationships."³⁶²

5.7 Conclusion

The Uganda experience became one case in point where an insensitive approach to peace proved to counter all efforts to achieve any kind of peace at all. Within the larger framework of post conflict peace building in African, such examples as evidenced by the Ugandan case highlight the benefits, with respect to sustainable peace, which may accrue from incorporating effective and positive aspects of indigenous peace-making strategies into working frameworks for peace. Evidence from accounts of conflict and peace-making within African pre-colonial societies and a good number of African transitional societies, reveal a substantial preference for justice and peace via reconciliatory methods. This may not be unconnected to the fact that such methods continue to constitute an essential part of a community's daily life. A number of African semi-modern societies tend to relate naturally to such practices regardless of the gravity or magnitude of offences that may accrue from the conflict. This was the case among the people of Acholi. Predispositions as these tend to supersede the putative imperativeness for retributive justice. To this extent one is able to discern the community's strong desire to return to status quo, which is akin to the revival of societal harmony.

In like manner, outsider perspectives may obscure the true meaning of a people's indigenous practice. This does not diminish the potentials such practices may possess. However, the outsider's ability to assume a broad mind, allows for the entrance of knowledge and the conception of certain realities, which may exceed one's horizon of knowledge. To this end it remains a fact that all humanity identifies with a unique world view, one that guides its conceptions of war and most importantly of peace. Mato Oput may not satisfactorily address justice according to international standards, yet in the eyes of most Acholi sometime in its history it owned a peace-making heritage with the capacity to mend broken relationships, heal wounds, reconcile parties and restore the social fabric of its communities

³⁶² Latigo, James Ojera. "Northern Uganda: Traditional based practices in the Acholi region.", 108

5.8 Examining the efficacy of the oath system in Sub-Saharan African societies and investigating a selected case in Nigeria's southeast.

Introduction

This section commences with a close investigation into the practice of oath taking, as is the case in a number of Sub-Saharan African societies. It then continues with a detailed description of how the oath system became instrumental to the termination of an age long conflict between rival groups in the south-eastern part of Nigeria.

5.8.1 The oath system: An instrument of conflict mitigation in sub-Saharan African Societies

The oath taking system has been widely spotted as a mechanism of conflict resolution and peace keeping among diverse societies of the African sub-Saharan region. Its efficacy is linked to an unabated allegiance towards the people refer to as the ancestors. It is purportedly effective whenever employed because it is a phenomenon ingrained in the people's belief system. Such beliefs are demonstrated by the continuous interaction between the living members of society, and what Olaoba³⁶³ refers to as the living dead (ancestors). Before going further into the essence of oath taking among African societies, it is paramount to establish here, the significant nexus between African societies and their ancestors. This makes a comprehension of the efficacy of oath taking a lot easier especially for readers from divergent worldviews.

Most African societies are believed to maintain strong connections with their 'living dead' members of society. The strong affinity towards the ancestors exists on a continuum. This may be discernible in the way that communities underscore the significance of maintaining relationships, and the emphasis placed on reconciliation when conflict occurs among its living members. The cordial ties between the members of the community and their superiors, facilitates the transition to closely knitted ties between deceased members of one's lineage, who have successfully transformed to the status of an ancestor.

³⁶³ Olaoba, O B. "Ancestral Focus and the Process of Conflict Resolution in Traditional African Societies." In *Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa: Essays in Honour of General (Dr.) Abdulsalami A. Abubakar*, edited by Isaac Olawale Albert, 140-151. Ibadan: John Archers Publishers, 2005.

The ancestors are believed to wield strong authority over their living members. This conception is presumed valid to the extent that entire lineages or communities were at the risk of affliction should its members ignore or treat its ancestors with disdain. Misconducts listed as taboos of society are carefully avoided to avert the anger of the gods.³⁶⁴ In like manner, the living dead may be called upon to oversee the smooth running of community events. An invitation to the ancestors as spiritual witnesses and partakers of occasions like a marriage, a naming ceremony, a new yam festival, initiation to adulthood or the likes, is believed to contribute to successful proceedings.

Communities beckon upon the wisdom of their ancestors in delicate matters concerning community life, especially in decision-making, where any wrong move could spell doom for the entire community. While the conception of an ancestor may translate to varying roles and attributes among a plethora of groups across the sub-Saharan region, Olaoba opines that the principles underlying ancestral belief in Africa, may be viewed as homogenous, but may differ in the terminology employed by each society.³⁶⁵ To the Lugbara of Uganda for example, their ancestors serve the purpose of conflict managers.³⁶⁶ They are perceived as:

“good people who set examples that men should follow and who maintained the ideal of social order and social behaviour... they were men of integrity and worth” ...³⁶⁷

The Tallensi of Ghana view the relationship between them and their ancestors as a continuation of the bond that existed between them and their departed parents. They go as far as making symbols, which they appease from time to time.³⁶⁸ The Tiriki of western Kenya, relate to their ancestors via an enduring relationship between the living elders and their recently deceased

³⁶⁴ Ibid, 141

³⁶⁵ Olaoba, O B. "Ancestral Focus and the Process of Conflict Resolution in Traditional African Societies.", 141

³⁶⁶ Ray, B C. *African Religions-Symbol Ritual, and Community*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc, 1976. 147 cited in Olaoba, "Ancestral Focus",140

³⁶⁷ Middleton, John. *Lugbara Religion: Ritual and Authority among an East African People*. Münster: LIT Verlag, 1999. 29

³⁶⁸ Fortes, Meyer. "African Systems of thoughts-Fortes and Dieterlen Pg. 122-142." www.lucy.ukc.ac.uk (accessed July 29, 2015).

progenitors. The recently deceased are understood to play the intermediary between the living elders and the ancestral spirits.³⁶⁹

The essence of highlighting the close link between African societies and their ancestors is purposely targeted to enlighten the reader on the efficacy of the oath system as already hinted in the beginning. This mechanism works in unison with the people's ancestral belief system. It is the dread of incurring the wrath of the gods that lends credence the oath system. In some ways, such deep ancestral reverence preserves and invigorates indigenous practices like the oat system and endorses it as a viable instrument of conflict resolution among African societies. It is believed that compliance to the terms of an oath signifies respect for one's ancestors, in whose power it lies to punish deviants. The oath system has shown to be of continued relevance to a number of societies across the sub-Saharan region. The Kamba of eastern Kenya for example, rely on the oath to detect guilt.³⁷⁰ Among the Yoruba of southwest Nigeria, the oath system had the capacity to influence adversaries into confessing wrongdoing³⁷¹ The Azande located in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Central African Republic and in parts of South Sudan, tap into the oath mechanism to determine cases of adultery and witchcraft among its members.

5. 8. 2 Conflict between the Aguleri and Umuleri of Southeast Nigeria³⁷²

The following section provides an illustration of the oath system as an apparatus for re-instating peace and harmony to a society beset with conflict dating back to pre-colonial times. There is a dearth of information on the prolonged conflict between the Aguleri and Umuleri conflict, but also a paucity of information on how the reliance on the oath system became instrumental to the complete termination of an age-old dispute in Nigeria. I rely therefore, on Nwolise Osioma's³⁷³ narrative to portray the trajectory towards the restoration of peace and reconciliation for the affected communities at war.

³⁶⁹ Sangree, Walter H. "Youths as Elders and Infants as Ancestors: The complementarity of Alternate Generations, Both Living and Dead in Tiriki, Kenya and Irigwe Nigeria." In *Ancestors*, edited by William H Newwell, 297-304. New York: Walter deGruyter, 1979.

³⁷⁰ Olaoba, O B. "Ancestral Focus and the Process of Conflict Resolution in Traditional African Societies.", 142

³⁷¹ *ibid*

³⁷² Nwolise, Osioma B.C. "Traditional Models of Bargaining and Conflict Resolution in Africa." In *Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa: Essays in Honour of General (Dr.) Abdulsalami A. Abubakar*, edited by Isaac Olawale Albert, 160-167. Ibadan: John Archers, 2005.

³⁷³ *ibid*

The Aguleri and Umuleri had enjoyed peaceful coexistence until the outset of the conflict that saw each party lay exclusive claims of ownership to the land called: Otuocha. That conflict commenced as far back as 1933 and stretched all the way into the 21st century. In 1995, tensions had escalated into riots, and horrifically took the turn for the worse. A war though of low intensity, erupted between both communities between 1999 and 2000. The conflict had indeed passed through transitions of colonial, democratic and military governance, so that at every point in the nation's administrations, efforts on the platform of litigation had proved abortive. In the 50s, the colonial court granted the people of Umuleri the sole right of occupancy to the land in contention. The verdict was appealed and further transferred to the West African Court of Appeal and subsequently to the Queens Privy Council in London. The efforts of the 50s had proved counterproductive.³⁷⁴ By 1960, Nigeria had gained independence, there was hope that at least from an indigenous standpoint the problem would be peacefully resolved. Instead democracy became the platform for some planned manipulations in favour of the people of Aguleri. This was stalled and the baton for viable solutions passed unto Nigeria's first military administration. By 1981 Nigeria's Federal Court of Appeal reached a verdict against the Aguleri people. In 1982 the Aguleri community again contested the judgment of exclusive right to the Umuleri community.³⁷⁵ The conflict remained unsettled with no compromise in sight. Neither of the two communities could produce concrete evidence of possessing sole right to the land. Instead historical accounts alluded to one fact, - that both communities had lived and cultivated the land in peace and harmony until the selfish desire for sole ownership crept in on them.

In the entire nearly seven decades (1933-2000) of the conflict, traditional mechanisms available to both communities for the resolution of conflict became somewhat inconsequential as neither parties saw the need to tap into a heritage of peace-making practices. In Nwolise's opinion, it was the gruesome effect of the conflict, which erupted between 1999 and 2000 that triggered the search for other means of resolving the protracted conflict. Both communities reawakened

³⁷⁴ Nwachukwu J. Obiakor, "History, Land and Conflict in Nigeria: The Aguleri and Umuleri Experience, 1933-1999," *Unzik Journal of Arts and Humanities* accessed June 7, 2015, <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ujah/article/viewFile/142675/132408>.

³⁷⁵ R. A. Chinwuba, *Legal Essay on the Otuocha Land Case* (Enugu: Star printing and publishing company, 1981)

to the revival of that one tool which had the capacity to determine truth even in controversial circumstances.

It was the oath system that became the solution to this long-standing conflict. The warring parties were made to swear to a binding oath. This was a 'No more war' declaration made in the presence of the deities of both communities. Both communities understood the implications of breaking an oath sworn in the presence of the deities and ancestors of the land. Both communities were made to swear to two oaths in the same year of 2000. The first oath in January of 2000 was instrumental to dousing tensions from the erupted war. The second was intended to consolidate on the negative peace achieved. Oath number two specifically targeted the reconciliation of both communities and to ensure the durability of the elicited peace. Parties to the second oath were leaders of the rival communities. The aim was to remind them of their position as custodians of the structures of societal harmony and their role as harbingers of peace. It was their duty to preserve the long-awaited but reinstated peace.

Some of the important aspects of the declaration included the resolve not to replace dialogue with violent aggression. Both parties acceded to an immediate laying down of weapons. The oath could not be revoked without the consent of all the parties involved. Intending violators were advised against incurring the wrath of the gods especially since the proceedings were believed to have transpired in the presence the ancestors of each community. The day's events culminated with a cleansing ceremony. It was a symbolic ritual to expunge the land of all the blood shed from the war. Once the ritual had been performed both communities dined and wine together. This signified the wars' end. From that day forward both communities would forget the past and remain reconciled to each other in peace and harmony.

5.9 Concluding reflections

The narrative clearly demonstrates how the indigenous oath system became effective in terminating a conflict of many decades. In similar manner, that account exposed the failure of the formal judicial system to produce positive outcomes. It rendered redundant within that context, the legal approach to peace where the perception of peace is based on the zero-sum winner takes it all principle. The conflict between the two communities hardly engendered a humanitarian crisis, in which case international diplomacy became unnecessary. However, the enduring severed ties between both communities elicited much concern when it took a drastic

turn in 1999. There is no gainsaying the fact that both communities undermined the potentials of their age long mechanism for conflict resolution. It is also clear that an earlier reactivation of the relevant indigenous conflict mechanism may have forestalled both the protracted nature of the conflict as well as averted its eventual escalation in 1999. Nonetheless, the potency of the people's oath system remains laudable. It deserves to be acknowledged for its significant role in the demise of a nearly six-decade old conflict.

5.10 Somali indigenous institutions actors and processes, searching for peace in the immediate aftermath of war.

Introduction

The next peace-making institution under investigation has been conceived as a quasi-success and in some instances a near colossal failure. In this section, I examine Somalia's peace-making actors and processes, and its relevance in the conflict that erupted in 1988 and which by 1991 had culminated in a total collapse of the state. The Somali people have suffered the same fate or even worse when compared with a myriad of societies in the sub-Saharan region. The Somali state has for decades since 1991 been characterized by endemic war, famine, state collapse and a complex humanitarian crisis. Although the ceded region of Somaliland in the north and the autonomous state of Puntland have recorded relative peace since 1991 and 1998 respectively, the south-central region of Somalia continues to aspire towards sustainable peace, especially since the emergence of a new dimension to the conflict: the 'Al Shabaab' militant group.

Why is it important to examine, at least in summary, the Somali people's indigenous institutions and attendant actors? The answer is hardly far-fetched. Indigenous peace processes had immensely contributed to reinstating and sustaining the peace in Somaliland as well as in the state of Puntland. Even though this was not the case for the people of Somalia's southern region, at the early stages of peace-making in the 1990s, such mechanisms have produced some result as an effective alternative means of governance, security, conflict resolution and peace-making among the people of the south especially on the local level. This has been the survival mechanism of a people grappling with the effects of state failure, the lukewarmness of the international community and consistent efforts at securing a viable and sustainable political structure: a reliance on indigenous peace-making processes. In the first section I touch briefly on the historical antecedents of the Somali state, then proceed to provide a brief examination

of indigenous institutions, practices and actors, extant in the culturally homogenous regions of Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia.

5.10.1 Historical background

The triumph over Siyad Barre's dictatorship regime and the announcement of cessation in 1991 by the Somali National Movement had produced the republic of Somaliland. The underlying causes of the Somali conflict are rooted in a legacy of colonialism, competition for resources and power, and the repression by which the military administration became characterized.³⁷⁶ A combination of these factors precipitated the emergence of rebel movements. The creation of insurgent groups along clan lines became the Somali people's mechanism of response to the myriad of problems that plagued the country particularly in the early post-independence years.

Initially the Siyad Barre regime projected its regime as that government with the interest of the people at heart. Unfortunately, the next two decades of Barre's leadership proved to be a nightmare. Bouts of killings, and horrendous attacks on innocent lives, social and political marginalization summed up the hallmarks of that dictatorship government. Intra-clan rivalry had always been part of a predominantly nomadic society. Competition over the resources that sustained the people's livelihood prevailed and worse so, even the onset of modernization had begun impacting negatively to reveal a shift in the people's priorities. This precipitated the proliferation of the clan-based fights that characterised Somalia's initial war between 1988 and 1991.³⁷⁷ In the 80s, one of such clan groups was identified as featuring prominently in the revolt against Barre's regime. They were an offshoot initiative from members of the Isaaq clan in diaspora and were called the Somali National Movement. The fighting, which escalated into full-blown war in 1988, was partly attributed to the movements' insurgent attacks on some strategic locations. By 1991, the hitherto independent nation of Somalia now comprised of two: Somalia in the south and Somaliland in the north.

As one nation, the northern and southern regions had been subjected to dissimilar colonial experiences. British, French, and Italian colonizers partitioned the country into five regions,

³⁷⁶ Elmi, Afyare Abdi. *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding*. London: Pluto Press, 2010.

³⁷⁷ Elmi, Afyare Abdi. *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding*. London: Pluto Press, 2010.
See, Mark Bradbury, *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace* (Oxford [England]: Oxfam, 1999),

each taking parts to themselves. The western part of Somalia also came under the authority of Ethiopia. Observers claim that the post-colonial state had constantly struggled to surmount this legacy of colonialism. The post-independent regime strived towards reuniting its lost regions under the caption of a 'Greater Somalia'. Many commentators in part, attribute the country's woes to the legacy of the colonial era. The north and the south gained independence in 1960 and reunified into a single Somali state.³⁷⁸

Both states are delineated along ethnically homogenous lines, emerging from a similar pre-colonial decentralized and stateless system of governance in which indigenous practices; actors and institutions facilitated the smooth transition from periods of conflicts between clans to peace. Years of dictatorship saw indigenous institutions and actors grossly marginalized.³⁷⁹ With the creation of Somaliland, peace-making mechanisms became revitalized and institutionalized, contributing effectively to the country's gradual transition to peace and reconciliation. The reverse was regrettably the case in the nation of Somalia, as related practices became insignificant, redundant and largely undermined. The neglect of indigenous practices and the adoption by the international community of a different approach to peace in Somalia engendered a less hopeful outcome for the people in the south.

Before recounting the significant role of indigenous institutions and actors towards the process of reinstating peace in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 civil war, it is relevant to provide some insight into a number of Somalia's peace-making and conflict resolution practices, actors and social institutions. As mentioned elsewhere, the people of Somalia regardless of the present-day political terrain, share a similar culture, language and religion. Mechanisms of peace as such, have largely remained homogenous albeit to varying degrees of efficiency as evident in the ceded Somaliland, the autonomous state of Puntland and in the southern region constituting the state of Somalia. Regardless of Somalia's' state of statelessness in pre-colonial times and after the 1991 collapse of Barr's dictatorship government, Somalis at every given phase of their history, knew to rely on indigenous structures and actors as viable mechanisms for the maintenance of law and order. In the absence of political forms of governance

³⁷⁸See, Raphael C. Njoku, *The History of Somalia* (Santa Barbra California: Greenwood, 2013)

³⁷⁹ Menkhaus, Ken. "Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia." In *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts. African Conflict 'Medicine'*, edited by I William Zartman, 183-199. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

indigenous systems and actors, found relevance in a predominantly nomadic society both as a means of settling clan disputes and reconciling rival parties.

5.10.2 Somali indigenous practices

Some practices linked to Somali culture, features prominently in the literatures. For instance, Somali's are known to have a flair for literary arts, especially for poems. Poetry is relied upon as a medium of cultural expression. It has been specifically utilized in the course of its decades of war to elicit peaceful relations among Somalis. It is a channel for exposing the ills of its society, for protest and also for handing down history to generations.³⁸⁰ Aside from poetry, proverbs have also been viewed to be of discernible significance to peace-making sessions. They are a significant trademark particularly of Somali elders.

Intermarriage is another noteworthy practice of the Somali people. It is central to the maintenance of cordial inter clan relations. In specific cases intermarriage has become a tool for inter-clan reconciliation, in which case Somalis refer to the bonus derived from such a union as 'godob-reebta gabadhaha, translated as 'the leaving behind of a grudge through women'³⁸¹ Intermarriage reflect strong ties between both families and places the woman in the strategic position of a reliable go between.³⁸² Aside from the elucidated cultural practices, other practices, institutions and actors have been identified. As is the practice amongst the Acholi's of northern Uganda, Somalis equally embrace the culture of paying compensation, which is restitution for wrongdoing. It is utilized in resolving cases of crimes ranging from theft to murder. The payment of the diya is seen as imperative to avert revenge killings, albeit with the ultimate aim to create the appropriate circumstance for mending broken relations. Somalis refer to the Arabic translation of 'diya' as 'mag'³⁸³. The diya was also associated with a 'diya-paying

³⁸⁰ Afrax, Maxamed Daahir. "Towards a culture for peace: poetry, drama and music in Somali society." *Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peace-making*. no. 21. Edited by Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy. London: Conciliation Resources in collaboration with interpeace, 2010. 72-74.

³⁸¹ Rashid Sheekh `Abdillaahi Gadhweyne (ed). 2009, War and Peace: An anthology of Somali literature Sugaanta Nabadda iyo Colaadda, Progressio & Ponte invisible, London & Pisa cited Walls, Micheal. *State Formation in Somaliland: Bringing Deliberation to Institutionalism*. February 2011.

³⁸² Menkhaus, Ken. "Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia." In *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts. African Conflict 'Medicine'*, edited by I William Zartman, 184. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

³⁸³Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, *Whose Peace Is It Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peace-making* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2010), 114.

group'. According to Menkhaus, the diya-paying group is the 'most stable lineage unit' consisting of myriads of close relatives, whose obligation it is to make payment on behalf of transgressing members or to receive payments on behalf of them.³⁸⁴ The diya was calculated in camels, payments however could be made in monetary terms. In similar vein, it was not uncommon among diya paying groups, to insist on strict adherence to a customary code of conduct (Xeer) since violations also bore heavily on the resources of the group whose members were highly recalcitrant.³⁸⁵

It is important at this juncture to accentuate the presence, among Somalis, of strong clan affiliations. The clan system represents the Somali people's most significant social organization. Somalis function under an agnatic descent system. Each family traces its genealogy to one of six clan groupings. Indeed, the pernicious conflicts in the last decades of fighting have been defined along clan lines.³⁸⁶ Clan rivalries have ranged from fights over access to pastureland and water, to very catastrophic conflicts over territorial control and power. Yet Somali clans purportedly submit to the tenets of the Xeer to guide social relations.

The Xeer

The Xeer (pronounced hair), which has been referred to elsewhere, is notably an indigenous institution that regulates social relations among the various Somali clans. It is an unwritten customary law, containing Somali norms and values interpretable under instances of conflict over access to pasture land and water for example. It also contains predefined codes regarding the rights of women and conduct during war.³⁸⁷ The knowledge to mediate family as well as inter-clan disputes is equally derived from it. Diya paying groups are specifically bound by this contract whose principles are interpreted by clan elders. It is the sole obligation of a convening council of elders called the Shir, to mitigate conflicts based on the authoritative capacity of the Xeer. While the Shir refers to an in-clan assemblage of elders, the Guurti represents a gathering of elders from different clans, convening to mediate and negotiate peace within the larger community. The Shir and Guurti procedures of conflict resolution have been described as

³⁸⁴ Menkhaus, Ken. "Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia." In *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts. African Conflict 'Medicine'*, edited by I William Zartman, 185. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Bradbury and Healy, "Whose peace is it anyway", 114

³⁸⁷ Bradbury and Healy, "Whose peace is it anyway", 114

lengthy democratic processes. They incorporate the consensus building and consultative approach as vital elements of any indigenously motivated efforts at peace and reconciliation.³⁸⁸

Somali elders

The most significant peace actors known to Somalis are the clan elders. The distinctive task assigned to the position of an elder, is that of maintaining peace in the community. Aside from the prevention and resolution of conflicts between and within the clans, their responsibilities have included the payment and collection of diya on behalf of the clan. When fights erupt between clans, it is the duty of clan elders not related to either of the opposing sides to negotiate peace and pursue reconciliation. Clan elders retain the authority to impose sanctions on violating groups. They serve their community as honest and impartial peacemakers, they are well versed in customary law and they command the respect of the constituency that they represent and are accountable to in local peace sessions.

5.10.3 Indigenous peace-making applied to Somaliland's conflict

The basic difference between the approach to peace-making adopted in the early years, in the regions of Somalia and Somaliland have been those of a top-down versus a bottom-up inclusionary strategy towards settlement. The outcome in both regions had been at variance owing to existing factors in the south, which militated against an equally favourable result. How could this be? Given the linguistic, cultural and religious homogeneity that prevails across the regions as well as similar indigenous laws governing conflict and its resolution, albeit with distinct colonial experiences. Somaliland's stable peace was attributed to at least 38 indigenously driven peace and reconciliation conferences between 1990 and 1997 and the institutionalization of indigenous institutions reconstructed to constitute a synergy between modern and indigenous wisdom. Ibrahim and Terlinden have referred to this grafting of mechanism as an incorporation of traditional substance into western political forms. The system is driven by a power sharing clan-motivated formula for governance and evidenced in the institutionalization of the indigenous Guurti system- 'assemblage of elders' in the government's Upper House.³⁸⁹ When the conflict erupted in the northern region around the tail end of 1991, Somali indigenous institutions and actors were described as central to the restoration of peace

³⁸⁸ Menkhaus, "Traditional Conflict Management", 186

³⁸⁹ Ibrahim and Terlinden, Somaliland: 'home grown' peace-making and political reconstruction (76-79) in Accord an international review of peace initiatives. Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peace-making ed. Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy

in the region. Two peace conferences: the Erigavo and Boroma peace conferences have been identified as key milestones, to the actualization of sustainable peace for many Somalis especially those of Somaliland. These conferences have gone a long way to proof the effectiveness of the Somali people's peace-making institutions and actors, if allowed to thrive.

The Boroma and Sanaag peace conferences

The Boroma national conference held from between January to May 1993, summoned together the 'Guurti' of the northern region. Over 150 members were in attendance.³⁹⁰ It was a large assemblage, which attracted participants from far and wide. Most significant, was its ability to produce viable results. Admits a line of achievements recorded by this conference, three have most remarkably formed the bedrock of the peace as summarized by Dr. Mohammed A. Omar:

*"First, it helped to establish a framework for managing security, second, it aided the definition of Somaliland's political structures, which laid the foundations of an independent state and third, it marked the transfer of power from the Somali National Movement to a civilian government"*³⁹¹

The 'Guurti' of Somaliland, also elected a new president in the person of Mohammed Egal and presided over an assembly that produced a 'National Peace Charter'. According to Omar, the charter was conceived as a symbolic reaffirmation of Somaliland's sovereignty, which had been declared in the Burco Grand Conference convened by the northern clans two years before Boroma. Menkhaus observes that this signified a renewed 'Xeer' (social contract) for the people of Somaliland.³⁹²

The second conference took place in Erigavo, in Somaliland's eastern region of Sanaag, between August 1992 and June 1993. It was a regional conference described as the culmination of previously conducted peace processes within the Sanaag region. As the largest region in Somaliland, Sanaag plays host to a good number of clans. Dating back to colonial times, the

³⁹⁰ Murithi, Tim. "African Indigenous and endogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution." In *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, edited by David J Francis, 20. London: Zed Books, 2008.

³⁹¹ After Borama: consensus, representation, and parliament in Somaliland", May 17, 2013. <http://www.somalilandsun.com> (accessed August 12, 2015).

³⁹² Menkhaus, Ken. "Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia." In *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts. African Conflict 'Medicine'*, edited by I William Zartman, P189. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

region had become impoverished and marginalized by successive Somali regimes. Underdevelopment precipitated competition over scarce resources and at intervals escalations into violent aggression between the various clans, which inhibited the region.³⁹³

The Sanaag peace process is worth mentioning at this point because it produced the resolution of disputes between four warring clans in the Sanaag region, facilitated the reconciliation of the war's fierce opposing clans: the Isaaq and Harti clans and by extension contributed to the country's relatively sustained peace.³⁹⁴ On its part, the Erigavo conference became esteemed for its capacity to address the region's numerous problems, some of which were a derivation of prolonged fighting and those that triggered them in the first place. In fact, it became the grand peace-making event that saw elders negotiating an end to hostilities contingent on Somali peace-making mechanisms, which included the Xeer (customary law). Indeed, with the subsequent adaption of indigenous apparatus as integral to the proper functioning of formal state structures, Somaliland redefined the future of its people and laid the foundations for the relative peace by which Somaliland is defined till date. A number of factors account for the inability of Somali institutions and attendant custodians, to replicate the same outcome in the southern region of Somalia.

5. 11 Indigenous peace-making mechanisms in Somalia: what prospects?

The following section attempts to capture in summary the opposing dynamics to unsuccessful attempts at peace in Somalia

When the Barre regime was deposed in 1991 January, what followed was a relapse into war and lawlessness. The clans had resorted to an intense power struggle in Somalia's capital Mogadishu. Although the international community's response initially signalled disinterest in the affairs of Somalia, what followed subsequently was the intervention of both the UN and the US under appellations: UNOSOM I UNITAF and UNOSOM II. In hindsight, commentators remain acquiesced in the singular notion that the method employed in bringing peace to the people of Somalia, contradicted fundamental peace-making processes by which Somali indigenous institutions were defined.³⁹⁵

³⁹³ Ali, Mohamud Omar, Koss Mohammed, and Micheal Walls. *Interpeace and the Academy for Peace and Development*. Edited by Micheal Walls. <http://www.interpeace.org> (accessed August 12, 2015), 61

³⁹⁴ *ibid*

³⁹⁵ See, Ahmed-Khadar Hussen Egal-Aymo, "Towards reconciliation," in *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17 - 19 January 1994* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), 87-89.

When UNOSOM II finally arrived as the major peacemaker for the southern Somalis, a contrasting approach to peace became evident in the region. Although the south possessed similar indigenous institutions, mechanisms and actors, these resources became clearly ignored in the entire framework designed towards peace. Contrary to the reconciliation approach adopted by the north, Somalia saw the employment of an exact opposite model for peace. As has been highlighted in the preceding sections, the Somali peace-making institution relies heavily on the Xeer customary law which hinges on the indispensable involvement of elders in Shir gatherings or at higher levels the Guurti assemblies.³⁹⁶ In stark contrast, UNOSOM undertook to provide peace via the track I trajectory. The model ostensibly defied the natural process of peace-making according to Somali culture. In Menkhaus's words instead of local peace conferences,

*“Formal peace conferences and negotiating procedures which conformed to international diplomacy were conducted in posh hotels in distant regional capitals of Ethiopia, Nairobi, Djibouti and Egypt”.*³⁹⁷

As if that was not enough, meetings arranged to negotiate peace among the warring parties included faction leaders and warlords, but excluded the reconciliatory mediation and negotiation skills of clan elders. In similar vein, the adoption of a ‘quick fix’ approach, which contradicted the Somali culture of investing much time into peace meetings, hardly produced the desired result for stable peace. To cap it all, the natural atmosphere under which clan elders became proponents of peace, was non-existent on the southern terrain. The dynamics of the conflict had produced debilitating effects that undermined the effectiveness of indigenous institutions and its actors. The proliferation of weapons in the hands of youths engendered the diminished legitimacy of the elders. A disassociation also, from so called indigenous wisdom and a complete disregard for its purported efficacy became evident. Faction leaders began to conceive of indigenous knowledge and actors as anachronisms incompatible with contemporary times.³⁹⁸ At some point however having ran through conventional means of resoultion,

³⁹⁶ Haroon Yusuf and Robin Le Mare, "Clan Elders as Conflict Mediators: Somaliland," in *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society* (Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner Publishers, 2005), 459-464
Jannie Malan, "Traditional and Local Conflict Resolution," in *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society* (Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner Publishers, 2005),449-458

³⁹⁷Menkhaus, "Traditional Conflict Management "

³⁹⁸ Menkhaus, Ken. "Traditional Conflict Management in Contemporary Somalia." In *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts. African Conflict 'Medicine'*, edited by I William Zartman, 183-199. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

UNOSOM began to display subtle interest in Somali indigenous peace gatherings. For example, support to indigenous mechanisms was employed in procuring the Jubaland Peace Accord. Such moves nonetheless, were perceived as strategic and tailored towards UNOSOM's own interest. Indeed, vigorous clan tussles over Kismayo had resurged; nullifying what was left of the signed agreement. UNOSOM withdrew from Somalia in 1995.³⁹⁹ That outing lasted four years. The mission's inability to actualize her designated mandate, delineated the international community's intervention and strategy, in that conflict, a colossal failure. Over the last 24 years Somalia continues to search for all means available to secure the peace, which has remained elusive.

5.12 Indigenous mechanisms: strengths and limitations

From investigating into three cases of indigenous mechanisms across sub-Saharan Africa, it is possible to decipher some inherent strengths and weaknesses associated with the practice of peace and reconciliation among Africans. Indigenous mechanisms exhibit positive features but also limitations. This last section examines both. The examined indigenous systems and practices exhibit some similarities in approach, principles and in some cases actors and their roles. These features are also emblematic of traditions and customs extant among other sub-Saharan African societies not mentioned here.

5.12.1 Reconciliation

One significant principle of conflict resolution and peace-making in African societies, emphasizes societal repair. The restoration of social harmony is achieved on the vehicle of reconciliation. The norm of peace-making goes beyond resolving the conflict; it goes further to mend the relationships severed as a result of the conflict. African societies believe that "an assault on one is an assault on all". A conflict does not just involve the direct parties to the conflict, but his or her immediate family, clan, or even larger community. To ignore the reconciliation of parties to a conflict is tantamount to defying indigenous wisdom. Downplaying the wisdom behind reconciling parties to a dispute can precipitate violent aggressions between the rivalling communities. This can engender complete disorder in the larger society. In order to avoid violence, reprisal attacks, or even a resurgence of the same

³⁹⁹ *ibid*

conflict, African indigenous peacemakers ensure that reconciliation becomes the end target of all efforts to resolve and manage conflicts.

Reconciliation is also an occasion for inner healing. It is the platform for the confession of wrongdoing and for offering forgiveness for the offender. Rituals cleansing ceremonies for example, which are rooted in the people's belief system become part of the reconciliation process, geared towards restoring the social fabric of the society. The sharing of food from the same bowl, the embrace of former adversaries, the shaking of hands and giving out the hand of a woman in marriage all symbolize a return to communal status quo. When African indigenous mechanisms focus on reconciliation, they indicate an inherent alignment with justice that is achieved contingent on non-punitive measures. The main objective of indigenous peace-making institutions therefore, is to promote the essentiality of restorative justice, which does not in any way condone the atrocities of perpetrators of injustice but accomplishes the quest for justice based on the customs and traditions of the people directly affected by a conflict.

5.12.2 Lengthy discussions and consensus reaching.⁴⁰⁰

Another major defining feature of African indigenous peace-making is the adoption of a democratic approach to peace. It involves not only the participation of parties to the conflict mediated by indigenous peacemakers, but the presence of immediate family members, clan members and interested parties. It is conducted in an open location, mostly under a popular village tree, freely permitting the contribution and opinion of passers-by. The significance attached to communal consensus tends to allow for peace meetings to drag for long. African indigenous peace-making sessions have been referred to as unnecessarily time consuming. Lengthy dialogues nonetheless, allows for all interested persons to air their grievances. It gives room for deep investigation into the cause of the conflict, effectuates the thorough cross-examinations of the parties and becomes an enablement for perpetrators to show remorse and seek forgiveness. The entire process, although overseen by the mediating peacemakers, such as elders, as is the case in a myriad of African settings, is tailored towards attaining favourable and satisfactory decisions based on consensus. The weight lent to consensus agreements translates to the community's collective responsibility to ensure the implementation of agreements reached. Although consensus came at a cost or was never even achieved, the entire

⁴⁰⁰ See, Jannie Malan, "Traditional and Local Conflict Resolution," in *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society* (Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner Publishers, 2005),449-458

process was usually steered to the direction of a positive sum outcome, which resulted in a no victor and no vanquished resolution. As is the case in the reconciliation mechanism of the people of northern Uganda, a consensus is reached on letting go of the past to embrace a new future via the Mato Oput. Based on the people's consensus decision to adhere to the oath of 'no more war' the Aguleri and Umuleri communities were able again to embrace lasting peace. Both the Sanaag and Borama peace conferences tapped into the principle of consensus, which has paid off in the stability that greeted Somaliland in the aftermath of the conflicts of the 1990s.

5.12.3 An African model?

Even though African societies exhibit similarities in underlying principles like reconciliation, consensus, dialogue and the payment of compensation. There is no such thing as an African model for conflict management and resolution. Each African society has its own unique practice and strategy for reviving peace and order in the society. These methods are embedded in the people's customs and traditions. Therefore, just as the oath system cannot be referred to as a universal practice among Africans, the Mato Oput can only be associated with the people of northern Uganda, albeit other African societies practice ritual cleansing for specific needs, which may differ from what Mato Oput set out to accomplish. In similar vein, the Xeer is an emblem of the Somali people. The Gacaca courts exclusive to Rwandans and the 'Palaver huts' to Liberians. While elders and peace meetings remain important components of peace-making in Africa, they assume different appellations for different societies yet performing the same task of mediating, negotiating and adjudicating to secure that crucial transition from conflict to peace.

5.12.4 Elders

Unfortunately, the status of an elder has become compromised in many African societies. In most cases, elders find themselves torn between allegiance to the system they must uphold and loyalty to community they represent. This was the experience of elders in southern Somalia during the early years of the conflict in the 1990s.⁴⁰¹ The credibility of elders has been put to the test with attractive packages intended to coax them into relinquishing themselves to the manipulative steer of government officials, against the people they are meant to serve. In some

⁴⁰¹ Menkhaus, "Traditional Conflict Management" 185

cases, elders have been handpicked by the government and exported outside of their natural environment in the periphery, to embrace urban life, which negates the very essence of that status. The corrupt imagery of elders in a number of societies, contradicts the African perception of an elder. An elder within the African framework of understanding, is one who commands the respect of his people, represents the interest of his community, employs his wisdom in the areas of conflict resolution and management, exhibits vast knowledge of the peoples' customs and traditions and speaks eloquently, conveying strong messages via proverbs. Alas the corruption of that respectable position has diminished their capacity to effectively control conflicts at various levels of community, even at its latent stage. Communities can no longer rely on their elders as the voice that speaks the truth regardless of whatever circumstance they are confronted by. Young men no longer hold them in high esteem, thus their admonishment to young men to shun violent aggressions constantly falls on deaf ears. This has been the experience of a myriad of African societies and the fate of attendant peace-making institutions.

5.12.5 Women in African indigenous peace-making

The vast majority of African societies assume a patriarchal nature, therefore the continued discrimination of women in indigenous peace-making. The woman is constantly identified with the role of procreation and home making. She is consistently reputed to be too feeble and incapable of the role of an arbitrator, negotiator or mediator of the disputes prevalent in African societies. This biased opinion is perceived as a major weakness in a contemporary world where the role of women in international peace-making cannot go unnoticed. Women hardly assume the role of principal peacemakers in a good number of African societies. The respectable role of a mediating elder for example, continues to be dominated by the male folk. Although in some societies, women feature significantly in the restoration of societal cohesion, such instances of women involvement in peace-making may be considered as the exception rather than the rule. In the south-eastern part of Nigeria for example, which is predominantly an Igbo speaking region, the 'Umuada' (First born females in the family lineage) as elaborately expatiated by Obasi and Nnamani, assume the role of conciliators especially in stubborn cases of disputes, both in the family and the larger community.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰² Obasi, Cletus O, and Rebecca Ginikanwa Nnamani. "The Role of Umuada Igbo in Conflict Management and Development in NIgeria:." *Scientific Research Publishing*. June 17, 2015. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2015.54027> (accessed August 25, 2015).

In light of the above, Isike and Uzodike strongly maintain that the discrimination against women is not to be understood as a characteristic feature of African indigenous peace-making because pre-colonial peace-making procedures allegedly recognized the woman as naturally inclined to peace-making, tapping into virtues of womanhood. The subsequent marginalization of women they argue is a mere neo-colonial occurrence traceable to the colonial interlude experienced in the African region. The adoption of state-centric mechanisms of peace in Africa and the interpretation given to African conflicts may have robbed off on indigenous strategies of peace. Women as a result, became invisible actors in African indigenous peace-making often times completely detached from an entire process aimed at durable peace.⁴⁰³

5.12.6 Caveats in African indigenous peace-making.

The unwritten nature of African indigenous mechanisms may play to the disadvantage of a good number of African societies. The gradual transition to modernization and the adoption of state judicial methods tends to precipitate disaffection for indigenous methods. The only means by which such mechanisms are passed down to generations is via experience, songs and proverbs. If modernization prompts the younger generation to shun such practices in preference for alternative strategies and if hardship causes them to seek greener pastures in faraway lands, then the possibility of such methods becoming anathema may not be farfetched. If the population in the diaspora shy away from imbibing into their children these undocumented cultural ethics of peace-making, treating them as anachronisms of a forgotten era and should such practices remain inaccessible in print mediums then chances of their longevity become compromised.

5.13 Conclusion

This chapter examined three selected strategies of peace-making associated with societies in the sub-Saharan African region. A number of the principles underlying these indigenous mechanisms have been likened to the same elements of peace-making, which inform the school of conflict transformation's thesis on conflict and intervention. The emphasis for example on relational change features strongly within the African indigenous worldview of conflict

⁴⁰³ Isike, Christopher, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike. African Journal on Conflict Resolution. "Towards an indigenous model of conflict resolution: Reinventing women's roles as traditional peace-builders in neo-colonial Africa" . *African Journals Online*. 2011. <http://www.ajol.info> (accessed 09 01, 2015).

resolution and peace-making as evidenced in the examples from Uganda, Nigeria, and the regions of Somalia. In similar vein, the long duration peace meetings whether local or national, that characterize indigenous peace-making, which are axiomatic of the essence of deep investigation, truth telling, forgiveness and reconciliation as played out in consensus-based processes, aligns with the prescription to invest more time in building peace. Therefore, when the conflict transformation school underscores the essence of long-term intervention in the predominantly intra-state conflicts of the 21st century, it simply calls on the international community to adopt context specific strategies as vital aspects of a complementary approach towards sustainable peace. Indigenous tools should be allowed to thrive where necessary. As in the case on Somalia, the continuous engagement of indigenous mechanism has remained the only option in the face of unstable governance for more than two decades since the total collapse of state structures in 1991.

The selected three cases have substantiated some of the propositions underlying Lederach's comprehensive framework for intervention in protracted conflicts.

- a. All of the selected cases have successfully corroborated the significance of contextual peace-making processes in the search for durable peace.
- b. As evident in the context of Uganda, repercussions may accrue from imposing on the direct recipients of a conflict, a peace process that lies in contrast with the peoples believe system. In this manner therefore, lending credence to Lederach's recommendation for a culturally sensitive approach to peace.
- c. The Nigerian case supports the claim for a bottom up approach to peace and reveals the merits of complementarity. That example encourages African societies to adopt an "introspective" approach to peace. It is an affirmation of Lederach's call to empower indigenous actors and resuscitate indigenous practices, primarily where they seem the most relevant.
- d. The experience from Somaliland confirms the claims for interdependency. It exemplifies "space creation" "incorporation" and is a demonstration of the benefits of a synergy between formal and informal peace-making processes. Where significance is accorded to the most pragmatic approach to peace

Finally, it is evident that the three delineated cases: northern Uganda, south east Nigeria Somalia, are fraught with lessons for both ends of the peace-making spectrum: the African indigenous peace-making and the mainstream. Indigenous techniques cannot be branded "a

one- size-fits-all approach” to all contemporary conflicts on the African continent. They also do not possess the capacity to stand in isolation of mainstream approaches in today’s conflicts. On both sides, the issue of complementarity may be encouraged. There is no gainsaying the fact that indigenous mechanisms have retained their efficacy as reliable tools in a good number of conflict terrains on the continent. Unfortunately, as evidenced in this chapter, others have recorded adverse benefits and told a different story. These instances may not be seen as leverage to dismiss the efficacy of indigenous wisdom. Cases of negative returns should not elicit a general bias or insensitive approach towards the prospects for peace contingent on indigenous processes. Inefficiency cannot be generalized judging from a single case. Most favourable therefore would be to adopt the attitude of learning and exploration. This tends to reveal the uniqueness of each technique, as applied within the context and simultaneously addresses the tendency to unduly subject indigenous mechanisms to generalized conclusions.

Chapter Six

6.1 Research Methodology

This study seeks to address its research questions dependent on a single case, theory driven, and qualitative research methodology. Focusing on Darfur's conflict since 2003, three major questions have been developed to guide investigation into: the international community's intervention strategies, the potentials of indigenous knowledge and its actors and the prospects of incorporating into a single operational framework, modern approaches and indigenous peace-making mechanisms. Yin posits that the case study approach can be utilized when: "How" and "why" questions form the platform on which the study will progress. Case studies also become a significant strategy in research if "the investigator has minimal control over events within the context"⁴⁰⁴ The questions guiding this thesis are suited for a case study kind of research because they are specifically conceived to focus attention on describing "how" those conflict-mitigating processes, which are linked to the fields of conflict management and conflict resolution and eventually transformation have contributed to the peace process in Darfur.

State-centric approaches such as peacekeeping and formal mediation, as well as the more people-oriented strategies such as informal mediation and problem-solving workshops provides the link to investigating the extent to which such approaches have found relevance in the search for durable peace to the Darfur conflict. It illuminates further "how" indigenous processes from pre-colonial times, have become applicable to making peace and stabilizing the region. .⁴⁰⁵ Before I proceed, it is imperative to understand from a scholarly standpoint what the case study research sets out to achieve and why this strategy may be applicable to qualitative research.

In Hartley's words:

*"Case study research consists of a detailed investigation, often with data collection over a period of time, of phenomena, within their context. The aim according to the author "is to provide an analysis of the context and processes which illuminate the theoretical issues being studied"*⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁴ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Fourth Edition. (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publishers, 2009), 9-11

⁴⁰⁵ See, Daniel Druckman, *Doing Research, Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis* (California: Sage Publication, 2005)

⁴⁰⁶ Jean Hartley, "Case Study Research," in Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, *Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research* (London: SAGE Publications, 2004), 323-333

According to Yin,

*“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-time context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”*⁴⁰⁷

Within the context of this study, that “contemporary phenomenon” within its real-time context points to the conflict, on all levels, as obtained in Sudan’s western region: Darfur. Central to this study however, is not to engage in a detailed investigation into the reasons for Darfur’s implosion. Scholars and Analysts have since succeeded in understanding and identifying the root causes underlying pockets of conflict terrains in the Sudan. One case in point is the conflict in the Blue Nile. The more prominent Darfur conflict has not eluded academic conception either. Analyst have dissected conflict causalities and probed into the underlying reasons for its protraction. The purpose of fighting therefore constitutes no form of novelty to the exponents of the theory of conflict. What seems new, though, is the international community’s interventionist mechanism. When closely viewed, this ad hoc, hybridized approach by the international community to Darfur’s conflict, exposes a new terrain for academic probing.

As earlier noted, it has become a topic for debate especially among African scholars,⁴⁰⁸ to revive pre-colonial peace-making mechanisms on the continent, so as to make them applicable to the conflicts of the modern era. The reason has been the endemic nature of conflicts in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Scholars have proposed the creation of synergies between the contextual resources within a conflict terrain and the more conventional strategies.⁴⁰⁹ In practical terms however, such considerations have been adopted in isolation of each other, I.e. applied to societies in the post-conflict settlement phase or have been employed as state initiatives to bolster extant western strategies for peace. The examples from the experiences of Somalia, South Africa and Rwanda come to mind.

⁴⁰⁷ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Fourth Edition. (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publishers, 2009)

⁴⁰⁸ See, William Zartman, *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict "Medicine"* (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000)

See, Martha Mutisi and Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, *Integrating Traditional and Modern Conflict Resolution: Experiences from selected cases in Eastern and the Horn of Africa* (Durban: ACCORD, 2012)


⁴⁰⁹ See, Martha Mutisi and Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, *Integrating Traditional and Modern Conflict Resolution: Experiences from selected cases in Eastern and the Horn of Africa* (Durban: ACCORD, 2012)

The case of Darfur however, presents a rare scenario to be explored, especially because of the unique intervention framework associated with that conflict from the outset. It is the first of its kind adopted in response to a conflict on the sub-Saharan. While it still falls within the rubric of a state-centric military approach, it is conceived to be of a different kind. The uniqueness is evinced in the hybridized nature of the intervention but also in the mandate to operate within a multidimensional framework that allows for grassroots intervention. In the empirical chapters on international intervention, this study will interrogate the international community's approach to peace, in the direction that investigates a synergy between the external peace actor and specific actors on the level 3 of Darfur's affected population. The UN's innovative strategy, which authorizes partnership from top to bottom as well as from bottom to top, is yet to be considered a success or a failure. However, it leaves room for further investigations, one that this study cannot fully achieve without an empirical analysis of the "real time context" that accords special attention to intervention on the grassroots level.

6.2 Research design

Yin differentiates between four types of case studies: the single case holistic, the single case embedded, the multiple cases holistic and the multiple cases embedded. The major differences are between the single versus the multiple types and the holistic versus the embedded. By embedded, the author describes the multiple or the single case study approach, which involves the analysis of embedded units within the chosen case. While the single case among other reasons "can be used to determine whether a theory's propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant." The single case "embedded" becomes relevant when "within a single case, attention is also given to a subunit or subunits".⁴¹⁰

⁴¹⁰ Yin, "Case Study Research", 46



Single-case embedded with multiple units of analysis adopted from Yin⁴¹¹

This study will employ the single case embedded approach. On the one hand I examine intervention approaches utilized in the conflict by the international community. I focus on UNAMID (peacekeeping mission), the first embedded unit of analysis and the officially recognized peacemaker, operating within the framework of its mandate. On the other hand, I investigate into my second embedded unit of analysis which is Darfur's peace-making institution. I probe into this second unit of analysis as an independent unit. This in alignment with the proposition underlying my framework for analysis has the capacity on the basis of unique and positive methods to contribute to the transformation of the Darfur conflict. More successfully so, when they are integrated into the operational framework of the officially recognized peacemaker.

It is important to note that for the purpose of background information, this study will equally consider the activities of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as separate missions preceding UNAMID. At the initial stages of the conflict's outbreak, both the AU and the UN intervened as two separate and independent bodies. The AU heeded the initial call as regional peacemaker while the UN followed suit as international peacemaker. That being the case regardless, this study as mentioned earlier, concentrates on UNAMID as a single mission comprising both organizations-the UN and the

⁴¹¹ Yin, "Case Study Research", 46

AU. Having elucidated on the research design, I proceed to state the purpose for selecting the case.

6.3 Case Selection

Initially, the years of civil strife between the north and the south marked Sudan as one of the nations in the sub-Saharan region with a prolonged history of fighting. That conflict terminated in 2005 and as mentioned earlier, precipitated the secession of the south from the north in 2011. Separate regions within the Sudan have also documented a history of violent eruptions. The conflict in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile are cases in point. Darfur, located in the west of Sudan, has equally remained an active zone of conflict since 2003. Pockets of conflict domains have therefore plagued the Sudan. I have nonetheless, chosen the Darfur conflict as the selected case for investigation in this study. The conflict takes ascendancy over others within the Sudan, owing to the myriad of instruments applied by the international community to the mitigation of the conflict. Also, the Darfur case exhibits features that this thesis utilizes to illuminate the theoretical perspectives⁴¹² underpinning the conflict transformation field of inquiry. As outlined elsewhere in this study, conflict transformation prescribes its underlying ideas as germane to the amelioration of protracted conflicts. The Darfur case for one, has prolonged for a decade and counting. The transformation perspective also seems to align with emerging African scholarly debates about the efficacy of indigenous peace-making systems⁴¹³ in contemporary conflicts. The Darfur case therefore provides a real-time conflict scenario for probing into African perspectives, as well as unexplored academic research areas, which this thesis intends to examine.

Furthermore, when the Darfur conflict initially broke out, it attracted international attention on the basis of controversies over genocidal tendencies meted out on the black population by government-backed militias also known as the “Janjaweed”. Neither the conflicts of the Blue Nile nor those of Southern Kordofan have generated that magnitude of concern from the outside world. The Darfur case is the only conflict in Sudan and the one singular conflict in the world

⁴¹² See, Daniel Druckman, *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis* (Thousand Oaks [etc.]: Sage Publications, 2005).

⁴¹³ See, Martha Mutisi and Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, *Integrating Traditional and Modern Conflict Resolution: Experiences from selected cases in Eastern and the Horn of Africa* (Durban: ACCORD, 2012)
See, Isaac O. Albert, "Understanding Peace in Africa," in *Peace and Conflict in Africa*, ed. David J. Francis (London: Zed Books, 2013), Kindle Edition, 31-45

that has played host to an unprecedented hybrid peace mission. The mission is a conflict intervention synergy between the AU and the UN. On the basis of such unparalleled cooperation, the Darfur case provides a very good platform for investigating into the prospects of integrating indigenous peace-making mechanisms into the UNAMID's working framework for peace. I find this to be a very interesting starting point to revive African methods of making peace, especially in semi modern societies like Darfur. A reawakening to some of Africa's positive intervention strategies may ensure harmony and prevent the eruption of conflicts with the propensity to attract international concern.

UNAMID represents collaboration between the parent body and a regional organization. That been the case regardless, the direction of this thesis argument must be clearly stated. I conceive of the principles guiding the African Union intervention in conflict terrains like Darfur as parallel to the framework within which the UN operates. UNAMID functions under a multidimensional mandate, however both organizations as separate entities, represent an embodiment of militarized operations as well as bolster state-centric approaches to peace. I have not selected the Darfur case with the aim to determine the workability of a synergy between both organizations. This will by far negate the purpose of this research. It is also not within the scope of this thesis to determine the general success or failure of UNAMID in the Darfur conflict. The Darfur case nonetheless, becomes relevant to this study for probing into the operationalization of a multidimensional framework that sanctions grassroots intervention and aims towards cooperation with host state's contextual peace-making resources. Developing chapters illuminate on UNAMID's multidimensional mandate in Darfur. In utilizing the Darfur case, the study is able to gauge the extent to which UNAMID's work in tandem with Darfur's peace-making actors and methods contributes to the conflict's gradual transformation. That been said, I shall proceed to elaborate on my choice of research tools and how they aided the collection of evidence.

6.4 Study Location

Concise information about the exact study location would suffice at this point. The Darfur region comprises of five federal states: Central Darfur with its capital in Zalingei, East Darfur with the capital located in El-Daein, El-Fasher, the capital city of Northern Darfur, while Nyala and El Geneina are capital cities of both South and West Darfur respectively. Each of these states experience spates of violence. The entire Darfur province is characterized by precarious

security precipitated by active fighting. The study's research location was El Fasher, the capital of northern Darfur. El-Fasher plays host to UNAMID headquarters. Other states in Darfur were not visited because the study's units of analysis (UNAMID's CAS and Darfur's Indigenous Peace-making Institution) function under the same operational framework in all of the other four regions. Also, Darfur's peace-making institutions tend to be largely homogenous across all the states.

6.5 Sources of Data

Secondary sources

This study relies on both primary and secondary data. Specifically, three libraries have been beneficial to gathering secondary data that provided detailed insight into what have constituted the theoretical chapters of this thesis. The online materials of the Berghof Research Centre have been very insightful in unearthing and understanding assumptions from the school of conflict transformation guiding this study. The resources from both the Nigerian Defence College Abuja and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs provided rich data pertaining to the AU's intervention in the Darfur conflict. The knowledge gathered from secondary data afforded acquaintance with the "case" as well as with a number of notable indigenous Sudanese authors. While on ground in Khartoum, the researcher enjoyed the rare privilege of engaging a number of these local scholars in insightful interview sessions. Finally, a good number of authors engaged in writing about Sudan, rely on archival materials from Durham University in the United Kingdom. This research draws on a number of E- theses with rich empirical information about the Darfur conflict.

Primary sources

In order to gain deeper understanding of the study location, the researcher (I) connected with scholars, experts and other researchers working on Sudan and South Sudan. This connection was effected on the platform of a conference organized by the SOS Darfur student group of the University of Erfurt. The solicited link to local contacts and relevant information collected from that forum, specifically about conducting research in the Sudan, served to bridge the gap against initial challenges that may have stemmed from the researcher's unfamiliarity with the domain of study. Once on ground in Khartoum other logistics began to fall in place, those that eventually paved the eventual access into Darfur.

Mazurana et al state that:

“Conflict environments are often rapidly evolving, requiring that researchers be flexible and able to adapt their methodologies”⁴¹⁴.

Also hear Druckman:

“Loosely bound case studies are performed in an inductive emic tradition that allows for inventiveness at all stages of research. Tightly bound case studies, conducted in an etic tradition, proceed from a research design that specifies in advance the collection and analysis procedures...⁴¹⁵

The emphasis here is both on the researcher’s flexibility and on the “inventiveness” at all stages of the research, which the case study approach condones. Accordingly, the thesis adopted an open-ended approach to sourcing its primary data. This was intended to allow for “inventiveness” on the field, as the need arose. The notion of “inventiveness” became paramount to generating the thesis’s primary data owing to the strict regulations guiding accessibility into the study terrain as well as the volatility of the region.

Interviews:

According to Yin, interviews constitute one of the major sources of evidence when doing a case study research. They are differentiated from surveys because of the conversational manner interviews adopt. This study relied on unstructured methods of interviewing especially because it allowed the researcher (I) to delve into matters that did not necessarily relate to the proposed questions, but which added some value to the entire process. In like manner, seeking information from more than a single source, became a calculated effort to enable the “*development of converging lines of inquiry*” i.e. to allow for the triangulation of the evidences gathered “⁴¹⁶

The study relies largely on in-depth interviews with key informants. Access to a good number of informants became available due to a snowballing technique. Focused group discussions were conducted with participants that were specifically sampled for the purpose of the targeted information. Significant documents were obtained from UNAMID. Unpublished materials were also made available to the researcher by a number of Interviewed key informants.

⁴¹⁴ See, Dyan Mazurana, Karen Jacobsen, and Lacey Gale, eds. *Research Methods in Conflict Settings: A View from Below* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)

⁴¹⁵ Daniel Druckman, *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 163

⁴¹⁶ Yin, “Case Study Research”, 98

6.6 Multiple Sources

The strength of any case study research is the use of “multiple sources of evidence”⁴¹⁷ As earlier pointed out, initial data was sourced from within the state capital Khartoum and from the neighbouring commercial city of Omdurman. This plan was easily conceivable as part of the inventiveness which accompanies an open-ended research design. The researcher utilized this approach as a plan B to the proposed plan A. This became necessary at the point where the actualization of plan A seemed unattainable.

In Khartoum, in-depth interviews were conducted. The first interview with a key informant facilitated the connection to all other informants interviewed in Khartoum. The interviews lasted between 60 to 90 minutes. In the course of the interviews I noticed, once I asked for the respondents’ names, that these were the very authors I had become familiar with while reading secondary materials about the Darfur conflict. Within the premises of the University of Khartoum, interviews were carried out in English language.

Outside the University premises an interpreter became indispensable. That was the case with the group discussion conducted in Omdurman where the informal services of an interpreter were engaged. A diplomat, (Names withheld for security purpose) with one of the embassies located in the state capital, facilitated the link to 10 Darfuri male youths between the ages of 30 and 35. Two of the ten group participants were childhood acquaintances to the interpreter. (I refer to them as informant A and B). Informant A and B fetched other 8 of their friends. All of the 10 had lived a greater part of their lives in Darfur and had fled the violence in its initial stages. They had become traders at the Omdurman market, eking out a living from meagre profit generated from their trade. Informant B specifically displayed vast knowledge and claimed strong affiliations with the known Native Administration hierarchies. One could sense that he spoke from a wealth of experience. My interpreter had explained my mission to them. I noticed the readiness on their part to pour out their hearts to me, once I reassured them of the confidentiality of our meeting. We conducted silent group discussions on two separate dates in one restaurant. Our conversations usually lasted for not more than 30 minutes at the most. Although participant A and B had started off responding to my line of questions in English, they arrived at the point where it became difficult to express themselves in clear terms and had to make the switch to Arabic.

⁴¹⁷ Yin, “Case Study Research”, 97

The restaurant was the choice of the participants of the group discussion. This was a calculated step to ensure confidentiality as well as the safety of the participants. Worthy of note is the fact that issues around the conflict in Darfur have almost become a political anathema.

One strategy adopted by the researcher since coming to terms with “Darfur” being anathema, was to become involved in informal personal conversations. Social functions in Khartoum drew together the high and mighty of the society, attending them provided the unique opportunity for relaxed discussions. Questions were usually posed in a manner that concealed the actual intention behind them.

6.7 On ground Darfur...

The permit into Darfur was approved, albeit with stringent conditions. A short duration of stay was granted, and this facilitated the commencement of the second phase of data collection. For reasons of personal security, the collection of primary data in Darfur was carried out strictly within the confines of the UN headquarters in El-Fasher, northern Darfur.

Reflecting on the data gathered while in the state capital Khartoum, I realized my respondents seemed divided on the issues I presented before them. With this background knowledge in mind, I understood to make adjustments that incorporated other aspects, and which would enable a deeper insight into the problem I sought answers to. I began to spread my tentacles so as to capture varying perspectives. For example, while in Khartoum, I discovered that my informants were either Darfuri or non-Darfuri. Perspectives were either connotative of subjective opinion or extremely critical and reflective of issues from an academic stand point.

In Darfur, my data-gathering horizon became much wider in contrast to what obtained in Khartoum. In- depth interviews were carried out with UN personnel. Informants responded in the capacity of their represented department; the political and the humanitarian. So as to fully explore the terrain, the researcher was introduced to the head of the Civil Affairs Section. He in turn assigned the researcher to the team leader of the Civil Affairs Section (sector north), as it is being referred to on ground.

A group discussion was organised to enable officers who are part of the team leaders’ group, to enlighten the researcher on the department’s mandate as well as introduce the four cells operating under the Civil Affairs Section: The Capacity Building, Information Management, Quick Impact Projects and Conflict Resolution Cells jointly operate to ameliorate conflict at

the grassroots. At the end of that introductory session was able to identify the appropriate cell, which based on my research questions could aptly furnish me with the needed data. In the days that followed, I focused on extracting vital information from the Conflict Resolution Cell. My questions revolved around issues of the conflict, international response and prospects of indigenous peace-making mechanisms. Our discussions would last between 25 -30 minutes and were usually morning sessions which stretched into the afternoons.

Triangulation

The idea of data triangulation is to encourage the researcher to collect information from multiple sources, they are aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon.⁴¹⁸ For this reason, interview sessions were taken a step further. A representative of Darfur's civil society groups was engaged in a lengthy discussion. The researcher in that manner became acquainted with on ground facts relating to the efforts at mitigating conflict at the middle level of society. In similar vein, the researcher was opportune to be in the presence of four representatives of the "Ajaweed". The Ajaweed are mediators and custodians of the "Judiyya;" Darfur's mechanism for justice and reconciliation. The underlying motivation was to understand the role of the region's indigenous peace-making heritage: "Judiyya" in the current conflict. The researcher sought insight into the process itself and tabled some of the allegations levelled against Darfur's indigenous mechanisms. One of these claims capture discussions about the ineffectiveness of the NA institutions and the diminished legitimacy of local peace-making custodians in asserting a mitigating authority on local tensions. This inadequacy on the part of local methods purportedly culminated in the eruption of fresh violence in 2003.

6.8 Analytical Approach and Interpretation

According to Robson, the case study does not call for a particular approach to the analysis of the data it produces.⁴¹⁹ This study nonetheless relies on selected propositions and techniques to analyse the data collected from Khartoum and Darfur alike.

⁴¹⁸ Yin, "Case Study Research", 116

⁴¹⁹ Colin Robson, *Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005)

6.8.1 Research propositions

The essence of propositions within the case study approach is the opportunity afforded the researcher to contemplate theoretical issues. They also aid a refined search for evidence on the field.⁴²⁰

In similar vein:

... *“The researcher needs to develop theoretical frameworks during the course of the research, which inform and make sense of the data and which can be systematically examined during the case study for plausibility”*⁴²¹

The propositions underlying the conflict transformation field form the lenses through which this study engages in a descriptive analysis of the data that will be collected. Around the early 1990s, scholars from the school of conflict transformation engaged in a thorough examination of guiding ideas and propositions. Their assumptions against those underlying the fields of conflict management and conflict resolution as mentioned in the theoretical chapters, advance the transformation discourse as pragmatic, beneficial and significant towards the realization of durable peace especially to cases of prolonged conflicts. There is however a paucity of detailed empirical backing in this regard. A further examination into the applicability, in a real conflict scenario like Darfur, of conflict management and conflict resolution approaches, validates or repudiates the creation of a vacuum as suggested by conflict transformation scholars.

Two main analytical models as expounded by Edward Azar⁴²² and John Paul Lederach⁴²³ will be employed in the empirical chapters of this study. Edward Azar’s lenses for understanding Protracted Social Conflicts, forms the basis on which the thesis sets out to examine the conditions which may have precipitated the eruption of conflict in 2003. To what extent can the author’s propositions find cogency within the Darfur context? Contingent on Lederach’s comprehensive framework, the study will investigate into the prospects for the creation of “space” for the region’s indigenous resources within the working mandate of UNAMID in Darfur.

⁴²⁰ Yin, “Case Study Research: Design and Methods”, 28

⁴²¹ Hartley, Case Study Research, 324

⁴²² Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990).

⁴²³ John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 201-222

6.8.2 Pattern Matching

Pattern matching is the core procedure of theory testing with cases. Testing consists of matching an “observed pattern” (a pattern of measured values) an “expected pattern” (a hypothesis), and deciding whether these patterns match (resulting in a confirmation of the hypothesis) or do not match (resulting in a disconfirmation).⁴²⁴ According to Yin, It compares findings from the case study with predictions made before the collected data.⁴²⁵ Therefore findings most specifically from Darfur will be compared with Lederach’s postulations to “confirm” or “disconfirm” the assumptions. The technique will be used to evaluate the extent to which Lederach’s propositions can be viewed as a pragmatic approach to sustainable peace achieved on the platform of reconciliation administered in conjunction with resources from within.

Longer time frames invested on the terrain of conflict, and a bottom up integrative approach to peace, constitute some of the underlying conjectures, which should facilitate the transformation of prolonged conflicts. Its implication for the case of Darfur is yet to be fully explored. Also, its effectiveness within the capacity of an official strategy of the international community remains to be proven.

Historians may recommend a historical approach to investigating the case of Darfur. It is not out of line, considering Darfur’s antecedents of conflict as well as an age long peace-making institution. This study touches on historically related issues but does so with brevity to avoid any form of digression. In this light, it must be reiterated that it is not the focus of this study to concentrate on the causes of conflicts per se, but to examine basically the effectiveness of conventional approaches to the conflict. Therefore, as put forth by Yin, the choice to do a case study above a historical method arose for me because the study contemplates the analysis of contemporary events, “where relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated” and where the concentration is not on the ‘dead past’.⁴²⁶ The edge the case study approach exercises above the historical method is the ability to hear directly from relevant sources involved with these events. Also, the case study caters for the direct observation of the object of study which is Darfur. However, as already mentioned, a historical perspective cannot be entirely overruled.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁴ Tony Haks and Jan Dul, “Pattern Matching,” *ERIM Report Series Research in Management*, June 2009, 1, accessed June 5, 2017, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1433934>

⁴²⁵ Robert K Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (California: SAGE Publications, 2014), 143.

⁴²⁶ Yin, “Case Study Research”, 7

⁴²⁷ Yin, “Case Study Research”, 11

6.8.3 Generalizations

While the case study approach is refuted for its proneness to subjectivity, others view the ability to make analysis contingent upon a collection of instruments as expedient against issues of researcher bias. One area where the case study approach tends to come under intense scrutiny is the issue of ‘generalizations’. Its critics tend to fault the ability to generalize from a single study. Its exponents tend to view such assertions a different light. Yin repudiates this claim stating that

*“case studies are generalizable, but in a different manner as compared to other approaches to research. Case studies according to him, are generalized to theoretical propositions, and not to populations or universes”*⁴²⁸

Since the case is not to be likened to a sample under assessment, generalizations through the case study lenses must be viewed as an analytical rather than a statistical task, where the objective is *“to expand and generalize theories”*.⁴²⁹ Johansson further illuminates the analytical stance by stating that analytical generalizations are based on reasoning. He mentions three principles of reasoning: deductive, inductive and abductive, stating that *“Generalizations can be made from a case using one or a combination of these principles”*. Going by his understanding, this study will adopt the deductive; without seeking to *“falsify theory”* as he puts it, but to contribute to the conflict transformation body of knowledge.⁴³⁰

What implication does this have for the case in question? Will the findings from the Darfur case be transferrable to other cases of protracted conflicts on the sub-Saharan region? Note must be taken to understand that no two conflicts on the sub-Saharan region have displayed the exact same dynamics or complexities as have been recorded in Darfur or in the wider context of the Sudan as a whole. Similarly, until now, Darfur remains the first and the only conflict where a hybrid mission has been deployed to aid the containment of a deadly escalated violence. The task as it is, therefore is one of contributing to what Yin referred to earlier as the expansion and generalization of theories. To that effect the underlying propositions of the adopted framework for intervention as projected by the field of conflict transformation may become applicable to

⁴²⁸ Ibid, 15

⁴²⁹ Ibid

⁴³⁰ Rolf Johansson, "Case Study Methodology," ResearchGate, last modified January 2003, <http://www.researchgate.net>.

other cases of protracted conflicts on the continent. Yet the results are bound to differ, as is evident in its partial form, exhibited for example in the case of Somalia. In like manner, the findings from here should expose the weaknesses and strengths of the propositions, while checking for their plausibility and practicability in real time conflicts or future conflicts of the region. Finally, since this study focuses on the northern region of Darfur-El Fasher, findings may readily become applicable to all other states of Darfur, where homogeneous conditions apply.

6.8 Caveats to the study

Conducting research in a volatile region like Darfur can be a daunting task for any researcher interested in “*systematic documentation, testing, and learning that helps to identify which practices are effective, which components work and how, which approaches are cost effective and sustainable...*”⁴³¹ Darfur has for some time remained out of the international media’s spotlights. The enthusiasm therefore to venture into on ground research initially becomes dampened as researchers realise they are in the dark about the status of the war. Yet the motivation to fill the gap in knowledge and tell the story from the perspective of those within, tends to propel the researcher regardless. Sometimes it is by sheer luck that researchers become aware of beneficial sources of information like the Radio Dabanga⁴³² and the online resource: The Sudan Tribune⁴³³ or about bloggers like Eric Reeves⁴³⁴ who by some means stumble on up to date information about the region. In the course of data collection in Darfur I was confronted with a number of challenges, surmountable and insurmountable alike. These encounters have called for the flexibility and inventiveness alluded to in the section capturing the thesis research design. The efforts made towards contextualising the methodology of this thesis within Darfur’s active conflict is what I present as the caveats of this study.

6.8.1 Accessing the field

Accessing the Darfur province starts with an entry visa into Sudan, however, it does not end there. A researcher must make an application to the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in order to procure the permit that grants entry to the region. The delay in processing is one aspect

⁴³¹ Michael Wessells, “Reflections on Ethical and Practical Challenges of Conducting Research with Children in War Zones: Toward a Grounded Approach,” in *Research Methods in Conflict Settings: A View from Below*, ed. Dyan Mazurana, Karen Jacobsen, and Lacey Gale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 81-105

⁴³² See, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en>

⁴³³ See, <https://www.sudantribune.org>

⁴³⁴ See, <https://www.sudanreeves.org>

of conducting research in the province that should be put into consideration especially when the entry visa into Sudan is a short one. The commission may also decide the length of stay. In my case, a three-week duration was approved. A short stay has the tendency to distort the data collection plan mapped out for the research trip. I resorted to adopting an intensive approach to data collection as a strategy to maximise time. Nonetheless, the lack of sufficient time tended to inhibit the opportunity to access a wide array of respondents, which indeed may have boosted the level of the thesis reliability and minimised any biases.⁴³⁵ For example, a visit to the government of North Darfur was impossible. Scheduled interviews with respondents at the university of El-Fasher could not be executed. Similarly, interview sessions revealed that Darfuris on the camp maintain a form of the Native Administration hierarchies and therefore depend on indigenous peace-making mechanisms to preserve peace and harmony on the camps. Based on the rationale that my personal security would not be guaranteed, a visit to the IDP camps in the company of Civil Affairs officers who frequently carried out routine checks was disallowed. It may have been possible with a longer duration of stay to penetrate these areas when tensions have doused.

6.8.2 Protecting Data from the field

*“The challenge of protecting sources (from zones of conflict) can be quite difficult and may force one to limit the research conducted and what is done with information collected.”*⁴³⁶

While in Darfur the researcher (I) resorted to full note taking as compared to the freedom to record interviews in Khartoum. Although conducting interviews within the UN quarters did not constitute any problem, the major complication was in being able to circumvent the confiscation of recorded data while departing the Darfur region. Therefore, the idea of interviews at all became a problem. Taking notes while conducting the interviews was more of a drawback for the researcher. In Khartoum, it was possible to take repeated listens to recorded interviews once the researcher retired to her closet. It is therefore possible to have omitted some vital information during interview sessions. Although the researcher largely avoided recording, during the interview/ discussion session conducted with the indigenous mediators, it became

⁴³⁵ Robert K Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (California: SAGE Publications, 2014)

⁴³⁶ Timothy Longman, “Conducting Research in Conflict Zones: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region,” in *Research Methods in Conflict Settings: A View from Below*, ed. Dyan Mazurana, Karen Jacobsen, and Lacey Gale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 256

pertinent to weigh the risk benefit ratio of recording or not. Since the Ajaweed communicated in Arabic, the imperativeness to second vet and cater for accuracy became the motivating drive to shun the envisaged risk. The researcher, (I) engaged the services of a UNAMID staff to act as interpreter. On my arrival in Germany, I equally explored the language prowess of Arabic speaking colleagues from Palestine and South Sudan. The effect of language barrier on the authenticity of a research nonetheless must be acknowledged especially as this hinders access to the depth of the information solicited for. In Khartoum for example language constraint tended to hamper the flow of the discussion during some attended state functions.

6.8.3 Data Sourcing

By virtue of Sudan's patriarchal configuration, the sourcing of data tended to tilt predominantly towards the male folk. They, in contrast to the females readily responded to casual conversations or entreaties to conduct interviews. On stating my mission via email or telephone, a number of women for some reason promptly declined any form of interview or discussion. This constraint can undermine the potential of the research to produce a gender-balanced opinion. The reverse however was the case when sampling the opinion of Civil Affairs and UNAMID top personnel.

A researcher practically meets the challenges of conducting research in a conflict setting by adopting what Mazurana et al have referred to as "one of the most productive approaches". It is the proposition "*for externally based researchers to partner with an organisation based in the conflict zone and staffed with locals*".⁴³⁷ The research study is not the result of an official partnership with UNAMID. However, the researcher was granted access to UNAMID premises for research purposes. On the basis of unhindered access to UNAMID, both the analysis delved into in chapter 9, and the core empirical findings stated in chapter 10, rely to a large extent on primary data acquired from UNAMID's coffers of classified information. It is for this reason that the research's susceptibility to biased interpretations cannot be absolutely nullified. Nonetheless when such information is contrasted with what seems like rumours deriving from the state capital. The conclusion tends to retain its validity. According to the editors of "Research Methods in Conflict Settings: A view from below",

⁴³⁷ Mazurana et al, "A View from Below: Conducting Research in Conflict Zones" in *Research Methods in Conflict Settings: A View from Below*, ed. Dyan Mazurana, Karen Jacobsen, and Lacey Gale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 7

“Research in conflict settings requires careful triangulation of information to sort out rumour from knowledge. However, rumours are revealing in and of themselves as to what they disclose about the communities’ view of those in power and of the power dynamics affecting daily lives...”⁴³⁸

This assertion aptly captures the context of substantiating vital primary data collected from UNAMID with other data, but also with the “rumours” emanating from Khartoum.

⁴³⁸ Mazurana et al, “A View from Below: Conducting Research in Conflict Zones,” 13

Chapter Seven

7.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to achieve a dual purpose. The first is to provide historical insight into the conflict that eventually engulfed the Darfur region in 2003. This initial task does not make the attempt to rummage into the region's long historical antecedence. It is instead, an inquiry into the factors that have contributed to the protracted nature of Darfur's conflict. I delve into this analysis against the backdrop of Edward Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict. I conceive of his framework as significant to investigating into the occurrence of "protracted social conflicts" in developing worlds. The keyword here is "protractible". My analysis based on that, seeks to establish the connection between the underlying factors of protractedness as expounded by Azar and those responsible for Darfur's prolonged war. Azar expatiates on four clusters of variables. The "Genesis" component is embedded with explanatory patterns matching the Darfur case. While this account may represent a mere synopsis of the causes of the Darfur conflict, the reader is furnished with background information of those historical events that culminated with the fresh eruptions of violence in 2003.

The second objective progresses from a probing into the causes of Darfur's prolonged violence, towards an investigation into the international community's approach to peace in Darfur. In chapter three, I examined the fields of conflict management and conflict resolution as well as the principles and assumptions for intervention underlying them. These approaches predominantly informed the strategies applied to intervention in conflicts of the protracted kind. In this chapter, it is my preoccupation to probe into how specific strategies such as formal mediation or peacekeeping have contributed to the search for peace and stability in Darfur. The concluding section introduces UNAMID's mandate for grassroots intervention. It also examines the mission's approach to peace on the grassroots, by utilizing Lederach's comprehensive framework as the analytical tool.

7.2 Examining the protractedness in Darfur's conflict: An analysis based on Edward Azar.

Understanding the causes of prolonged violence in Darfur

According to Edward Azar:

*'Many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterized by blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors, they are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actors and targets...and are conflicts which do not show clear starting and terminating points.'*⁴³⁹

To a great extent, this opening statement from Azar mirrors the narratives captured as salient to the comprehension of Darfur's prolonged conflict. As I will examine in detail subsequently, an investigation into the conflict and its dynamics ostensibly reveals, as proposed in Azar: "blurred demarcations between internal and external sources"; the emergence of "multiple causal factors and dynamics" as well as the absence primarily of a "clear terminating point". Also, it is inadequate and academically incorrect to attempt an analysis of Darfur's conflict without mentioning the impact of across boarder affiliations on the frontiers to the east of Darfur. Ostensibly, ethnic loyalties have fed into the conflict drivers of both Chad and Darfur to precipitate escalated tensions on each side of the divide.

It is against the backdrop of Azar's conflict prototype that Darfur's conflict can be explicated along the trajectory that "characterizes it as a conflict exhibiting blurred demarcations between internal and external sources and actors." In similar vein, the region's historical antecedents and climatic conditions account for and constitute "*the multiple causal factors*", that provoked the outbreak of the war in the first place. The chronology of events leading up to 2003 would be incomplete for example, if an analysis capturing the salient role of Libya's erstwhile and demised dictator: Gadhafi, is omitted. His pendulum of intervention, motives and unwavering interest had swung towards catastrophe for the entire region. Gaddafi represented one major external actor in the early making of the war which erupted subsequently.

⁴³⁹ Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990). 6

Finally, since 2003 the region continues to be a zone of active conflict. Tribal fights resulting from pending unresolved matters persistently trigger fresh eruptions of conflicts notably from early 2013. There is hardly any end in sight as the political undertone of the war of insurgency and counter –insurgency unabatedly gains ascendancy on disputes between tribes on the grassroot. This assertion holds true at least up until April 2014 when the researcher visited the region of Darfur for field research.

As mentioned elsewhere, Azar presents three variables in his thesis of protracted conflicts. They contribute to or may be responsible for the emergence and longevity of social conflicts. They are Genesis, Dynamics and Outcomes. Significant for this analysis are the components which underlie the Genesis variable: a. Communal Content, b. Human Needs, c. Government and the State's Role and d. International Linkages. As already alluded to in the introductory note, the Darfur case to a large extent matches the patterns: b, c and d as linked to the Genesis variable. According to Azar these “components” constitute the ‘preconditions’ for protracted conflicts to occur.

7.2.1 Communal Content

The multi ethnic composition of colonized societies plays a vital role in the emergence of protracted social conflicts. In Azar's words:

“If a society is characterized by multi communal composition protracted social conflicts are likely to occur”.

In most colonized societies, the communal content derives from the era of colonialism. However, it is the politically active nature of its multiple groups traceable to a ‘colonial legacy’ of divide and rule that tends to exacerbate conflict. To what extent can this component find validity in the Darfur case? In order to establish the parallel between Azar's contention and the Darfur case, it is imperative to establish whether or not Darfur's communal content was a configuration from the colonial era. Also, did colonialism bequeath the legacy of “divide and rule”, which according to the author is responsible for the politically active nature of multiple groups? For explicit comprehension, it is important to start by an exploratory analysis of Darfur's communal content.

The outsider perspective of Darfur's communal content categorizes Darfur's ethnic constellation into a classification of Arab and African races. Such conception of Darfur's ethnic

configuration is only partially valid when conceived from an ideological point of view.⁴⁴⁰ This misguided perception had in fact gained prominence in 2004 when Collin Powell the former United States Secretary of states alluded to genocidal tendencies meted out on the ‘black population’ by government backed militias known as the Janjaweed.⁴⁴¹ Indeed the initial perceptions of the terms ‘Arab’ and ‘Black’ tend to suggest that the population in Darfur comprises light and dark skinned people. This may be the case especially when the majority tends to associate the word Arab with a light skinned race. Unfortunately, this imagery as confirmed during my research visit negates the reality on ground. Such skin colour contrasts as may be the case in the capital city of Khartoum are unavailable at least in Darfur. Furthermore, intermarriage makes it even more difficult to distinguish between the appearances of extant groups traceable to different origins.

Author Gerard Prunier described the regions communal content as a ‘complex ethnic mosaic’.⁴⁴² On that note, it is easier to detect racial divergence based on the people’s means of sustenance. It is possible therefore to identify some contrast in lifestyle especially between pastoralist and farmers, but not based on physical appearance per se. Even so, with respect to occupational distinctions, Mamdani observed that “occupational transitions”⁴⁴³ do exist, leading to somewhat blurred lines between pure nomadism and sedentary life. “These nuances regardless do not deny the fact that certain groups remain to be identified with specific orientations.”⁴⁴⁴

Migrant groups began to settle into what is today known as Darfur from as early as the fourteenth century and stretching into the nineteenth century. These groups have since co-existed with the Fur who prior to this period occupied the Jebel Marra Mountains. Indeed, the name Darfur does derive from a combination of the Arabic Dar (abode) and predominant Fur ethnic group.⁴⁴⁵ History has it that the early migrants were either of Nilo-Saharan origin who stemmed from the Nile Valley or consisted of Arab groups. Today their descendants exist in

⁴⁴⁰ Prunier, “*Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*”, 55-80

⁴⁴¹ Cable News Network. “Powell calls Sudan killings genocide,” CNN.

<http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/09/sudan.Powel/> (accessed August 1, 2015)

⁴⁴² See, Prunier, “*Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*”, 1-7 ,

⁴⁴³ Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror*. (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2010), 178

⁴⁴⁴ *ibid*

⁴⁴⁵ Martin W, Daly *Darfur's Sorrow: The Forgotten History of a Humanitarian Disaster* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4

Darfur as the Nilotic Saharan: Berti, Zaghawa and Bidayat, the Nile Valley: Meidob and the Ziyadiyya, Ta'aisha, Beni Halba, Habbaniya and the Rizeyqat Arabs, who have been referred to as Darfur's native Arabs.⁴⁴⁶ Present day Darfur also constitutes descendants from settlers who supposedly joined the flow of migrants in the seventeenth century. Their origin was traceable to today's northern Nigeria. This brief description of Darfur's ethnic configuration suggests that the region comprises of aborigines and migrant groups from around the fourteenth century. Such communal arrangement therefore defies comparison with nation states referred to as: 'colonial constructs.' Where the comprehension of 'colonial construct' depicts the colonial exercise that merged diverse ethnic groups into a single territorial space called the "Nation state". Darfur's communal content is therefore not the prodigy of colonial intrusion but of series of migratory influxes to the region. In like manner, there is no evidence of a politically active group in Darfur that derives political authority from the era of British administration in Darfur. To this extent therefore, the policy of divide and rule, as a factor to induce ethnic domination, cannot be validated within the Darfur context in the same manner as epitomized within other British colonies. A conspicuous level of dominance became evident only when Darfur lost its independence and became amalgamated with Sudan. With that singular act, Darfur became subservient to the elites of the riverine who also dominated the entire political terrain of the Sudan.

Not a legacy of divide and rule, but a legacy of poverty.

It is important to note however, that while the legacy of "divide and rule" cannot apply to the Darfur case, the policy of "indirect rule" remoulded to suit Darfur's political configuration, continues to be applauded as the colonial era's laudable contribution towards the preservation of peace and stability in the region. I shall elaborate on this in chapter 8 of the study. In similar manner, nonetheless, other legacies from the era of British colonialism abound that indicate a nexus between that phase in Darfur's history and the overt expression in 2003. Those that mirrored the discontentment defined by years of political marginalization, underdevelopment and economic inequality.

⁴⁴⁶ Prunier, " *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*", 6-7

Analysts have christened it ‘institutionalized neglect’⁴⁴⁷, ‘marginalization’⁴⁴⁸ ‘benign neglect’⁴⁴⁹ and more. These terms serve to summarize the British ‘conservative’ policy towards governing and administering its newest protectorate as from 1916: Darfur. Sudan’s western region had remained an independent Sultanate until 1899 when the British occupied the ancient Funj kingdom. History has it that present day Sudan existed as two independent regions: the Funj kingdom and Dar Fur Sultanate.⁴⁵⁰ The death of Ali Dinar- the last sultan and the occupation of Darfur in 1916, historically marked the end of the Fur Sultanate and the beginning of new historical tides for the region.

The colonial master’s blueprint for administration in Darfur: The ‘conservative policy,’ sought to maintain existing political structures along indigenous lines of governance, albeit reflecting economic and social policies, which steered development away from Darfur. What seemed peculiar about the system was the marriage between the “indirect rule” style of administration (where Native leaders were elevated to the level of absolute authority over the community) and the institution of a “conservative policy” with respect to the development of the region. The conservative policy fundamentally designated life essentialities to the privileged class. Education for example became reserved for a selected few- ‘for people who mattered.’⁴⁵¹ Daly explains how the British may have concocted several own-interest tailored arguments to favour the adoption of such policy on the terrains of Sudan’s Darfur. This arrangement diverged completely from the framework guiding the administration of Khartoum. The British colonials nonetheless justified its actions. Restrained expenditure for the British administrators, accounted for a conservative policy, while peace and stability and the insulation against ‘foreign trend’ such as ‘nationalism’, were counted among the reasons for empowering tribal leadership and instituting a ‘Native Authority’ in Darfur.⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁷ M W Daly, *The Forgotten History of a Humanitarian Disaster: Darfur’s Sorrows*. 2nd Edition. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

⁴⁴⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror*. (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2010)

⁴⁴⁹ Prunier Gerard, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. Revised and Updated Edition. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007)

⁴⁵⁰ Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 131

⁴⁵¹ M W Daly, *The Forgotten History of a Humanitarian Disaster: Darfur’s Sorrows*. 2nd Edition. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 133

⁴⁵² *ibid.* 133

Although the colonial administration stood to benefit from its much-approved approach, its gradual internalization eventually translated to a state of economic condemnation. This has ostensibly trailed the western region of Sudan till date. The conspicuous economic disparity between contemporary Darfur and the capital city Khartoum stems from the continued economic neglect of the province as orchestrated from the centre. However, there is no gainsaying the indelible impact of a conservative policy, administered for 40 years and bequeathed to post independent Sudanese leaderships. Indeed, successive Sudanese administrations have remained in stark denial of governing strategies and the attendant realities that confront the governed as a result. In any case, this sort of conservative attitude towards Darfur's economic health, slowly but steadily transformed Darfur from an independent Sultanate into an economically deprived region, while a more progressive policy towards the north showed glaring signs of economic prosperity. The disparity in mode of governance became evident around the 'triangular area'. Specific locations between Khartoum and the valley of the Nile in the north, the Blue and the White Nile and extending southwards to the frontiers of central Kordofan and the southern parts of Kassala province, began experiencing the economic boom⁴⁵³ For an autonomous state that hitherto made sufficient economic prosperity for itself, this new development would only serve to its detriment. Darfur's overall sectors ranging from transport to health and education had remained completely stagnant.

The education sector as alluded to elsewhere, served the precise purpose of providing education specifically to highly placed citizens of the community. This trend was heavily backed by the colonial administration's retrogressive ideas towards education in Darfur. The best form of education was to be derived majorly from Islamic schools called the khalawa. The khalawa focused on the intensive study of the Qur'an. Conventional education was almost entirely written off to the extent that Darfur could hardly flaunt more than 12 primary schools from the early to the late 1920s. In fact, Darfur at this time never owned a secondary school. As at 1929, none out of 510 students who attended Sudan's only channel to acquiring secondary education came from the Darfur region.⁴⁵⁴ The situation continued to record a downward progression. By 1935 Darfur could only boast of four government primary schools⁴⁵⁵. From the administration point of view everything worked according to the colonial administration's conservative plan for the region.

⁴⁵³ Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 194

⁴⁵⁴ Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 195

⁴⁵⁵ Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, 30

The health sector was not excluded. In fact, when the initial drought and famine invaded the region, the need for health care intensified. Not even such deteriorating ecological conditions attracted the attention of Darfur's administrators for some development either.⁴⁵⁶ Suffice it to say that Khartoum continued to enjoy preferential treatment over Darfur, most notably in areas where basic living requirements remained consciously unavailable. To buttress this point, for example, it was most obvious that provision for at least one maternity clinic could not be made for in Darfur. This was at a time when Sudan owned eighteen maternity clinics, with eight located in Khartoum.⁴⁵⁷ According to Flint and De Waal, not even records contained in the file 'Economic Development, Darfur Province', from the Sudan archives, could contradict the height of neglect and underdevelopment that befell the region during the period 1917-1950. It was only in 1945 that colonial administrators began to lift the tiniest finger for some development.⁴⁵⁸ Cattle, camel and its by products remained Darfur's only export product. These merchandises could hardly compete in the larger markets and therefore fetched only very limited returns.⁴⁵⁹ From none, Darfur by 1952 now owned its own secondary school.⁴⁶⁰ These developments may have been the early signs of what was to come in the future. The years leading up to Sudan's independence similarly provided no meaningful succour in all of the areas already examined. However, it seemed that some ray of hope was to shine on Darfur at the time when Sudan would finally achieve its independence. Two secondary schools: one located in El Fasher and another in Nyala now serviced a population of 1,329,000, while the number of elementary schools had also increased to twenty.⁴⁶¹ By the time Darfur's colonial masters were signing off, total investment had recorded the highest in Khartoum. 56% had accrued to Khartoum leaving Darfur with an ignominious 5-6% rating.⁴⁶² Although after independence, rail lines had been constructed reaching Nyala to the south of Darfur, this was of relatively zero consequence to the region. Mamdani noted that by 1956, when Sudan finally gained its freedom, the situation had only improved 'marginally'. Analyst observed that

⁴⁵⁶ Daly, *Darfur's Sorrows*

⁴⁵⁷ Prunier, *The Ambiguous Genocide*, 31

⁴⁵⁸ Julie Flint, and Alex de Waal, *Darfur: A new history of a long war*. (London, New York, 2008.) Kindle Edition

⁴⁵⁹ Daly, *Darfur's Sorrows*, 138

⁴⁶⁰ Prunier, *The Ambiguous Genocide*, 33

⁴⁶¹ Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 195

⁴⁶² Prunier, *The Ambiguous Genocide*, 33

between 1967-68, in comparison with its northern counterparts, Darfur's poverty rate was documented as being the highest.⁴⁶³

The leadership of Sudanese nationalists has recorded no tangible development for the province. Indeed, Darfur continues to be deprived of the smallest modicum of change. As a matter of fact, since the arrival of the seating government in 1989, economic and political inequality has persisted as defining features of the region. Suffice it to say, that colonialism had bequeathed to these leaders a heritage of poverty that tarried into the 21st century.

On the issue of the 'Communal Content' as precondition for protracted violence underlying the 'Genesis' component, Azar concludes using with the following sentence:

'Imposed integration or incorporation of distinctive and often conflictual communities into one political entity retards the nation-building process, strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict'.⁴⁶⁴

Azar in that context had referred to societies like Nigeria, Uganda and the likes, where colonial governance served to promote the 'divide and rule' policy. In contemporary times, such countries have experienced internal cleavages between the northern and southern divides. His analogy nonetheless is somewhat synonymous with the case of the Fur Sultanate's compelled amalgamation with Sudan. This forced marriage, which only retarded the growth and development of the region, bred somewhat racial 'fragmentation' as orchestrated by the centre, between Arab and non-Arab communities (in their competition over depleting resources) and culminated with the outbreak of a conflict which has remained 'protracted' in every sense of the word.

7.2.2 The Human Needs factor

An investigation into Azar's stance on the human needs factor with respect to 'Protracted Social Conflicts' has been examined elsewhere in this work. To what extent can his analysis be validated in the Darfur case? Having examined the extreme economic marginalization that characterized the Darfur region since the era of colonization, one may be quick to conclude that there can be no other reason for the region's entanglement in prolonged violence other than the

⁴⁶³ See, Daly, Darfur's Sorrows, 177-180

⁴⁶⁴ Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, 7

abject poverty by which it is defined. This argument is valid, but only in part. While inequality and marginalization largely reverberate on the level that investigates national and communal concerns, other salient issues have dominated the discourse at the grassroots.

Land needs in Darfur

I commence by asking the following questions in line with Azar's thesis. Can it be said of Darfur that '*...communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of material needs*'? Are there groups within the province that above others, have enjoyed in abundance, the satisfaction of basic needs? ⁴⁶⁵ Have successive Sudanese administrations failed to redress, if any, grievances resulting from need deprivation? Lastly, Can the escalated violence in Darfur be linked to the government's attitude towards the satisfaction of "basic needs" as seen through the lenses of Azar? ⁴⁶⁶ To provide answers to these questions, I have identified one underlying root cause to the conflict- 'land'. My position is based on the complexities that have surrounded the Darfur's land tenure system. Controversies around this topic have persisted without tangible solutions in sight. Problems resulting from depleting resources amidst a growing population, as well as famine and drought have become exacerbating factors in a scholarship capturing continued intertribal rivalry over land and the right to ownership. Needless to say, that land has remained the bone of serious contention among land and landless tribes in Darfur. There is no gainsaying that 'land' constitutes that 'human need' tied to the survival of both sedentary and nomadic communities in Darfur. This point of view nonetheless must be expatiated on.

To investigate into the case of Darfur in this context, the researcher relies on extant scholarly categorizations, which tend to split Darfur's multi-ethnic composition into: a) land owning and b) landless groups.⁴⁶⁷ Category (a) comprises those tribes in Darfur associated with a sedentary way of live. These tribes mainly indigenous to the Darfur region depend largely on farming as their source of livelihood. Other groups recognized within this classification as opposed to a sedentary lifestyle, practice a nomadic way of life in which cattle herding has largely prevailed as the core source of livelihood. These are Arab groups such as the Rizeigat (Baggara), Habbaniya, Ta'aisha and the Beni Halba whose homeland is located in the southern part of

⁴⁶⁵ Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict*, 8

⁴⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 9

⁴⁶⁷ Adam A. Mohammed, "Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement," Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University & Nordic African Institute Uppsala, last modified 2009, <http://www.pcr.uu.se>

Darfur. The (b) category consists of landless tribes, which include Arab camel herding nomads of northern Darfur. They are referred to as the northern Rizeigat or Rizeigat Abbala.⁴⁶⁸

Categorizations such as these reveal a correlation with the 'Human Need' factor underlying Azar's stated precondition for the occurrence of protracted social conflicts. Azar identifies two groups: A discontented and a contented group. Darfur's internal composition comprises both, especially when argued from the standpoint of these classifications. The landless groups are the "discontented" in the region because 'material needs' with respect to land have remained unmet. A separate group nevertheless enjoys the satisfaction and contentment of material needs. As far as land is concerned, a basic need (for the land-owning group) is recognizably 'justly met'. An inequitable pattern of wealth distribution according to Azar creates the enabling environment for protracted social conflicts to occur.⁴⁶⁹ In Darfur, this feeling of disenfranchisement continued to lurk around for a while until in tandem with other exacerbating factors the region finally imploded in 2003.

The question is: How did the region arrive at an arrangement that granted land rights to some and rendered others landless? This is traceable to Darfur's land tenure system. Before probing into the system of land rights, it is important to point out two debilitating factors that have undeniably contributed to Darfur's predicaments: drought and environmental degradation. In addition to a growing population these factors in connection with proximate causes, fanned to flame the war of insurgency, which commenced in 2003. Darfur's ecological configuration distinguishes between the wastelands to the north and the savannah marshlands to the south. Declining climatic conditions from as early as the 1930s impacted negatively on Darfur's communities especially those located to the north of the region. A number of communities not exclusive to Arab groups have been confronted with, as well as endured harsh climatic conditions that took a heavy toll on the very source of their livelihood and survival.⁴⁷⁰ In many

⁴⁶⁸ Jerome Tubiana, "Darfur: A Conflict for Land?" In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. Alex De Waal, (Global Equity Initiative. Harvard University, 2007),

⁴⁶⁹ Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict*, 9

⁴⁷⁰ Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, "Nomad-Sedentary relations and the question of land rights in Darfur: From Complementarity to Conflict." Richard Rottenburg (Hg): *Nomadic-Sedentary relations and failing state institutions in Darfur and Kordofan (Sudan)* (Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte 26, Mitteilungen des SFB „Differenz und Integration" 12, 2008): 4.

instances, intense cases of drought have precipitated survival related mass movements into Fur homelands, as was evident during the period from 1979 to 1985.⁴⁷¹

In hindsight, such movements resulted in overcrowded terrains and the struggle over depleting resources. However, the host community ensured to coordinate and accommodate mass arrivals using a regulatory system also known as the land tenure system. The Hakura as will become explicit shortly, is Darfur's preserved age long land acquisition heritage. It differs from a good number of African societies where the kin-based system of land allocation and rights continue to prevail. From the era of the Sultans, Darfur's land tenure system preserved societal order as it resolved all land related issues. The next heading reveals the linkage between human needs factor as delineated by Azar and one of the major causes underlying the prolonged conflict in Darfur.

Darfur's land tenure system

A brief historical journey into Darfur's traditional land tenure system dating back to the era of the sultans is imperative at this juncture. It is intended to uncover background knowledge leading to the questions on how Darfur arrived at categorizations such as mentioned above, which have fed into Darfur's prolonged conflict narrative.

Darfur's indigenous tribes have been traced to three successive dynasties.⁴⁷² The Daju, Tunjur and the Keira dynasty. The last of the three dynasties produced several prominent Sultans whose leadership had left indelible marks on the growth and development of the DarFur Sultanate. Advancements included territorial expansions but were not exclusive to it. The Fur sultans also sought to enlarge the sultanate ethnically and socially. The homeland of the Furs thereby (DarFur) included other ethnic groups and even now constituted a nomadic people who perfectly blended into a predominantly agrarian society.⁴⁷³

For the purpose of our analysis, it should suffice to focus on Sultan Musa ibn Suleiman the second king of the Keira dynasty, he ruled from 1680 to 1700. History has it that he was instrumental to the changes the Sultanate experienced in the area of land rights.⁴⁷⁴ Prior to this development the Fur sultanate had operated under a communal system of land ownership. According to Abdalla Mohammed, when a tribe acquired a land, it belonged to its entire

⁴⁷¹ Jerome Tubiana, "Darfur: A Conflict for Land?" In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. Alex De Waal, (Global Equity Initiative. Harvard University, 2007), 77

⁴⁷² Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 134

⁴⁷³ *Ibid* 134

⁴⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 137

members. The traditional leader oversaw both property and people. Each family owned a share in the land for the purpose of cultivation. Excess or unallocated land was reserved for other purposes, which included offering land to arriving guests (nomads) as a mark of hospitality⁴⁷⁵. In line with the minor adjustments made by Sultan Musa Ibn Suleiman, the *Hakura* as it was called in Arabic, (plural: Hawakir) was now to serve an administrative purpose. It became the platform on which the Sultans attracted the loyalty of its chiefs. In the real sense of it, the sultans did not effectuate any fundamental change to the land acquisition mechanism that the people had been used to. The *Hakura* system merely became an official confirmation of ownership. The major restructuring that may have occurred was the opportunity for individual ownership that came with it. The estates (*Hawakir*) for which the sultans granted rights of acquisition were of two types: The Administrative *Hakura* and the Exclusive *Hakura* of privilege.

The Administrative *Hakura* was granted to native leaders who apart from their role as tribal heads now became the legal custodians of the estates over which the collection of limited taxation was also permitted. The Administrative *Hakura* today referred to, as ‘dars’ e.g. (tribal homelands) therefore became an official right of occupancy by the Sultans to the tribal chiefs in favour of the tribes under their tutelage. To confirm its authenticity, the Sultans also awarded some sort of certificate of occupancy written in Arabic. It stipulated the boundaries to these estates. The more personal *Hakura* of privilege on the contrary, was awarded to eminent persons in recognition of their service to the state. Among the recipients were religious men, merchants, army leaders and state officials whose right to land also extended towards tax collection as a source of income.⁴⁷⁶ Land rights were granted to indigenous farming groups as well as herding groups such as the Rizeigat, Habbaniya, Beni Halba, and the Ta’aisha whose homelands (*Dars*) are located to the south of Darfur. To the north of Darfur, Arab groups such as the northern Rizeigat were to be excluded from this new system of land allocation. The reason is that these nomads were non-sedentary and constantly in search of pasture for their animals. At the time, it was of no specific importance granting land rights to camel herding groups. This new arrangement ostensibly bred no animosity or dissatisfaction, not the least among landless nomads.

⁴⁷⁵ Abdalla. A. Mohammed, ‘Environmental Degradation and Conflict in Darfur Experiences and Development Options’ in *Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur*, ed. R.S O’Fahey. Addis Ababa: University for Peace, 2004, www.steinergraphics.com/pdf/darfur_screen.pdf (accessed October 25,2015)

⁴⁷⁶ Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 138

When the British finally annexed Darfur with Sudan in 1916, having deposed Ali Dinar the last sultan of the Keira dynasty and Fur sultanate, all existing tenure rights were left in place albeit with adjustments such as the enactment of the 'Land Settlement and Registration Act of 1925 and the Land Acquisition Act of 1930. These amendments demanded for all land in the Sudan to be registered. Its implementation according to Tubiana, became most effective in the towns than in the hinterlands like Darfur. To this end Darfur continued to operate under the customary system of land acquisition.⁴⁷⁷ Indeed, the authority of tribal leaders became all the more confirmed with the establishment of the Native Administration, which became the colonizers strategy for providing and ensuring stability and governance.

During the colonial era, the tribes held true to the tenets underlying the administrative *Hakura*. One of such principles was to grant herders the access to the animal migration routes known as the '*Marahil*'⁴⁷⁸. It was also within customary practice for tribal leaders to welcome newcomers to the tribe. As mentioned elsewhere, the *Hakura* made provision for the temporary accommodation of visitors (nomads) whose life style included seeking greener pastures especially when their homelands became dryer. Abdul Jalil⁴⁷⁹ explains how initially arriving guests would adhere to the rules guiding the new place of habitation, including subservience to the native heads of the host community. These arriving guests also knew that lands allotted to them for whatever purpose was not meant to serve as a permanent place of abode. Tensions between farmers and herders (arriving nomads) were not entirely ruled out, however ensuing conflicts either over grazing land or water, as was predominantly the case, were promptly resolved with the intervention of Native Administration leaders. In fact, in the words of the author, relations between farmers and herders were more of 'complementary' than adversarial. When the Sudan gained its independence in 1956, Darfur's traditional land rights remained untampered with, but for a short period until 1970. Until then, native leaders continued to successfully wade into whatever kind of conflicts that emerged between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists. By the 1970s and stretching forth into the 1980s, the region began experiencing the onset of some of its worse environmental downsides. Droughts and degradation began encroaching in on camel herders of northern Darfur and also on the homelands of the Zaghawa, precipitating mass migratory movements towards more habitable

⁴⁷⁷ Jerome Tubiana, "Darfur: A Conflict for Land?" In *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. Alex De Waal, (Global Equity Initiative. Harvard University, 2007), 81

⁴⁷⁸ Abdul Jalil, *Sedentary Relations*, 18

⁴⁷⁹ *ibid.*

lands. Unruh explains how despite emerging tides the Hakura systems adjusted to changing times. Successfully and peacefully migrants were accommodated on unused vast lands of indigenous tribes, pending when living conditions would have improved on their own homelands.⁴⁸⁰

As already mentioned, newcomers were under the obligation to remain subservient to the Native Administration of the host community without any right to affirm their presence. (For example, by way of claiming ownership to acquired land) However, it behoved traditional leaders in the midst of escalating ecological conditions to relax the stringent rules binding the land tenure system. Arriving groups were now allowed to choose leaders from amongst their own members to manage some of its internal affairs. That notwithstanding, the newcomers would remain accountable to the authority of the host community's tribal leadership. The jurisdiction of leaders referred to as the Sheikh Anfar were moderate when compared to the powers of the Sheikh Al-Ard (Sheikh of land). These native leaders wielded such powers over land as well. The Sheikh Anfar (Sheikh of people) was in contrast, constrained to jurisdiction over people.⁴⁸¹ As a matter of fact, the Sheikh of the people continued to act in support of the land Sheikhs to effectuate a regulated system that now accommodated and made provision for both farmers and herders. To this extent, Native leaders continued to operate in their fullest capacity: mitigating conflicts and maintaining the law and order required for peaceful coexistence on the level of tribes and communities. Then came the breaking point. The assumption of office in 1970 of Sudan's military administration headed by Jaafar Nimeiri can be viewed as a contributing factor to the deeply adversarial relations which now prevailed among existing tribes. In reality, such grassroot cleavages could not fall short of the description of interethnic confrontation, as that was exactly the manner in which events unfolded in the years that followed.

The underlying tenets of the 'Unregistered Land Act' promulgated by the Nimeiri regime, apparently stood to oppose those of traditional land acquisition rights guiding the west of Sudan. This uncalculated step in effect, as well as measures adopted by the 1989 regime, precipitated

⁴⁸⁰ John Unruh. *The Role of Land Resources Rights in the maximization of Adaptation Investments: The Example of Darfur*. Paper, Institute for the Study of International Development, 1-11.

⁴⁸¹ Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, "The dynamics of customary land tenure and natural resources management in Darfur" in *Land Reform Land Settlement and Cooperatives*, eds. M.P Törhönen and P. Groppo (Rome: FAO, 2006) cited in Unruh, *The Role Land Resources*, 7 and 8

or legalized the overt expression of a hitherto seemingly deep-seated and unnoticed grievance nursed by the landless tribes of Darfur. This was to become one of those significant changes that ended up transforming Darfur negatively. Such debilitating factors undoubtedly fed into existing tensions aggravated by declining ecological conditions. The law was to be interpreted like this: 'Henceforth, all land in Sudan belongs to the government, we render all forms of land acquisition and ownership null and void'. Newcomers who prior to this time remained within the confinements granted them, now began to capitalize on the new law to make legal claims to lands belonging to indigenous tribes. This was the resultant effect exactly. Land rights in Darfur regardless of the existing status quo essentially became subject to new laws, albeit without taking serious effect in places such as Darfur.

The Unregistered land act was also accompanied by the abolishment of Darfur's Native Authority. Unfortunately, it now became a thing of the past for the once reliable channel for conflict resolution to manage climax periods (specifically relating to land) at the grassroots. Native leaders were stripped of their usual powers. Their office of authority became undermined, and with it came chaos, anarchy, instability and insecurity to say the least. A state of complete lawlessness emerged, and of course, the onset of the 'land grabbing discourse.'⁴⁸²By now, landless groups had begun to exhibit a preference for the statutory interpretation guiding land acquisition in Sudan, shunning thereby, all pre-existing traditional ownership arrangements.

By the time the 1986 regime reinstated and legitimized the powers of the Native Administration, so much water had gone under the bridge. Subsequent efforts by the government to make appropriate amends, only proved to be inadequate. In fact, landless Arabs commenced the forceful occupation of the same lands granted them out of hospitality. For fear of losing more land to drought induced migrants and the likes, farmers initiated the closing of all animal passage routes hitherto accessible to herders. As tensions arose, discontentment on both sides of the farmer/ herder divide, even louder. Indeed, the magnitude of the impending catastrophe was inconceivable. For some, the signs were comprehensible, -violent escalations were imminent. The only obscurity lay in the inability to forecast actual timing. When the war erupted in 2003, some analysts insinuated a connection, at least in part, with issues of land and the scramble for depleting resources. While natives took up arms to safe guard their inheritance,

⁴⁸² Jerome Tubiana, Darfur: A Conflict of Land, 78-80

others became propelled by the government's bait of land rights, to partake in a counter insurgency war that unleashed mayhem in the entire western region.

The government backed militias also known as the Janjaweed unabatedly cleansed out entire villages. They perpetrated heinous atrocities in the hope that someday their landless status in the region would be overturned to assuage their growing need for land. This was a deviation from the status quo as precipitated by declining ecological conditions. Such increasingly unbearable climatic conditions by now, had begun compelling affected tribes such as the Zaghawa to push further south as well as embrace alternative sources of livelihoods for the sake of survival. It seemed also that previous administrations never took into serious cognizance the need for camel herding groups to become officially accommodated into a fairly regulated land-owning system. Indeed, as time passed, and desertification began to take its toll, successive governments only overlooked the exigency to secure a permanent settlement for hitherto landless tribes. Flint and De Waal describe how landless tribes survived decades on the basis of patchwork tribal arrangements dating back to colonial times. Poorly laid out tenets regarding leadership and land rights only amounted to periods of violent escalations.⁴⁸³

By 2004 and stretching into 2005, what seemed like mere local tensions soon to be resolved, now elicited serious international concerns. The figures representing dead civilians increased with each passing day, while countless displaced persons began flooding the camps. These citizens of Darfur were expelled from their villages and forced to flee the venom of the Janjaweed militias. The Darfur Peace Agreement signed in May 2006 recognizes that land issues and depleting natural resources should be addressed in order to achieve sustainable peace for the region. Article 20 makes meaningful provision in the required direction. While paragraph 158 underscores the significance of traditional land ownership rights, paragraph 159 draws attention to rectifying the discontentment not only of 'displaced persons but also of 'other persons arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived of rights to land'⁴⁸⁴. Apparently, this can be interpreted as referring to landless tribes as well, who by virtue of customary laws may not lay permanent claims to any land in Darfur.

⁴⁸³ Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *Darfur: a new history of a long war* (London and New York, Zed Books, 2008), 41

⁴⁸⁴ Darfur Peace Agreement, [http:// www.un.org/zh/focus/southernsudan/pdf/dpa.pdf](http://www.un.org/zh/focus/southernsudan/pdf/dpa.pdf) (accessed 25 October 2015)

The current situation sees a good number of “landholding tribes” occupying displacement camps, whose villages have been usurped by militant groups. Landless groups now craving land see no reason to relinquish the vast areas they have come to occupy since the onset of the war. Indeed, the expectations of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), almost a decade on, remains to be fulfilled.⁴⁸⁵ While the region continues to anticipate peace, the imperativeness of appeasing both discontented parties must be carefully considered, otherwise peace may continue to elude the region. Reflecting deeply, it seemed less strenuous for both rebel and Janjaweed leaders alike, to capitalize on underlying sentiments for the mobilization of membership in support of a course that putatively promised a better life for all enlisted sympathizers in the final analysis. This consideration stems from the fact that somewhat harmonious relations existed between Arabs and non-Arabs prior to the eruption of conflicts in 2003, This fact indeed corroborates Azar’s stance on the manner in which identity groups tend to air their grievances collectively as a single voice against their perpetrators. In many ways the Darfur experience stands to validate Azar’s insightful thesis on underlying factors that enable protracted conflicts to thrive. It is indeed correct to assert that:

*‘Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. **Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for protracted social conflicts.***⁴⁸⁶

Accordingly, unaddressed grievances have the capacity to engender the ‘them’ and us dichotomy, especially within deeply divided societies where ethnic consciousness tends to resonate the loudest as in the context of Darfur.

Suffice it to say also, that the war with the South overly engrossed the regimes in Khartoum. Under the circumstance, other internal issues were accorded diluted attention. The complications generated from across the Sudanese borders in no time started to engulf its western region. I shall elaborate on this in developing chapters. As time passed, such problems only transmuted to levels that subsequently became too intransigent to tackle. In the light of what can be interpreted as a clear case of regional marginalization and negligence, it may not be wrong to stress that the reverse (with reference to the escalated conflicts of 2003) may have

⁴⁸⁵Julian T. Hottinger, The Darfur Peace Agreement: Expectations unfulfilled: Peace by piece: Addressing Sudan’s conflicts, www.c-r.org/accord-article/darfur-peace-agreement-expectations-unfulfilled (accessed 25 October 2015)

⁴⁸⁶ Azar, Protracted Social Conflict, 9

played out, if successive regimes had considered the amicable settlement of land rights an issue of priority. The enactment of progressive policies for example, geared towards the development of the region may have attracted diverse and alternative means of survival in the province of Darfur. Sudan's western region may have surmounted the challenges of the trial years, regardless of the ravaging rage of the droughts. This was not the case. In fact, all parties involved seem to be confronted with immense loss. Neither the armed movements who subsequently splintered into factions as the conflict progressed, nor the Janjaweed whose hopes were gradually dashed, recorded major headways in the directions initially anticipated. Darfur has remained on the level on which the entire drama unfolded. The dynamics of the conflicts continue to defy on-going efforts at peace. They blur all expectations for an end to what has become a conflict too intransigent to budge.

In the next section, I shall examine the issue of political marginalization as precipitated by ethnic domination. It delineates within the Darfur context, those preconditions according to Azar, that may precipitate Protracted Social Conflicts especially in developing worlds.

7.2.3 Governance and the State's Role

Azar's thesis, enumerates those 'human needs', which are essential to the survival of a group.⁴⁸⁷ Security needs, acceptance and access needs are prioritized. The 'access need' is accorded specific attention with a targeted reference to either the satisfaction or deprivation of the rights of identity groups to participate or not in the political landscape of the state. This has been extensively discussed elsewhere. Essentially, the satisfaction or the deprivation as the case may be, is the prerogative of state authorities. In this section, the focus is not on the "basic need," but to investigate into the role of the Sudanese state with respect to its responsibility of equitable governance to all its citizens. In this study, the 'political authority' under scrutiny, referred to as the state, is the leadership of the Sudanese state from the time of independence in 1956.

The ideal Sudanese state going by Azar, should be characterized by a fair and just mode of governance. It should be able to satisfy human needs regardless of communal or identity cleavages. At the same time, it should exhibit the capacity to promote communal harmony and social stability. If this is not the case, the state as opined by Azar is prone to experience

⁴⁸⁷ Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict*, 10

protracted social conflict. Accordingly, the occurrence of prolonged conflict under such circumstance should be attributed to the governing mode of incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian (Sudanese) governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs'.⁴⁸⁸

The 'incompetence' and 'fragility' of the civilian administration in Sudan, occasioned the emergence in November 1958 of an authoritarian military regime. By 1965 the Sudanese state again reverted to civilian rule, only to be submerged into another round of military repression from the 'parochial' government that saw Jaafar al-Nimeiri at the helm of affairs. The regimes, both civilian and military alike, turned a blind eye to the development of its peripheries (with specific reference to the region under our radar of scrutiny: Darfur). Also, the governments of the day exhibited laxity and bias towards 'promoting communal harmony and social stability'. The pursuit of strategic foreign policies perceived as being connected to polarizing ideologies originating from Libya, coupled with a demonstrated prejudiced perception of grassroots cleavages by the government in Khartoum, (notably as from the 1989) served to fuel an already precarious situation, one that eventually engulfed the region. Not only did the 1969 administration of Nimeiri for example, abolish the 'Native Administration' which stood to preserve the region's grassroots sanity to a reasonable level, it equally, not excluding other regimes, cultivated a politics of derailed international relations which as already mentioned got Darfur entangled in Chad's political conflict.

By providing a safe haven in Nyala for Chadian rebels under the leadership of Ibrahim Abatcha to found in 1966 the 'Chad National Liberation Front' (FROLINAT-Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad) and by succumbing gradually to Gadhafi's antics, who pursued a supremacist doctrine on the platform of 'The Arab Gathering', Darfur regrettably plunged deeper and deeper into a complicated web of afflictions.⁴⁸⁹ **At various times the political terrain of the Sudanese state was dominated by the governing elites of the riverine.** (Bold for the sake of emphasis) What seemed to have exceeded ordinary comprehension nonetheless, was the region's inability to secure tangible change in all its devastated sectors despite its unrelenting support to its own Umma party. The Umma party was formed in February 1945. It drew inspiration from the era of the Mahdist, a revolutionary movement that had emerged to oppose the repression that defined the days of the Turkiyya in Darfur. In both 1958 and 1965,

⁴⁸⁸ Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict*, 10

⁴⁸⁹ See, Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *Darfur: a new history of a long war* (London and New York, Zed Books, 2008 (Chapter 3)

Darfur's Umma party was said to have gained considerable access to the state's governing platform. While nineteen out of its twenty-two constituencies had been claimed by the party in 1958, the 1965 elections also recorded a win with an emerging victory of 76 seats out of a total number of 173.⁴⁹⁰ Sadly, neither these victories nor its third victory in 1985 became consequential to the state of deterioration that had for long burdened the region. In fact, the 1985 government of Al-Sadiq al-Mahidi further aggravated the rising instability in the west by keying into across boarder rifts inherited from its predecessor. If Darfur was to suffer neglect even with representatives in government, then all hope was already lost by the time the next military coup of 1989 brought Omar al-Bashir into power.

On assumption into power, it seemed the regime would adopt a policy different from its predecessors. What was to come only summarizes and validates Azar's assertion on Protracted conflict prone societies.

He states:

'Most protracted social conflict-laden countries are hardly neutral. In democratic societies, the state is an aggregate of individuals entrusted to govern effectively and to act as an impartial arbiter of conflicts among the constituent parts. Empirically, however the world behaves differently. Political authority tends to be monopolized by a dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups'.

Inter-tribal rivalry had always been part of a society whose configuration constituted both nomadic and sedentary life styles. Yet a vibrant tribal authority amid Darfur's enormous challenges, sought in all respects to provide the region with order and stability. When Bashir's regime announced its arrival in 1989, a greater part of Darfur had been engulfed in lawlessness and turmoil owing to the mode of governance and the strategic interest of preceding administrations too weak and overly distracted to reinstall orderliness and stability.

By now an Arab –Fur war had been underway. An undermined tribal authority only struggled to find voice in establishing peace among its respective constituencies and this amid a new era defined by gun violence. In the face of a dwindling tribal authority, a new regime headed by

⁴⁹⁰ Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. Revised and Updated Edition. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 37 and 38.

Omar Bashir, waded into a heated Arab-Fur dispute, bringing to an astonishing halt an ideologically motivated ethnic cleavage.⁴⁹¹

This outstanding achievement by the government projected new hope for a region already plunging deeper into precarious security. However, when the new government revealed its true nature by carrying over its predecessor's policy of political and economic marginalization, (which Daly refers to as 'internal colonization') it fed into the narrative that captured underlying causes of the Darfur conflict as from 2003. It turned out that the major allegation levelled against the 1989 regime had been, as culled from Azar's assertion, its inability to act as the '*impartial arbiter of conflicts among the constituent parts*' in Darfur. In alliance with an ideology for Arab dominance the new regime demonstrated the incapacity to shun ideologically motivated racial sentiments. In like manner, it became evident that the responsibility to employ appropriate state apparatuses in the most urgent and sensible direction, was abandoned by the administration only to intensify the state of instability in Darfur.

Darfur's black African ethnic groups such as the Fur, Massalit and the Zaghawa condemned the government's interventionist role in inter-tribal rivalry since 1989 as ostensibly lacking in neutrality. An endless outcry against the regimes unflinching support for Arab groups (both militarily and otherwise) continued to fall on deaf ears, while slowly brewing deep indignations against the centre. At the slightest eruption of inter-tribal disputes ensuing predominantly over land and ownership rights, as well as other scarce resource, rival groups allegedly seized the advantage of government backing to annihilate, overpower and mesmerize non-Arab groups. Arab attacks on both the Masalit and Zaghawa in June and September of 1996 respectively, have been documented in this regard. This conflict culminated with a peace conference in 1997. Positive peace nonetheless had remained elusive to say the least.⁴⁹²

Flint and De Waal in their scholarship, recount how non-Arab groups in the event of such incessant government-backed attacks, began the mobilization of its members in self-defence and resistance against erstwhile neighbours who had now turned 'foes'. Such circumstances had warranted the birthing of 'rebel movements'. Darfur's case began to gradually get out of hand. Local rivalry met with a renewed proliferation of weapons, a reignition of ideological

⁴⁹¹ See, Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *Darfur: a new history of a long war* (London and New York, Zed Books, 2008 (chapter 3 & 4 for more details)

⁴⁹² Daly, *Darfur's Sorrows*. 262-263

sentiments from the 1970s and a resuscitation of the issues from the Nimeiri regime surrounding the then enactment of ‘the unregistered land act’. Although by now the legitimacy of the native authority had been revived to a certain degree, its exclusive and customary authority thanks to the government, began to infiltrate into hands that hitherto possessed no traditional claims to power within the native administration hierarchical order. Observers without mincing words interpreted such tendencies as unabated efforts tailored towards the actualization of the regime’s vested interest in establishing an Islamic state ⁴⁹³

This destabilizing agenda according to Prunier had begun translating into what he tagged the ‘ethnic consciousness split’. It was a tactics deployed by so-called Arab elites in Khartoum to exploit the region for its own political aggrandizements: To float an ideologically motivated ‘Arab Alliance’ backed by Libya. Once the need to tap into Darfur in fulfilment of this agenda arose, Darfur became a polarized region consisting of its own ‘Brothers’ and others termed ‘Foes’- Arabs and Non-Arabs respectively.⁴⁹⁴ However when the moment came for the same leaders to assuage the ‘basic needs’ of the region, the story changed, - from a ploy to pit one race against the other for political gains, to that of an unwavering political agenda that demonstrated the continued perpetuation of political marginalization and injustices as perpetrated by the National Islamic Front (NIF). Azar assertions in the light of underlying conditions for PSC went further to underscore what seem to be most conspicuous in the centre periphery narrative of the Darfur conflict. He states that:

‘Political authority tends to be monopolized by a dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups.’⁴⁹⁵

Small wonder that in the year 2000, when a group of anonymous intellectuals emerged with the ‘Al-kitab al-aswad’ fondly known as the ‘Black Book’ it was to be perceived as the last straw that would break the camel’s back. The conflict of 2003 as interpreted by many, became the overt expression of both prolonged economic deprivation and an accumulation of grievances captured in black and white in the pages of the ‘Black Book’.

It was titled: The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan and was written in Arabic. For the purpose of this analysis, I rely on an article in English, published in the journal

⁴⁹³ Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *Darfur: a new history of a long war* (London and New York, Zed Books, 2008)

⁴⁹⁴ Prunier, *The Ambiguous Genocide*, 79

⁴⁹⁵ Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts*, 10

of African National Affairs in 2003 by Abdullahi El-Tom, a renowned Sudanese scholar based in Ireland.⁴⁹⁶

The Black Book

The Black Book basically summarizes the political marginalization meted out on Sudan's peripheries by its centre based in Khartoum. Special emphasis is placed on the experience of Sudan's western region: Darfur. The book excludes the economic deprivation occasioned by the conservative policy of the colonial era. The main focus is the critical examination of the discourse on Darfur's 'internal colonization' or most emphatically the perpetuation of political marginalization' by a '**dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups**' as presaged in Azar's thesis.

The controversial literature commences with stressing the inherent nature of the continued dominance of state authority by the regional North, since 1964. It names successive governments from civilian to military rule, those that have been presided over by a Northern leadership: Multi-party democracy (1964-69), Nimeiri regime) 1969-1985, Military Provisional Council (MPC) (1985-1986), second multi-party democracy (1986-1989), NIF/ National Salvation 1(NS1) (1989-1999) and National Salvation 2 (NS2) 1999-date.⁴⁹⁷ While the Book does not deny the presence of marginalized ethnic groups within the north as well, it spares no words in identifying the major culprits in the act of political injustice. The Shaygia, the Jaalieen and the Danagla,⁴⁹⁸ are the three major ethnic groups in the north known to have steered the affairs of the Sudanese state from inception. This trend has remained static both at top most leadership and national ministerial levels, ostensibly creating a parallel between Azar's reference to a coalition of hegemonic groups' and the case of Sudan's governing authority as it were. According to Azar:

'Hegemonic groups tend to use the state as an instrument for maximizing their interests at the expense of others. In the protracted social conflict context, these groups have manifested in communal terms. ...The means to satisfy basic needs are unevenly shared and the potential for protracted social conflict increases'

⁴⁹⁶ Abdullahi El-Tom, *The Black Book of Sudan: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan* (in Arabic): A Review in Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader, eds., Sallah M. Hassan and Carina E. Ray (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009) Appendix J

⁴⁹⁷ El-Tom, *The Black Book of Sudan*, 11

⁴⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 15-16

In fact, there is no gainsaying the fact that the state as dominated by the aforementioned trio, has persistently maximized its interests at the expense of others. A fact corroborated by data supplied in the Black Book. These hegemonic groups from the north have denied other regions of the Sudan access to that representative platform on which to satisfy its human needs. Indeed, this is indicative of a government as suggested by Azar without the capacity for *'fair and successful governance'*. While our focus here rests on the Darfur region, it must be noted that other regions have suffered the same fate albeit in lesser magnitude when compared to Darfur. The Book in similar vein highlights the proliferation of such exclusionary tendencies as exerted by the north, on the state's legal system. As translated by El-Tom, its authors aver that:

*“The leadership of the legal system at the level of the Minister for Justice and the Attorney General has been controlled by the executive powers, which are characterized by nepotism and discrimination among members of the nation.”*⁴⁹⁹

It goes ahead to confirm this allegation by presenting in tabular form a regional representation at the top of Sudan's post -independence legal system.⁵⁰⁰

Region	No.	%
North	8	67
Eastern	0	0
Central	3	33
Southern	0	0
Western	0	0

From the table above, it is explicit that the northern region with a percentage of 67 and followed by the central with a percentage of 33, have dominated the legal system in the post-independent era of the Sudanese state. Other regions have recorded zero representation within the same period under examination.

In a multi-ethnic society as the Sudan, its media as suggested by the Book, equally shares in the tainting of unjust practices and serves as a medium in the propagation of ideological sentiments originating from the racial coffers of the North. The Book specifically underscores the injustice of showcasing and promoting the culture of the northern region in a manner that depicts the Sudanese state as a homogenous entity. This notion is perceived to be in apparent

⁴⁹⁹ El-Tom, The Black Book of Sudan, 28

⁵⁰⁰ El-Tom, The Black Book of Sudan, 28

denial of an existing cultural diversity. An allegation its authors perceive as a stratagem in furtherance of its supremacist ideologies. It accuses the centre of inequitable wealth distribution, traceable to the colonial era and re-emerging as a bad habit embraced by a government supposedly of the Sudanese people, by the Sudanese people and for all the Sudanese people.

The 1989 regime has remained in power till date, consolidating on its '*monopoly of power*', which as confirmed by Azar may be actualized by denying other groups access to political power. It is an accumulation of the centre's atrocities officially since 1956 and exacerbated by the myriad of attendant factors already discussed that provoked in the Sudan, what Azar refers to as a '*crisis of legitimacy*' that eventually culminated with the war of insurgency. In a concluding related assertion Azar attests:

'Such crisis exacerbates already existing competitive or conflictive situations, diminish the state's ability to meet basic needs and lead to further developing crisis... In most protracted social conflict-laden countries, policy capacity is limited by rigid or fragile authority structure, which prevents the state from responding to and meeting, the needs of various constituents. This happens because the state is often unable to insulate the decision-making machinery from political pressures of the dominant identity groups.'

His statement apparently illuminates on the case of Sudan, but most ostensible alludes to the prevalence of a neo-patrimonial style of governance across sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the cold war and its attendant backlash on the continent as a result.

7.2.4 International linkages

'International linkages' is the last assumption underlying the 'Genesis' component identified by Azar as holding the capacity to engender protracted social conflict within the state. This last precondition from the author's thesis, shall be examined as a concluding note in this section dedicated to investigating the most salient issues responsible for the implosion of Darfur in 2003.

A cursory assessment of Sudan's foreign relations confirms that successive post-colonial regimes from around the late 1960s, exhibited strong inclinations towards regional geopolitics. In the crisis of legitimacy that haunted Chad barely six years into independence for example,

the Sudan was known to have played opposing dual roles: either as conspirator providing safe havens for Chadian rebel groups as mentioned elsewhere or as conflict mediator. In like manner, the state became inundated with ambitious ideological motivations emanating from the Libyan state and its leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, shortly after he seized power in 1969. His obsession with creating an alliance with so called regional like minds and the strategies he employed for its actualization, projected him as a significant external actor in Darfur's conflict. Analyst and experts on Darfur's insurgency understand the erroneousness of divorcing these external conflict drivers from the narrative surrounding the conflict.⁵⁰¹

Historical accounts reveal an apparent interference of stronger governments in the affairs of other governments: For example, Libya's overzealous ambitions to unify and Arabize the region, translated into aggravated local tensions and an attack on Darfur's economic vulnerability. In similar vein, Sudan's conspiratory involvement with Chadian rebels unduly heightened insecurity amid existing challenges. A quick look at Azar's conception of an extant connection between 'international linkages' and PSC, suggests that underlying determinants of protracted conflicts, do not emanate exclusively from internal drivers alone. The dynamics of any protracted conflict may equally emerge from without, as suggested in the introductory summary of the Sudanese experience provided above. Azar's postulations indicate two pathways towards a state's susceptibility to PSC under the international linkages exacerbating factor: '*economic dependency*' and the second, being a '*political and military client relationships with stronger states*'. Such parasitic relations with more economically vibrant states, 'not only limits the authority of the state, but also distorts the pattern of economic development, and at the same time, impedes the satisfaction of security needs'⁵⁰²

The second factor attests to a patron-client relationship between two states. In this case, the client forfeits its autonomy and independence, in return for benefits. This it does at the expense of the needs of its own citizens. The big question is, has 'international linkage' played any role in exacerbating tensions in Darfur in anyway at all? The answer is in the affirmative. Darfur

⁵⁰¹ See, Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror*. (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2010)

See, Prunier Gerard, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. Revised and Updated Edition. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007)

See, M W Daly, *The Forgotten History of a Humanitarian Disaster: Darfur's Sorrows*. 2nd Edition. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010),

See, Paul L Moorcraft, *Omar Al-Bashir and Africa's Longest War* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2015),

⁵⁰² Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts* 11

became a rear base for Chadian dissidents armed by Libya against repressive regimes as well as a recipient of the victims of the Sahelian drought. Previous regimes before Nimeiri purportedly forged good relations with Libya. When Nimeiri arrived in 1969 and coinciding with the accession of Gaddafi to power, cordial ties became severed. Nimeiri's islamization policy could have provided the smooth path leading to Gaddafi's ultimate agenda for the region. Nonetheless, Nimeiri was Pro-US. He relied on US aid and therefore withheld support. Ties with Libya during that regime could have been termed 'cold' more or less. However, subsequent regimes embraced Libya and all of the ideological baggage that accompanied it.

Gaddafi's global aspirations turned him into an enemy of the West. He ostensibly became consumed with the desire to create a common ground on which his supremacist ideologies could blossom. His envisaged Arab unity coincided with the music of pan-Africanism also gradually gaining grounds around the late 1960s under Chad's Tombalbaye.⁵⁰³ In 1972 the Libyan head founded the 'Islamic legion'. It was the platform on which he intended both to actualize his ambition for a unified region as well as fight his self-acclaimed adversary: the Chadian dictator, who was both African and Christian. Gaddafi demonstrated his aggression against Chad by occupying the Aouzou strip. These harassments reverberated with racial undertones and were in line with his own ideological sentiments. Recruits into the 'Islamic Legion' included Bedouins from Mauritania to Sudan,⁵⁰⁴ as well as migrant workers.⁵⁰⁵ In furtherance of his mission, Gaddafi went on to establish the 'Arab Gathering' in Darfur. According to Prunier 'it was a militantly racist and pan- Arabist organization which stressed the Arab character of the province'.⁵⁰⁶

In the meantime, war had begun to rage in neighbouring Chad. The rebellion had emanated from Chad's predominantly Muslim north against a southern repressive government headed by Francois Tombalbaye. Both Libya and Sudan were in support of the resistance. Small wonder that Nyala, located in the southern part of Darfur, became the locus for the formation of FROLINAT (Front de Liberation de Nationale du Tchad) on the 22 of June 1966 and Libya, the preparation ground for insurgency against the regime. In fact, as earlier mentioned, Ibrahim

⁵⁰³ Mamdani, *Saviours and Survivors*, 250-251

⁵⁰⁴ Flint and De Waal, *A new history*, 48

⁵⁰⁵ Daly, *Darfur's Sorrows*, 242

⁵⁰⁶ Prunier, *The Ambiguous Genocide*, 45

Abatcha, the hardliner against Tombalbaye's government, allegedly received material support from Khartoum and was given political access to Chadian refugees in Darfur⁵⁰⁷

When Nimeiri took over power in 1969, he continued in the same line of support for Chadian dissidents, this time in support of Hissen Habre's Northern Army (Forces Armees Nationales Tchadiennes) also known as FANT (English: Chadian National Armed Forces) against the government of Goukouni Oueddei. After Nimeiri was ousted from power, the Transitional Military Council and eventually the coalition civilian government which replaced him, not only revived ties with Libya, but also, Chadian insurgents continued to receive unabated assistance in the fight against a supposed illegitimate regime.

Having garnered some historical insight, it is important not to get drowned in history but to sift out the analytical significance. Whether this was a matter of negligence or a mere display of the government's inadequacy or probably a calculated move, Darfur became embroiled in activities and foreign policies of both Tripoli and Khartoum. The consequences these debilitating developments have engendered continue to hunt the region. There is no contravening the fact that Darfur's case was gradually being amplified. Darfur continued to be the pawn not only in Gaddafi's games but also in those of successive regimes in Khartoum. Apparently, Libya was beginning to take advantage of Darfur's economic vulnerability and the onslaught of the 1985 famine in Darfur, to offer a soothing effect. Sadly, relief took the form of both the desired and the destructive. With the inflow of rebels and refugees: those fleeing the war in Chad and seeking to regroup against repression, came the proliferations of guns and light weapons. Libya had seized every opportunity to arm aggrieved groups in furtherance of the war against Chad. Guns became a new development in Darfur, one that gave fresh impetus to the conflict of 2003. The porous border and the resultant influx from across, accentuated the Arab factor already gaining momentum among Arab groups in Darfur. Thanks to Libya. Therefore, when Libya's handshake with Khartoum began to go beyond the elbow, Darfur began reaping the consequences. Khartoum deeply engrossed with the war in the south, financed by Tripoli, neither found any moral justification to forestall Libya's destructive role in Darfur, nor was it capable of addressing the growing instability resulting from it. In any case the security vacuum it engendered by nurturing such relations with Libya only validates Azar's

⁵⁰⁷ Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 251

See, Irit Back, *Sovereignty in Africa: Conflict Resolution and International Organizations in Darfur* (London. New York: I.B. TAURIS, 2016)

assertion of a state's inability under such circumstance, to provide any form of '*security needs to its citizenry*'. Sudan's reliance on Libya's military and economic assistance, serves to validate the claim that international linkages inadequately conducted contributes to the susceptibility of the state to Protracted Social Conflicts. In the same vein the dependency of a weaker state on the military strength of a stronger state, strips the weaker of its autonomy. In that way, obligation to its citizenry becomes compromised by a forced loyalty to the stronger state.

Conclusion:

It has been the task of this initial section, to examine to what extent Azar's thesis on Protracted Social Conflicts serves as a framework for understanding the preconditions that underlie the Darfur conflict. All of the stated preconditions undergirding the 'Genesis' component as expounded by the author cannot be validated within the Darfur context. However, the human needs factor with respect to the conflict over land, triggered by discontent from landless tribes, as well as the political dominance of specific groups by elites to north of Sudan, as evidenced by the Black Book strongly align with the Darfur case. Similarly, in demonstrating the consanguinity between Libya and the Sudan at one point and the ostensible role played by Libya's Gaddafi in exacerbating precarious conditions on ground Darfur, (which served as a trade-off for her military support to the Sudan), Azar's reflections on international linkage have undoubtedly found validation. Indeed, the Darfur case exposes the impact of an external actor like Libya. Darfur's communal content nonetheless, may not be delineated as the product of colonial construction. The case of a divide and rule bequeathed to the independent state of Sudan, as a legacy, becomes irrelevant to understanding Darfur predicaments. The commendable accomplishment of empowering local leaders served to preserve the stability of the region. Nonetheless, poverty, inequality and marginalisation abide as grievances of the periphery, which informed and fuelled the outburst of conflict in 2003.

7.3 International Intervention: An analysis of methods, tools and actors

Introduction.

In chapter three precisely, this study examined theoretical underpinnings, actors and tools associated with both the fields of conflict management and conflict resolution. The chapter delineated the essence of track I and track II diplomacy in conflicts of the 21 century and shed

light on the significance of attendant actors in internal conflicts of the sub-Saharan region. Formal mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement were identified as consistent approaches within the rubric of the field of conflict management or state centric strategies. Informal mediation, controlled communication and problem-solving workshops recognisably found relevance as strategies of the field of conflict resolution. It became evident in that chapter, that in contrast to the techniques of conflict management, the conflict resolution field pursues a more people to people dialogue defined approach to peace. Yet as suggested by the salient underlying notions and principles of the school of conflict transformation examined in chapter four, inadequacies do abound. It is against this backdrop that this section seeks to delve into an analysis of approaches, methods and instruments, those that have found utility in the longstanding search for peace to Darfur's conflict.

7. 3. 1 The crux of this section:

This sub-section of the seventh chapter, as captured in the sub-title above, examines the third-party response, both track I and track II, to Darfur's on-going conflict from 2003 till 2014. The basic focus of this section is to provide the reader with concise insight into the international community's approach, tools as well as the strategies to sustainable peace in Sudan's western region. State centric intervention kick started by Chad's Idriss Derby and concluded in Doha with the DDPD, is examined to understand how effectively or not, informal mediation has contributed to stable peace in Darfur. I intend to establish whether the deployment of troops to the conflict terrain provided an opening to sustainable peace in Darfur? Have both strategies made headway in the desired direction of sustainable and durable peace? Has PSW contributed to the long search for peace in Darfur? If in the affirmative, to what extent? How have the principles guiding these approaches to peace impacted (negatively or positively) on the entire process of peace in Darfur? In the concluding part of chapter three, the study argued that there seems to be a large vacuum created by both fields. Does this hold true for the case of Darfur? The knowledge of the entire process towards sustainable peace has become and continues to be the preoccupation of scholars in the quest for greater knowledge. It is on the scholarship of seasoned authors and experts on Darfur's conflict resolution trajectory, that this thesis seeks an analysis of methods applied to Darfur. Those in consonance with the conflict management and resolution framework for intervention in international conflicts.

7.3.2 Darfur implodes with a war of insurgency: A brief Historical background

It is not the aim of this thesis to concentrate on the conflict in Darfur. The purpose as mentioned elsewhere is to delve into an analysis of the intervention strategies of the international community in their search for durable peace in Darfur. Other sections in this chapter have threaded relevant aspects of the conflict in line with the primary objective of the thesis. (Please see chapter 7.2 for details) A brief history nonetheless suffices at this juncture.

Two major armed groups were observed to be at the forefront in what was ostensibly a rebellion against the Government of Sudan (GoS). Both the Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army formerly going by the name: Darfur Liberation Front and the alleged mastermind behind the Black Book,⁵⁰⁸ the Justice and Equity Movement, took up arms to fight a course that both aggrieved parties assumed was capable of engendering a turning point from prolonged years of political marginalization and economic deprivation.

What has now prevailed for the fourteenth year and counting, commenced with attacks on government establishments by one of the two major mutinying groups. In February 2003, the SLM/A reportedly launched attacks on military posts in Gulu the capital of Jebel Marra province, killing 200 soldiers.⁵⁰⁹ A subsequent attack targeted the El- Fasher airport located in the capital of northern Darfur. Similar rebel outrage was recorded around both Kutum and Tiany leaving scores of soldiers dead.⁵¹⁰ The GoS initially dismissing these eruptions of violence as mere local rivalry responded with counter attacks. In alliance with the Janjaweed (the Arab militia group, hitherto armed and supported by the government to ward off any form of threat from local non-Arab tribes) the GoS resorted to what it considered the best quick action. With aerial and landed counter attacks, the GoS sought to rapidly nip the violent outburst in its bud.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁸ See, Irit Back, *Sovereignty in Africa: Conflict Resolution and International Organizations in Darfur* (London. New York: I.B. TAURIS, 2016)

⁵⁰⁹ Daly, *Darfur's Sorrows*, 280

⁵¹⁰ *ibid.*, 281

⁵¹¹ See, Alette Smeulders and Fred Grünfeld, "Warnings February 2003-February 20045," in *International Crimes and Other Gross Human Rights Violations A Multi- and Interdisciplinary Textbook* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 63

See, Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, "The Genocide Determination," in *Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 147

While the two elephants fought, the grass suffered. A huge humanitarian crisis promptly emerged. Thousands were displaced and many more lost their lives. And while the international community at this time, seemed too engrossed in matters concerning the southern part of the country (by now the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) responsible for halting the war between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the GoS was in the making in Naivasha Kenya.) Time was of the essence. An urgent intervention to intercept the emerging carnage sweeping rapidly through the western part of Sudan became imperative.

7. 3. 3 Mediating the Darfur conflict: The Chadian response

Intervention to douse escalating tensions initially emerged from Chad under president Idriss Derby. Talks centred on achieving a ceasefire, and on the provision of humanitarian assistance for the victims of the war. Derby's efforts eventually produced the signing by both belligerents of the Abeche Agreement on September 3, 2003. The GoS and the SLM/A consented to a forty-five-day truce. This was notably the most significant outcome of that Agreement. However, as observed by Iyob and Khadiagala, hostilities resumed almost immediately, rendering the agreement null and void.⁵¹² Toga also observed that the agreement proved inadequate in hindering the Janjaweed's relentless outrage on civilians identified by the militias as sympathizers with the SLM/ A or JEM⁵¹³. Nonetheless to some extent fighting tended to decrease between the parties. Whether the Chadian president acted out of the necessity to halt the spill over effect from the war into neighbouring countries such as his, or whether his efforts stemmed from a mere humanitarian concern or not, his initial actions however minute, was a welcomed move which attracted subsequent and even higher levels of intervention.

The Ndjamenan Ceasefire Agreement

By March 23, 2004, renewed mediatory efforts had been underway. Idriss Derby of Chad was still the mastermind, hosting what eventually birthed the 'Ndjamena Ceasefire Agreement.' By now mediatory meetings had become more advanced and were holding in conjunction with the African Union. Pitswane noted an added leverage to the peace process with the official involvement of the AU. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had reviewed the body's guiding tenets of 'non-interference' to adopt a principle of 'non- indifference'. Now

⁵¹² Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace (International PeaceAcademy Occasional Paper Series) (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2006) 152

⁵¹³ Dawit Toga, "The African Union Mediation and the Abuja Peace Talks" in War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, ed. Alex de Waal (Global Equity Initiative: Harvard University, 2007)215

metamorphosed and rechristened, the AU seemed poised and ready to embrace the challenge from new organisational perspectives, which included the notion of seeking ‘African Solutions to African Problems’. It was Mali’s erstwhile president Alpha Konare, who would take on the mantle of the new AU leadership, as its first Chairperson. According to Flint and De Waal, Konare’s antecedence seemed to make him capable for what lay ahead.⁵¹⁴ Hamid Elgabid, a former prime minister of Niger was appointed to lead the AU mediation team to the talks in Ndjamena. A Nigerian Ambassador-Sam Ibok replaced him few months later, owing to an unsuccessful outing.⁵¹⁵ Despite AU internal reshufflings and a noticeable reluctance on the part of the GoS to negotiate terms with the rebel groups, a ‘Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on Darfur’ emerged on the April 8, 2004, albeit with some pressure from AU’s Alpha Konare on Sudan’s Omar Bashir. Bashir who had strongly opposed the presence of the larger international community at the meetings, previously assured, that the Darfur issue was in good hands. Darfur, he insisted was merely facing internal challenges not necessitating international intervention beyond already existing consultations with Chad’s Derby, as well as the watchful eyes of the AU.⁵¹⁶

The Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement made certain provisions, which included: the cessation of hostilities, the creation of an unhampered path for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the release of prisoners of war.⁵¹⁷ Most significantly it produced the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)/ Ceasefire Commission. Flint and De Waal re-echoing Konare, noted the significance of the body’s physical presence. Konare equally enlightened on the limitation of partaking in the mediatory talks alone. It was also pertinent to set initial precedence in Darfur (in line with its renewed humanitarian vision on intervention in Africa) by deploying forces to the troubled Sudanese region. On that account and in line with the outcome of an AU Peace and Security meeting held on May 25, 2004, boots were deployed on the grounds of Darfur, for the first time since the commencement of the war.⁵¹⁸ The Ceasefire Commission as it was tagged, initially consisted of 120 military observers and 350 troops. In classical peacekeeping fashion these deployments were to be restricted to the monitoring of the ‘Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement’. Their duty was to give protection to the members of the Ceasefire

⁵¹⁴ Flint and De waal, *A new history of a long war*, 174

⁵¹⁵ Barltrop, *Darfur and the International Community*, 63

⁵¹⁶ Toga, *The African Union Mediation*, 216

⁵¹⁷ Toga, *The African Union Mediation*, 216-217

⁵¹⁸ *ibid.*, 218

Commission and not to the dying victims of war.⁵¹⁹ The Ndjamenan Agreement seemed to have yielded some fruit. After all the AU was now present on ground. Toga observed nonetheless that the entire process was unfortunately compromised. The Agreement was purportedly tampered with and allegedly so, with knowledge of the Chadian prime minister.⁵²⁰ The GoS was to benefit from this major alteration: An extra sentence had been included to the 6th paragraph of the document. It read as follows:

‘The Sudanese government shall commit itself to neutralise the armed militia, the forces of the armed opposition should be assembled in clearly defined sites.’⁵²¹

This singular display of knavery might have allowed the rebels the audacity to discredit the entire process. Flint and De Waal termed the document ‘fatally flawed’. Noting impediments cited by deployed military personnel, those with the capacity to militate against accomplishing the Commission’s mandated task.⁵²²

In similar vein, Pitswanne affirms the failure of the Ndjamenan Agreement as well as the emergent Ceasefire Commission. He maintains that this was traceable to the myriad of challenges encountered during the process, after the signing and in the operationalization phase. Among them: the document’s insufficiency in providing a balanced measure for addressing the violence emanating from both parties. It must be noted that both adversaries had been involved in attacks and reprisal attacks which left citizens at the receiving end of the entire aggression. Similarly, when the document accentuated on the disarmament and cantonment of the rebel groups and turned a blind eye to ensuring the same became applicable to the government backed Janjaweed, it raised questions on the credibility of that statement. Furthermore, the supposed neutrality of the Chadian president was at some point called to question. There had been initial contentions on the rebel side, over Derby’s capacity to assume the role of an impartial mediator going by the political friendship that existed between him and Sudan’s Omar Bashir. Khartoum had years back, backed the Chadian leaders’ political ambition from on ground Darfur. At the same time Derby remains ethnically affiliated with the Zaghawa group in Darfur. The Zaghawa have been the main targets of the Janjaweed violence. The group is ably represented in both SLM/ A as well as in the JEM leadership. Derby was therefore viewed as a loyalist of both

⁵¹⁹ Flint and De Wall, *The New History*, 174

⁵²⁰ Toga, *The African Union Mediation*, 217

⁵²¹ Flint and De Waal, *The New History*, 174

⁵²² *Ibid.*, 174

Khartoum and the JEM movement. It is on account of this that Slim argues that ‘the Chadian process lacked the political leverage necessary to give talks credibility and weight’⁵²³

In a nutshell, the process was perceived to have assumed an asymmetrical posture. On the one hand, the rebels pushed for maximum international presence in order to expose the atrocities perpetrated by the government and its agents. On the other hand, the GoS concentrated on propaganda directed at thwarting all efforts to beef up security.⁵²⁴ De Waal noted that the GoS succumbed to pressure coming from the UN Security Council to acquiesce in an increase to the inadequate number of troops on ground in Darfur. The government already declined the proposal for extra 3,500 troops, to augment the already scanty deployment of 300.⁵²⁵ The deployed observer mission as was the case, became confronted with challenges that militated against the task of achieving its mandate. The scant resources and Darfur’s huge landmass too insurmountable, superseded the capacity of the meagre troops (135 military observers and 310 AMIS soldiers) deployed to monitor the ceasefire. Although the size of troops later increased, this initial predicament posed a huge challenge to the entire exercise. It seemed like the mission was close to ending in a futile venture.⁵²⁶ Neither party adhered to the signed accord. Tensions escalated, leaving innocent citizens at the worse end of the spectrum. Even when the boots on the ground more than doubled its initial size, it translated to minimal progress on the safety of civilian lives. According to Iyob and Khadiagala, ‘At Khartoum’s insistence, AMIS increased its numbers without changing its mandate’.⁵²⁷

Mediatory Talks: A restart in Addis Ababa

While the fighting showed no signs of abating, AU leaders also relentlessly pushed for renewed avenues for political solutions. The first of the seven rounds of political dialogues (The Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks) had commenced, this time in Addis Ababa. Both adversaries amidst vehement recriminations, nonetheless made some effort to remain focused on stating the conditions under which further talks would be considered plausible. The GoS emphasised

⁵²³ Hugo Slim, “Dithering over Darfur? A Preliminary review of the international response“ *International Affairs* 80, 5 (2004) : 811-828

⁵²⁴ Johnny Thabo Pitso, *The Dynamics of Mediation and Conflict Resolution in Darfur, Sudan: 2004-2011*, In fulfilment of a PhD: University of the Witwatersrand, March 24, 2014, www.wiredspace.wits.ac.za (accessed February 15, 2016) 7

⁵²⁵ Alex De Waal, “Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace”, *African Affairs*, 104/414. (2005): 129, <http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org> (accessed January 19, 2016)

⁵²⁶ Pitso, *The Dynamics of Mediation and Conflict Resolution in Darfur*, 72

⁵²⁷ Iyob and Khadiagala, *The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 155

majorly on neutralising rebel groups and in addition, ensure their cantonment. However, the GoS equally signalled a vested interest in increased humanitarian assistance, as well as the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The rebels on their part assertively demanded that the GoS, ensures among other things: the disarmament of its Janjaweed agents, discontinue aggression on civilian lives as well as consent to the unhindered passage of humanitarian relief.⁵²⁸ According to Daly, the GoS insistence on a humanitarian action going by its antecedence since the eruption of the war, was a mere charade, to be taken with a pinch of salt⁵²⁹. In reality the GoS, did all it could to close all avenues through which humanitarian aid could reach the victims of that war.

7.3.4 ...from the talks to the signing: Examining the Abuja mediation, 2004-2006

It is pertinent at this juncture, to note that most analysts have viewed the Abuja process as the main mediation process associated with the Darfur conflict. It is the case because mediators engaged both parties in talks that led to the signing of Darfur's first Peace Agreement. Although the emergence of a Peace Agreement failed to translate to the much envisaged "peace" in Darfur-neither negative nor positive. The process nonetheless, is noteworthy since it corroborates and sheds light on the employment of 'official mediation' as a strategy underlying the field of conflict management. The chapter makes evident: Who was involved? How it was conducted? As well as examines whether or not the adoption of official mediation satisfactorily doused violent tensions in Darfur?

By the 23, August 2004 the talks had moved from the Addis Ababa to Nigeria's capital city Abuja. They were presided over by the then Nigerian incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo, who by now chaired the AU. Until December 21, 2004, when the fourth round of Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks were ending for the year, not much had been achieved either on paper or on ground in Darfur. Deliberations had continued to focus at the insistence of the parties on humanitarian and security issues.⁵³⁰ At other times the pendulum of discussions swayed to political matters. De Waal observed that once discussions tended to focus more closely on security and humanitarian issues, it seemed to play to the advantage of the GoS, who would rather circumvent any path towards a political resolution. This ultimately disadvantaged the rebels. Although issues of security were also paramount for the rebels, the author noted the

⁵²⁸ *ibid.*, 220

⁵²⁹ Daly, *Darfur's Sorrows*, 295

⁵³⁰ Iyob and Khadiagala, *The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 154

significance attached to channelling discussions in the direction of unearthing the conflicts root causes.⁵³¹ Security situation on ground was yet to improve and attacks on civilian lives continued unabated. It therefore became exceedingly crucial for the mediation team to persuade both parties to agree on adhering to a cessation of hostilities. To this end discussions commenced towards achieving a draft protocol on security matters in Darfur. While the GoS pushed for the rebels to comply by the rules and guidelines necessary for its self-disarmament under the supervision of AMIS, the rebel groups insisted on the imperativeness of a ‘no fly zone’ and the disarmament of the Janjaweed via a more reliable platform other than the GoS.⁵³² By now, the UN Security Council had passed the resolution 1556 on 30 July 2004. This pressed on the GoS, to halt all military attacks on unarmed civilians as well as to adhere to the demand for discontinued obstruction of humanitarian relief. Furthermore, the GoS was advised to disarm its agents (the Janjaweed) and bring to book all perpetrators of human rights atrocities.⁵³³

The Declaration of Principles

While consultations were underway, it became significant on the team’s agenda to map out a trajectory towards realizing a ‘comprehensive political settlement’. Both parties were thus persuaded to commit to what the team referred to as a ‘Declaration of Principles’ (DOP). This document was to contain an outline of statements (by the GoS and the two rebel groups). The statements were to be developed and deliberated upon in order to lay the groundwork for further negotiation. The contents of the DOP would then serve as guideline in resolving matters pertaining majorly to power and wealth sharing.⁵³⁴ The GoS made its position clear: it was in support both of a decentralized system and an equitable distribution of the country’s wealth. The rebel groups wanted inter alia an end to the prolonged marginalization of the region, the reconstruction of Darfur and compensation for accrued damages. The mediation team also became constantly confronted with obstacles. One major challenge was getting parties to reach a compromise on the contents of the ‘DOP’. For example, the issue of whether or not it was paramount to include a ‘no fly zone’ kept arising. For the rebels, this was of high priority especially considering the safety of the civilians on ground. With a signed consent on 9 November 2004, the GoS eventually accepted inter alia to honour the ‘no fly zone’ proposal by

⁵³¹ Alex De Waal, “Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace”, 129

⁵³² Toga, *The African Union Mediation*, 227

⁵³³ Slim, *Dithering over Darfur?* 819

⁵³⁴ Toga, *The African Union Mediation*, 226

the rebels. Nonetheless it failed to match this written statement with appropriate action on the ground. During the same period, it launched attacks on civilians at the El Geer refugee camp in southern Darfur, precisely in Nyala and on rebel strongholds. This action promptly nullified the potency of the November agreement.⁵³⁵

The Libyan initiative

In between the Abuja peace talks, Colonel Gaddafi also made some attempts at mediating the Darfur crisis. This peace initiative however assumed a different posture from the proceedings in Abuja. The Gaddafi initiative drew to its dialogue sessions a delegation not consisting of leaders of both rebel groups already participating in the Abuja talks. Although a subsequent intervention effort from Libya notably summoned the presence of both SLM/ A and JEM, the initial attempt in October 2004 consisted of tribal leaders. Darfur's indigenous rulers notably focused on resolving inter-ethnic rivalries at the grassroots level. The dialogue session was tagged the 'Darfur Tribes Initiative'. It centred mainly on peripheral matters. The meeting among other things saw tribal leaders remain resolute on preserving the old system of landownership rights known as the Hakura system.⁵³⁶

For this analysis, it is important to sift out unnecessary information and proceed to the fifth round of talks as was convened from 10 June till July 5, 2005. This round tends to represent the most decisive path leading to the eventual signing of the peace agreement. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim headed the mediation team on further talks aimed at brokering a peaceful settlement between both parties. Despite hard haggling and controversy over the role of both Chad and Eritrea in the peace talks, (recriminations ensued between the GoS and the rebels over the purported bias of Chad and Eritrea, who supposedly sided the GoS and the rebel groups respectively) it became possible in this fifth round of talks, to conclude deliberations over the terms of the DOP. On precisely 5, July 2005, both adversaries signed the DOP. Some very tough points had been tabled for deliberation. The issue of landownership rights for example, known to be among the key elements underlying the Darfur conflict, became a highly controversial topic for debate. Discussions in this phase reached a troubling crescendo. At one point, mediators found it extremely challenging to persuade both rebel groups to accession. They insisted that their demands to solidify security in Darfur be attended to with utmost

⁵³⁵ Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, 155

⁵³⁶ Pitswanne, The Dynamics of Mediation and Conflict Resolution in Darfur, 82

urgency. The intervention from the international community and some prominent African leaders had been timely; else the entire proceeding may have ended without achieving any significant milestone. One very positive outcome nonetheless was the provision to create the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. A forum intended to draw a pool of stakeholders together, whose major purpose will be to dialogue and sketch out a way forward for the entire Darfur region.⁵³⁷

Abuja talks: The seventh round

Why is it necessary to proceed from the fifth round of talks onto the seventh round of the Abuja discussions? The seventh round as it were, constituted the final stages of the mediation process but also vividly portrays the international community's adopted tactics towards accomplishing the DPA on behalf of peace in Darfur. It is important, before delving into extracting the main argument from the Abuja mediation process, to comment on the internal friction that emerged between the rebel groups. These divisions tended play to the detriment of the movements in the final analysis. As commentators observe, the polarity may have militated against the achievement of the desired mediation outcome.

Internal cleavages within the ranks of the SLM/A leaders, hitherto latent in nature and posing yet no threat to the mediation process, had begun to escalate. So as to avert the negative impact these divisions may exert on the process, the AU and the international community promptly commenced mitigating the ensued power tussle between SLM/A Abdel Wahid and his counterpart Minni Minawi. While this task became time consuming, it was pertinent to attempt an amicable resolution in order to secure the smooth running of the re-launched talks. By the time the seventh round of talks were fully underway, Minawi had assumed leadership of the SLM/A. This development as Toga⁵³⁸ noted, became an incontestable bitter pill for Abdel Wahid-the erstwhile chairman of the SLM/A, to digest. Mediators were left with no option than to manage two factions of the SLM/A. It is significant to note, how in the last round debilitating factors such as these weighed heavily on the mediators and the process alike. This predicament compelled mediators to seek the most viable party to forge ahead with.

At that point in time realities on the battlefield had reinforced the notion that SLM/MM wielded greater military strength on ground in Darfur. His group members were equally less inclined to

⁵³⁷ Toga, *The African Union Mediation*, 231

⁵³⁸ Toga, *The African Union Mediation*

internal rifts. That been the case regardless, it was also a known fact that Abdel Wahid's Fur population constituted the majority in the IDP camps and outweighed SLM-MM's faction in terms of numerical strength. AU mediators nonetheless perceived the prospects of creating alignments with that group which possessed greater influence on the deteriorating level of security on ground.⁵³⁹

The lack of internal cohesion on the part of the SLM and the gradual resonance of Abdel Wahid (Fur) and Minawi's (Zaghawa) ethnic affiliations ostensibly fed negatively into the group's capacity to declare its position as a united front. Brook affirms that the split '*altered the negotiating dynamics of the mediatory talks.*'⁵⁴⁰ Nathan also noted how difficult it became for the talks to progress hitch free. *Not only did the climate around both factions become characterized by mistrust, the fragmentation elicited a discernible fear among the fractionalized groups who perceived that the split could be capitalized on and used as a manipulating tool by both the mediators and the GoS representatives against them and their power to negotiate in unison.*⁵⁴¹ But while the AU mediators envisaged higher benefits in dealing with Minawi, the GoS representatives, as analyst opine, anticipated a deal with SLM/AW for his membership base. In the eyes of Khartoum SLM/AW held strong prospects for the elections that were to hold three years later in 2009.⁵⁴²

The seventh round also became exceedingly challenging for the mediators, because of the intricacies of arriving at a compromise on the subject of power and wealth sharing as presented for deliberations by the respective commissions. Neither the GoS nor the rebel groups conceded to shifting its stance on issues perceived to be hard-core. In the area of power sharing for example, the GoS found it quite an onerous task conceding to the rebel's demands for meaningful representation in government. On the part of the movements, the call to equity and fairness in the allocation of power was based on the argument that Darfurians constituted two-fifths of the entire nation's population, and therefore deserved justice in that regard. Under the rubric of wealth sharing, the GoS would resist the rebels longing for recompense to the victims of the conflict. Further recommendations to alleviate the security tensions on ground, pointed

⁵³⁹ Sean P. Brooks, "Enforcing a Turning Point and Imposing a Deal: An Analysis of the Darfur Abuja Negotiations of 2006" *International Negotiations*, 13. (2008) 421 citing Ismail Omer, Policy Advisor, ENOUGH Project. Interview. 22 August 2008

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴¹ Nathan Laurie Nathan, "The making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement" in *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. Alex de Waal (Global Equity Initiative: Harvard University, 2007)256

⁵⁴² Flint and De Waal, *The New History*, 176

to adopting an Enhanced Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.⁵⁴³ Both parties (the rebels and the GoS) continued to contravene agreements tailored towards halting the aggression. Rebel cleavages had become exceedingly prominent, while the mediation process on its part, scarcely made any headway. By now, the prolongation of the talks had begun to beget frustration on the part of the AU leadership. Worse still, international donors also threatened to withdraw financial support.⁵⁴⁴ These unsettling scenarios may have compelled the organization's next line of the action.

At this juncture, it is important to pay attention to the significance of this **'next line of action'** by the AU and its international allies. It specifically accentuates the impact engendered (by this new tactics) on the mediators, the parties at the mediating table and the final outcome of the mediation process. Analysts view this final development as most decisive in the seventh round of the Abuja talks.⁵⁴⁵

Adopting a new mediation strategy (The last days)

The AU's Peace and Security Council in conjunction with the UN Security Council would on account of the previously mentioned reasons, settle for the **'deadline tactics'**. To its initiators this change in operational tactics felt like the most feasible approach towards a positive settlement. The deadline strategy aimed at fast tracking the entire process. The idea was to pressurize parties into a final compromise and dissuade a foot-dragging attitude. Flint and De Waal noted that after series of unachieved deadlines a deadline for April 30, 2006 was announced. This action was thought to be germane to the envisaged entrance of UN troops into the conflict zone, especially since the impact of AU boots on the ground had begun to prove inadequate to the security demands in Darfur. As the chapter progresses a critical examination of the modified strategy reveals whether or not a viable and enduring solution was eventually achieved.

The Abuja mediators had failed to meet up with previously set deadlines. However, when the final April 30 deadline was announced, it came with a compelling urgency on the mediators to

⁵⁴³ Toga, *The African Union Mediation*, 231

⁵⁴⁴ Nathan, "The making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement", 248

⁵⁴⁵ Sean P. Brooks, "Enforcing a Turning Point and Imposing a Deal: An Analysis of the Darfur Abuja Negotiations of 2006" *International Negotiations*, 13. (2008): 413-440

work towards finalising consultations. The mediation team ostensibly succumbing to growing pressures, commenced a compilation of all deliberated matters and then handed the parties a five-day ultimatum to digest its contents.⁵⁴⁶ Contingent on the final consent of all the parties involved in the consultations, the compilations should translate to the long-awaited Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Towards the end nonetheless, both sides expressed dissatisfaction at the level of compromise on a number of issues deliberated upon. Since the mediation team was intent on smoothening out these rough edges, an appeal for an extension of the deadline was requested. The deadline was postponed for 48 hours. Now in the final days of the deadline phase the pressure on the mediators to deliver on the much-awaited settlement intensified. Senior officials from the US and the UK: in the persons of Ambassador Robert Zoellick and Hilary Benn, the US Deputy Secretary of State and the British Secretary of State for Development respectively, had started arriving in Abuja. It seemed appropriate, since the presence of influential persons could prospectively inject positive energy into the process. The ‘deadline diplomacy’ nonetheless, remained in use. It was considered a feasible trajectory in achieving the end goal: A Peace Agreement.⁵⁴⁷ Assessing this new development, Nathan opined that the distinct strategy proved counterproductive to the entire mediation process. Brooks also noted a deviation from a more viable and positive outcome oriented ‘*resolving formula*’ to an ‘*agreeing formula*.’ The process as it were, now progressed as founded on the bedrock of an international strategy. It prevailed on the parties to accept a final settlement deal by way of imposing it.⁵⁴⁸ Duursma further confirming these sharp adjustment of approach states: ‘*The US mediation team attempted a breakthrough in negotiations by employing a strategy based on threats and rewards*’...⁵⁴⁹

In addition to adopting this stratagem, the international team would allegedly assure the rebels of the US’s unflinching support in the implementation of the DPA. Ostensibly, this was interpreted as bait targeting the rebels’ acquiescence and signatures. Incentives would also go hand in hand threats against SLM/A’s Minni Minawi, who was also confronted with pressure to sign or face UN sanctions or ICC indictments in the event of a refusal to partake as a signatory

⁵⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, “Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement.” International Crisis Group, June 20, 2006. <http://www.crisisgroup.org> (accessed January 29, 2016)

⁵⁴⁷ Laurie Nathan, “The making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement” in *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. Alex de Waal (Global Equity Initiative: Harvard University, 2007) 245-266
Sean P. Brooks, “Enforcing a Turning Point and Imposing a Deal: An Analysis of the Darfur Abuja Negotiations of 2006” *International Negotiations*, 13. (2008): 413-440

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ Allard Duursma, “Mediation with Muscles or Minds? Lessons from a Conflict Sensitive Mediation Style in Darfur”, ACCORD, 2011, <http://www.accord.org.za> (accessed January 20, 2016) 17

to the DPA.⁵⁵⁰ Abdel Wahid would not yield to the mounting demands. Instead he bided for firmer assurances on issues of security and pressed for concrete guarantees with respect to the implementation of the DPA once signed.⁵⁵¹ Baltrop⁵⁵² also observed that the exertion of *'diplomatic pressure'* on both adversaries yielded the desired fruit after all. Interestingly, five days into the month of May 2006, the Abuja talks birthed the Darfur Peace Agreement.

In the end, the GoS representative Majzoub al Khalifa and the Minawi led faction of the SLM/A became the only signatories to the Agreement. The Abdel Wahid faction of the SLM/A and the leader of JEM expressed unresolved discontentment with provisions of the DPA and therefore declined to partake in the signing. Regardless of intensified persuasion in the aftermath of the signing on May 5, 2006 as well as additional days of grace from the May 15 to 31 to review their position and sign, both non-signatories remained insistent on the fulfilment of their respective conditions before cementing a final deal.⁵⁵³ The best offer from both non-signatories JEM and SLM/ AW was a declaration to support the DPA. Their signatures never appeared on the DPA itself. Meanwhile on ground in Darfur, the DPA met with zero acceptance, not the least among the IDPs by whose interpretation the DPA spelled bias and a purported prejudice toward the Zaghawa minority group.⁵⁵⁴ By now Minawi had gone ahead to embrace the GoS offer for a position in government. An action which was perceived as side tracking other factions and movements also represented in the Abuja talks.

7.3.5 Continuing the Peace: From Abuja to Doha

In the ensuing months after the signing of the DPA, continued efforts to resolve the conflict, saw the parties return to the negotiating table. From 2007 until 2008 peace talks were held between the GoS and the movements in Libya. A more robust intervention into the conflict in the form resembling the Abuja peace talks commenced in July 2009 under the joint efforts of AU, the UN and the government of Qatar in the Doha. It was referred to as the AU/ UN Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST). Djibril Yipene Bassole, a diplomat from Burkina Faso

⁵⁵⁰ Brooks, "Enforcing a Turning Point and Imposing a Deal: An Analysis of the Darfur Abuja Negotiations of 2006" 249

⁵⁵¹ Flint and De waal, A new history of a long war,

⁵⁵² Barltrop, Darfur and the International Community, 62-68

⁵⁵³ International Crisis Group, "Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement." International Crisis Group, June 20, 2006. <http://www.crisisgroup.org> (accessed January 29, 2016).

⁵⁵⁴ See, Flint and De waal, A new history of a long war, chapter 9

functioned as the joint Chief mediator. More than two weeks into Bassole's appointment, AU leaders sought to broaden its intervention strategy by establishing a platform designed for detailed investigation into the region's conflict. –The AU High panel on Darfur was created almost parallel to the renewed talks in Doha. It was charged with the responsibility of unravelling the most appropriate trajectory towards justice, peace and reconciliation in Darfur. Findings and recommendations were to be submitted to its mandating authority- the AU. The team adopted a distinctive intervention approach, which involved trips to Darfur to engage in dialogue like consultations with diverse groups at the grassroots level of society. By 2009 when the commission published its recommendations to the AU, it had embarked on more than three missions to the Sudan.⁵⁵⁵ It is such visits that afforded the team a glimpse into the suffering of the war's direct recipients. The commission's capacity to permeate the different categories of Darfur's grassroots society was what differentiated its approach to peace from other forms of intervention hitherto employed. Despite an envisaged complementarity between the Doha mediation and the AUPD's (African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur), observers have been quick to identify some measure of competition between both mechanisms of intervention.⁵⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the panel's strategy without doubt, continues to be regarded as one of those forums, which presented Darfuri stakeholders with the rare privilege of being heard. The AU panel ostensibly embraced a bottom-up approach, when compared with the peace talks organised by the government of Qatar.

Doha for example tended to replicate Abuja in some ways albeit with slight divergences. The nature of proceedings never deviated from the usual top-level track I diplomacy involving the mediators, the GoS and its antagonists. The talks in Doha nonetheless, gleaned a lesson or two from the Abuja mediation. For example, Darfur's civil society was hosted to three conferences in Doha. The mediation team allegedly claimed that a 'unanimous endorsement' of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) had emerged from one of such assemblies in May 2011.⁵⁵⁷ Analysts nonetheless, perceived foul play, criticising the efforts to showcase civil society as less substantial to the peace talks. Others have further denied the existence of any connection between Darfur's traditional civil society, and that group of civil society represented

⁵⁵⁵ Sudan Tribune. "TEXT: Recommendations of the AU Panel on Darfur." October 23, 2009, <http://www.sudantribune.com> (accessed February 17, 2016). 11

⁵⁵⁶ International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Spreading Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur's Peace Process." International Crisis Group, January 27, 2014, <http://www.crisisgroup.org> (accessed February 22, 2016). 4

⁵⁵⁷ *ibid.*

in Doha. Such allegations have been based on insinuations that the said group was a mere concoction of the government in Khartoum.⁵⁵⁸

Furthermore, the configuration of rebel participation in the Doha talks mirrored one of the major concerns resulting from the signing of the DPA-the emergence of an array of splinter rebel movements. While one of Darfur's main armed movements- JEM remained almost intact as a group, the name SLM had by now almost fizzled out of Darfur's peace talks in Doha. The significant roles nonetheless, played by Libya and the US in Addis Ababa to unify fractionalised Fur groups precipitated both the coordination among hitherto fragmented parties aligned with the SLM and the subsequent formation of an alliance movement called the (LJM) Liberation and Justice Movement.⁵⁵⁹ It became one of the major negotiating parties in Qatar. Tijani Sese, a Fur indigene became the movement's nominated leader. Analysts suggest that his nomination was premeditated, bearing the concealed objective to secure huge membership from the Fur community. Nonetheless, the group comprising majorly Zaghawas and Arabs, appeared less attractive to the Furs⁵⁶⁰.

The Doha process was confronted with similar pressure from the international community- to produce results within a stipulated timeframe. When compared with the talks in Abuja the exertion nonetheless was to a lesser degree. Mediators made efforts to obviate the risk of compromising the entire process a second time over. Also, the question of imposing on the parties an outcome, which they seemed unprepared to consent to, constituted a non-option in Doha. In the light of this, mediators tended to improvise as much as the situation presented itself. For example, consultations developed gradually and contingent on the platform of a strategy referred to as '*proximity mediation*'. The technique, which allowed for documents to move back and forth from mediator to the negotiating parties, aimed at securing an agreement in the final analysis.⁵⁶¹The mediators applied this method to circumvent the challenge of dragging the parties to the negotiating table.

⁵⁵⁸ Paul R. Williams and Matthew T. Simpson "Drafting in Doha: An Assessment of the Darfur Peace Process and Ceasefire Agreements ". In *Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR*, eds. Melanne A Civic and Michael Miklaucic (Washington: NDU Press, 2011)

⁵⁵⁹ Williams and Simpson "Drafting in Doha, 46

⁵⁶⁰ International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Spreadig Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur's Peace Process." International Crisis Group, January 27, 2014, <http://www.crisisgroup.org> (accessed February 22, 2016).

⁵⁶¹ Allard Duursma, "Mediation with Muscles or Minds? Lessons from a Conflict Sensitive Mediation Style in Darfur ", ACCORD, 2011, <http://www.accord.org.za> (accessed January 20, 2016) 17

Of major significance during Doha, was the signing of two agreement frameworks. The first agreement signed in February 2010, between JEM and the GoS, aimed at securing a cessation of hostilities between the signatories. The second agreement targeted the resolution of the conflict and was signed by both the GoS and LJM. Despite all attempt by the JMST to avoid the same mistake made in Abuja, Doha in the final analysis proved to be no different from the Abuja negotiations. The JMST failed to secure the signatures of all the parties present at the Doha talks. Observers suggest that coupled with the sense of urgency injected into the process towards the end, the mediator's incapacity to deliver as anticipated, may have resulted from the reappointment of the AU/UN Joint Chief Mediator Bassole as his country's foreign minister. More so, South Sudan's independence, which was only four days old, supposedly also served to divert the international community's focus on Darfur.⁵⁶² Whatever the case, the DDPD was eventually signed on 14. July 2011 between the Gos and LJM, albeit without JEM. Going by the team's chairperson-Bassole, the Doha process was to be referred to as a 'document'. As opposed to the appellation - 'Agreement' with which the DPA was identified, the 'document', instead of being treated as sealed and final as with the DPA, would allow non-signatories the chance to review their stance. The final agreement with LJM was described as partial and lacking in the capacity to translate to any form of stability on ground in Darfur. Six years have passed since the initial signing of the DDPD. Non-signatories to the document remain adamant towards joining the peace process. The DDPD which abounds as the framework for Darfur's most anticipated peace, can only be described subtly as 'work in progress'. In the eyes of Darfur's displaced and refugees the DDPD is far from being a 'work in progress'. Resentment towards the lack of implementation of the DDPD's provision continues to mount four years on. As reported by Radio Dabanga⁵⁶³ in January 2015, the Doha Peace Accord has brought Darfur's displaced and refugees even more suffering. In an interview, Adam Suleiman, the head of the Oure Cassoni refugee camp criticised the DDPD for its failure to fill the vacuum created by a long-lost peace and instability in the region. He lashed out at the leadership of LJM for "*betraying and selling the Dafuris by signing this partial Doha agreement*" and accused the

⁵⁶² International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Spreadig Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur's Peace Process." International Crisis Group, January 27, 2014, <http://www.crisisgroup.org> (accessed February 22, 2016) .5

⁵⁶³ According to Eric Reeves - a Research Analyst on Sudan, against untrusworthy reports from the hybrid mission, Radio Dabanga remains the most important and reliable source of Information about happenings in Darfur

group of “participating with the Khartoum regime in the widespread crimes against the people of Darfur”.⁵⁶⁴

7.3.6 Concluding reflections

International mediation endures as one of the salient tools of conflict management. It has been applied to both interstate and intrastate conflicts of the 21st century. The utilisation of the approach in Darfur’s conflict was perceived therefore, to be in line with the international community’s state-centric blueprint for conflict resolution in war torn societies. The initial and subsequent response therefore, by Idriss Derby of Chad, the AU and the international community, to mediate Darfur’s conflict, underscores the persistent reliance on mediation as a top-down third party non-coercive approach to peace in conflict torn societies like Darfur. International mediation cannot be relegated to the past because it bears roots as a mechanism of conflict management associated with the era of interstate rivalry. The usage has therefore gained significance over time and specifically to societies beset by internal strife. Having found applicability in civil wars, it may be important to fashion out ways in which this apparatus of conflict management can be made adaptive enough to engender sustainable peace in conflicts prevalent on the African soil. With respect to Darfur, the international community has failed to project the mediation strategy as a viable and effective tool for accomplishing the task of positive peace for the people of Darfur.

Bercovitch echoing Ott in a most recent publication, states that *‘the success or failure of mediation is inter alia determined by the nature of the dispute’*. *‘Parties in conflict weigh up certain issues and attach more relevance to some than others’* furthermore, *‘some issues will be seen by one or both parties as vital’*⁵⁶⁵. For the Darfur rebels, there was no compromising the issue of civilian protection and power sharing. The GoS on its part was resolute on neutralising the movements. However, since both parties especially the GoS would persistently violate ceasefire agreements, the issue of security became a tough compromise to make. The process would as a result experience several deadlocks and intangible results. The several rounds of talks, the impasses and the boycotts from deliberations, are evidence enough to show that the Abuja talks were nothing short of hitch free. When pressure set in, based on the AU

⁵⁶⁴ Radio Dabanga, Doha peace accord brought us more suffering: Darfur displaced, refugees, <http://sudaneseonline.com> (accessed March 2, 2016)

⁵⁶⁵ See, Jacob Bercovitch, "Part I The nature and theory of mediation," in *Theory and Practice of International Mediation: Selected Essays* (London: Routledge, 2011), 33-41.

and international community's deadline diplomacy the process became jeopardised, forcing mediators to alter the natural course or the strategy hitherto applied to the mediation process.

In chapter three of this work, I cited according to Touval and Zartmann,⁵⁶⁶ the procedures mediators are likely to adopt during a mediation process: communication, facilitation, formulation and manipulation. When applied to conflict mediation, they have the capacity to positively or negatively influence both the process and the conflict itself and in essence produce a failed or successful outcome. As such, a mediator may perceive within a unique context, higher prospects of achieving a positive outcome and therefore chooses to apply one strategy over another. On that note, a mediator may assume the role of either one or a combination of the following: communicator, facilitator, formulator or manipulator. According to Bercovitch, when mediators act as 'go between' merely making contacts with the parties, gaining the trust and confidence of the parties, arranging for interaction between the parties, identifying issues and interests, clarifying the situation and amongst others encouraging meaningful communication and developing a framework for understanding, they assume the role of communicators- Facilitators. When mediators inter alia structure agendas, deal with simple issues first, reduce tensions and establish protocols their role is conceived as 'procedural - formulative'.⁵⁶⁷ The Abuja mediators initially adopted both strategies to varying degrees. They sought to maintain the tempo by way of persuasion at least up until the sixth round. It is no wonder therefore that the mediators recorded some positive outcome with the signing of the DOP, by all parties, in the fifth rounds of talks.

The change in strategy in the final round of talks became the last straw to break the camel's back. The fragile equilibrium maintained by the mediators had begun to corrode. In the seventh-round mediators lost control of the process and began dancing to the piper's tune. With very minimal input from the mediating team at this juncture, the baton moved to the hands of the AU authorities and their international partners. Brooks noted that *'while the AU mediators continued to attend meetings and served as experts on issues, the command of the negotiation had been passed to the international diplomats'*⁵⁶⁸ who were now physically present in Abuja.

⁵⁶⁶ Saadia Touval and I William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory". in International Mediation in Theory and Practice ed. Saadia Touval and I William Zartman, (Boulder CO: West View Press, 1985) 7-17

⁵⁶⁷ Jacob Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee, "Mediating International Conflicts: Examining the Effectiveness of Directive Strategies", The International Journal of Peace Studies Volume 6, 1085-7494. (2001)

⁵⁶⁸ Brooks, Enforcing a Turning Point and Imposing a Deal, 428

Once the baton changed hands, the new owners commenced with *manipulating* the process in the assumed ‘right’ direction, relying on threats, sanctions and inducements.

Bercovitch and Mi Lee contend that the directive strategies (the authors term for manipulative strategies) constitute the highest and most powerful form of mediation. It gives the mediators the power to “affect the content and substance of the bargaining process by providing incentives for parties or issuing ultimatums’ aimed at changing the motivation and behaviour of the parties in dispute. However, when applied to a conflict situation, directive strategies “allow mediators to control the process and the substance of the conflict, albeit at *the expense of the disputant’s freedom to control their own affairs*”⁵⁶⁹. The authors identify the use of Ultimatums as part of the strategy towards the achievement of the desired goal. They allude to this strategy as ‘most powerful’. The question is, what kind of results are yielded in the final analysis when applied to a case of protractedness like Darfur. The authors do not refer to the use of threats and sanctions as part of the instruments at play, when directive strategies are adopted. Yet it is firmly assumed that in comparison with other mediator strategies, when directive strategies are utilized in international mediation they yield successful outcomes. ⁵⁷⁰Unfortunately, this strategy proved inappropriate to the Darfur case. Deadlines, incentives and sanctions translated to nothing but the failed DPA and attendant consequences as a result.

The officials from the United States and Britain sought to assuage the growing impatience of donor countries in the short term by applying the manipulation strategy in order to achieve a final settlement. Most ominously, this engendered the imposition of a final agreement and precipitated the withdrawal of the parties right to fully own the resolution process. The long-term consequences of such undoing have lingered as a sour taste in the tongue of all affected by the conflict. In resolving the conflicts of our 21st century, essential ingredients of consensus, free volition and inclusion continue to be emphasised in peace process seeking sustainability. The Abuja mediation sacrificed these essentialities, compromised the chances for a comprehensive agreement and rendered that mediation process ineffective. As aptly summed up by Nathan the conflicts prevalent in our 21st century world:

⁵⁶⁹ Bercovitch and Mi Lee, *Mediating International Conflicts*

⁵⁷⁰ Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston. “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence.” In *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1996) 11

*'are not conducive to a viable quick accord. They have multiple historical, structural, political and economic causes that are complex, deep-rooted, and intractable. The difficulty of resolution is compounded greatly by the protagonists' mutual hatred and suspicion. However, grave the situation, mediators have no option but to be patient.'*⁵⁷¹

Although there have been subsequent attempts at mediating the Darfur crisis since 2006, the Abuja process is conceived as that singular mediation effort to have attracted ample attention and analysis from the international community, analysts and scholars alike.

7.4 Applying the Problem-Solving Workshop (PSW) approach to Darfur's conflict

Scholars from the field of conflict resolution as examined in preceding chapters, may have identified the link between its Basic Human Need theory and the prolonged violence in Darfur. Ostensibly, the continued denial of the region's most pressing needs: security, land ownership, recognition, political participation to the very basic means of survival: food, water clothing and shelter, is accountable for the conflict's intractability and longevity. In a bid to diversify the options leading towards positive peace and also to identify the conflicts root causes, unearth such and seek the complete termination of Darfur's conflict, scholars from the field of conflict resolution, contingent on one of its unique apparatuses for peace, delved into the peace process, to activate the scholar practitioner third party unofficial initiative for peace, as applied under circumstances of intractability.

In the third chapter of this thesis I examined Problems Solving Workshops as a conflict resolution apparatus for intervention in protracted conflicts. (See section on controlled communication and interactive problem solving) The application of Problem-Solving Workshops to conflict, engender "changes in attitudes, perceptions, and ideas for resolving the conflict among the individual participants in a workshop" which are then transferred to the more official negotiation process⁵⁷² In this section, I probe into the significance of PSW in the search for peace to the Darfur conflict. Since there is a paucity of documentation on the process and impact of Darfur's Problem-Solving Workshop- dubbed the "Sudan Task Group" (STG), on the conflict, I will rely on the account from R. J Fisher titled "Acknowledging the Basic

⁵⁷¹ Nathan, The Making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement, 247

⁵⁷² Herbert C. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving: Informal Mediation by the Scholar Practitioner", in Studies in International Mediation: Essays in honor of Jeffery Z. Rubin, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 175. Harvard University, <http://www.scholar.harvard.edu> (accessed March 20, 2016)

Human Needs and adjusting the focus of the problem-solving workshop”⁵⁷³ published 2011, in a collection of essays.

In both July 2009 and February 2011, a group of social scientists under the auspices of the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR), at the George Mason University at the Arlington, Virginia campus, came together to facilitate a PSW in honour of the Darfur conflict. Both workshops were held at the University of Siena Italy, with major financial support drawn from the Italian Foreign Ministry. Attending the first workshop held in 2009 were 17 participants. These constituted representatives from the (Wahid, Shafi and Unity), the United Resistance Revolutionary Force Front, and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance. Since after the signing of the DPA in 2006, several splinter groups emerged in pursuit of identifiable political views and a solidification of ethnic alliances. The effect of such rebel fragmentation became manifest in the lack of cohesion among rebel parties at the negotiating table. This was evident in the Abuja process for example, when the initial divisions ensued within the hierarchies of the SLM/ A- Minawi and Wahid. For Wahid, the security of the main targets of the war-the Fur, was paramount. Minawi was basically concerned with issues of power sharing. (See section on Abuja mediation). A divided front could not satisfactorily coordinate internally to produce harmonised views, against its opponent-the GoS. Disunity reduced the chances towards progressive deliberations between the negotiating parties and left divided groups susceptible to the pranks of the divide and rule antics that played out in the Abuja talks. It was against this backdrop that the Sudan Task Group targeted Darfur’s splinter groups with the aim of:

*“Jointly analysing the nature of their grievances and the overall conflict, fostering coordination and cooperation among the movements... to seek unity of purpose in their negotiations with the GoS. In addition, the workshop sought to improve intergroup relationships among movements and renew channels of communication that had broken down during the fractionation process”*⁵⁷⁴

The workshop proceeded with an official plenary session facilitated by the organisers and unofficial smaller groups that were presided over by local leaders from Darfur, who possessed

⁵⁷³ Ronald J. Fisher, “ Acknowledging Basic Human Needs and adjusting the focus of the problem-solving workshop“. In Conflict Resolution and Human Needs: Linking theory and practice, ed. Kevin Avruch and Christopher Mitchell (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) 186-196

⁵⁷⁴ Fisher, Acknowledging Basic Human Needs, 191

good knowledge about the conflict and the various alliances of the rebel groups. The issues discussed in the smaller unofficial circles were subsequently presented before the more official sessions. The session produced a consensus accord stating proposals for the way forward in terms of coordination and cooperation between the splintered groups.

Problem Solving Workshops develop and proceed as a non-binding arrangement organised by facilitators who do not wield any power to propose or impose on the proceeding.⁵⁷⁵ Sessions are therefore allowed to take its natural course in anticipation of positive outcomes and changes to the participants' attitudes and perceptions. In similar vein, on the basis of improved communications participants become capable of discerning mutually acceptable outcomes and other ways of achieving their objectives without having to bear the high cost of continued aggression.⁵⁷⁶ In the final analysis, such workshops become supplementary pre-negotiation sessions, which serve as *transfers* to more official processes for peace.

Notably, transfers were made to the official mediation process in Doha. Some of the workshop's factions formed alliances that later transformed into the umbrella movement known as the Liberation and Justice Movement. The Liberation and Justice Movement became the only party in the Doha mediation to sign the Document for peace. (DDPD). The positive impact of the proceedings may have been discernible among the factions represented at the workshops. The outcome in the final analysis nonetheless missed the mark. The major rebel factions – Minawi, Wahid and JEM declined involvement with the signing of the document. The final outcome may have been expected, since there was no representation for the SLA and JEM factions in Siena.

The second PSW workshop was organized in 2011. In contrast to the first, conveners arranged for participants to include representatives from Darfur's civil society sector. Among the participants were members from non-governmental organisations and the academia. One of the reasons why the DPA was considered a failure was because it did not resonate with Darfur's civil society. Darfuri's conceived the DPA as an agreement that served the interests of the rebel movements, while neglecting theirs.⁵⁷⁷ Having identified the distrust and altered relation

⁵⁷⁵ Herbert C. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving, 168-169

¹⁴⁵ John Burton, *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations*. (London: Macmillan, 1969)

⁵⁷⁷ Brosche and Rothbart, *Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding*, 131

existing between the rebel movements and Darfur's civil society, it behoved the STG to facilitate direct discussions between "mid-level leaders from a combination of rebel movements" and "influential" representations from Darfur's civil society. The objective was directed towards altering un-progressive perceptions of the conflict as well as attitudes formed in the process of peace.

While the PSW on the Darfur conflict may not have recorded any direct impact on the conflict per se, such avenues have nonetheless presented the opportunity for scholars to critically analyse the conflict for which they have also garnered deeper insights. Scenarios as these have equally afforded the organisers fresh ideas to better contextualize workshops to adequately achieve the desired purpose. For example, Fisher noted that the first two workshops illuminated one of the major root causes underlying the Darfur conflict-land. It is such consciousness that has allowed for the STG to plan towards convening a third workshop, which will draw together a wide range of stakeholders for a forum to discuss several other issues underlying the conflict in Darfur.⁵⁷⁸

7.5 Applying the peacekeeping approach to peace in Darfur

Introduction

In the previous section, I investigated into the use of mediation as a non-coercive means of delivering peace to the people of Darfur. This section examines another tool of conflict management applied to the Darfur conflict shortly after its eruption in 2003. My major preoccupation here is to probe into the effectiveness of realizing the quest for peace and stability in Darfur, based on a coercive (militarised) means of intervention as managed by the AU.

Peacekeeping as I explored in the third chapter of this study, records a history of relevance as a mechanism for curbing aggression among the states of the international system. Since the prevalence of intra-state rivalry, military intervention has become equally relevant to managing the debilitating effects of violence in civil wars. As has been the case with a number of conflicts across sub-Saharan Africa, the Darfur conflict is one of those violent eruptions where the UN and its regional affiliates intervened with the sole aim of effectively dousing tensions and ensuring the safety of civilians at the risk of displacement and death, using military action.

⁵⁷⁸ Fisher, Acknowledging Basic Human Needs, 193

In 2004 the world saw the AU promptly respond to the onslaught of violence in the Darfur region. Having evolved from the defunct OAU, the AU seemed revitalised and ready to take on the challenge of militarily tackling issues of violent eruption under its jurisdiction. With recommendation from its newly instituted Peace Security Council, an observer mission to Sudan's western region was authorised in 2004. It was called the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). According to the constitution of the OAU, the body had no business interfering in the affairs of Sudan. The transformed body of the AU however made room for major adjustments to the OAU's stance on matters of conflict among its members. Although the AU maintained adherence to the issue of 'non-interference' in the affairs of member states, acts of genocide and cases of crimes against humanity now became exceptions to that rule.⁵⁷⁹

The ultimate decision to deploy boots on ground emerged from the signing on the April 8, 2004 of a Humanitarian Ceasefire between the GoS and Darfur's major rebel groups: SLM/A and JEM. The conflict had seen the prompt mediation effort of the Chadian president Idriss Deby. The onerous task became the AU's second attempt at peacekeeping on a terrain of conflict. Observers may have too soon heaved a sigh of relief at the presence of the AU in Darfur. No sooner had AMIS I arrived than it became apparent that the AU peacekeeping experience in Burundi a year earlier was insufficient to replicate the achievements of ECOWAS in the conflicts of both Liberia and Sierra Leone.

7.5.1 The tenets of peacekeeping and its impact on Darfur

Some of the principles underlying the theory of traditional peacekeeping have been outlined in the third chapter of this thesis. These principles determine the conduct of peacekeepers in UN and regional deployments across the globe. Some of such basic principles continue to include:

- (a) Taking cognisance of the consent of the host nation where the troops are to be deployed.
- (b) The maintenance of a neutral stance.
- (c) The use of force authorised only in instance of self-defence.

The analysis in that chapter, disclosed some of the weak points associated with operationalizing these principles in real time conflict scenarios. It drew the conclusion that traditional

⁵⁷⁹ Roba Sharamo, "The African Union's Peacekeeping Experience in Darfur, Sudan", *Conflict Trends*, Issue 3. (2006): 51, <http://www.mercury.ethz.ch> (accessed March 14, 2016)

peacekeeping viz a viz what we today refer to as Peace Support Operation (Peacekeeping with extended functions) continues to be a work in progress. The ethics of peacekeeping in most cases persistently obstructs the need to urgently and adequately attend to cases of complex humanitarian emergencies like have been evident in Darfur.

Diehl's definition of peacekeeping for example describes the activity in its traditional form, but also provides insight into what constituted the first major military response to Darfur's conflict shortly after the signing in 2004 of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA). He states: *"Peacekeeping is the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved"*

Indeed, the HCA though violated many times over, was intended to cease the hostilities between the GoS 's proxy forces in Darfur also known as the Janjaweed, and the two major rebel groups. The peacemakers contemplated that once peace was achieved it would pave way for the warring parties to deliberate on the root causes of the conflict at the negotiating table in Addis Ababa. In pursuant of the signed truce, AMIS I came on board. Shortly after the authorisation from the AU's Peace and Security Council, Darfur witnessed, in 2004, the deployment of 120 military observers to monitor the truce and 350 troops to protect the lives of the observers.⁵⁸⁰

That initial deployment was a far cry from commensurate with the military capacity required to reasonably terminate the incessant killings perpetrated by both the Janjaweed and the rebel forces. By this time observers had begun to count the dead. In late 2003 the USAID administrator Andrew Natsios allegedly put the number of dead civilians at 7,000. By March 2004, the UN estimated a death toll of 10,000 and in early August 2004, the UN reportedly gave an estimate of 30,000 to 50,00 dead.⁵⁸¹ By now AMIS I, had months earlier made its appearance on the terrain of conflict, albeit without a mandate to protect the growing number of casualties on ground. Instead AMIS I was to cooperate with the strict orders to exclusively monitor the truce.

In like manner, if the mandate solely authorised the protection of military observers, then this kind of peacekeepers could not be associated with the use of heavy weapons of any sort. Besides this glaring operational constraint, and the lack of numerical strength, AMIS I encountered

⁵⁸⁰Flint and De Wall, *The New History*, 174

⁵⁸¹ Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 24

several other problems, which hampered its effectiveness on the ground. It was logistically constrained and severely under resourced.

Be that as it may, this fledgling organisation mustered the courage to embark on an assignment it was hardly attuned to or capable of. The magnitude of that escalation definitely required the intervention of well-equipped and experienced hands. The AU on this initial outing became unable to defend its new commitment to hinder, among its members states, the degeneration of conflict to the level of genocide and human violations. As the war ravaged on, there was the exigency to protect civilian lives, to disarm and neutralise the Janjaweed and to ensure the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid. It was clearly beyond the observer mission to meet all these expectations.⁵⁸² To this end, the AU commenced arrangements to strengthen its capacity on ground and equip such with a stronger mandate.

In the face of Darfur's escalating tensions, the GoS would neither approve of the AU's plan to increase the number of boots on the ground nor would it consent to proposals for a stronger mandate to accommodate the right to protect civilian lives. At one point it dawned on the AU authorities that it may have been overstretching its bounds. It soft-pedalled on pushing for a stronger mandate and opted for an alternative, which suited the government in Khartoum, but would maintain the status quo for the victims of the war.⁵⁸³

According to Kagwanja and Mutahi:

“The PSC (Peace and Security Council) backed away from its campaign for a strong mandate. It instead settled for a smaller force with no civilian protection capacity. A triumphant regime in Khartoum welcomed a feebler AMIS II”⁵⁸⁴

These lines culled from the authors above underscores the crippling conflict between the theory and practice of peacekeeping. Khartoum no doubt reserved the right to exercise its sovereignty and uphold its territorial integrity. That fact regardless, the AU equally possessed the constitutional right to:

⁵⁸² AU Peace and Security Council 2004a in Peter Kagwanja and Patrick Mutahi, “Protection of civilians in African Peace Missions: The case of the African Union Mission in Sudan, Darfur”, Institute for Security Studies, ISS Paper 139. (2007) 4-7, <http://www.reliefweb.int> (accessed March 14, 2016).

⁵⁸³ AU Peace and Security Council 2004a in Peter Kagwanja and Patrick Mutahi, “Protection of civilians in African Peace Missions: The case of the African Union Mission in Sudan, Darfur”, Institute for Security Studies, ISS Paper 139. (2007) 4-7, <http://www.reliefweb.int> (accessed March 14, 2016).

⁵⁸⁴ *ibid.* 6

‘Intervene including through multilateral military force, in respect of grave circumstances, genocide and crimes against humanity... to restore peace and security in a member state (Constitutive Act, Articles 4 (h) and (j))’.⁵⁸⁵

If the AU had such strong constitutional backing, why did it fall short of the mark? Why did the AU allow itself to become inhibited in its duties to Darfur’s unarmed civilians? Was it a case of continued adherence to the principle of ‘non-interference’? Did the lack of a political will to protect civilian lives, under clear instances of genocide, continue to stand in the way of the AU as it did debar the OAU from intervening in Rwanda? Or Was the AU too weak to confront Khartoum with its atrocities and complicity in the conflict?

While it remains a known fact that the AU lacked financial and material capability, onlookers were baffled by the AU’s failure to deter the perpetrators easy manoeuvring, regardless of its physical presence on ground. Not even an expanded AU mission now tagged AMIS II proved consequential to the fate of Darfur’s vulnerable civilians.

Yet Bellamy and Williams contend that:

*“The post-Westphalian understanding of international security recognises the sovereignty of a state only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens” the most significant of these obligations being the “protection of civilians against arbitrary killing”.*⁵⁸⁶

In addition to Bellamy and William’s assertion, paragraphs 138 and 139 of the September 2005 ‘Summit Outcome Document’, contains the reaffirmation by world leaders to assume the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity... **should the state fail in such duties to its citizens.**⁵⁸⁷

If these assertions fit into the vision of the international community, why did it take so long to respond to the Darfur crisis? Why the hesitance until the outcry from the save Darfur movement to motivated into an eventual response towards accelerating a state of emergency.⁵⁸⁸ Ostensibly, the government of Sudan not only failed in its duties to protect the lives of its citizens, but also aggravated the conflict by engaging in acts of killing, which it perpetrated with the aid of its violent militias: the popular defence forces also known as the Janjaweed.

⁵⁸⁵ *ibid.* 5

⁵⁸⁶ Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 38

⁵⁸⁷ UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, “Responsibility to protect from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (16 September, 2005) 138-39, <http://www.un.org> (accessed March 16, 2016)

⁵⁸⁸ Johan Brosche and Daniel Rothbart, *Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding: The continuing crisis in Darfur* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013)110

Bellamy and Williams however rightly concluded that:

'The post-Westphalian conception remains controversial and is opposed by defenders of the Westphalian order, most of whom are found in the 'global south'.

Meaning that the global south (which includes the Sudan), - as opposed to an attempt by the international community or organisations like the AU to secure the lives of individuals at the risk of death or displacement, interprets any military intervention on its soil as an incursion on its territorial sovereignty. This probably explains why the government in Khartoum initially rejected the offer for an expanded peacekeeping mission on its terrain. After all, in the first instance, the UN's 1970 principle of international law states that:

'No states or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly for any reason whatever, in internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against its political, economic, and cultural elements are in violation of international law'.⁵⁸⁹

On the flip side however, Khartoum may have also contemplated the consequences of an effective mandate on its militia proxy forces. Nevertheless, such controversies tend to expose the dark sides of peacekeeping and undermine the viability of applying or relying solely on this apparatus of conflict management to violent internal conflicts, especially those of the global south where the integrity of the state remains pivotal. If any peacekeeping operation however, fails to significantly ameliorate the suffering of victims directly affected by war, what then, is the essence of military intervention in civil wars in the first place?

7.5.2 A more robust peacekeeping mission for Darfur

In October 2004, AMIS I was officially authorised to give way to AMIS II. It took the mission almost six months to get its act together and make its first appearance on Sudanese soil. Finally, in April 2005, AMIS II arrived with a larger contingent comprising 2,341 military personnel, 450 military observers, 815 civilian police, and 26 civilian staff.⁵⁹⁰ By October 2005, the number of both military personnel and civilian police had increased to 5,583 and 1,198 respectively⁵⁹¹.

⁵⁸⁹ Johan Brosche and Daniel Rothbart, "Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding"³²

⁵⁹⁰ Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011) 204

⁵⁹¹ Eric Reeves, "Ghosts of Rwanda: The Failure of the African Union in Darfur", Sudan: Research, Analysis and Advocacy, November 20, 2005, <http://www.sudanreeves.org> (accessed March 16, 2016)

The upgraded AMIS II on the basis of its staff component bore on the one hand, the similitude of a peace support operation. On the other hand, it remained too weak to enforce compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in N'djamena. Both belligerents had continued to violate the truce despite continued deliberations reaching its fifth round in the Abuja talks, to end the violence.⁵⁹² AMIS II by contrast, deployed a larger contingent, yet analyst suggested a more robust deployment to the numerical strength of 20,000 troops, insisting that the deployment at that time could hardly create an impact by any standard, on the rapidly escalating humanitarian conditions on the ground.⁵⁹³ AMIS II also elevated from the status of an observer mission to an operational mandate that empowered it to accommodate the security imperatives of Darfuris, albeit with patent ambiguity. The mandate stipulated the following:

'To monitor compliance with the N'djamena agreement, ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian relief and create the needed safety for the return of IDPs and refugees'

and in what may be perceived as an attempt to verbally water down the reality on ground-of the persistent volatility of the region and the plight of civilians, the mandate specified for peacekeepers *'to protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, **within resources and capability**'*⁵⁹⁴. These last lines seemed like mere formality, based on the fact that AMIS in all of its appearances (I, II) lacked the sufficient resources and capability to confront its challenges from the onset.

As earlier indicated, AMIS II arrived Darfur in April 2005. This was several months after the mission's authorisation at the end of 2004. Prior to AMIS II arrival in March 2005, the AU delegated a Joint Assessment Mission to Darfur (JAM) in conjunction with its international partners from the EU, UN and US. The team returned with a report, which underlined the exigency of prioritising efforts towards a more secure environment. The report in addition, drew attention to AMIS's ineffectiveness amid violence.⁵⁹⁵ Despite this confirming report of insecurity on ground in Darfur, AMIS II arrived with conditions attached to the task of providing security.

⁵⁹² Toga, *The African Union Mediation*, 231

⁵⁹³ "Protect Darfur", <http://www.protectdarfur.co.uk> and BR in Eric Reeves, *Ghosts of Rwanda*,

⁵⁹⁴ AU Peace and Security Council 2004b in Peter Kagwanja and Patrick Mutahi, *Protection of civilians in African Peace Missions*, 7

⁵⁹⁵ AU Peace and Security Council 2004b in Peter Kagwanja and Patrick Mutahi, *Protection of civilians in African Peace Missions*, 7 and Human Rights Watch, "Imperatives for immediate Change: The African Union Mission in Sudan", Human Rights Watch, January, 2006, <http://www.hrw.org> (accessed March 17, 2016)

In similar vein, as at September 2005 Jan Egeland, who was then the head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, emphatically warned about the carnage and drew attention to addressing with utmost urgency the growing insecurity in Darfur. There was a persistent exigency to sustain a lifesaving operation covering 2.5 million people.⁵⁹⁶ With this startling reality, the best security arrangement ended with the clause to accord protection only to civilians under imminent threat, **and within the vicinity of AMIS deployment.** At the same time, AMIS could **decline to offer protection to civilian lives if the resources and capacity was inadequate. (Added emphasis)**

By all implication AMIS was ill prepared. Simply operating on an ad-hoc basis to limit the effects of the violence and secure lives. It was obvious nonetheless, that the experience in Burundi had not sufficed. How did the international community anticipate for AMIS, despite declined proposals to elevate the capacity of the contingent to over 12,000 troops by the end of 2006,⁵⁹⁷ to manage with the array of challenges to its name. Analyst have catalogued a litany of AMIS weaknesses and constraints ranging from logistical shortcomings, a lack of standard operating procedures, to poor finances and data management and to the very least of necessities required under such conditions: maps, to navigate Darfur's huge landmass matching the size of France.⁵⁹⁸ This were the lapses a more robust mission like UNAMID was meant to cover.

Prior to effecting the transition to UNAMID on December 31st 2007, AMIS remained the only international response to the crisis in Darfur. Despite a poor outing, the AU's prompt intervention and bravery to venture into tough areas of responsibility, based on scant expertise and experience is laudable. AMIS continued to weather the storm without manpower commensurate with the degree of carnage occurring each day in territory as vast as Darfur. Coupled with a weak mandate, or a clear authorisation to secure the lives of vulnerable Dafuris,

⁵⁹⁶ Eric Reeves, "Ghosts of Rwanda: The Failure of the African Union in Darfur", Sudan: Research, Analysis and Advocacy, November 20, 2005, <http://www.sudanreeves.org> (accessed March 16, 2016)

⁵⁹⁷ Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Darfur Region of the Sudan, art 115 in William G. O'Neill and Viollete Cassis, "Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur", The Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on International Displacement, November 2005, <http://www.brookings.edu> (accessed March 16, 2016)

⁵⁹⁸ See Flint and De Waal, The New History, Electronic Book Loc 3023 and Eric Reeves, "Ghosts of Rwanda: The Failure of the African Union in Darfur", Sudan: Research, Analysis and Advocacy, November 20, 2005, <http://www.sudanreeves.org> (accessed March 16, 2016) and William G. O'Neill and Viollete Cassis, "Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur", The Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on International Displacement, November 2005, <http://www.brookings.edu> (accessed March 16, 2016)

hardly anything tangible in terms of security could be expected from the peacekeepers who themselves became the target of the insurgents. That being the case, Khartoum tactically dodged the responsibility to protect its citizens at risk of genocide, refused to disarm the Janjaweed and persistently obstructed all efforts from without to assume such obligations. As the war raged on, so the number of displaced civilians in dire need of humanitarian relief increased.

Since peacekeepers barely guaranteed maximum security within the region, even the job of aid workers providing relief became jeopardised. With increased pressure on the international community to intervene appropriately in the Darfur crisis and ameliorate the suffering of millions, and on Khartoum as well, to open its doors to the UN, UNAMID was born in accordance with the UN's resolution 1769 and chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorising the enforcement of peace in the Darfur region.⁵⁹⁹ Now in its ninth year this hybrid mission between the African Union and the United Nations, operates within a mandate that authorised the deployment of: -31, 042 personnel, 19,555 soldiers, 6,432 police officers and 5,105 civilians⁶⁰⁰. The mission is regarded as a robust Peace Support Operation. It was mandated to operate beyond the tasks of an observer mission. The mission targets the stability of a region now in its fourteenth year of continued violence.

7.6 A Transformatory approach to building peace in Darfur

Introduction

This section is basically about the practicability of the conflict transformation's approach to building sustainable peace in Darfur's protracted conflict. As established in chapter four, the school of conflict transformation suggests a rethink in the international community's approach to durable peace in protracted internal conflicts. It is my task in this section, to identify the extent to which Lederach's proposition to adopt a "comprehensive framework"⁶⁰¹ in protracted internal conflicts, can apply to UNAMID mandate to espouse grassroots intervention in Darfur.

⁵⁹⁹ Arvid Ekengard, *The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Experiences and Lessons Learned*, <http://www.foi.se> and Brosche and Rothbart, *Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding*, 117

⁶⁰⁰ Brosche and Rothbart, *Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding*, 118

⁶⁰¹ John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 201-222

The researcher is able to delve into this validation exercise on account of the field research conducted in April 2014 at the UNAMID headquarters in El-Fasher Darfur. According to Lederach, the adoption of a comprehensive framework behoves the external peace actor to recognize the imperative for reconciliation based on resources from within.

The reader also becomes acquainted with support component, which UNAMID relies on for grassroots intervention. I shall elucidate its role in the conflict and identify the “affected population” within the conflict as expounded in Lederach’s Pyramid. However, I do not examine the prospects for reconciliation, which may derive from collaborative efforts between track III actors under scrutiny and the external peace actor. That aspect will be treated in the last chapter of 9 of the research.

7.7.1 The role of UNAMID’s “Civil Affairs” component (CAS): An analysis based on Lederach’s Comprehensive Framework for Protracted Internal Conflicts

Within the conflict transformation line of thinking, Lederach avers that underlying a Transformatory peace-building framework for intervention in a protracted conflict scenario, are “central and guiding conceptual elements”⁶⁰². The following analysis examines three of such elements with a view to evaluating the prospects of a transformative approach to peace in Darfur. While chapter four already delved into the core message of the conflict transformation field, a brief reminder may suffice so as to understand the link between that chapter and the main objective of this section.

A transformative approach to building peace the author says, adopts “a more holistic view of conflict”⁶⁰³ when compared with other lenses for analysis within in the field of conflict studies. The transformation model possesses the capacity to be descriptive of conflict dynamics and prescriptive of an all-encompassing approach to sustainable peace. In practise, the external peacemaker is enjoined to intervene in a conflict from the viewpoint of conflict transformation. To that extent it envisions and absorbs multiple actors and strategies and channels such interdependency towards the realization of durable peace. More specifically, it incorporates

⁶⁰² Lederach, "Conflict Transformation," 202

⁶⁰³ *ibid*, 201

tracks I, II and III into the peace process and acknowledges as integral to it, the component of “reconciliation”⁶⁰⁴.

This external peace actor’s strategy for transforming conflict, should obtain from what Lederach refers to as the “comprehensive framework”. It sets out to achieve the gradual transformation of protracted conflicts. It also seeks innovative means of sustaining the transformation. The fourth chapter dealing with reflections from the conflict transformation school of thought, already illuminated on the propositions underlying Lederach’s comprehensive framework. For the sake of emphasis, I have highlighted some important points from the author’s statement, which tend to strike a chord. Please refer to chapter four for details on the propositions.

7.7.1a Proposition one makes the case for “establishing an Infrastructure for Peace”

With reference to the external actor in conflict scenarios, the author suggests that the intervention mechanism “legitimizes and integrates multiple levels of the affected population” and “devices mechanisms explicitly and intentionally” for the purpose of coordination. Furthermore, he specifies the exigency of creating “space”. From the author’s postulations, it is possible to draw a few inferences, which can be related to the case of Darfur.

The adoption of a comprehensive framework ultimately translates to a refusal to marginalise any level of the affected population. It recognises that all levels of the affected population (levels 1,2,3) are integral parts of the peace process. Furthermore, it acknowledges the expediency of tapping into the complementarity of the inputs that may be extracted from all three levels. The author equally advocates for the creation of “space” but does not mention specifically for whom space should be created.

A deep reflection on the history of external intervention in Sub-Saharan internal conflicts (especially of the kind analysed in this study) reveals to a large extent, that “high” and “middle”⁶⁰⁵ range actors have constituted the major players in peace processes. In fact, these actors often operate without requiring “space and legitimacy” from the external peace actor. They tend to

⁶⁰⁴ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 23-35.

⁶⁰⁵ See Lederach’s Pyramid of an affected population in the appendix

flow naturally into the peace process as legitimate actors. It may be correct to conclude therefore that the group that does require “space and legitimacy” exists at the bottom. Lederach refers to them as the “level 3 or the grassroots”. Diagram 1 (Please refer to the appendix), reveals according to the author the three levels of society that may constitute the affected population within a protracted conflict scenario and also the peace-making focus of each level. Based on analysis from preceding chapters, it is possible to link the players in the Abuja mediation or Doha peace talks and the Problem-Solving Workshops to what Lederach refers to as Level 1 and 2 of the affected population.

In his book titled: *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Lederach in his opinion, contends that level 2 or middle range actors are: “the key to a sustainable peace building framework in contemporary conflicts”⁶⁰⁶... he affirms this is so because “middle range actors” tend to be positioned in a way that they are connected to and often have the trust of both top-level and grassroots actors”⁶⁰⁷. The author at the same time strongly subscribes to the “restoration and rebuilding of relationships”. In the light of mending broken relationships, he posits further that a transformative framework “must address and engage the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central component of peace building”.⁶⁰⁸

I contend that in line with the significant feature of the transformative approach, which is to rebuild and restore relationships on the platform of reconciliation, the institution of the Native Administration, specifically the Ajaweed mediators and the Judiyya mechanism for reconciliation fit best into level 3 actors of Lederach’s affected population.

The institution of the Native Administration is an encapsulation of indigenous conflict management, resolution and above all reconciliation. While I do contend that the Native Administration and its corollaries have a significant role to play on that level, I do not hold that these indigenous actors by themselves are key to the transformation of the conflict. I also do not argue that they constitute the sole actors available on the grassroots level. However, the institution and the players in it, represent a culture and a way of life, a tradition despite colonialism, which the people can relate to. These indigenous actors have constituted dependable resources for conflict resolution and reconciliation prior to 2003. They predate the conflict to as far back as the sultanate.

⁶⁰⁶ Lederach, "Building Peace," 41-42

⁶⁰⁷ Lederach, "Building Peace," 41-42

⁶⁰⁸ *ibid*, 24

Essentially the NA as elaborately discussed elsewhere, is the only indigenous institution that from inception recognises and acknowledges the imperative to reconcile conflicting parties and restore broken relationships based on the parameters of Darfur's peace-making heritage. Reconciliation is in fact central to the Judiyya process, and the Ajaweed are the custodians of that mechanism.

My position is that this track III actors represent the missing link. That is, the connection between the international peace actor's obligation to reconcile conflicting parties and their lack of a context specific cultural mechanism with which to reconcile parties. Consequently, within a comprehensive framework, indigenous strategies would become adaptive tools of the international peace actor. They should however be operated by indigenous actors, in tandem with the external peace actor's efforts geared towards sustainable peace.

What is the main point?

The major business in all of this preliminary discussion is to examine how this proposition from Lederach finds applicability in the Darfur case. Has the international peace actor adopted a "comprehensive framework" or not? If yes, does it incorporate multiple levels of the affected population in Darfur? In order to find answers to this question, it is imperative to establish a number of facts. These facts enable a logical flow. They serve as premises, to validate or negate the proposition.

So, to answer the question whether or not the international peace actor integrates multiple levels of the affected population it is important to establish the following:

First, I start by stating that UNAMID (United Nations African Mission in Darfur) stands as the authorised international peace actor in Darfur. For this reason, I intend to focus my analysis on UNAMID. Second, UNAMID was deployed in conformity with the United Nation's tenets guiding "multidimensional" peacekeeping. Such guidelines specifically point out the complexities of contemporary conflicts as the rationale behind "multidimensional" peacekeeping. It states that:

"The transformation of the international environment has given rise to a new generation of "multi-dimensional" United Nations peacekeeping operations. The operations are typically deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of

*military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement*⁶⁰⁹.

As I will elucidate subsequently UNAMID is a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities. It was also mandated to follow up on the implementation of the DPA (Darfur Peace Agreement). In the light of this it is safe to surmise that UNAMID, in compliance with the core functions of “multidimensional” peacekeeping listed below, recognises the essence of an all-embracing perspective of the conflict as well as conceives of a broad intervention strategy towards Darfur’s protracted conflict. Accordingly, the core functions of multidimensional peacekeeping are:

- To create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights,
- To facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- To provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and international actors pursue activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner. ⁶¹⁰

Having established that UNAMID was deployed with a multi-dimensional directive, I should indicate that this analysis would defy comprehension without introducing the components attached to the peace support mission deployed to Darfur.

While the components exhibit additional evidence of UNAMID’s multidimensional nature, it is equally expedient that I proceed on this path because I introduce thereby, the most important component for this analysis: The Civil Affairs Section. Since this is an analysis that examines UNAMID’s activities on the grassroot level. It is imperative to introduce the Civil Affairs component because of its unique role on level three of any conflict society where they are deployed. I will expatiate on this subsequently.

To this point, I have evidenced in part that UNAMID operates from a comprehensive framework. This I did by illuminating on the mission’s multidimensional attribute, which consists of a mixture of military, police and civilians. However, it is not yet clear whether or not this is truly comprehensive going by Lederach proposition. Why? This is so because it is

⁶⁰⁹ United Nations, 22

⁶¹⁰ United Nations, 23

yet to be determined, whether UNAMID incorporates multiple levels of Darfur's affected population. In proceeding I shall be discussing towards validating or refuting that proposition. However, it is important to advance toward an examination of the components attached to UNAMID. Why is this so?

First, when I speak of a multidimensional peacekeeping, it is possible without much investigation to construct in one's mind, an imagery of what the military and the police might be involved with on a terrain of active violence. Nevertheless, it becomes somewhat of a challenge, without first-hand experience or research to conceive of civilian involvement on a terrain defined by active violence and aggression. This, in any case, constitutes the trend going by the current UN configuration as stipulated within the parameters of peace building and as prompted by the nature of contemporary conflicts. Civilians are deployed to contribute their quota in fulfilment of an authorised mandate. It is also civilians who form the bulk of the personnel assigned to the various components attached to a peacekeeping mission.

Second in the course of introducing the components, I shall be discussing the component 2 in detail. It is from examining the role of component 2 in Darfur, that I can determine whether or not UNAMID incorporates multiple levels of Darfur's affected population.

7.7.1b Introducing UNAMID's supporting components

When UN resolution 1769⁶¹¹ authorised for the hybrid operation to replace AMIS in Darfur it attached certain components to bolster the mission. These components⁶¹² are as follows:

1. Support for peace process and good offices
2. Civil Affairs
3. Security- military
4. Security- police
5. Security- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
6. Protection and promotion of human rights
7. Rule of law

⁶¹¹ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1769," United Nations, last modified July 31, 2007, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769\(2007\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769(2007)).

⁶¹² United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 5 June 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council," UNAMID/ United Nations, last modified June 5, 2007, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/307/rev.1.

8. Humanitarian liaison
9. Child protection
10. Gender
11. HIV/AIDS support
12. Mine action
13. Public information
14. Safety and security
15. Conduct
16. Mission support.

Each of the components operates under specific directives as authorised by the mandate. In 2014 when I embarked on my research trip to Darfur, I visited the offices of components 1 and 8. The offices of both components are located at the UNAMID headquarters in El-Fasher. Nonetheless, this is an investigation that focuses purely on the activities of component 2. The interviews with personnel attached to components 1 and 8, were conducted for the purpose of triangulation. For that reason, therefore, besides the focus (component 2) I shall also give cursory information about components 1 and 8. The reader is enjoined to refer to resolution 1769 for information on all other components.⁶¹³

Component 1: Support for the peace process and good offices

I was introduced to this component in Darfur as the political affairs section. The component as stipulated by the resolution, was created to assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any other agreement. It will carry out this obligation by collaborating with all stakeholders involved in the Darfur peace process. It will also monitor relevant developments of the peace process and perform early warning and conflict analysis functions. The component will provide political guidance to all other components and will be responsible for ensuring that reconciliation initiatives are coordinated with security, recovery and development efforts in Darfur.⁶¹⁴ These are but mere stipulations as culled from the mandate. When I conducted interviews with representatives of this section, I gathered concrete information and insight into how UNAMID operates on the political level. I received illumination on the scope of its activities but also their opinion on the main subject of my inquiry.

⁶¹³ United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 5 June 2007", components

⁶¹⁴ United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 5 June 2007", components

Component 8: Protection and promotion of human rights

The human rights component will also assist in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement but only in aspects that are connected to issues of human rights. It will work according to the guidelines of the international humanitarian law and other relevant international standards. Its activities will include monitoring, investigation, reporting, advocacy, protection, advisory and capacity and institution building. It will also provide support for the establishment of a national human rights commission in accordance with the Paris Principles.⁶¹⁵ When I visited this section, I gained insight into their modus operandi and most importantly, gleaned information on how the lenses through which they view peace-building efforts tends to be incompatible with some of the customs and traditions of the people of Darfur.

Component 2: Civil Affairs

As mandated by resolution 1769:

“The civil affairs component will assist in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements through support to reconciliation processes, including at the grassroots level, the conduct of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation and the functioning of the institutions established under the Darfur Peace Agreement, including the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, the Land Commission and the Civil Service Commission. The component will also assist in the capacity building of national institutions and civil society organisations in Darfur. The component’s activities will include the holding of workshops on various governance and peace building aspects, with the aim of promoting a culture of peace and establishing contacts with key stake holders to support dialogue and reconciliation among conflicting parties. Furthermore:

Given the complex conflict dynamics and the necessity for grassroots engagement in the peace process, civil affairs officers will be deployed throughout Darfur...⁶¹⁶

These are the precise words with which resolution 1769 sets out the specific functions of CAS. To this extent, this directive is true on paper. It allows the reader some knowledge into what is expected of UNAMID on the grassroots level in Darfur. It also confirms the authorisation of a

⁶¹⁵ ibid

⁶¹⁶ ibid, Components/ Civil Affairs

grassroot activity and by extension a call to collaborate with actors in the area of reconciliation. Besides documented evidence, one must delve into further research in order to ascertain the implementation of these directives in Darfur. The main challenge therefore is to eventually deduce how pragmatic these injunctions are in Darfur's conflict.

Although the practicability of these injunctions might remain ambiguous to the reader, the following inferences may be made from closely examining resolution 1769 demands on CAS.

1. That CAS operates mainly on the grassroot level of Darfur
2. That the authorizers of UNAMID going by Lederach's propositions should: explicitly and intentionally devise mechanisms for integrating and coordinating high, middle and grassroot level strategies. This is evidenced by incorporating into the peace operation the components mentioned above, (the 16 of them) as ways of supporting the peace process.
3. It indicates furthermore that grassroot actors should officially constitute a part of the peace process. This can be actualized through CAS, when it ultimately provides the "space" and "legitimacy" for cooperation with level 3 actors
4. That UNAMID is designed to recognize the imperativeness for relational change in Darfur. More specifically it realizes that such change can be achieved on the platform of reconciliation. It also understands that dialogue is integral to the peace process.
5. That UNAMID'S peace effort engages the civil society. However, it refrains from making any elaborations when referring to civil society in Darfur. As it is common knowledge, civil society does cover a wide spectrum of actors on the grassroot level. In addition, some commentators prefer to distinguish between "civil society" and "traditional civil society". In which case, they refer to traditional leaders and mediators as members of the traditional civil society. It is assumed that civil society in this context refers also to indigenous peace-making actors like the Ajaweed.

In the first part of chapter eight, this study identified the institution, actors and mechanisms employed in peace and reconciliation in Darfur. In similar vein, it is now established that going by resolution 1769, it is imperative for CAS to engage in the reconciliation of conflicting parties. The question however is: Does UNAMID collaborate with specific actors on the grassroot or within civil society in order to achieve the goal of reconciliation?

In order to provide a valid answer to that question, I must examine the second proposition underlying Lederach's comprehensive framework. However, in further pursuit of my initial question, (Does UNAMID incorporate all levels of Darfur's affected population) it is significant at this juncture to provide a working definition of CAS according to UNAMID as well as furnish the reader with some insight into the core roles of CAS on ground Darfur. After accomplishing this task, it should be clear to a reasonable extent, with whom CAS partners in achieving the task of peace and reconciliation.

7.7.1c Defining CAS and examining its role in Darfur.

*“The Civil Affairs Section is a civilian component in UNAMID that works at the social, administrative and sub-national political levels to facilitate the implementation of the UNAMID mandate and to support the population and government in creating and strengthening conditions and structures conducive to sustainable peace in Darfur.”*⁶¹⁷

A second definition states that:

*“Civil Affairs is the most important interface between the UN mission and the community, not just in terms of the local/regional authorities but also civil society in its broadest sense”.*⁶¹⁸

While both definitions provide concise information on CAS, one very vital feature of CAS becomes evident: CAS acts as the intermediary between the UN missions and actors on Lederach affected population level 2 and 3.

Furthermore, CAS in Darfur performs three major roles in accordance with the directive to achieve the main objectives for which UNAMID was deployed.

- 1. “Cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation of the peace process at the local level:**

Civil Affairs is the channel for communicating the priorities and perceptions of different sectors of the population to the mission, concerning both UNAMID and the Darfur peace process.”

- 2. “Confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation and the resolution of conflicts:**

⁶¹⁷ United Nations, "Civil Affairs," UNAMID, last modified July 2012, <http://unamid.unmissions.org/civil-affairs>. Accessed August 20, 2016

⁶¹⁸ United Nations, *Civil Affairs Handbook* (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2012),130 , http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/civilhandbook/Civil_Affairs_Handbook.pdf. Accessed September 15, 2016

For a conducive and sustainable peace, Civil Affairs convenes and facilitates dialogue between interest groups and stakeholders; undertakes direct outreach to the population (working with other mission actors to design and deliver appropriate and consistent message); supports efforts of government, Native administration and civil society groups seeking peace and reconciliation; identify, implement and monitor Quick Impact Projects (QIPs); and promote or protect of the interests of excluded, threatened, marginalized or minority groups.”

3. **“Support to the restoration, strengthening and extension of state authority and governance institutions:**

Civil Affairs contributes to the establishment and strengthening of legitimate and representative governance, as well as providing operational support to the activities of National, state and governance institutions through capacity building activities and assistance in the structuring of state and transitional governance institutions as well as supporting dialogue between different sectors of the population (including civil society actors) and the government.”

“In each of the roles identified, the work of Civil Affairs intersects with, supports and draws upon the work of other UNAMID components and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), as well as providing information to facilitate community level responses.”⁶¹⁹

The number two role of CAS in Darfur revolves majorly around the themes of conflict management, resolution and reconciliation. Three actors are mentioned as collaborators with CAS in her efforts towards the realization of conflict resolution and reconciliation. Reference is made to the government, the Native Administration and civil society groups. Ostensibly, the Native Administration exists as an entity of its own and has not been lumped under the “civil society groups” tag name. This study already examined peace-making on the platform of “government sponsored peace conferences”. It is therefore not out of place to assume that such “government sponsored peace conference” constitute part of the peace initiatives associated with the government, which as stated in role No. 2, also gains the support from CAS.

Civil societies in Darfur also play a significant role in peace-making activities. Based on that CAS is equally mandated to provide Civil Society Groups with reinforcement. The Ajaweed

⁶¹⁹ United Nations, "Civil Affairs," (roles)

for Peace and Reconciliation is one good example among the over 20 civil society groups⁶²⁰ presently in partnership with CAS to secure stable peace for the all Darfuris. Lastly, going by CAS role number 2, it is possible to assume that CAS supports the kind of peace-making that exists within the framework of the institution of the Native Administration. Of particular interest to this thesis is the cooperation between CAS and the indigenous mediators who are an integral part of the NA.

To this extent, I have been able to identify some relevant actors involved with peace-making on the grassroots, with whom CAS tends to merge efforts. However, it is not yet clear who constitutes level 3 of Darfur's affected population and most importantly whether they have a say in UNAMID's peace process.

Validating the propositions

I mentioned elsewhere, that my visit to UNAMID headquarters in El Fasher afforded me a rare insight into CAS sector north. It is on the basis of that research visit that I can categorically make an affirmative statement or refute UNAMID's presence on the grassroot level of Darfur's conflict. On that basis, I also can validate or repudiate the incorporation, as projected by Lederach, of levels 1, 2 and 3 of Darfur's affected population into the peace process. However, both of my assertions can only be validated if I go beyond this stage to demonstrate their validity. That implies that I must be able to substantiate the premise that leads me to making such conclusions.

In the preceding sections of this chapter, I assessed some of the current third-party external strategies that have been applied towards peace in Darfur. In that analysis, I provided insight into the participation and input of levels 1 and 2 of the affected population in the peace process. In the course of my field trip it was possible to ascertain besides CAS, the engagement of other components (as already mentioned) with the affected population.

The political affairs component for example engages more of the affected population on level 1 and guided by the dictates of its mandate, operates within the framework of a statist kind of diplomacy. My visit places me at an advantaged position to develop on scholarship documenting the participation of tracks I and II in the peace process.

⁶²⁰ United Nations, *CSOs, Intellectual reps*, (UNAMID Headquarters El-Fasher: CAS Sector North, n.d)

Lederach argued that:

“Reconciliation should be seen as a process of encounter and as a social space... Reconciliation can therefore be comprehended as both a “focus and a locus”. He states, “as a perspective it is built on and oriented towards the relational aspect of a conflict. As a social phenomenon, reconciliation represents a space, a place and a location of encounter where parties to a conflict meet”⁶²¹.

Why is it important to bring in this argument at this juncture? It is intended to usher in illumination on the essence of the CAS cells. I establish that it is the cells that facilitate this “location of encounter” which Lederach expounds. It is one specific cell, as I will display, that takes on the responsibility to ensure that reconciliation becomes “a process of encounter” and eventually a “social space”. In essence, the cells can be conceived of as the meeting point between level 3 of the affected population and CAS, and by the same token, the connection to the parent body, which is UNAMID.

Introducing CAS and its underlying cells

The cells are the various departments operating under CAS. All of the cells are assigned specific functions that are tailored towards actualising the three core roles of CAS. On my arrival at UNAMID headquarters, I was introduced to the team leader of CAS Sector North. He obliged me the audience of all the staff working under him. In that meeting, I became acquainted with CAS sector north and its cells.

These cells are as follows:

- Crisis management / Conflict resolution
- Capacity building
- Information management
- Quick impact projects.⁶²²

After the introductory session, it became apparent that I needed to narrow down my research activity to just one cell. This was the conflict resolution cell.

The conflict resolution cell according to the discussion I eventually held with staff under it:

- Monitors the impact of the security situation on the civilians

⁶²¹ Lederach, “Building Peace “, 30

⁶²² Civil Affairs Sector North, Group Interview, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 17, 2014.

- Monitors conflict at the local level between two tribes
- Facilitates meetings for the conflict parties to come together
- Facilitates and supports intra community dialogue
- Organises workshops for the strengthening of the role of the Native Administration.⁶²³

On account of these findings, and based on the discussions I shall further advance, it is correct to confirm that CAS and its cells engage in grassroots activity geared towards peace and reconciliation. However, it is not yet evident who constitutes the level three of Darfur's affected population as propounded by Lederach. Two facts are important to note here. First, it is by identifying these stakeholders that this study can emphatically aver whether or not UNAMID has integrated the 3rd level and indeed considered them to be legitimate actors in the peace process. Second, in order to probe further into the validity and practicability of proposition 1 in Darfur, it is pertinent to proceed further with examination into the second component. Lederach considers this second proposition to be vital to a comprehensive and transformative approach to sustainable peace in protracted conflicts.

This second proposition investigates into whether the creation of CAS and its cells and the incorporation of the third level of the affected population, if proven to be so, should be perceived merely as a ploy to observe formality or not. It checks to determine whether the incorporation of level 3 actors can be interpreted as CAS actively involved with charting the course of reconciliation and relationship building? Should UNAMID'S involvement on the grassroots be perceived as a strategy to commence with a resuscitation of a peace culture in Darfur? Does this engagement by any means provide Darfuris with the “**suitable space**”⁶²⁴ but also the platform to experience a relearning of social peace and harmony? Are these efforts been channelled towards the restoration (if needed) of those human and cultural resources that should engender sustainability long after UNAMID is gone? The answers may be found in this proposition 2. Nonetheless besides these conjecturing, this next sub title should lead to identifying the stakeholders on level 3 of the affected population in Darfur.

⁶²³ Civil Affairs Sector North, Group Interview, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 17, 2014

⁶²⁴ Darfuris have witnessed the manipulation of their that space which invariably denied them the privilege of encountering their peace-making heritage in the true colour that lead to reconciliation

7.7.1d Proposition two: Building a Peace Constituency

It is important to mention here that the entire notion behind building a peace constituency is for the peace actor to aim towards sustainability that builds on the resources from within the context. How does this translate to the Darfur case?

To the assertions (a) and (b) (See chapter four for details) the author adds that there are three salient principles guiding the efforts towards building a peace constituency.

- The principle of indigenous empowerment
- The principle of cultural relevance
- Long-term commitment.⁶²⁵

Before expatiating on these three principles, it is essential to draw attention to the key intervention concerns, as projected by Lederach. According to the author they constitute considerations that are vital to the external peacemaker's commitment towards adopting a transformative approach to peace. The initial concern is to ascertain:

1. Why it is important for an international actor to be concerned about who participates in peace-making

I understand the author to be suggesting a shift away from the partisanship that tends to inform the choice of parties (among the affected population) to participate in a peace-making process. The external peace actor is expected to adopt an open and flexible strategy that allows for the accommodation of all kinds of initiatives available within the conflict setting. In order to actualise this, it is assumed that the external peace actor neither attaches ample significance to strategies external to the conflict setting nor exhibits preference for any actor or initiative within the conflict setting.

This initial concern may be paralleled to the mediatory sessions in Abuja, which culminated with the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. When the AU dragged the movements to the negotiating table, they acted on the assumption that these representatives constituted the key to resolving the situation on ground. Indeed, the predilection to pressure Minawi over Wahid, into signing the peace agreement, turned out to be misguided. Even though Miniawi wielded greater military strength in Darfur, the majority of the internally displaced were members of the Wahid divide. The agreement eventually attracted the

⁶²⁵ *ibid* 212

signature of one party-SLA Minawi. It failed to ameliorate the suffering of the IDPs at the same time, aggravated the security situation in Darfur all the more.

Indeed, as may be inferred from Adam Azzain, the choice of who participated in Darfur's mediation process, lay in the external peacemaker's presumed deeper understanding about the conflict. Had the team in Abuja been guided by in-depth knowledge of the conflict and its dynamics. If the mediators deeply reflected on the fact that the movements merely triggered the conflict but were not the underlying root cause, maybe the strategy to intervene would have differed. It may have included other actors on other levels of the affected population

This is what Adam Azzain had to say in his paper titled "Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement: A call for an Alternative Approach to Crisis Management.

He states:

By overlooking the vast body of indigenous knowledge and conflict resolution practices, and by focusing on the civil war dimension of the conflict by placing emphasis on the wealth and power sharing, the DPA... **became out of touch with the hearts of the real conflict parties in conflict- the landless and the landowning groups...**⁶²⁶. Notice the highlighted expression: became out of touch with the hearts of the real conflict parties in conflict. The team of mediators had analysed the conflict wrongly. In fact, it is such inaccurate analysis that has informed according to Hottinger's the application of the same templates for the mediation processes that culminated with the CPA and the DPA. Unfortunately yielding an undesirable result for Darfur.

Therefore, as far as the DPA was concerned the real parties in conflict (the landless and the land-owning groups) were not part of the negotiating process in Abuja. Neither the parties nor their leaders, by which I mean the tribal leaders, were invited to the negotiating table. Civil society groups were not represented. The focus was on the movements. In fact, it was the Doha document that eventually recognized the need to take cognizance of indigenous peace-making actors as well as attendant peace-making mechanism.⁶²⁷ Ostensibly, conflict raged on even in the immediate aftermath of the signing. It denotes further that too much attention was placed on the political. That is on level 1. Leaving out other levels and other initiatives for peace that might have contributed to a gradual transformation.

⁶²⁶ Adam A. Mohammed, "Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement," Department of Peace and Conflict Research. UPPSALA Universitet, last modified 2009, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18583_CAMP6-Adam_Muhamed.pdf. 11

⁶²⁷ See, Doha Document for Peace in Darfur Chapter V- Justice and Reconciliation, Article 55: 279 and Article 58: 308

Since the arrival of UNAMID, a multidimensional mandate tends to stipulate the mission's operation in line with the major focus of actualizing sustainable peace for the people of Darfur. UNAMID, going by its operational framework is therefore obligated through CAS:

To "make an exhaustive survey of civil society beyond the most vocal or empowered and look to provide a voice for the voiceless"⁶²⁸.

This by implication suggests that the current approach rectified the deficiency in prior intervention models. Beyond levels 1, commendable significance has been attached to pooling stakeholders on the grassroots, in order to address the peace and reconciliation demands of the affected population on level 3.

2. Why should any intervention strategy take into cognizance how various actors are understood and coordinated? The important point to note here is that there usually are several peace actors within the conflict setting. They should be coordinated as legitimate partakers of the peace process because each peace actor possesses the capacity to contribute in a distinctive manner towards the actualization of an initiated peace process.

In that case, the international peace actor is urged to refrain from conceiving of any actor within the conflict setting as less significant to the peace process. Again, with reference to the Abuja mediation, external mediators had estimated levels 2 and 3 of Darfur's affected population as irrelevant to the peace process, while focusing all attention on level 1 actors. Adam Azzain contends that in the Darfur case, in order to understand and coordinate the various actors, the first step would have been to understand the conflict as a triadic one.

He contends:

*"Three distinct conflicts are to be separated, (The intergroup conflict at the grassroots level, power struggles between communal elites, region centre conflict over marginalization charges) instead of lumping them together under one label and resorting to the so-called inclusive negotiations and dialogues to deal with them."*⁶²⁹

Were this the case, the AU and its partners could have identified the various actors in the conflict and attendant strategies for making peace within the setting. Within the on-going framework towards peace in Darfur, UNAMID as the major external actor currently seeks to

⁶²⁸ United Nations, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 132.

⁶²⁹ Mohammed, *Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement*, 17-18

address that flaw by connecting to stakeholders in each of these conflict categorizations using as a platform the components attached to the mission.

CAS and its cells for example are charged with coordinating all peace actors on the level of the intergroup conflicts that from time to time play out on the grassroots. In similar vein, the political affairs for example supports initiatives geared at mitigating the “region centre conflict over marginalization charges”.

3. Why is it important for the external actor to identify what unique resources each actor brings and when they are incorporated into the peace process?

In the first place, the above question implies that every peace-making resource is unique in its right. Furthermore, no single peace-making actor or initiative should be viewed as the panacea to ending conflict. All actors should be treated as legitimate, while taking into cognizance the notion of interdependency. Equally significant is the timing. It is imperative for the peace actor to be able to ascertain when the time is ripe for the incorporation of each actor. This is simply suggesting that the peace actor is expected to discern when to administer military strategies, utilize external mediators and recognize the point where the conflict warrants that contextual resources also be incorporated into the peace process.

In the case of Darfur, what human or material resources has the peace actor identified as relevant to the peace process? The answer may be derived in the developing discussion below. UNAMID’S CAS *is configured to cooperate with “interlocutors ranging from local government officials, elders and traditional leaders to a wide spectrum of non –institutional actors, including civil society organizations, media, the business sector, IDPs and members of the general population”*⁶³⁰ More precisely UNAMID has identified the institution of the NA and its integral parts. In addition to the above-mentioned, CAS SN as at 2014, officially identified and established links with 28 Civil Society Organizations.⁶³¹

Among the 28 is the organization already mentioned elsewhere, called “Ajaweed for Peace and Reconciliation”. This organization is not directly involved with the kind of mediation conducted by traditional mediators. The Ajaweed organization nonetheless prepares the platform and the suitable conditions and environment for traditional mediators to carry out their

⁶³⁰ United Nations, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 131

⁶³¹ Civil Affairs Sector North, *CSOs, Intellectual reps*, (UN Headquarters El-Fasher: CAS SN, n.d)

functions. The traditional Ajaweed are also not members of the organization. The job of the traditional Ajaweed and members of the organization can be viewed as complementary⁶³² In fact my visit afforded me the opportunity of a meeting with the head of civil societies in Darfur.

Having expatiated on these major concerns, I probe further into the three elements underlying the proposition, which expects the peace actor to work towards building a peace constituency within the conflict settling

The principle of indigenous empowerment: (See chapter four for details)

How does this translate to the Darfur case? Going by this principle, the conflict transformation approach advocates for the external peace actor, *in this case UNAMID to envision, include, respect and promote the human and cultural resources from within the setting*,⁶³³ in this case: Darfur. This implies that Darfur and Darfuris must no longer be viewed as the problem, and the external peacemaker as the solution. Darfuris must now become part and parcel of the solution to their problems. Not just as belligerents seeking the intervention of a third party, but as prospective peacemakers themselves. UNAMID in essence bolstered by supportive components like CAS, is expected to create the enabling environment for Darfuris to own their peace process, considering that the notion of ownership shores up the prospects for sustainability.

How then can Darfuris become part of the process that envisages peace in the long run? In the first place, and as already stated CAS operates within the legal framework that has authorised access to the population directly affected by the conflict on various levels but especially on the grassroots. It is therefore the platform on which UNAMID “*promotes the human and cultural resources*” that may be available within the Darfur region. Moreover, in the light of guiding tenets it is incumbent on CAS and its cells to take the initial step of “*considering the skills and expertise that local actors possess*”⁶³⁴. CAS must “*avoid undermining local capacity by “doing or replacing” rather than enabling*. It must “*identify and build on existing processes and structures that are both formal and informal*. In like manner CAS must “*value and make use of*

⁶³² Ahmed A. Yousif, E-Mail Interview, Darfur July 25, 2016.

⁶³³ Lederach, “Protracted Internal Conflicts”, 213

⁶³⁴ United Nations, Civil Affairs Handbook, 177

local or “insider” knowledge and expertise, including that of National Professional Officers and local counterparts”⁶³⁵.

These are but general guiding principles for CAS deployed in conjunction with peace missions all over the world. Does the Civil Affairs component of UNAMID, implement them on Darfur’s conflict terrain? In developing sections I shall delve into the operational aspect of this proposition so as to check for its validity.

The principle of cultural relevance suggests:

“That all cultures and groups develop ways and approaches for handling conflict...these cultural modalities and resources for handling conflict in a given setting are not only important to identify but should be seen as foundational for building a comprehensive transformative framework” ...it understands outside models, even widely accepted practices of international diplomacy with its strong Western influences, as having intrinsic cultural biases and adaptations, and does not blindly accept them as applicable in a given setting”⁶³⁶

In the case of Darfur, it is important going by this 2nd principle for UNAMID to transcend strategies that are external to Darfur in order to unearth the potentials for peace that may be embedded in mechanisms and actors that stem from within that conflict setting. “Such mechanisms and practices must be viewed as “foundational for building a comprehensive framework” Darfur is still at the point of transitioning from a traditional to semi-traditional society.⁶³⁷ Therefore peace-making continues largely to be informed by the cultural practices of the people of Darfur. On that note and based on Lederach it may be correct to surmise that UNAMID explores the options of peace-making that are in line with the institution of the Native Administration and the practice of mediation as delivered by the Ajaweed. Such culturally defined peace-making mechanisms according to Lederach, are *“naturally a part of the setting and must be rediscovered and put to creative use within the setting and must be viewed as foundational for building a comprehensive framework”⁶³⁸* In this regard, UNAMID is designed to adopt a culturally sensitive approach to peace in Darfur. This requires, going by its underlying principles, for UNAMID via CAS to

⁶³⁵ ibid 67

⁶³⁶ Lederach, Conflict Transformation, 212

⁶³⁷ Mohammed, Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement, 8

⁶³⁸ Lederach, Conflict Transformation, 213

“Understand and consider prevailing beliefs, norms, traditions, attitudes and practices when planning and implementing activities and interacting with communities”. However, UNAMID does not conform to this principle when “local customs or practices run contrary to other principles, such as equality, inclusiveness or human rights”⁶³⁹

7.7.1e Proposition three: long-term and short-term perspectives

The assumptions underlying this proposition tend to overlap with the principle of “long term commitment underlying the proposition two. The significance is interpreted as the peace actor capacity to accord equal relevance to perspectives that inform both short-term and long-term intervention in protracted conflicts. This proposition assumes that the international peace actor “recognizes that peaceful transformation takes time and continues well beyond the crises moments of interest when the media is paying attention...”⁶⁴⁰

Validating, creating space and building from both human and cultural resources within the setting also requires time. Rebuilding a society to the level where the peace actor can reliably disengage requires intervention on a longer duration basis. It implies that the authorizers of the UNAMID mission are expected to reckon with the fact that realizing a ceasefire agreement based on short term perspectives represent a significant step towards peace, nonetheless “broader transformation, reconciliation and social reconstruction”⁶⁴¹ of Darfur’s conflict may require for the mission to invest time beyond the envisaged period.

A long-term engagement should allow for the establishment of a peace constituency that can sustain the achieved peace past when UNAMID has exited from the conflict terrain. This kind of intervention is defined by the realization that the underlying structural concerns that have motivated Darfur’s conflict have brewed over a long period. The eruption in 2003 only became the overt expression of a conflict in the making. Darfur’s conflict has eaten deep into the society’s fabric. Accordingly, it is correct to assume that the root causes of Darfur’s conflict cannot be uprooted in the short term. While it is important for UNAMID via CAS to devote time to re-empowering indigenous actors as a means to an end, such notion must not be misconceived as an effort to romanticize whatever human and cultural resources may be

⁶³⁹ United Nations, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 64

⁶⁴⁰ Lederach “Protracted Internal Conflicts”, 214

⁶⁴¹ Lederach, "Conflict Transformation," 203

available in Darfur. Darfur does possess other formal and informal mechanisms, which have no cultural undertone.

A culturally apt approach to peace nonetheless captures the essence of building a peace culture that aims at sustainability. One that is hinged on resources and extant practices within the setting. In similar vein the idea of short-term intervention cannot be dismissed. Such may form part of the phases a conflict undergoes in order to earn a longer-term intervention in the final analysis. The major idea behind this proposition is for the international community to take into consideration that intervention in conflicts like Darfur, cannot terminate at the level of AMIS. The international community has therefore taken the right step to deploy the UNAMID mission in consonance with a vision to rebuild Darfur.

The big question however remains: How much longer must UNAMID remain in Darfur for its efforts to be considered commensurate with that kind of peace that is perceived to sustainable? That answer lies with the members of the Security Council, but also with the level of progress made in Darfur by the current peace actor UNAMID. It is imperative for Darfur's security situation to mutate to the level where the citizens are able to embrace lasting peace and stability. That the conflict also ceases to constitute any threat to international peace and security. A number of conflicts in the sub-Saharan region have prolonged for many years. To predict an imminent end is beyond the peace actors themselves. How then must the international community and donors to the peace in Darfur respond to the prolonged path towards peace, should the situation remain the same for many more decades? The answer might lie in Lederach postulation: "decade thinking" This implies that UNAMID and its authorizers:

*"Must think in longer blocks, in decades, in reference to peace building processes required to move toward the desired change in relationships" ... cognizant "conflicts (such as the Darfur one) have been expressed through violent cycles of interaction that dates across decades or even generations."*⁶⁴²

In any case it is worth mentioning that UNAMID made its first appearance on Darfuri soil in January 2008 following the authorization of its mandate by resolution 1769 in July 2007. In like manner, the Security Council on June 29, 2016, adopted resolution 2296 in favour of

⁶⁴² John Paul Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 841-845.

renewing UNAMID'S mandate once again.⁶⁴³ In 2017 UNAMID would be close to clocking a decade in Darfur.

7.8 Examining Lederach's propositions based on the role of CAS SN in Northern Darfur's conflict.⁶⁴⁴

In this section, I endeavour to probe into the operationalization of these propositions in a real-time conflict like Darfur. How does CAS, deployed as a component of the UNAMID mission function on a terrain marred by years of active violence? Put differently, how does CAS implement the mission's mandate on the grassroots level of the conflict? Elsewhere in this study, I established according to Adam Azzain that there are three kinds of conflicts in Darfur. This study concentrates on "intergroup conflicts at the grassroots level". Why is this so? I chose to explore this path because it is at that level of the conflict that an adequate examination of the "prospects of indigenous mechanisms in modern conflicts" becomes feasible. Also, cultural resources like those linked to the institution of the NA are utilized in the mitigation of conflicts, which stem from the grassroots only. Lastly the inter-group conflict "is the most intricate and most challenging to peaceful coexistence in Darfur" and is supposed to have informed the other two: The region- centre and the communal elites' conflict.⁶⁴⁵

Similarly, I introduced the cells and mentioned that significant to this study are the activities of CAS via the cell which oversees the activities of conflict management, resolution and reconciliation. The core of role of CAS, number 2, as outlined elsewhere, basically defines the functions of this cell.

Essentially, the general functions of the cells and the second core function of Civil Affairs have been examined. In order to build on that and provide concrete evidence of the activities of CAS via this cell as obtainable in Darfur, (conflict management and resolution cell) it is imperative that I examine the activities of CAS Sector North located at the Headquarters of UNAMID In El-Fasher. **It is at this point of the analysis that it becomes evident what stakeholders have become incorporated as actors in Darfur's peace process**

⁶⁴³ United Nations, "Security Council Renews Mandate of African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur," United Nation: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, last modified June 29, 2016, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12427.doc.htm> Assessed September 3, 2016

⁶⁴⁴ See pictorial representation in appendix, diagram two

⁶⁴⁵ Mohammed, Evaluating the Darfur Peace Agreement, 20

Evaluating CAS SN:

Broadly speaking, *CAS* “is entrusted to contribute to the peace building (in Darfur) through conflict resolution and reconciliation, as well as capacity building of local authority and civil societies, conflict mapping activities and implementing of Quick Impact Projects”⁶⁴⁶

It is from these specific categorizations of its duties that CAS SN derives clear-cut guidance into the scope of its activities in Northern Darfur.

In one of the documents⁶⁴⁷ I had the rare privilege to gain access to during my visit to North Darfur in 2014, CAS SN had recently reviewed its efforts on the grassroot in the two years preceding my arrival. The obligations of CAS SN as culled from that report was outlined under the specific rubrics I have listed below: Why do I engage in providing such insight? The objective is to briefly provide illumination on specific activities that CAS SN facilitates within the geographical confines of north Darfur. As I proceed further in this regard, I will draw attention to salient points which that report uncovers.

Firstly, the scope of SN’s activities are as follows:

1. Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation
2. Conflict Mapping
3. Capacity building
4. Capacity building
5. Quick Impact Projects

Conflict Resolution

That report reveals that prior to my arrival in 2014, CAS SN was and continues to be actively engaged with incorporating stakeholders from among level 3 of Darfur’s affected population, into the peace process. Over a thousand representatives had been pooled together from among the Native Administration, Locality Administrations, IDPs, women, farmers, nomads, academics, government officials, youth groups and pastoralists to partake in initiatives geared towards peace for the province. This “space” was created by CAS SN to communicate to Darfuris the international community’s position on indigenous mechanisms. Darfuris should be

⁶⁴⁶ UNAMID, Civil Affairs Sector North, *CAS-SN Input to the Briefing to the JSR visiting Sector North*, (UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur: UNAMID Sector North, n.d). 1-2

⁶⁴⁷ *ibid*

aware that the international community attaches importance to the region's "Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms" and views them as relevant to the peace process.

In essence CAS SN facilitates the meeting point for the NA (as an institution) and other stakeholders who beyond their representative units also constitute members of tribes under the jurisdiction of the NA. This may be interpreted as CAS SN targeting the restoration of the Native Administration's diminished legitimacy⁶⁴⁸ as well as a reinvigoration of the institution's concomitant role in conflict resolution and reconciliation on the grassroots. To this end, initiatives originating from CAS SN also tend to aim towards empowering the Ajaweed who are integral to the NA. In similar vein that report discloses that CAS SN does accentuate the significance of the Judiyya as a vital tool in the reconciliation of parties to the conflict.

Furthermore, CAS SN putatively recognised the essential role of religious leaders. This in turn propelled their integration into the peace process. Religious leaders as I gathered during interview sessions, were initially excluded as stakeholders in the Doha document. A subsequent review of that document recommended the integration of religious leaders into the peace process. Members of the conflict management cell, during our discussions, corroborated this decision with a concrete evidence of how CAS effectuated a formal assimilation of religious leaders in Darfur. CAS SN had organised (prior to my arrival in 2014 April) four peace process meetings that incorporated 130 Imams in Darfur. One member of conflict management cell stressed that:

"These meetings were organised to explain the Doha document. The Imams were enjoined to admonish their followers into accepting peace and to further disseminate the information in the Doha document to their followers during Friday prayers." ⁶⁴⁹

The envisaged input of these Imams as leaders who wield considerable influence over a people inclined to religious beliefs was assumed to be the motivation for absorbing them as legitimate players within UNAMID's framework for peace in Darfur.

Beyond that, CAS SN supposedly facilitated a number of sensitisation workshops in favour of farmers and pastoralist in Darfur. The rationale behind these workshops was to hinder the emergence of disputes along migratory routes and to engender communal harmony through

⁶⁴⁸ See the section on Native Administration in this study

⁶⁴⁹ Civil Affairs Sector North, Group Interview, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 17, 2014. (Conflict Management Cell)

dialogue among members of the community. As part of CAS efforts towards the reconciliation of conflicting parties, SN became involved with the conflict between the Beni Hussein and the Northern Rezeigat. In fact, the conflict management cell followed the process up to point where both tribes signed a local ceasefire agreement on the 17th of January 2013. I shall elaborate on this process in the ninth chapter. At this point it suffices to learn that CAS SN further invested time into elevating the capacities of both tribes. This was to enable the negotiation of a peaceful settlement at the reconciliation conference that was scheduled to convene at a later date.

To this point, it is clear with reference to validating Lederach's first proposition, that CAS SN legitimates and integrates multiple levels of the affected population. This ostensibly includes level three of the affected population as proposed by the author. Furthermore, it is well founded to conclude that the stakeholders mentioned below constitute level three of Darfur's affected population. However, when guided by examples from Lederach's pyramid captured elsewhere, the stakeholders below represent a mixture as the case may be of levels 2 and 3 of the affected population in Darfur: (See Appendix for Lederach's Pyramid)

Stakeholder on level three of Darfur's affected population

- . Members of the Native Administration and by extension the Ajaweed
- Members of the Locality Administrations
- IDPs
- Women
- Farmers
- Nomads
- Academics
- Government officials
- Youth groups
- Pastoralists
- Religious leaders⁶⁵⁰

Indeed, CAS recognises the meaningful contributions of these stakeholders towards the peace process. Besides acting in accordance with the stipulations of the mission's mandate: to adopt

⁶⁵⁰ UNAMID, Civil Affairs Sector North, 1

an inclusive approach that incorporates actors on the grassroots, CAS SN maintains an advantaged position on the basis of its proximity to the people. On that account, officers are able to unearth stakeholders deep-seated concerns, fears, and interests. One officer of the conflict management cell during our discussion buttressed the rationale behind CAS SN's efforts to subsume inputs from levels 3 of the affected population as captured above, with other initiatives geared towards stable peace. He re-echoed the stakeholders' sentiments in this manner:

“They want to participate in the peace agreement and not leave the deliberations to the rebels and the government alone”.

Essentially this connotes a yearning interest to transcend a marginalised position and to assume a status that allows a hitherto voiceless majority “space” in the process that should engender peace and stability for all Darfurians.

Conflict mapping:

This is another aspect where CAS SN's performance is perceived as relevant to the process of achieving peace and stability in the northern Darfur area. As stated in that report, CAS SN is involved with “indicating potential flashpoints in North Darfur”⁶⁵¹. In order to understand the role CAS in conflict mapping, it suffices to furnish a conception of what conflict mapping entails. Conflict mapping is defined as the systematic process in which a conflict is critically analysed to help both the interveners and actors of the conflict in comprehending its root causes and nurturing its possible reduction, management or resolution.⁶⁵² Based on this definition it is possible to assume that CAS is involved with analysis on terrains of conflicts where a peacekeeping mission is deployed. The document under analysis provides insight into CAS in this regard.

CAS via its Crisis Management cell was instrumental in a critical analysis of the conflict in Kutum/ Awala locality. Based on that analysis the mission became aware of the root causes of that conflict and similarly commenced with formulating strategies to address underlying issues. In chapter nine, I will delve in details into the manner in which that conflict was approached. Important however is the fact that CAS's analysis informed the initiatives applied towards

⁶⁵¹ UNAMID, Civil Affairs Sector North, 1

⁶⁵² International Network Infrastructure for Peace, "Conflict Mapping," Infrastructures for Peace, accessed September 10, 2016, <http://www.i4pinternational.org/conflict-mapping>.

charting the pathway to peace for that locality. This demonstrates to a certain extent the mission's dependence on CAS SN as a reliable source for extracting information on conflict occurrences within the Northern Darfur area. However, CAS does not solely assume the role of conflict analysis in Darfur, and especially not on the national level, the authors of the Civil Affairs Handbook argue that *"the analysis from the local level nonetheless feeds into a complex stream of analysis conducted by different internal and external actors..."*⁶⁵³ in the light of this argument analysis by CAS must be meticulously executed. However, there is no way of ascertaining the quality and accuracy of reports which have emerged from CAS SN's conflict mapping efforts, which I will subsequently analyse with respect to arriving at the main theme of this thesis.

In the course of my discussions with representatives of the Political and Humanitarian Affairs nonetheless, I gathered that their units equally engage in analysis of the conflicts on ground as related to the duties assigned to them by the mandate. I also realised that these officers exhibited equal knowledge when compared to CAS, of the dynamics associated with tribal conflicts that erupted between from 2012 and 2014. Similarly, a trend analysis report from the Joint Mission Analysis Centre validates a number of the issues highlighted in conflict analysis reports emerging from the office of CAS. In any case, it is worth mentioning that the authors of the civil affairs handbook underscore the need for CAS officers to conduct conflict mapping with precision:

"If the basic facts and the interpretation of the local conflict dynamics are inaccurate, the overarching strategy of the mission to fulfil its mandate is likely to be misdirected".⁶⁵⁴

A subsequent mapping of the conflict in the Jabel Amir area precipitated the creation of the **"Joint Protection Group"** as the intervention mechanism utilized in addressing that crisis. That initiative became the platform on which the crisis management cell participated actively in supporting efforts towards peace in that locality

Capacity Building:

In similar vein, that report disclosed the activities of CAS SN in the sphere of building the capacity of local leaders as well as those of civil society organisations.

⁶⁵³ United Nations, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 103

⁶⁵⁴ United Nations, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 102

One major accomplishment of CAS in this regard, was the organisation of 57 DDPD dissemination workshops in various localities in Northern Darfur. Participants were drawn from the male and female gender bringing the number of all participants to a total of 7,540 Darfuris.⁶⁵⁵ A separate report stated that DDPD dissemination workshops were conducted between 18 January and 02 July 2012. That report discloses stakeholders ranging from: locality Native Administration and youths to religious leaders, lawyers and political leaders.

One striking observation from that data was: that from a total number of 7,286 participants, 4,478 were men while 2,808 were women.⁶⁵⁶ This variance in male and female participation may be interpreted two ways. On the one hand, it tends to evidence (on the part of women in Darfur) a minimal interest in the peace process. On the other hand, it may be understood as the clear manifestation of a patriarchal society. One group tended to favour the argument of a male dominated indigenous conflict resolution system. Others demonstrate an ingrained inclination towards gender inequality. For example, out of the 141 representatives from the Zam Zam Native Administration, all were male. In similar vein of the 113 IDP youths from the Zam Zam IDP Camp in El-Fasher who participated, all 113 representatives were men. Also, among religious leaders all 94 participants were men.⁶⁵⁷ This is the point where the humanitarian component steps in: To advocate inclusiveness, underscore human rights, promote gender equality and communicate to all Darfurians the right for all people (male and female) to participate in the peace process.⁶⁵⁸ Within the scope of building the capacity of locals, CAS undertakes activities that foster cooperation with civil society groups. The regulations guiding the activities of CAS with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) recommends for CAS to: “Act as an “enabler” for civil society to emerge and function, but not to take a strong lead in doing so. Civil Affairs can and should encourage civil society actors to understand their potential role in conflict resolution and democratic governance...”⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵⁵ UNAMID, Civil Affairs Sector North, 1

⁶⁵⁶ UNAMID Civil Affairs Sector North, *Completed DDPD Dissemination Workshops in North Darfur, for the period of 18 January - 02 July 2012*, (UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur: Civil Affairs Sector North, 2012).

⁶⁵⁷ UNAMID Civil Affairs Sector North, *Completed DDPD Dissemination Workshops*, 1-3

⁶⁵⁸ UNAMID, Humanitarian Affairs, Personal Interview, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 21, 2014.

⁶⁵⁹ United Nations, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 171

During my group discussion with CAS SN, I gathered that prior to 2003 CSOs had been dormant. CSOs were not allowed to operate in full swing in Darfur.⁶⁶⁰ In fact, the re-emergence of CSOs in Darfur can be traced to the year 2004 when (according to a former Minister of Darfur) the many initiatives to solve Darfur's problems were collated under a single framework tagged: "The Darfur Forum for Peace and Reconciliation". During the 2nd Tripoli declaration in 2005, the group split and formed the pro and anti-civil society groups extant in Darfur today.⁶⁶¹ According to one respondent during the meeting:

"Grave challenges are facing CSOs in Darfur. The environment is not conducive for CSOs to play their role in the peace process and most times the government blocks the activities of a good number of vibrant CSOs and banned others from any further participation in the Doha talks".⁶⁶²

Regardless of the numerous setbacks, CAS continues to support whatever efforts CSOs bring to the table. CAS organises seminars and conferences to empower and assist them in developing their capacities further. One of such seminars was tagged:

"The role of CSOs in the Darfur Peace Process".

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs):

"Are small scale, low cost projects that are planned and implemented within a short timeframe. With respect to a UN mission, QIPs represent projects funded and/ or implemented by UN peacekeeping operations. QIPs are executed to the advantage of communities and should not be perceived as humanitarian or long-term development support. The implementation of QIPs tends to bolster confidence in the mission.⁶⁶³ According to one officer during my discussion with CAS SN cells:

"Officers go to communities to ask them what they want then return to map out strategies toward implementing."⁶⁶⁴

In 2011, a number of QIPs included the funding of two youth training centres in El-Fasher, North Darfur and the construction of classrooms, offices, and other facilities. In addition, the

⁶⁶⁰ Civil Affairs Sector North, Group Interview, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 17, 2014.

⁶⁶¹ Khalil A. Abdulkarim, Personal Interview, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 21, 2014

⁶⁶² Civil Affairs Sector North, Group Interview, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 17, 2014

⁶⁶³ United Nations, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 224

⁶⁶⁴ Civil Affairs Sector North, Group Interview with Conflict Management Cell, UNAMID Headquarters El- Fasher Darfur April 17, 2014.

Shangil Tobaya locality in North Darfur benefitted from funding in the area of education, health and water. Prior to my arrival in 2014 the implementation of 11 QIPs had been underway in addition to four backlog projects.

By probing into the activities of CAS SN in the Northern Darfur region, I demonstrated the manner in which CAS incorporates stakeholders into the peace process using workshops and seminars. This section has also brought clarity to the issue of who constitute the stakeholders on level 3 of Lederach's affected population. In like manner, the section informed about CAS SN engagement in conflict analysis tailored towards both the understanding of conflict dynamics and the utilization of appropriate strategies in its mitigation. Finally, the reader has garnered insight into CAS SN role in the area of conflict management, resolution and reconciliation confirming the significance of Darfur's peace-making mechanisms in the conflicts mentioned.

Conclusion reflections

The factors, which have militated against Darfur's path to sustainable peace, are legion. In spite of that, the nagging question as to how positively or otherwise hitherto applied mechanisms have contributed to peace and stability in the first place, continues to arise. Examining the international response to Darfur's conflict from another analytical perspective, one is led to reflect on whether the continued instability in the Darfur region, was a case of failure on the part of the AU- during the period of its existence, to bring sustainable peace or might it have been that the military approach to peace was inadequate to address the nature of the Darfur conflict? While AMIS activated military action- (albeit at its barest minimum), against the insurgents and other warring parties, the Abuja talks became the interventionist tool targeting a political solution to the conflict. Yet all of these mechanisms have engendered very minimal successes with respect to durable peace.

In seeking to restore the Darfur region to a state of normalcy, the international community has both successfully and unsuccessfully in many areas applied two of the three major tracks of third-party intervention to conflicts of the 21st century. UNAMID beyond military action operates within a framework that encapsulates peacekeeping, peace-making and peace building. As was elucidated in the chapter, such intervention approach relies on the support of components like the Civil Affairs Section; tasked with the onus of actualising the mandate that authorises intervention on Darfur's grassroot level

The track III level of intervention as demonstrated in the third section of this chapter, evidences a work in progress status with respect to a multidimensional intervention that creates space for grassroots participation. It is yet premature to make an overall statement, especially since the mission remains an active one. Nonetheless chapter nine will illuminate on individual cases of conflict, where an analysis may expose levels of success or failure. This chapter also examined the direct causes of the Darfur conflict, based on Edward Azar's framework for understanding the management of Protracted Social Conflict.

Chapter Eight

8.1 The crux...

This chapter seeks to provide an understanding of Darfur's indigenous conflict resolution and peace-making institutions. It develops on the preceding chapter in a way that illuminates one of the listed stakeholders relevant to the goal of achieving durable peace for Darfur. As there is a lot of history connected to the region's institutions for handling conflict and reinstating stability within society, this chapter will attempt to maintain brevity by providing the basic and most salient information which should lead to the main points to be addressed in this thesis. The chapter commences by providing insight into Darfur's "Native Administration". It is an indigenous institution basically associated with the task of local governance, conflict resolution as well as the restoration of societal coherence. That term "Native Administration" (Idara Ahlia in Arabic) is adopted- as dubbed by the Anglo-Egyptian influence- in reference to such local governing structures extant within the sultanate prior to its capitulation to imperial invasion in 1916. While the focus here is not mainly to draw attention to the local governing institution, attendant actors, and the evolution thereof, from the era of the sultans to contemporary times, such background information nonetheless, must be delved into, so as to provide scholarship about the ways in which society functioned, maintained order and stability and how it has operated in contemporary times in the face of near consistent reformation.

What is of major essence in this chapter is to understand the current standing of Darfur's peace and reconciliation mechanism- Judiyya and its custodians- Ajaweed, and their functions in the search for sustainable peace within the region. The first step is to establish whether or not the people of Darfur, despite colonial interference, attach any significance to indigenous peace-making institutions and actors. In chapter 5, an overview knowledge on peace-making mechanisms and actors across sub-Saharan Africa has been provided, specifically those actors who advocate for justice and peace of the restorative kind. When linked to Lederach's underlying assumptions for transforming protracted conflicts, international peace actors are essentially enjoined to adopt a culturally sensitive approach. One that empowers these indigenous institutions and reinstates the legitimacy of undermined attendant custodians.

In the light of Lederach's propositions three important points are worth mentioning. First, this chapter identifies the broader institution of Darfur's Native Administration, concomitant custodians and mechanisms, as the "sociocultural resources" within the context. According to

the author, these “local people and their culture” can indeed become significant to the external peace actor’s framework for achieving durable peace.⁶⁶⁵ I must specifically point out here that in establishing Darfur’s peace-making institution as an age long one, I do not suggest that attendant procedures exist in its pristine form. Phases of external intrusion as well as successive post -colonial governments, impacted on its peace-making institution (NA) and remoulded them to the current state in which it exists today.

Second, in the light of the author’s (Lederach) assertion of the concept of reconciliation as an integral aspect of building peace in protracted conflicts, this chapter will concentrate on and provide detailed scholarship on Darfur’s Ajaweed elders as the “insider partial” and Judiyya as both the “cultural and contextual” resource for achieving reconciliation.⁶⁶⁶

Third, Lederach contends that middle range leaderships are the most suitable actors within the context of a protracted conflict because they possess the capacity to sustain conflict transformation.⁶⁶⁷ He supports his assertion with the argument stating, “middle range actors are positioned such that they are connected to, and often have the trust of both top level and grassroots actors.”⁶⁶⁸ His definition however of middle range leaders as “natural helpers”, “insider partial” and “mediators” delineates clearly Darfur’s Native Administrators as well as Ajaweed elders. These leaders are located at the grassroots level of the Darfur’s peace-making society. Though they possess the capacity to act as intermediaries between the top-level leaders and their constituencies at the bottom, (NA) they are not recognized as leaders of the middle range or second level. With those points at the back of the readers mind, this chapter proposes to examine the relevance of such indigenous actors and mechanisms for peace, from pre-colonial Darfur until the current regime. In developing chapters I shall examine the prospects of such peace-making mechanisms when applied to the current cases of conflict at Darfur’s grassroots level.

Furthermore, it is important to mention why the chapter accentuates the Judiyya system and not the parent institution of Darfur’s “Native Administration” per se? The first reason on the one hand is connected to the fact that the Judiyya remains Darfur’s only mechanism for

⁶⁶⁵ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) 93-95

⁶⁶⁶ Lederach, *Building Peace*, 96

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 94

⁶⁶⁸ *ibid*, 96-97

reconciliation. The NA on the other hand was instituted to perform other functions besides its major obligations of conflict resolution and the maintenance of law and order within the society. In the postcolonial era however, the authority and legitimacy to extend its influence into the postcolonial state, diminished immensely. This indigenous conflict mitigating institution became unable due especially, to its abolition in 1970, to exert the same legitimate control over domains formerly under its jurisdiction. This was the case in the whole of Sudan, but most prominently within Darfur's predominantly rural disposition. The end result for example being evidenced by the NA's inability to tackle pockets of conflict which eventually escalated into full blown in 2003, at its very latent stage.

The task therefore is not only to examine the prospects of a re-empowered, yet politicized NA in the emanating discourse relating to the current tides, but as already mentioned, to examine the prospects of administering relational change as suggested by Lederach contingent on the wisdom and resources of specific track III actors charged with the realization of that vital aspect of conflict transformation-reconciliation. It therefore rests within the purview of this study, to probe into the efficacy of the "Ajaweed-elders within a peace process that gives room for the application of the Judiyya- reconciliation mechanism as supplementary efforts to bolster a comprehensive framework geared towards the realization of sustainable peace.

8.2 The term indigenous

This chapter on Darfur's indigenous peace-making mechanism also retains conception of the term "indigenous" as already alluded to in the sixth chapter of this thesis. The usage of the term in conjunction with expressions like institutions, mechanisms and actors, which are linked to peace-making, will refer to systems, methods and players emanating from within the context in question. This basically establishes the fact that such resources will not fall under the rubric of mechanisms or actors that are exogenous to Darfur. Also, when examining the context in question, peace-making resources will not include initiatives such as grassroot NGOs, religious groups or the likes, operating at the micro level within the region. The term "indigenous" therefore does not encompass or depict all inputs towards peace as may be emanating from civil society groups in Darfur. Contextual resources will only be captioned "indigenous" as long as they draw heavily on and continue to establish a connection to Darfur's peace-making heritage, to which the people can relate, and in many ways can be linked to the era of the Fur sultanate.

This will equally hold true regardless of external influence from the era of colonialism or a process of reformation effectuated by regimes of the post-colonial dispensation.

The seventh chapter of this thesis established the connection between land acquisition in Darfur and the attendant role of the Native Administration in its allocation, as was the case more prominently during Anglo-Egyptian condominium. In this chapter I shall examine another domain of the Native Administration's influence in Darfur- conflict resolution as well as peace and reconciliation. Native Administrators undertook such obligations especially during the colonial era and in the aftermath. Chapter seven conceived of the NA as an indigenous governing institution whose actors became recipients of colonial favouritism. It equally constituted the platform on which the condominium launched a cost-effective form of governance that was adopted in consonance with its proposed conservative policy and which ultimately was defined by gross underdevelopment to say the least. Yet the onus of providing peace and stability, rested on the institution, the actors in it and the mechanisms employed in sustaining orderliness and reinstating harmony in the aftermath of conflict.

8.3 Native Administration and its evolution: A historical analysis

Darfur in the days of the Sultanate, maintained a multi-ethnic society. The Sultans sought to establish a centralized system of governance to supersede extant indigenous and hierarchical political structures that revolved around the Fur chiefs. The entire endeavour to reorganize a predominantly agrarian society targeted the creation of institutions that would both contribute to the proper functioning of the state and at the same time redirect the authority wielded by the Fur chiefs to the Sultans at the centre. Such attempts at state creation, culminated with the creation of three major centralized institutions of administration and governance. The first was an upgrade from kin based communal arrangements for landownership and allocation, to the Hakura system already mentioned in the seventh chapter of this thesis. The second was the embrace of a belief system as state religion, which was also applied to administrative as well as judicial sectors of the state. The last was the establishment of a control system where power and authority previously invested in a hierarchical framework presided over by territorial heads, (wielding influence over a heterogeneous ethnic configuration with powers for land allocation), shifted but not entirely, to the institution of the magdume- a commissioner, who ruled over a

magdumate-province and was furnished with ultimate authority. Magdumes now administered provinces with a multi-ethnic composition.⁶⁶⁹

This was the status quo and the modus operandi of a centralized system of governance before the invasion in 1874 of Egyptian powers (also known as the Turkiyya) and the Mahdist movement between 1885. During both phases of Sudanese history, the system of governance and power rested at the centre, almost replicating the era of the Sultans.⁶⁷⁰ In fact it seemed the efforts to create a centralized system of governance intensified during the era of the Mahdist. Mamdani buttresses this point with a brief insight into the nature of governance at the time. He states that:

“The Khalifa’s rule was extremely centralized and autocratic, and he saw any power wielded by tribal sheikhs as a threat to his supreme authority. For thirteen years (the period of Mahdist control in Darfur), the main axiom of the Khalifa’s policy was to break the power of any tribal sheikh who might possibly oppose his authority... he concluded “The Mahdiya was extremely hostile to tribal organization along political and administrative lines.”⁶⁷¹

The era of the Mahdist ended in 1898. For a period, the sultanate of the Fur was reactivated but not in its entirety. Ali Dinar who was allegedly a ‘prominent Fur loyalist of the Keria royal family’ was said to have returned and ordained himself sultan. It was he who supposedly made efforts to revamp old administrative systems. His stay nonetheless would not prolong enough to make an impact, especially as echoes of imperialist invasion already within the Sudan, soon caught up with its western region.⁶⁷²

8.4 The end of the Sultanate and the arrival of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium

With the arrival of the British in 1916, Darfur lost its independence forever and became amalgamated with the rest of Sudan. The colonial powers deposed Ali Dinar who was the last of the Fur sultans and then adopted a devolutionary approach towards administering the region. At this point it may be important to mention quickly that although this colonial regime was

⁶⁶⁹ Mamdani, *Saviours and Survivors*, 150-151

⁶⁷⁰ See Mamdani 158-166 for further reading on the era of both the Turkiyya and Mahdiyya.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid* 163

⁶⁷² Musa A. Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed, and Ahmed A. Yousuf, “Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: Past and Future,” in *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, Alex de Waal (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2007), 43

referred to as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, Egyptian influence was almost largely invisible.

The devolutionary approach as already alluded to, was a deviation from what had obtained in the previous era of the Mahdiyya. In fact, the British initially thought to replicate the Indirect Rule system of administration as defined by Lord Lugard, which had found strong relevance in the northern part of Nigeria. Indirect rule in its defined original form would nonetheless become inapplicable to the setting in Darfur.⁶⁷³ The British therefore resorted to designing a system compatible with Darfur's existing internal structures for administration. It was in the light of this, that internal structures as well as mechanisms were revived, and Darfur's indigenous institutions and actors empowered. With time an evolutionary process was set in motion. This one gradually restructured and developed the system and for example introduced new leadership titles to conform to the imperialist underlying vision for the region. In fact, the British conceived of the notion to politically side line Egyptian administrators with both the adoption of a locally inspired institution for governance and the corollary empowerment of its custodians. Above all the arrangement was regarded as most economical and efficient,⁶⁷⁴ and on the grounds of its origin, would be referred to as "Native Administration".

8.5 Native Administration: Definitions.

At this point a very brief definition of the Native Administration as culled from James Morton should suffice. According to the author, the *Idarat al ahlia* (the Arabic version of the term Native) is:

*'a system of local government in which the state uses traditional leaders-chiefs or sheikhs- to administer the people of their tribe, where tribe means any group which is organised around kinship'.*⁶⁷⁵

His definition provides some basic knowledge into how the Condominium (Anglo-Egyptian powers) managed to hold together Darfur's predominantly tribal arrangement. However, a more elaborate definition according to Lord Hailey, quoted by Bakheit states that the:

⁶⁷³ James Morton, 'How to Govern Darfur'. Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow, 2011, <http://www.jfmorton.co.uk>. (accessed June 12, 2014) 12

⁶⁷⁴ James Morton, "Tribal Administration or No Administration: The Choice in Western Sudan," Sudan Studies, January 11, 1992, <http://www.sssuk.org/SS/SS11.pdf> (Accessed April 17, 2016) 30

⁶⁷⁵ James Morton, 'How to Govern Darfur'. Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow, 2011, <http://www.jfmorton.co.uk>. (accessed June 12, 2014) 5

*“Native Administration is a procedure by which a colonial government whose European establishment is necessarily restricted in numbers, has provided itself with administrative machinery required for certain definite purposes of which the most important was the supervision of tribal communities, the maintenance of law and order, the assessment of taxes, the provision of local government services and the establishment of judicial tribunals”.*⁶⁷⁶

8.6 The leadership structure of the Native Administration

The institution of the Native Administration naturally operates within a hierarchical framework. In contemporary times both leadership titles and structures of the Native Administration have largely evolved. British colonial administrators gradually commenced with the changes, which have continued in the post-independent state. The Native Administrative consists of three leadership levels: The top, intermediate and lower level leadership positions. Each level possesses the power to preserve law and order as well as collect tax. The paramount chief occupies the top-level leadership position. He presides over an entire tribe. He exercises judicial powers inside the courts and possesses the authority to deliver jail sentences.⁶⁷⁷ Today appellations used to identify a paramount chief, differs among tribal groupings and would include titles like: Malik, Shartai, Sultan, and Nazir. The title ‘Nazir’ was a creation of the British for the paramount chiefs of a number of Arab groups⁶⁷⁸. The ‘Omda’ occupies the intermediate level of leadership. He directly submits to the paramount chief and heads tribal sub-groupings. Put differently, he exercises power over as many as 100 lower level leaders.⁶⁷⁹ Both levels of leadership in addition can exercise mitigatory powers over their followers. At the lower leadership levels are the ‘Sheikhs’. These are village or camp heads.⁶⁸⁰ They have

⁶⁷⁶ J.M.A Bakheit, “Native Administration in Sudan and its Significance to Africa” in Sudan in Africa, ed. Y Hassan (Khartoum: Khartoum University, 1971) cited in Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, From Native Courts to People’s Local Courts: The Politics of Judicial Administration in Sudan (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1985), 4

⁶⁷⁷ Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, “From war to peace and reconciliation in Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for the Judiyya” in Integrating Traditional Modern Conflict Resolution: Experiences from selected cases in Eastern and the Horn of Africa, eds. Martha Mutisi and Kwesi Sanculotte-Green (Durban: Accord, 2012) 106

⁶⁷⁸ Jerome Tubiana, Victor Tanner and Musa Adam Abdul Jalil, Traditional Authorities’ Peace-making Role in Darfur (Washington: Peaceworks, 2012)

⁶⁷⁹ Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, “From war to peace and reconciliation in Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for the Judiyya” in Integrating Traditional Modern Conflict Resolution: Experiences from selected cases in Eastern and the Horn of Africa, eds. Martha Mutisi and Kwesi Sanculotte-Green (Durban: Accord, 2012) 106

⁶⁸⁰ Musa A. Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed, and Ahmed A. Yousuf, “Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: Past and Future”, in War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, ed. Alex de Waal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) 47-49

powers to resolve conflicts, which stem from between 10 to 40 households under them. They nonetheless cannot exercise judicial powers from within the confines of a real court.⁶⁸¹

8.7 Relevance during the Sultanate

It must be noted that despite strong efforts to centralize the Dar Fur sultanate, such readjustments never aimed at eroding the legitimacy of Native leaders in significant domains such as the judicial sector of the state, where their impact had been most effectively felt. The Fur Sultanate as early as around the 15th and 16th century engaged the services of the tribal leaders to perform the function of administering justice based on customary law. In this way the Sultans maintained societal adherence to the law, which curbed lawlessness to its barest minimum. Even with the advent of Islam and the Sharia law, Native leaders retained their power over judicial matters with guidance from an Islamic clergy.⁶⁸² Defaulters within the state did not go scot-free. Crimes such as fornication, adultery, homicide etc., were levied with the payment of fines in form of cattle or length of cloth called *takiyya*. Other duties of a tribal leader during that period included the collection of taxes, and the power to administer land, which the Sultans eventually redefined in line with the newly established *Hakura* (estate) system⁶⁸³

8.8 In the Colonial era: relevance and reformation of tribal administration

As mentioned elsewhere, the powers of the Native Administrators became all the more legitimized during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The colonial administrators absorbed the entire framework of Darfur's indigenous peace-making and governing institution-Native Administration and subsequently commenced with effecting significant changes. In areas for example where the structures of the Native Administration seemed to defy basic comprehension, modifications were concluded and applied contextually.⁶⁸⁴ In actual fact, the purpose for adopting Darfur's extant indigenous governing structures, was to achieve the

⁶⁸¹ Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, "From war to peace and reconciliation in Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for the *Judiyya*" in *Integrating Traditional Modern Conflict Resolution: Experiences from selected cases in Eastern and the Horn of Africa*, eds. Martha Mutisi and Kwesi Sanculotte-Green (Durban: Accord, 2012) 106

⁶⁸² James Morton, 'How to Govern Darfur'. Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow, 2011, <http://www.jfmorton.co.uk>. (accessed June 12, 2014)

⁶⁸³ James Morton, 'How to Govern Darfur'. Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow, 2011, <http://www.jfmorton.co.uk>. (accessed June 12, 2014) 12

⁶⁸⁴ Jerome Tubiana, Victor Tanner and Musa Adam Abdul Jalil, *Traditional Authorities' Peace-making Role in Darfur* (Washington: Peaceworks, 2012)

gradual transition from native governing institutions to more modern apparatuses for governance.⁶⁸⁵

The British colonisers elevated the powers of the tribal leaders to perform administrative functions in addition to the duties hitherto assigned to them during the sultanate. Tribal leaders thereupon, became visible within the education and health sectors of the colonial regime, maintaining both administrative powers as well as judicial. Executing judicial rights- on the platform of native courts- over their communities. Similarly, very conspicuous changes became discernible in the Native Administration's configuration of authority. The 1922 'Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance' for example, successfully legalised the judicial authority of nomadic sheiks⁶⁸⁶. These village headsmen now operated with the full approval from the colonial government, even though before now limited powers had been assigned to them. In like manner, the creation of new titles for Arab groups engendered the impetus for insubordination and further exposed the system to unnecessary power tussle.⁶⁸⁷ From 1922 onwards, a number of other ordinances were passed: in 1925 (Village Courts Ordinance). The 1927 ordinance was a review of the 1922 ordinance exclusive to nomadic tribes, which now covered sedentary groups. The 1928 ordinance basically vested tribal leaders with extended judicial powers to include the hearing of cases. Such tasks hitherto were beyond their scope of operation.

By 1932 the Native Courts Ordinance called into existence more formalised courts that were presided over by the native sheikhs.⁶⁸⁸ Shortly before independence in 1951, colonial powers passed yet another ordinance in line with its evolutionary agenda for Darfur's NA system. It was called the Local Government Ordinance. Its provision stipulated the detachment of certain administrative duties from the functional capacity of Native Administrators; more precisely, this new legislation precipitated the transfer of financial powers from tribal leaders to the local

⁶⁸⁵ James Morton, "Tribal Administration or No Administration: The Choice in Western Sudan," *Sudan Studies*, January 11, 1992, <http://www.sssuk.org/SS/SS11.pdf> (Accessed April 17, 2016) 32.

⁶⁸⁶ Cherry Leonardi and Musa Abdul Jalil, "Traditional Authority, Local Government and Justice," in *The Sudan Handbook*, ed. John Ryle et al (Suffolk and Rochester: Boydell&Brewer, 2011), 190

⁶⁸⁷ Jerome Tubiana, Victor Tanner and Musa Adam Abdul Jalil, *Traditional Authorities' Peace-making Role in Darfur* (Washington: Peaceworks, 2012) 8

⁶⁸⁸ M. W. Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: The Forgotten History of a Humanitarian Disaster* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 125; Musa A. Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed, and Ahmed A. Yousuf, "Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: Past and Future", in *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. Alex de Waal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) 45 and James Morton, 'How to Govern Darfur'. Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow, 2011, <http://www.jfmorton.co.uk>. (accessed June 12, 2014)13

government councils.⁶⁸⁹ Reforms, which occurred during the colonial era almost always enhanced the capacity of the Native Administration to carry out those duties, which they knew to perform best: conflict resolution and peace-making. Apparently, the Native Administration functioned most effectively in conjunction with the institution of the Native Courts, which ultimately became the trajectory through which tribal leaders exercised judicial powers over the community and by extension, also maintained law and order among its people.

The British perceived this approach to governing the province of Darfur as most undemanding financially. Yet in hindsight, it might not be misguided to view Darfur's version of indirect rule, -on the flip side- as somewhat of a blessing in disguise, especially within the context of having the colonial government provide unflinching support to a system with tested capacity to guarantee maximum security as well as maintain law and order. British administrators never painted a picture of perfect harmony within the society. In fact, it recorded severally, occasions of intergroup or intragroup conflicts: between Arabs and Non-Arabs as well as intra-group conflicts.

In his write up, Morton citing the 1945 Governor General's report noted that:

“Despite the relative success the British had in keeping the peace, there hardly was a single year of the Condominium in which the Governor did not report a number of tribal fights”⁶⁹⁰ however these were amicably resolved. And contingent on the authority wielded over the community by tribal leaders, the province satisfactorily maintained stability and order.⁶⁹¹

The Native Administration effectively put a check on its members to circumvent the escalation of conflicts. One thing was certain, while the influence of the Native Administration had been milder in other parts of the Sudan, for a predominantly rural profile like Darfur, it became an option without a best-case alternative. That being the case however, the period of colonial influence in Darfur was considered the most retrogressive phase of Darfur's history. Having

⁶⁸⁹ Musa A. Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed, and Ahmed A. Yousuf, “Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: Past and Future”, in *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. Alex de Waal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) and James Morton, ‘How to Govern Darfur’. Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow, 2011, <http://www.jfmorton.co.uk>. (accessed June 12, 2014) 21

⁶⁹⁰ ⁶⁹⁰ James Morton, ‘How to Govern Darfur’. Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow, 2011, <http://www.jfmorton.co.uk>. (accessed June 12, 2014) 26

⁶⁹¹ M. W. Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: The Forgotten History of a Humanitarian Disaster* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) See page 130 for extended reading

bequeathed posterity with an indelible legacy of inequity and impoverishment. Darfur in current times, continues to languish under the consequences of a trajectory further explored by successive national governments. Conversely, there is no gainsaying the overriding consensus among scholars conversant with the Darfur's indigenous conflict resolution and peace-making institutions, that some wisdom may have emerged from that phase in Darfur's history: The empowerment of Darfur's Native Administration as a vehicle towards social coherence and re-engineering. Unfortunately, such discernments about the potency of the Native Administration have eluded successive post-independence national governments in the Sudan. These have either chosen to bury its efficacy with a colonial past or to manipulate such in the direction of special interests. The next section will probe into how the Native Administration fared in the hands of Sudan's postcolonial civilian and military governments alike.

8.9 Native Administration after 1956.

Not long after attaining its freedom in 1956, that colonial agenda geared at accomplishing the gradual transformation of the Native Administration into an institution to be incorporated into more contemporary structures for governance was shelved. According to Abdul Jalil however:

“Native administration with its twin institution of native courts continued to function as the backbone of local government in rural Sudan even after the country became independent in 1956 under the first civilian government which administered the country for two years...”

It was shortly afterwards that the institution called Native Administration and its custodians began to experience the intense heat that has trailed as well as undermined its effectiveness in Darfur's till date. Today the institution called Native Administration has since ceased to exist in its purest form, as obtained during the condominium at least. Tribal leaders have undergone ostensible transformation. One that aligns with the purpose of the 1989 regime led by the National Islamic Front.

As early as the 1960s, a growing antipathy towards the Native Administration commenced gathering momentum among liberally minded educated Sudanese. Their perception of the Native Administration in a nutshell, labelled the institution as a neo-colonial apparatus capable of compromising the efforts of Sudan's independent state towards establishing world compliant democratic governing structures. By 1964 the call to neutralise the NA system had become all

the more vociferous. Sudanese elites motivated either by ideology or religion, pushed for a complete abolition of the Native Administration. Interestingly, Islamic fundamentalism and leftist inclinations in Sudan have existed as political antagonists, however both ideological motivations had, most specifically around the early 1960s and 1970s, prevailed as the Native Administrations' worst adversary. Both groups posed as agents of reformation on a postcolonial political stage dominated by nationalist parties, which maintained a very strong alliance with members of the Native Administration. The more leftist opinions envisioned the reformation of Sudan's governance structures devoid of Native Administrators. The religiously minded aimed at ideologically penetrating, especially Sudan's rural west to overthrow existing religious sects that had significantly shaped the political orientation of the people.⁶⁹²

While the atmosphere remained tense around the subject of establishing social change, Sudan's military regime between 1958 and 1964 seemed less agitated over the clamour against the Native Administration. It was the new interim government aligned towards the left that devised concrete plans to dissolve the NA. Its strategic agenda included mapping out a replacement strategy for when the plan to neutralise the NA would eventually be completed. It commenced by putting forth recommendations for members of an elected local government council to supplant Native Administrators in all of their functional capacity; the plan as stipulated would follow through with:

- The suspension of the Native Administration in northern Sudan and the distribution of its functions among various specialized agencies.
- The repeal of the Chief's courts and the Native Courts ordinances
- The withdrawal of judicial powers of the nazirs, omdas and sheikhs and vested in the Judiciary.
- The consolidation and increase of local government police to fill the vacuum created by the dismissal of nazirs, omdas and sheikhs.
- The increase of local government staff to discharge the responsibilities previously performed by the Native Administration.
- The formation of purge committees to punish corrupt administration personnel
- The immediate liquidation of Native Administrations in the Blue Nile, Northern Kassala, Khartoum, Kordofan and Darfur provinces and the formation of a commission

⁶⁹² Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur, 10

to investigate the necessary plans for liquidating Native Administration in the southern provinces.⁶⁹³

For the short-lived appearance made by the interim government on the political stage, these measures would not be implemented, as that administrative leadership soon made way for a new regime.

The quest for social transformation clearly inspired a strong hostility towards the Native Administration, but equally prevailing was a political undercurrent to the entire discourse around dissolving the system of Native Administration. While a greater part of Sudan's post-independence political history has been shaped by the influence of communism and Islamism, two indigenous political parties had emerged as nationalist parties and frontrunners on Sudan's immediate post-colonial political landscape: The Umma party with ties to the Mahdist movement and a solid political base in Darfur and the National Unionist Party popular among Sudanese in the north. To overturn the political status quo in their favour, major opposition groups (Communist and Islamist) needed to break into extant alliances between these political parties and members of the Native Administration. Native Administrators became mobilising agents within their communities for the political aggrandizement of these indigenous parties who dominated Sudan's political scene during the first and second post independent parliamentary dispensation. The homogeneity of purpose-to actualise the abolition of the Native Administration- constituted the common ground on which these estranged groups (communist and Islamists) could meet.

Very pronounced in December 1964 was equally the outcry by Sudanese professionals within the judicial sector, over the need to terminate the judicial powers hitherto exercised by members of the Native Administration.⁶⁹⁴ The dissolution of Sudan's Native Administration system seemed imminent. However, when exactly this could become reality continued to remain obscure. Apparently, this also was a case of each government's unpreparedness to take the bull by its horns. There was no denying the ostensible undertone of disinclination to terminate a system whose roots obviously run so deep.

⁶⁹³ J.M.A Bakheit, "Native Administration in Sudan and its Significance to Africa" in Sudan in Africa, ed. Y Hassan (Khartoum: Khartoum University, 1971) cited in Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, *From Native Courts to People's Local Courts: The Politics of Judicial Administration in Sudan* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1985) 143 (With slight modifications)

⁶⁹⁴ M.W. Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow*, 194

In the meantime, the question of dissolution seemed to remain at the discussion level. Members of the Native Administration however, would not sit and watch an age-long institution and its custodians gradually plunge into oblivion. On that account, substantial efforts emerged. They were aimed at reliving the institution's positive contribution to the preservation of peace and stability-at least, as was the case in the peripheries.⁶⁹⁵ In fact Takana citing Abushouk noted the creation at this time of the Kordofan Native Administration Leadership Association intended to maintain the internal unity of its members and equally calling on them to hold strong in the face of gross animosity towards the institution.⁶⁹⁶ With the emergence of the Umma party as victorious in the parliamentary elections of 1965, the intense pressure to dissolve the Native Administration subsided.⁶⁹⁷ Probably owing to the added value to be derived from preserving the system. In the next phase of Sudan's history, Darfur's NA struggled hard to maintain its balance against the currents of tough oppositions which confronted it.

8.10 Native Administration under the Nimeiri regime

In 1969 the political atmosphere transitioned from civilian to military. Jafar Nimeri had assumed power on the platform of a military coup and promptly proceeded in 1971 to assuage the yearnings of all agitators seeking to undermine the authority of Sudan's Native Administration. Once his act was perfected, the substitution of the now abolished Native Administration for a new legislation: The People's Local Government Act, followed suit. This development denoted the withdrawal of all powers previously vested in the Native Administration. Government ordained personnel would fill the vacuum and continue to administer these areas in the same manner as members of the Native Administration. With time, it became evident that the government lacked a clearly defined blueprint to effectuate successfully, the transition from the status quo to the new order. The consequences could hardly be shoved aside. Security became an issue as the government battled contingent on meagre resources, inexperienced officials and few law enforcement personnel, to maintain any form of cohesion at all. This was specifically true to areas like Darfur where the Native Administration constituted the backbone of society in terms, as already mentioned, of governance, law and order, conflict resolution and peace-making.

⁶⁹⁵ Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, *From Native Courts to People's Local Courts: The Politics of Judicial Administration in Sudan* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1985) 145

⁶⁹⁶ Yousuf Suliman Saeed Takana, *Darfur Struggle of Power and Resources, 1650-2002 An Institutional Perspective*. Translated by Awad Al Awad. (Bergen: Michelsen Institute, 2016) 167

⁶⁹⁷ Tubiana et al, *Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur*, 10

It must be stated nonetheless, that the dissolution of the Native Administration affected only tribal leaders at the uppermost leadership positions. The leadership authority of the omda at the intermediate, and the sheikhs at the lower levels were left intact. But how could the body operate without the head? Besides it had never been a part of their functioning nature-at both levels below the paramount chief-to relate directly with the government or operate in judicial capacity, even when they possessed the powers to settle disputes on their own level of jurisdiction. At some point, it became inevitable for government officials assigned to fill the vacuum for local governance, to revert to the wisdom and expertise of Native Administrators on resolving issues that gradually proved too overwhelming. Some very delicate issues relating to land nonetheless continued to receive the direct attention of experienced leaders who at each point remained willing to render such services.⁶⁹⁸ In fact, Leonardi and Abdul- Jalil noted that:

'The importance of the judicial role of the traditional leaders was made particularly apparent by the abolition of the Native Administration'.

Ostensibly, the more modern judicial set up, established to replace those of the Native Administration failed to measure up to the precedent set by the abolished institution.⁶⁹⁹ The situation therefore warranted for Native Administrators to assume significant roles along the line of more modern judicial practices. Indeed, the waters were becoming troubled. Only the experienced and knowledgeable could attempt to wade in them.

There was no gainsaying the void created by dismantling the justice and control mechanism of Sudan's rural societies. Armed robbery became rampant in Darfur⁷⁰⁰, and no sooner than the abolition became a reality than the south of Darfur began experiencing initial boundary disputes numbered to as many as 16.⁷⁰¹

8.11 Seeking the restoration of the Idara Ahliya

In the 1980s the Native Administration was restored in individual regions of the Sudan: in the east and in the west. In Darfur precisely, Ahmed Direiji, was said to have restored the uppermost level of the Native Administration. He was himself a leader in the institution's hierarchy and a

⁶⁹⁸ Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur, 11

⁶⁹⁹ Cherry Leonardi and Musa Abdul Jalil, "Traditional Authority, Local Government and Justice," in The Sudan Handbook, ed. John Ryle et al (Suffolk and Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 2011) 194

⁷⁰⁰ Takana, Darfur: Struggle of Power and Resources, 168

⁷⁰¹ Musa A. Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed, and Ahmed A. Yousuf, "Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: Past and Future", in War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, ed. Alex de Waal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) 50

sitting governor of Darfur.⁷⁰² However as rightly observed by Morton,⁷⁰³ it seemed like the Native Administration never really succeeded in gathering its initial momentum especially as the odds continued to move against it. Not even under the guise of a revival agenda floated by Sudan's Islamic fundamentalist. In 1989 a new regime seized power and what followed afterwards was a complete overhaul of the Native Administration in a manner that conformed to the ideological persuasion of the National Islamic Front headed by Sudan's incumbent- Omar Hassan al-Bashir.

8.12 The Idara Ahliya and the 1989 regime

If previous regimes in the Sudan either developed cold feet towards dissolving the Native Administration or simply threw caution to the wind by out rightly abolishing the Idara Ahliya, the 1989 regime arrived neither seeking the Native Administration's redundancy in Sudan's rural areas, where they had been most active, nor a complete abolition of the system. In fact, the NIF had no problem from the outset, figuring out exactly to what use it wanted to put the Native Administration. This consideration holds true for a regime whose blueprint for the Sudan included an agenda for islamization, with emphasis on its peripheries. The current regime referred to as the Ingaz (Salvation) in Sudan, is responsible for some of the major reconfigurations that have occurred in the entire Native Administration system since 1989. In Darfur, it has successfully weakened the cultural foundation of the Native Administration and indeed redefined the purpose as well as the role of the Native Administration in the Sudan at large. It has become evident during this regime how tribal affiliations have resonated most prominently on Sudan's rural terrains. In the past, it was largely uncommon for a Tribal leader to wield authority over a purely homogenous ethnic composition. In fact, a Fur chief could exercise authority over Arabs and non-Arabs alike. Under the current Ingaz, this arrangement has become an anomaly. The tendency to have perceived the empowerment of the Native Administration during the Condominium as a process to re-tribalize Darfur becomes even more ostensible during the NIF regime.⁷⁰⁴ The 1989 regime has indeed taken the discourse on Darfur's tribilization via the Native Administration to a different level. In contrast to an empowerment agenda geared towards societal harmony, the Ingaz has maintained an institution

⁷⁰² Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur, 11

⁷⁰³ James Morton, 'How to Govern Darfur'. Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow, 2011, <http://www.jfmorton.co.uk> (accessed June 12, 2014)

⁷⁰⁴ See, Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2009), 175

to which it plays the tunes its custodians must dance to. In the light of a reconstruction agenda, the current regime has created leadership positions in the line of the Native Administrations positions of authority; where positions of authority hitherto remained none existent. Traditional posts and titles had been renamed and lower ranking leaders or persons without specific designations or obligation elevated to the level where such reformations became capable of fomenting disputes between tribal groups. In current times the system has been confronted with excessive control from the centre. This has called to question the legitimacy of a system where the loyalty of the tribal chief must first and foremost align with those of his constituency.

Whatever posture the Native Administrative has assumed in contemporary Sudan, stems from the orchestrations of the NIF as well as attendant eroding factors. As much as the Native Administration could not be considered a system without its flaws, in its heydays, the system continued to flourish in accordance with the vision of its forbearers, whose motive was to establish an institution capable of maintaining law and order, of providing justice and of ensuring societal cohesion via its apparatus for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Today a tribal leader leads his community in prayers, in the similitude of an imam (an Islamic religious leader) collects religious taxes, teaches in the mosque and mobilises his members for the purpose of a jihad (holy war) with the south.⁷⁰⁵ He maintains strong political allegiance to the government's political party also known as the National Congress and earns a monthly income to compensate for his dual role of service to the community and loyalty to the government. Such radical reversal in the functions of a Native Administrator is perceived as a complete shift from the original (during the sultanate and the condominium) conception of tribal leadership in Darfur and the Sudan as a whole, to compliance with the stipulations of a regime overcome by deep religious sentiment. Accordingly, it has become commonplace for indigenous leaders to be referred to by Islamic appellations like *Amir* (Arabic for prince), which have substituted traditional titles like: *sultan*, *shartai* and *nazir* employed during the Sultanate or Condominium.⁷⁰⁶

The current war has further impacted negatively on a system whose efficacy is persistently eroding. Concurrently, the authority and legitimacy of its custodians as a result continues to dwindle. The prolonged stay of the 1989 regime has in fact coalesced with the on-going conflict

⁷⁰⁵ Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur,13

⁷⁰⁶ Musa A. Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed, and Ahmed A. Yousuf, "Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: Past and Future", 53

to exacerbate the problems confronting the Native Administration. The war has either separated a people from its tribal leadership or a tribal leader from his people. In similar manner, the strategies adopted by the NIF to diminish the powers of the Native Administration since its arrival in 1989 (tribalization and politicization) have since stayed and become more pronounced in wartime Darfur. Even now the government seems to be embroiled in contestations with the rebel movements over what may be considered the priced allegiance of tribal leaders. Some members of the Native Administration have supported the mission of the movements, who in 2003 took up arms purportedly to end the suffering of Darfuris by demanding justice and equity from the GoS. The GoS reaction to any form of political disloyalty as a matter of fact has been grave. It has wasted no time in responding to dissidents among members of the Native Administration, in a manner as to mete out despicable actions on them, as reward for any perceived insubordination.⁷⁰⁷

On the IDP camps, displaced Darfuris have continued to draw on the wisdom embedded in the indigenous peace-making mechanisms of the Native Administration. This has become a viable tool for wading into disputes, capable of disrupting camp harmony. A good number of local leaders continue as a result, to maintain even stronger legitimacy on the camps. Where a people have become disconnected from the system, makeshift leaders have emerged to assume the responsibility of conflict resolution and peace-making. In like manner, the search for better life has precipitated the outflow of large numbers, as has the war, forced the migration of many including traditional leaders from Darfur to the bigger cities, where security in comparison to the war-torn province is most assured. These days, it is common for a local leader to exert authority and perform his ordained duties from his abode in the city, using a representative who remains in close proximity to the people.⁷⁰⁸ Indeed, when the people themselves seek greener pastures in the cities, the pressures and comfort from urban life precipitates a diluted allegiance to the institution of the Native Administration and in most cases, engenders a certain disaffection for rural life and all of its baggage. This forced separation either in search of greener pasture or as a result of the war, most often impacts negatively on any existing cultural consanguinity between a migrating people and their ancestral base. It leaves room for urban generated and so to speak-modernised reasoning. These re-orientations tend to counter strong affiliations to a system or way of life once revered. While the many factors mentioned here

⁷⁰⁷ Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur, 30-35

⁷⁰⁸ Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur, 30-35.

constitute the huge challenges that have confronted and continue to confront the institution of Native Administration, the system amidst the raging storm is yet to be completely wished away. And as in the words of Leonardi and Abdul Jalil:

“Native Administration has not survived because it represents some kind of ideal, much loved or age-old authority, but because it is entrenched in local power structures that have been more enduring than national ones”.

The next section is vital to the study because it introduces the Native Administration’s mechanism for peace and reconciliation and examines its prospects as a tool for rebuilding social harmony in war torn Darfur. It seeks to understand its prospects in conjunction with third party interventionist efforts of the major peace player in targeting durable peace.

8.12 The Judiyya: A mechanism for indigenous mediation and reconciliation

Introduction

In April 2014, while taking final notes, of over one-hour discussions I had with four Ajaweed members from El Fasher northern Darfur, one of the four respondents wrapped up the session with a quick quiz. “What is Judiyya”? He asked via my interpreter. I was quite taken aback, for the simple reason that the basis for our long discussions concentrated solely on providing me with illumination on the Judiyya mechanism and attendant custodians. “Judiyya brings conflicting parties together and resolves the issues between them using the Ajaweed. My intellectually packaged response nonetheless fell short of the message the Ajaweed elder intended for us and especially me, to part with. Judiyya means ‘generosity’ he replied. It is synonymous with the Arabic word – “Karam” which denotes hospitality. What was the Judiyya being generous or hospitable with?

Back in my cubicle that day, I reflected upon that meeting hoping to figure out how Judiyya in one word connotes ‘generosity’ or even hospitality? Indeed, further reflection, matched with available scholarship from the literatures confirmed what should have been the obvious. To be generous is to give without restraint. To be hospitable is to be equally accommodating. Dictionary.com gives another variation of the word generosity, as “the freedom from meanness or smallness of mind or character”. Contingent on the mediatory skills of the Ajaweed, the Judiyya as I came to conclude, which is a cultural heritage of Darfur sets the stage for protagonists to transcend their conflict. At the same time, it seeks to usher the parties in conflict to that level where they may now relish the generosity (forgiveness) and hospitality

(acceptance) the community has to offer in the aftermath of reconciliation. In other words, the Judiyya encapsulates the ingredients that parties to a conflict require to enable them to chart their path towards reconciliation. The concluding part of this 8th chapter provides insight to the reader, into the journey most Darfuris are inclined to embark on once there is the tiniest tear in the society's fabric of social cohesion. This commences at the level of the family and extends all the way to the level of the tribes. I also provide scholarly elucidation on the Judiyya as a peace and reconciliation mechanism and examine the functions and qualities of the 'Ajaweed' (council of elders). It concludes with an investigation into their modus operandi when confronted with a scenario of conflict?

8.13 Understanding the Judiyya mechanism

In an article for ACCORD titled "From war to peace and reconciliation in Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for the Judiyya, El Tom, an indigene of the Berti tribe in Darfur, defines Judiyya as: *"A grassroot system of arbitration that focuses on reconciliation and the resurrection of social relationship in the community"*.

From his very succinct definition, one is able to deduce the following:

- a. That reconciliation is at the foremost when applying the Judiyya mechanism to a conflict scenario.
- b. Social relations broken down as a result of a dispute or a conflict, may be mended contingent on the vehicle of reconciliation.

The Judiyya therefore, is Darfur's quintessence of that cultural resource for reconciliation, which according to Lederach may deliver prospects for peace and reconciliation in the final analysis. It is that indigenous peace-making mechanism, which international peace actors are expected to activate in tandem with other exiting outsider initiatives like peacekeeping and informal mediation, designed to achieve durable peace. On that account, the Judiyya may be delineated as the platform on which a society plagued by protracted conflict, commences as expounded by the school of conflict transformation, that journey toward the transformation of a conflict, which has eaten into the fabrics of society. In this manner, the Judiyya is considered the link to the concept of reconciliation already examined elsewhere in this study.

Having identified Darfur's mechanism for peace and reconciliation, it is expected that the Judiyya, possesses at the least, the capacity to offer the victim and the perpetrator the opportunity to forge ahead into the future and within the same community, having transcended

“subjective realities” precipitated by war and conflict. As propounded by Lederach, reconciliation (Judiyya) should be “that place where truth, mercy and justice meet. It is that social space, a locus where people (conflicting parties, their spokesperson, the Ajaweed with their wisdom and skill) come together”. Where concerns for exposing what has happened and for letting go in favour of renewed relationship are validated and embraced.⁷⁰⁹

In similar vein, Ibrahim conceives of the Judiyya as:

*“Darfur’s heritage used to solve little problems before they escalate into conflicts”*⁷¹⁰

Going by the above denotation of the Judiyya, it may be inferred that the custodians of this mechanism realize the essence of nipping a conflict in the bud, whose imperative goal is to circumvent the eruption of a full-blown conflict. Put differently, it seeks to tackle conflict at its latent stage, to avert its degeneration. The Judiyya therefore operates to fulfil a restorative kind of justice. It aims to re-establish societal cohesion by initiating the first step in the direction of rebuilding broken relationships while using reconciliation as a platform towards its accomplishment. In the light of this, the Judiyya mechanism is viewed differently from the institution of the customary courts, (makhama aliya) where punitive measures may be meted out on the offender. Having established this fact about the Judiyya and in similar manner identified this mechanism as the apparatus, which can enable peacemakers, begin to chart the course towards transformation, I advance towards examining the role of its custodians, known in the Sudan as ‘the Ajaweed’ or council of elders.

A number of times people have tended to confuse the term ‘Ajaweed’ with the more widely known - ‘Janjaweed’. The latter is the appellation peculiar to the government-backed militia at the centre of the carnage perpetrated on innocent civilians in Darfur, especially since 2003. The former is a title ascribed to indigenous mediators in the Sudan as a whole.

8.14 The Judiyya and its custodians-The Ajaweed

The Judiyya-in the similitude of other apparatuses for peace-making and reconciliation- must be applied to a conflict situation. In the exact words of (Ajaweed elder Tanko), conflicts, just like the one in which Darfur is embroiled in,

⁷⁰⁹ John Paul Lederach, “Building Peace, Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 27-33

⁷¹⁰ Isam Mohammed Ibrahim, “The Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution & Peace Building in Darfur; From an Anthropological Perspective,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences Vol 4, No 9. (2013): 134.

*“leaves very bad effects on social relations, it is at this point that traditional mediators like the Ajaweed step in”*⁷¹¹.

The Ajaweed are therefore the conveyors of Darfur’s peace and reconciliation mechanism.

“The word Ajaweed comes from perfectness”.⁷¹²

It is the plural form of the word Ajwad, denoting elder. The Ajaweed are a council of elders. They are an integral part of the institution of the Native Administration, serving as custodians to the Judiyya system for peace-making and reconciliation. The Ajaweed are known to be “wise people, the best among the elderly, they are bestowed with the wisdom to straighten out what has been made crooked”⁷¹³ It is their duty to mitigate conflicts within the community from the level of the nuclear family up to the level of intra and inter-tribal conflicts. Putting forward a conflict for the Ajaweed to mediate in constitutes one of the ways in which specifically members of Sudan’s rural societies seek redress in the event of dispute. In predominantly rural Darfur for example, it is common for members of the community to utilize other options available to them- like the customary courts for example or the more modern and formal judicial system, in obtaining justice for cases of crime or of airing grievances between adversaries.

The Ajaweed have received greater acceptance as the preferred channel for righting the wrongs within the community. This may not be unconnected to the precedent already set by the Ajaweed in matters of conflict resolution and peace-making. To a large extent these indigenous mediators are known to enjoy the respect of the people. The supposed non-biased posture of the Ajaweed elicits a perception of assuredness, such that members of the community feel uninhibited and comfortable to approach them with their dispute⁷¹⁴ The Ajaweed display their mediatory prowess in conflicts at varying levels. They may wade into disputes over water and grazing for example and can be called upon to partake in higher-level government sponsored tribal conferences. At government sponsored peace conferences, their wisdom may be applicable to negotiate a compromise between two tribes. More often than not, parties comply with the outcome of a Judiyya proceeding as recommended by the Ajaweed. Compliance with an Ajaweed ruling does, in most cases, indicate satisfaction with the outcome and the readiness on the part of parties in conflict to accede to a compromise. Ultimately, it communicates the readiness to make amends (reconciliation) and move past the current dispute. This is not to

⁷¹¹ Ajaweed Elder Tanko Adam, Personal interview, El Fasher Darfur North, April 23, 2014.

⁷¹² Ajaweed Elder Abu Idris, Personal interview, El Fasher Darfur North, April 23, 2014.

⁷¹³ Ajaweed Elder Adam, April 23, 2014.

⁷¹⁴ Ajaweed elder Musa Abdul, Personal interview, El Fasher Darfur North, April 23, 2014

connote the infallibility of the Judiyya mechanism per se. If most of the time parties tend to wholeheartedly embrace an outcome, at other times dissatisfaction with a Judiyya ruling can allow for a petitioning of the formal justice system, but as noted by Tubiana et al, the courts prefer to refrain from going counter to the ruling of the Ajaweed.⁷¹⁵

The Ajaweed do not initiate a mediatory session on their own, parties to a conflict must themselves invite the Ajaweed if they require their intervention. Once the powers of the Ajaweed have been activated, it is obligatory for the parties to accept the decisions arrived at in the final analysis.⁷¹⁶ Unlike members of the Native Administration, whose positions until lately, - since the drastic evolution by the Ingaz regime - had been hereditary, the position of an Ajwad on the contrary may not be inherited. In the light of this, membership to the council of elders (Ajaweed) is never a permanent one. Similarly,

*“in order to enhance reliability transparency and creditability” says Ajaweed elder Musa, “members to the Ajaweed council of elders are drawn from different tribes”. “For example, I come from the Fallata Futi tribe. If conflict ensues between my tribe and another, I cannot be a part of the elders who will be called upon to settle the conflict”*⁷¹⁷

An Ajwad prides over a repository of the people’s customs and traditions. He relies upon them to solve the problems brought before him. The Ajaweed are not members of the Native Administration. They do however, perform mediatory functions in the company of the lowest and intermediate levels of leadership of the NA (sheikh and omda). Once there is the dispute in the community, the Ajaweed is notified via the Sheikh, the Omda or the paramount chief. It is not uncommon for a conflict to move within the Native Administrations’ leadership hierarchy, that is: from the lowest level to the topmost level. As it is expected of them, members of the Native Administration will initially exhaust all efforts within their capacity to mitigate a conflict before passing it on to the wisdom of the Ajaweed. By virtue of their proximity to the people, these native leaders (sheikh, omda, paramount chief) as the case may be, often enjoy the privilege of being conversant with the different occurrences under their jurisdiction. The Ajaweed are therefore more likely, based on that fact, to depend on such knowledge for a

⁷¹⁵ Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur,61

⁷¹⁶ Ajaweed Elder Mohammed, April 23, 2014

⁷¹⁷ Ajaweed Elder Idris, April 23, 2014

historical perspective of a conflict. Ostensibly, this serves as background information to enable the council to produce a positive outcome.⁷¹⁸

8.15 Community based vs Government sponsored Judiyya sessions.

A Judiyya proceeding is either organised on the level of community or as a government-sponsored peace and reconciliation conference. The latter is traceable to the era of colonial administration in Darfur. The former originates from the region's cultural reservoir and stands as a pre-colonial mechanism for managing and resolving different kinds of conflicts at the grassroots level of society. Government sponsored reconciliation conferences are applicable to conflicts that have escalated to violence between bigger identity groups. For the most part, the outbreak of violence can be interpreted as the inability or unwillingness of respective native administrators to mitigate the conflict.⁷¹⁹ During the condominium one of such conferences was convened. Subsequently between 1957 and 1997, over two dozen of such conferences were organised to mitigate conflicts between groups.⁷²⁰ Going by this fact, it might not be out of place to conclude that the Judiyya- during British administration- may have functioned effectively in curbing grassroots aggression at the very latent stage, before attracting the attention of the colonial masters.

If the colonial administration organised a reconciliation conference, it ensured to assume a more detached posture. This gave room for the proceeding to progress naturally as directed by the Ajaweed. As it were, the condominium almost completely steered clear of manipulating the process in its favour. Initially also, early postcolonial governments played the role either of **“observer or a secretariat”**. They maintained a non-partial and non-authoritative stance. The entire process was dependent on the good will of the parties. When the parties had reached a deal, the government became the **guarantor**. It did not impose its views on the proceeding and people were happy with the process. In any case the government was present but neutral. After 2003, the process, with reference to government-sponsored conferences, has almost become irrelevant to peace. The interference of the ‘third hand’ has largely compromised the process”.⁷²¹

⁷¹⁸ Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur,57

⁷¹⁹ Adam Al Zain Mohammed, “Customary Mediation in the Sudan: Past, Present and Future,” The House of Nationalities: A Space for preserving the diversity and the unity of the South of Sudan. June 2002, <http://www.houseofnationalities.org> (accessed June 20, 2016)

⁷²⁰ Mark Bradbury et al., Local Peace Processes in Sudan. A Baseline Study (Rift Valley Institute, 2006), 85-104

⁷²¹ Mohammed A. Al Zawari, Personal interview with key informant, Khartoum April 7, 2014

“Personally, I prefer that the government does not interfere but should respect the mechanism of the Judiyya. They can concentrate on helping us with administration and expertise says Ajaweed elder Musa.”⁷²²

When the impact of the ‘third hand is heavily present in disputes between parties who share a common peace-making culture, it creates an advantaged position for one party, thereby setting one above the other. That way the process becomes undermined⁷²³. Unfavourable outcomes are generated thereby, or as noted by Tubiana a resurgence of violence is precipitated.⁷²⁴ In any case, such practices have contributed to diminishing the efficacy of government organised Judiyya reconciliation meetings. The continued manipulation of these government sponsored peace meetings, does largely negate the experiences of many Darfuris. Mohammed one of the participants in my focused group discussion noted that the peace-making tradition of the Judiyya can help to create social harmony, only if the people are left to solve their problems themselves.⁷²⁵ Notwithstanding these strong interferences from the government, people do feel the need to make peace and therefore indulge in secret peace-making.⁷²⁶ Groups therefore, continue to activate the potentials of the Judiyya so as to enjoy peaceful relations as well as create their own conditions for survival.

Secret peace deals have taken place in some areas of Darfur because the people do not want the government to hear about it, says one of my key informants. These secret peace deals did not resolve the overall conflict, but certain aspects were settled. For example, some groups wanted to regulate access to a given water point. The Ajaweed established a deal between them. Although other issues still needed to be resolved –like making peace between families who lost members during the conflict-, a deal that allowed for both groups to take turns at using a controversial water point was reached as well. One group was to make use of the water point in the morning and the other in the afternoon. This was how that problem was resolved amicably without the knowledge of the government.⁷²⁷

This example supports the notion that the more traditional version of the Judiyya, which serves the community in times of conflict, continues to retain its credibility to a large extent.⁷²⁸ This

⁷²² Ajaweed Elder Musa Abdul, Personal interview, El Fasher North Darfur April 23, 2014

⁷²³ *ibid.*

⁷²⁴ Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur, 70

⁷²⁵ Idris Mohammed, Personal interview with Group discussion participant, Omdurman March 30, 2014

⁷²⁶ Al-Zawari, April 7, 2014

⁷²⁷ Al-Zawari, April 7, 2014

⁷²⁸ Tubiana et al, Traditional Authorities Peace-making Role in Darfur, 70

may be so because both parties tend to enjoy the benefit of sharing positive sum outcomes. In addition to achieving a good compromise, broken relationships are restored, and parties are able to go on living their normal lives.

8.16 Paying the Diya...

Even though reconciliation remains the focus of a *Judiyya* proceeding, the peace-making process does not end with it. The *Ajaweed*, beyond negotiating a good compromise for both parties also ensure that justice is served to the victim. The perpetrator does not get punished in line with the precepts of retributive justice, but he is definitely held accountable for his deeds. In this way, a complete termination of the conflict rests equally on the fulfilment of the customary requirement attached to the process. This is the payment of the *diya*. *Diya* is our own form of resolution. We do not punish... says *Ajaweed* elder Yousif⁷²⁹ The *Diya* therefore is to the *Judiyya* process, what the prisons are to the court. The *Diya* serves as a communally accepted mechanism used to appease the offended family, clan, or tribe after a conflict has reached the settlement stage. It is the *Judiyya* mechanism's way of holding the perpetrator responsible for crimes committed. The *Diya* is mainly applied to cases of homicide. It is normal for the *Ajaweed* to get involved in peace-making, if this were an unintentional act of killing. According to *Ajaweed* elder Tanko,⁷³⁰ if the crime of homicide is committed intentionally, the victim's family may seek justice for their member, in three ways. They may ask for the offender to receive punishment based on the *Sharia* law. They also may let the offender off the hook by extending their hand forgiveness. Similarly, the *Diya* can be applied if that becomes an option for the family of the victim. When the *Diya* becomes an option for compensating a victim's family, a sum of 40, 000 Sudanese pounds must be paid in the case of intentional homicide. If this was an unintentional act, the sum of 30,000 Sudanese pounds is paid to the victim's family so as to terminate the conflict completely. The perpetrators identity at this time still remains undisclosed. As such it behoves the tribe of the perpetrator to make this *Diya* payment on his behalf and more specifically on that of his family, tribe and administrative unit. This remains true under a system where collective responsibility continues to hold sway within the society.

When a tribal group assumes collective responsibility, it means that a whole tribe is held accountable for the offences of one of its members. In fact, it is possible that no one gets to find out in the final analysis, who the real offender was. According to *Ajaweed* elder Yousif: "After

⁷²⁹ *Ajaweed* Elder Mohammed, April 23, 2014

⁷³⁰ *Ajaweed* Elder Adam, April 23, 2014

paying the Diya forgiveness is granted to the perpetrator” The family of the victim collects the Diya for the victim’s children (if he has any). The Ajaweed then makes a written statement confirming the payment and recommends that this payment is to be reserved for the children’s welfare. A written statement such as this is called “Rakoba”. For future purposes, this mechanism allows for the family to refer back to the manner in which such disputes were resolved.⁷³¹

8.17 The process...

A Judiyya mediatory session may be presided over by 3 to 9 Ajaweed elders. The intervening elders must be acceptable to both parties. They should be regarded as neutral and credible⁷³². Neutrality assumes a different connotation when applied to a Judiyya peace and reconciliation process. An Ajwad is allowed to take sides during a Judiyya proceeding. He tends to slant towards the party that subscribes to a peaceful compromise. As for the party refusing to yield to peaceful negotiations, the Ajaweed, so as to ensure they accede, exerts pressure on them.⁷³³ The process commences with prayers and citations from the Koran. Everyone is allowed to take part in a Judiyya meeting. Representatives and family members of the victim and the perpetrator converge at the location designated for the hearing. According to one informant in Gado’s thesis, a meeting to resolve family related disputes will normally hold at night, while a Judiyya session organised to intervene in a conflict between groups or tribes, commences during the day.⁷³⁴ The elders investigate into the matter at hand by listening to the testimonies of both parties via their representatives. At this juncture, the “fadfada” commences. This is the moment when, going by the translation of the Arabic word, parties start to pour out their hearts. In this period of ‘letting go’, tempers do rise to the extent that intense exchange of words may ensue between the parties.⁷³⁵ It is not unusual for the parties to also begin pointing accusing fingers at each other. In fact, it is allowed for the atmosphere to become heated up especially since this is not misconstrued but perceived as part of the proceeding. However, when it

⁷³¹ Ajaweed Elder Mohammed, April 23, 2014

⁷³² Isam Mohammed Ibrahim, “The Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution & Peace Building in Darfur; From an Anthropological Perspective,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* Vol 4, No 9. (2013) 135

⁷³³ Adam Azzain Mohammed, “Intergroup Conflicts and Customary Mediation: Experiences from Sudan, “*Accord*, June 25, 2002, <http://www.accord.org.za> (accessed June 21, 2016)

⁷³⁴ Shartai of Fur (Names withheld by author), “Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Sudan: Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conferences in South Darfur up to 2009” interview by Zuhair B. Gado. Online PhD Thesis submitted to the University of Bradford, 2013 (accessed July 25, 2016) 234

⁷³⁵ Former Magdooom of Fur (Names withheld by author) interview by Gado in “Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Sudan “, June 13, 2010, 232

becomes too tensed, the Ajaweed promptly wades in to calm the tensions and prevails upon the parties to submit to a reasonable compromise.

The witnesses also get the chance to be heard.⁷³⁶ It is an erroneous assumption to conceive of the Judiyya process as a smooth sailing venture. Sometimes issues at hand become extremely complex that Ajaweed elders are compelled to engage the adversaries in very long hours of mediation. Under such instances, a proceeding is likely to commence at 8.00am and terminate at about 5.00pm. Once this is the case, the Ajaweed allows for some time out. A recess usually happens immediately when the parties have gotten the opportunity to “pour out their hearts”. Since it is mostly impossible for this part of the process to proceed without tempers rising, a pause in the proceeding is initiated, to give room for prayers and food.⁷³⁷ This is probably to calm down the atmosphere. A Judiyya process in essence, has the tendency to reach a successful conclusion only after more than one sitting. After the hearing, the Ajaweed retire for a closed session where they deliberate further on what must be the best possible solution to the conflict.⁷³⁸ Once the verdict is announced, both parties must adhere strictly to the recommendations. Rejecting an Ajaweed ruling is tantamount to rejection by the society.

Adam Azzain Mohammed provides a metaphorical insight into the process of a Judiyya session. “The Ajaweed elders divide themselves into doves and hawks. The doves work relentlessly to persuade parties in conflict to forgive and forget. They remind them of how their ancestors lived in peace and what types of friendship they maintained. Considerable citation from the Koran, Sudanese proverbs and sayings are made, praising the virtue of forgiveness and showing how feuds are mischievous in life and hereafter. The wrongdoers will be asked to make friendly gestures-such as kissing the head of the victimised. On the other hand, the hawkish group would threaten the recalcitrant about the mischief that they would get into should they refuse to accept the Ajaweed judgment”⁷³⁹ Going by Adam Azzain’s metaphorical description of the Judiyya process, the reader is able to fit together some significant characterizing features underlying the Ajaweed peace-making process: forgiveness, the search for peace and the maintenance of healthy friendship. The Ajaweed hawks “threaten” the offender into submitting to a peaceful

⁷³⁶ Mark Bradbury et al., *Local Peace Processes in Sudan. A Baseline Study* (Rift Valley Institute, 2006), 88

⁷³⁷ Former Magdoo of Fur (Names withheld by author) interview by Gado in “Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Sudan”. 233

⁷³⁸ Isam Mohammed Ibrahim, “The Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution & Peace Building in Darfur; From an Anthropological Perspective,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* Vol 4, No 9. (2013) 132-140

⁷³⁹ Adam Azzain Mohammed, “Intergroup Conflicts and Customary Mediation: Experiences from Sudan,” *Accord*, June 25, 2002, <http://www.accord.org.za> (accessed June 21, 2016)

and positive compromise. The Ajaweed doves nonetheless, unlock the offenders mind towards discerning the essence of societal harmony. The offender is guided to the understanding that the society stands to fare better when conflicts are resolved amicably, and peaceful relationships restored. The focus therefore is for both the Ajaweed (hawks and doves) to reinstate, based on their unique technique, a harmonious co-existence between the parties in conflict. That, in essence is the imperativeness of applying persuasive words and admonitions to the mediatory process. The essence therefore of underscoring forgiveness in such a peace-making procedure is to accentuate also the significance of reconciliation and social harmony. These components remain identifiable as the hallmark of an Ajaweed mediation process. They constitute the central focus of any Judiyya proceeding. It must be established here, however as noted by Tubiana et al,⁷⁴⁰ that forgiveness is tantamount to truth telling. While truth telling may be considered an integral part of the entire process, it is never to be conceived of as the responsibility per se of the perpetrator, to perform an open confession. This assertion is reminiscent of social configurations already mentioned elsewhere, where collective responsibility is identified as part of the society's norm. Essentially, the lack of an open confession serves to ensure that the identity of the offender remains undisclosed till tensions have become calm, or till the peace-making process has reached a successful end. What is important to note however, is that telling the truth or the acceptance of wrongdoing in very remorseful terms, does translate positively during a Judiyya proceeding. The victim's family may begin to soft pedal on their stance and in many cases, this has led to a reduction in the amount of compensation (diya) collected by the victim's family.

8.18 Oath taking as part of a Judiyya process

Elsewhere in this thesis, we saw how oath taking was applied within the context of a conflict in order to extract the truth from the parties to the conflict. Specifically, I recounted the historical conflict between two antagonistic groups in the south-eastern part of Nigeria. Both adversaries as was delineated in chapter five, swore to the oath that held them bound to the compromises reached during the resolution process. In similar vein, there are certain times during a peace-making process, when the Ajaweed deems it appropriate to integrate the oath taking (halifa/Qasam) mechanism. According to one informant⁷⁴¹ captured in Gado's thesis,

⁷⁴⁰ Mark Bradbury et al., *Local Peace Processes in Sudan. A Baseline Study* (Rift Valley Institute, 2006), 66

⁷⁴¹ Tribal leader from the Falata group (Names withheld by author) interview by Gado in "Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Sudan", June 10, 2010

when a violent confrontation occurs for example between pastoralists, the Ajaweed intervenes with the immediate action of an “al suf”. ‘Al suf’ in Arabic means, “line”. This is when the Ajaweed, based on the activation of the ‘al suf’, carry out necessary action to deter parties from any form of direct contact -whether at the market place, grazing area or the water point- until the conflict has been resolved amicably. This action is central to the prevention of any further violent outrages between both adversaries. The Ajaweed also refuses both conflicting parties any access to land if for example a competitive resource like “land” becomes the bone of contention. A restriction as this remains valid until a Judiyya proceeding has been initiated and concluded.

Oath taking is deliberately incorporated into the process at the point where the Ajaweed deem it necessary to enforce adherence to the created restrictions. The elders will then subject both parties to swearing an oath. The oath should elicit compliance to all of the preventive measures already initiated by the mediating elders. The community leader of the parties in conflict swears the oath on behalf of its members who are involved in the conflict. Most often a Quran is used, and the following words are proclaimed loudly⁷⁴²:

“Neither I nor any person from my part, will involve in any act or behaviour that might provoke the other party. The restricted measures made by the mediators to contain the situation, will by no means be violated. Unless a Judiyya is carried out to decide otherwise, I will respect these commitments and will make my group respect it too”.

At other times, the oath taking mechanism may be incorporated into a Judiyya mediatory session in order to ascertain guilt. The mechanism tends to accelerate the resolution of the dispute at hand regardless of a shortage in evidence against the accused. For instance, a group mounts allegation on another without the capacity to present enough evidence. The supposed offenders deny the allegation. The initial response from the Ajaweed would be to propose a dismissal of the case for lack of adequate evidence. However, as a matter of last resort the oath system may be activated. On the insistence of the plaintiff, the alleged offenders are subjected to swearing an oath. The accused often accepts to swear to the oath in order to defend their supposed inculpability. Unlike the oath taking procedure described in chapter five, the potency of this kind of oath taking is not necessarily tied to a certain deity or ancestor per se. In that unique case described in chapter five, the fear of being punished by the ancestors tends to impel

⁷⁴² Former deputy Magdoo of Fur (Names withheld by author) interview by Gado in “Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Sudan“, June 13, 2010. 243

parties towards confessing the truth. As part of a Judiyya process however, oath taking is conceived of as an evidential act, in favour of the plaintiff. It is basically carried out to fulfil the bidding of the group presenting the claims. Once the oath is sworn, it is an indication that the alleged offender may not have been guilty as accused. The parties then proceed to shake hands. This is a sign that peaceful relations have resumed, and the conflict forthwith terminated. The one condition attached to this kind of Judiyya oath swearing, is that the alleged offenders must have to swear the oath in accordance with the preferences of the party tabling the allegation. For example, the accused may be requested to either place their hands on the holy Quran, a spear or a piece of wood. Alternatively, they can be asked to mention the name of a spiritually gifted Muslim cleric. Although the reason for invoking the sanctity of a spiritually gifted person is unknown, its execution is crucial to the process as a way of repelling the capacity for an offender to tell lies under oath.⁷⁴³

Conclusion

This chapter has concentrated on furnishing the reader with insight into Darfur's conflict resolution and peace-making heritage. It examined a peace-making culture, relied upon to preserve societal coherence in a setting defined by its unique multi-ethnic configuration. From the era of the sultans up until the immediate post independent phase of Sudanese history such indigenous peace-making mechanisms have remained relevant especially to Sudan's rural societies. Years of evolution have impacted positively and sometimes negatively, on the development of a peace-making institution struggling to withstand the test of time largely since its initial abolition in 1970. It is important to reiterate nonetheless that modern and more formal peace-making institutions and apparatuses do exist in the modern-day Sudanese state. This by extension also applies to Darfur. However formal peace-making structures have not measured up to the capacity required to preserve sanity within the society. Indeed, this has engendered, within a predominantly rural setting like that of Sudan's western province, a persistently prevailing preference for the more indigenous forms of peace-making. Ordinary Darfurians still find solution to their problems in spite of the diminishing legitimacy of indigenous actors and culturally inspired mechanisms. One notable aspect of the entire system as was established in this chapter, is the fact that indigenous peace actors and their attendant institutions never

⁷⁴³ Zuhair Bashir Gado, "Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Sudan: Inter-Tribal Reconciliation Conferences in South Darfur State up to 2009" (PhD diss., University of Bradford, 2013) University of Bradford e-Thesis. 243-245

operated in isolation. Dating back to the sultanate, indigenous mechanisms largely depended on the strong endorsement from the government of the day. Darfur's indigenous peace-making institutions and actors may have withstood the tides of day-to-day conflicts on the macro level. The question however remains: what are the prospects of such peace and reconciliation strategies in conflicts of the kind, which have prevailed on Darfuri soil since 2003?

Chapter Nine

9.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I intend to examine the role indigenous actors and mechanisms play in conjunction with CAS in the management and resolution of the conflicts on the grassroots since the arrival of UNAMID. I have selected for this task a number of conflicts as analysed in reports obtained from CAS SN during my visit to north Darfur in 2014. By now, the reader has become conversant with this study's continued allusion to Lederach assumptions, which underscores the essence of initiating reconciliation for parties enmeshed in a long history defined by conflict. He underlines the need to restore broken relationships and perpetuate harmonious co-existence. Also, I identified Darfuri actors charged with the task of reconciliation, as well as mechanisms used in the compensation of aggrieved parties in order to consolidate the reconciliation. Such efforts as elucidated, are geared towards the preservation of societal co-existence. I have equally established that the NA constitutes a part of the stakeholders incorporated into the peace process.

My final task is to examine to what degree the NA and its integral parts are perceived as relevant actors in the restoration of peace to the ongoing war in Darfur. Within the scope of my analysis are those conflicts that have freshly erupted between 2012 and April 2013. This was the period when Darfur experienced a renewed spate of intertribal conflicts. However, I have not excluded from my analysis updated reports on the conflicts that erupted after 2003 and especially since the arrival of UNAMID in 2008. This is also specifically so because the purview of the entire thesis covers the period from 2003-2014. It is also worth reiterating that the data for this analysis was gathered from sector north. All of the conflicts mentioned in this analysis have occurred inside the geographical space of northern Darfur. They comprise two major conflicts and three minor ones. Finally, in pursuit of the main question guiding this thesis, I ask the question: Does CAS via the conflict management cell rely solely on the Native Administration, the Judiyya, the Ajaweed and the Diya in its attempt to actualize the mandate for resolution and more specifically reconciliation?

9.2 Inter-tribal conflicts on the grassroots of Darfur: the prospects of applying indigenous peace-making mechanisms to modern conflicts.

In 2010, Julie Flint writing a working paper titled "The Other war: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur, noted a rising trend in inter-tribal conflicts in the aftermath of the signing of the Darfur

Peace Agreement in 2006. The author specifically highlighted the emergence of intra-tribal fighting among Arab groups in Darfur who nearly a decade earlier, had served to perpetuate the government of Sudan's (GoS) counter-insurgency war against the rebellion of 2003. The conflict between the Missiriya and the Northern Rizeigat as precisely narrated, occurred in the southern part of Darfur and became the bloodiest in the wake of de-escalating tensions between the government and the armed movements. Amidst the known reasons underlying the Darfur conflict itself, the fighting between these two Arab groups according to the author depicted:

“a struggle for the spoils of the counter-insurgency- use of, and access across, the land from which the “Janjaweed”, drove farming tribes perceived to be aligned with the armed movements.” Darfur’s reconciliation mechanism: the Diya allegedly played a decisive role in terminating the conflict and reconciling the parties. ⁷⁴⁴

In similar vein a trend analysis report from the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) in May 2013 reported the escalation of Inter-Tribal Clashes in Darfur from July 2012 –April 2013. That report outlined major inter- and intra-tribal conflicts among the following groups: Between the Northern Rizeigat and the Masalit in Masteri, Rizeigat v. Dinka Malual in Samaha, Northern Rizeigat v. Beni Hussein in Jabel Amer, Gimir v. Beni Halba in Ed El Fursan, Salamat v. Misseriya in Zalingei, Salamat v. Misseriya/ Taa’isha in Um Dukhun and Rahad El Berdi and also between the Rizeigat and Misseriya in confirmation of Julie Flint’s write up from 2010. On the one hand the report drew attention to the proliferation of weapons as one of the factors fuelling the eruption of conflict in recent years.⁷⁴⁵ Following that line of thought, analysts suggest that the prevalence of sophisticated weaponry in the hands of belligerent groups evidences a perceived sign of imbalance in local power politics that diminishes further the legitimacy of traditional governing structures. It tends to accentuate a disposition among fighting groups, which is perceived as being detrimental to the peace-making capacity of elders and the application of indigenous mechanisms in disputes of inter-tribal bearing.⁷⁴⁶

On the other hand, and regardless of the arms possession discourse, that report informs that local reconciliation mechanism constituted a conflict-mitigating factor, almost successfully

⁷⁴⁴ Julie Flint, "The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur," Small Arms Survey, last modified October 2010, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-22-The-Other-War-Inter-Arab-Conflict-in-Darfur.pdf>

⁷⁴⁵ UNAMID, *Trend Analysis: Escalations of Inter-Tribal Clashes in Darfur: July 2012 - April 2013*, (El-Fasher North Darfur: Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), 2013).

⁷⁴⁶ Director Peace Research Institute University of Khartoum, Personal, Khartoum Sudan April 13, 2014. (Names withheld)

filling the gap where inept formal institutions created the vacuum that had engendered a nagging security dilemma.⁷⁴⁷

Using the precise wordings of that report, it stated thus:

*“In the absence of established conventional justice system, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms serve the purpose of settling disputes and provide a sense of justice to the involved parties. If not total successful, reconciliation efforts have led to the reduction of inter-tribal tensions in some case”.*⁷⁴⁸

Some examples of conflicts where indigenous mechanisms became applicable to tribal disputes included those between the Rizeigat and Misseriya as well as those of the Rizeigat and the Dinka in Malual in Samaha. The map 2 in the appendix shows pockets of conflict eruptions around Darfur states between 2012 and 2013.⁷⁴⁹ When I arrived in 2014, Darfur states were still reeling from these inter and intra-tribal conflicts. On that account, it was possible to gain access to some data cataloguing the occurrences of northern Darfur’s fair share of conflict eruptions in recent times and since the arrival of UNAMID. It is against that backdrop that I commence this analysis by examining 3 of the minor conflicts before probing into northern Darfur’s most devastating conflict, which occurred in 2013 between the Northern Rizeigat and the Beni Hussein.

Up to this point it is evident that inter-tribal conflicts have overridden the initial conflict that emerged in 2003 between the GoS and the insurgent groups. Inter-tribal conflicts have not only become prevalent, the magnitude of its devastation does call for serious concern as these conflicts continue to constitute a major threat to peace and security in Darfur. To this end some observers may prescribe indigenous peace-making mechanisms as a good starting point in the quest for peace among tribal groupings. That position remains to be validated in the course of this analysis. In the five conflicts that will be examined, background information to the conflict will be provided. Furthermore, tribal groups involved in the fighting will be identified, as well as attendant localities from where these conflicts erupted. The root causes and as much as possible the triggers will be unearthed. Eventually I will endeavour to ascertain the role of indigenous mechanisms either as a lone option for making peace, or as a mechanism utilised in collaboration with CAS initiatives. As the case may be, I will equally examine instances where

⁷⁴⁷ UNAMID, “Trend Analysis”, 3

⁷⁴⁸ UNAMID, “Trend Analysis”, 3

⁷⁴⁹ *ibid*

such mechanism became irrelevant in the efforts tailored towards resolving the conflict and reconciling its parties.

9.3 Conflict One:

Conflict in the Korma locality of northern Darfur. ⁷⁵⁰

9.3.1 Background:

The villages of Kafod, Kuma Garadayat, and the Kobe Athar fall under the administrative unit of the Korma locality. These terrains have accommodated a mixture of African and Arabs groups known to have enjoyed harmonious relations over a long period of time. The Kafod area in particular evidences such tribal blend with communities like the Tunjur, Berti, Gowama, Arabs, Zaghawas and other minority groups who prior to the carnage of 2003 had lived side by side and in relative unison. With the implosion of Darfur more than a decade ago, African and Arab tribes each established political affinities with the armed groups and with the GoS in its campaign against insurgent groups respectively. As Arab tribes ostensibly became pitted against African groups, it seemed like a united front on each side, until the deep controversy that corroded the unity of the movements in 2005 emerged, revealing a new and divergent dimension to the conflict. In the aftermath of the 2006 DPA specifically, it became possible to speak of the presence of political alignments with factional groups such as the SLM/ MM, SLM/ AW or SLM/ Free Will. The Tunjur for example were core followers of SLA/Free Will. In essence, the conflict of insurgency mutated to factional fighting either between supporters of Minni Minawi and Abdel Wahid from 2005 to 2006 or in 2007 and 2008 among loyalist of the SLA/MM and SLA/ FW also embroiled in fighting in the Kuma Garadyat and Kobi area. These belligerents ostensibly constituted African groups engaged in a power tussle with one another, over political dominance in these specified communities.

9.3.2 Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation

For order to be reinstated in these villages, three peace actors became involved in mapping out solutions to the conflict: The Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Council, which was created by the DPA to oversee conflict situations in Darfur. UNAMID'S CAS and the Ajaweed mediators. The initiated mediation process, which hinged on the Judiyya mechanism culminated with the

⁷⁵⁰ UNAMID, *Conflict Zone: Kafod, Kuma Garadayat & Kobe Athar*, (El-Fasher North Darfur: Civil Affairs Sector North, 2012).

signing of a local ceasefire agreement in El Fasher on the 26th of August 2009. The peace actors in essence relied on the Judiyya peace-making process as well as attendant custodians of the process: (the Ajaweed) to re-establish peace and security in these communities. As a follow up on the negotiated peace settlement, the peace actors proceeded to conduct dissemination sessions as a way of lending credence to the signed agreement. It aimed at informing members of each community involved about the conditions under which the conflict was terminated. It also drew awareness to the imperative to preserve the secured peace. In this case, CAS played the role of supporter and enabler. Backing as well as enabling the actualization of initiatives geared towards the peaceful transformation of the conflict.

9.4 Conflict Two:

Conflict in the Kutum and Alwaha localities in North Darfur⁷⁵¹

9.4.1 Background:

The Kutum area had been an economically vibrant locality dealing in agriculture and animal livestock. Located approx. 120km northwest of El-Fasher, the town rich in arable land, is regarded as the headquarters of the Kutum and Al-waha localities. Prior to the recently escalated conflict of 2012, the town surrounded by nomadic villages, maintained commercial momentum from providing the link roads between Darfur and Libya. The demographic configuration of the area captures a predominantly Arabs population in the Al-waha locality while tribes like the Tunjur, Fur, Zaghawa, Kinneen, Birgid to mention a few constitute the majority in Kutum town and in the IDP camps in Kassan and Fatta borno.

In 2003 Kutum came under the siege of SLA factions. In 2004 a turn in the tide of events saw the movements capitulate to the control of the GoS and its proxy forces. Unfolding events ostensibly turned the area into the quintessence of a battleground.

These clashes mirrored the devastating tensions not only between the GoS and the rebel movements, but also at some point, depicted the fragmentation that characterised rebel groups seeking political alignments from among tribal groupings in the area. Historically conflicts between Arabs and non-Arabs derived from the economic marginalization narrative by which the entire Darfur region is defined. Depleting resources exacerbated by the climatic conditions

⁷⁵¹ UNAMID, *Civil Affairs Section, Locality Profile June 2013. Kutum and Al-Waha localities in North Darfur*, (El-Fasher North Darfur: Civil Affairs Sector North, 2013).

of the 1970s and the 1980s contributed to the escalation of conflicts in the area. Since 2003 disputes have become politically motivated, precipitating spates of inter-tribal clashes. In August 2012, conflict erupted in the Kutum area following the assassination of an Al-Waha commissioner by unidentified armed men. The commissioner who was murdered in the Kutum market was putatively a member of the Arab Mahamid. The Mahamid tribe shares kinship with the Abbala Arabs otherwise referred to as the Northern Rezeigat. In response to the attack on one of its own, the Mahamid retaliated by launching a massive attack on the IDPs located in Kassab and Fatta Borno. It seemed that the revenge attack was based on impulse, as allegations tended to be devoid of concrete evidence as was perceived from the report. Indeed, a separate report traced the murder of the commissioner in the market place to a reprisal attack conducted by a separate Arab group referred to as the Arab Zeyadiya. The Arab Zeyadiya reportedly accused members of the Arab Mahamid of their refusal to submit its members suspected to have been involved in the elimination of a Zeyadiyah top official in Kutum.⁷⁵² Evidently, the attack on the camps seemed misdirected. This resulted not only in the looting of property in the IDP camps but also the displacement of 25,000 IDPs from the Kassab IDP camp as well as from Kutum town. The incidence nonetheless, underscores the prevailing trend of attacks by government-backed militias on fellow Arabs.

9.4.2 Restoring peace in the Kutum area

An initial report from November 2012, made no direct reference to the potential role of Darfur's peace-making mechanisms or custodians in this conflict. Nevertheless, the report alluded to the prospects of applying inter-community dialogue to the conflict. On the account that the conflict exhibited minimal connection to hitherto prevalent historical rifts over resources, it became evident based on that report that "inters community-dialogue, if applied, would become counterproductive to the peace envisaged. It further pointed out that the conflict, which accurately should be defined along the lines of a political conflict, must be addressed using the appropriate tools. In fact, that report pointed out salient issues: The most significant for this analysis basically reflected CAS's incapability to initiate the path towards peace and reconciliation. Certainly, stringent regulations debarred CAS from a full engagement in the process. CAS was required to seek formal approval from the government of North Darfur. The report states that:

⁷⁵² UNAMID, *No such thing as Local Conflict: Prospects for Inter-community dialogues in Kutum*, (El-Fasher: Civil Affairs Sector North, 2012).

“The space for local reconciliation is controlled by the government” ... in that light the initiation of “parallel processes” by CAS could be interpreted as an act of defiance against the laws of the state. Even though UNAMID and by extension CAS, operates within a framework which authorises it to delve into matters of resolution and reconciliation. It must constantly rely on the prior approval of the host nation to take decisive steps towards the fulfilment of its duties. If CAS were resolved to broker peace between the belligerent groups, its final option was to consider co-operation with the government. To partner with the government in a conflict with political undertones (where the government is assumed to be in support of the Arab group) was tantamount to CAS undermining the mission’s guiding principles: To maintain a neutral stance at all times. In any case, as at the time that report was drafted in 2012, CAS understood the need to uphold the mandate, which authorised conflict resolution and reconciliation on the grassroots but remained handicapped in the face of the realities on ground.

A second document from 2013 reported that representatives from the Al-Waha and Kutum localities signed a peace agreement in January 2013. Putatively, both communities acquiesced in the peaceful co-existence agreement during a forum organised in El-Fasher, to promote peaceful co-existence among communities. The agreement allegedly contained a 60-point recommendation on the way forward in the area of security as well as economic and socio-cultural concerns. Even though this second document highlighted the significance of “Traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution” it lacked evidence on the involvement of the Native Administration, the Ajaweed or even the Judiyya in achieving peace to the localities under review.

9.5 Conflict three:

Conflict in the “Triangle”: In the Malha, Mellit and Kuma localities⁷⁵³

9.5.1 Background:

Three tribes dominate the Malha, Mellit and Kuma localities referred to as the triangle. They are the African tribes of the Meidob and Berti as well as the Arab Zayadyah respectively. The Meidob earn a living through pastoralist activities. The Berti are predominantly famers while the Zayadyah survive on farming and cattle herding. Until 2003, the Mellit town was famously regarded as the commercial hub of the triangle and a trade route connecting the town of

⁷⁵³ UNAMID, *Conflict profile of Malha, Mellit and Kuma " Triangle",* (El-Fasher, Darfur: Civil Affairs Sector North, n.d).

Omduruman, Libya and Egypt. The Malha locality was known around the early 1970s as the base for the first Custom Office for trade between Libya and the Sudan, while the Zayadyah women distinguished themselves on the basis of their handcraft. Regardless of a history of peaceful co-existence reinforced with inter-tribal marriage, the three major tribes of the triangle have witnessed periods of incessant fighting as provoked by competition over land. In the early 1990s conflicts erupted between the Berti and the Zayadyah over rights to land. The Zayadyah had asserted ownership of four Hakura (traditional land rights) around the Mellit area. The Berti putatively debunked such claims and promptly initiated the expulsion of the Zayadyah from the said lands. The Meidob, the third major tribe in the triangle, who were also the neutral party, initially made numerous futile attempts to mediate the conflict. Eventually two follow up attempts at organising a peace conference tended to yield result. The Sayah and the Mellit conferences seemed to have reinstated the peace and mended broken relations, however this was short-lived as fighting resumed in August 2012. The land issue, which in the first instance precipitated the fighting, was left unaddressed. As the peace remained elusive, the government waded in to schedule a peace conference, which ultimately targeted the restoration of peace contingent on addressing the major underlying issue: land.

A similar conflict on the Berti- Meidob frontiers emerged around the year 2000. Land constituted the major bone of contention between the two belligerent African tribes. An attack by the Berti on the Meidob supposedly triggered the conflict. In a bid to frustrate the Meidob out of the locality the Berti allegedly engaged in the harassment of the Meidob, the blockage of their trading routes and the closure of the customs office, which had served to support trading activities.⁷⁵⁴ To return the locality to normalcy, a peace conference was organised and based on the traditional diya (compensation money) both parties consented to a local ceasefire that was signed in 2001. By 2003, the conflicts in the triangle had assumed a political dimension. Although the area had been prone to conflict, the triangle became emblematic of the war between the armed movements and the GoS. In the meantime, resource-based conflicts had largely remained unresolved aggravating tensions to unprecedented heights. The political undertone deepened the age long historical anger due to land, while the involvement of the Zayadyah as puppets in the counter-insurgency campaign of the GoS, spelt further doom.

⁷⁵⁴ UNAMID, *Conflict profile of Malha, Mellit and Kuma " Triangle",* (El-Fasher, Darfur: Civil Affairs Sector North, n.d).

The Zayadyah capitalizing on historical grievances of land deprivation utilized such advantaged position as the government's proxy force to unleash terror on their neighbours within the triangle: the Meidob and Berti. In 2005 a peace conference called on all parties to the conflict, with the notion to chart the trajectory towards a durable solution to the conflict. The conflict however remained unresolved as the Zayadyah and the Meidob failed to arrive at any compromise with respect to the root cause to the conflict: land and access to water points. In 2008 the three tribes (Berti, Meidob and Zayadyah) consented to abide by the established "no hostility zone" A separate conference held in 2011 intended to consolidate on the agreements from previous conferences.

9.5.2 Searching for Peace: The role of CAS

In seeking to restore peace to the triangle, Darfur's peace-making mechanisms were found to have played a significant role. The Diya was activated to serve justice to the victims as well as to address all the loss accrued from the prolonged conflict between the Berti and the Meidob. Participating actors to the peace process from 2000 until 2012 included indigenous actors and the government. The effectiveness of these indigenous mechanisms varied especially with the change in conflict dynamics in 2003. It seemed that the clout of indigenous actors with respect to the politicized nature of the conflict had diminished or become ineffective. CAS played no major role in the resolution and peace process. Indeed, the profile report lacked any evidence of CAS's direct involvement in the path to actualise peace within the triangle. The proliferation of small arms in the hands of civilians as stated by that report, ostensibly undermined any concrete engagement of CAS in the peace process. It calls to question the essence of UNAMID's military wing in effectively providing protection to unarmed personnel at the risk attack in their line of duty. To surmount the constraint, the document recommended the commencement of a disarmament and demilitarization programme that will facilitate the entrance of CAS into the conflict area. Taking away weapons from the custody of civilians grants CAS direct access to the affected population in the "triangle" and to the belligerents themselves. Such access can enhance the delivery of accurate conflict mapping and based on such analysis the planning and implementation of appropriate peace initiatives with prospects for durable peace.

9.6 Conflict Four:

The conflict between the Zaghawa and the local communities in the Shangil Tobaya and the surrounding areas.⁷⁵⁵

9.6.1 Historical background and conflict:

Successive periods of drought between the early and late 20th century induced the migration of the Zaghawa from their original homelands. Around the early 1970s similar devastating ecological condition occasioned a major migration southward into the Shangil Tobaya area dominated by the indigenous Tunjurs. Since then the Zaghawa have become a constituent population in the Shangil Tobaya area. In addition to the Zaghawa, tribes like the Mima, Fallata, Birgid, and the Fur inhabit the Shangil Tobaya. It is considered to be the economic nerve centre of Northern Darfur, linking the capital El_Fasher with Nyala via trading areas and large cultivable lands.⁷⁵⁶ The Shangil Tobaya area started to record intermittent conflict around 1976, shortly after the arrival of the Zaghawa. History has it that the Zaghawa became enmeshed in disputes with their neighbours who constantly accused them of planned domination and the determination to usurp lands belonging to their host community. The Zaghawa are putatively vibrant, industrious and assertive in nature. In fact, it is believed that the migration of the Zaghawas southwards, which contributed to their advancement in different spheres of life, was the orchestration of the Zaghawa elites at home and in diaspora⁷⁵⁷.

Contingent upon a seemingly dominating character, the Zaghawa tend to invariably earn the hatred and distrust of their neighbours. Specifically, Zaghawa to the north of south Darfur and those located in the east of North Darfur fall the most prey to hate motivated confrontations. A typical example was around the 1990s when the Birgid ignited a wave of violence with the slaughter of 8 Zaghawa men. Although it turned out to be a futile venture, the motivation was to eject the Zaghawa from the northern part of south Darfur. Since being enlisted as part of the government's counter insurgency war in 2003 nonetheless, the Birgid have successfully expelled the Zaghawa from areas like the Jadeed in southern Darfur. In 1991 competition over power precipitated the eruption of a separate conflict between the Zaghawa and the Mima.

⁷⁵⁵ UNAMID, *The dynamics of Conflict between the Zaghawa and the local community in Shangil Tobaya and the surrounding areas*, (El-Fasher: Civil Affairs Sector North, 2011) 1-12

⁷⁵⁶ UNAMID Civil Affairs, *Dar el Sallam-Shangil Tobaya-Kalimendo Conflict Mapping*, (El-Fasher Darfur: Civil Affairs Sector North, n.d). 1

⁷⁵⁷ UNAMID, "The Dynamics", 1

Today, the Zaghawa predominantly constitute members of the SLA and JEM who in 2003 commenced the war against the GoS over the economic marginalization of Darfur region.

9.6.2 Conflict since 2003

The Shangil Tobaya area fell to the hegemonic control of the SLA/ MM in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion, which engulfed the entire Darfur in 2003. Since then other tribes like the indigenous Tunjur and the Birgid for example, have expressed discontent over the adverse treatment meted out to them by the SLA/MM and its cohorts within the Zaghawa group. Such has propelled hostile responses from the suppressed tribes toward members of the Zaghawa community and exacerbated precarious conditions in the area. Following the violent hostilities between Minni Minawi (the only signatory to the 2006 agreement) and the GoS over violations to the signed DPA, the conflict in the Shangil Tobaya is said to have mutated into intensified confrontations between the armed movements and the GoS. So as to gain political ascendancy over the movements, the GoS putatively recruited and mobilized hundreds of tribesmen from the Tunjur, Mima and Birgid (the suppressed groups) to form an alliance against the stronghold of the Zaghawa in the area.⁷⁵⁸ The fighting between the rebels and the GoS ultimately reached its peak in December 2010. Since the established alliance between the government forces and the local militia in the area, the expulsion of Zaghawa by their neighbours has continued unabated prompting a refugee situation in camps around Nyala and El-Fasher.⁷⁵⁹ The execution of 17 civilians by the government-backed militia in 2011 precipitated renewed violence in the area. A reprisal attack by the Zaghawa further aggravated security concerns and displaced a huge number of civilians.

9.6.3 Mapping out the path towards peace:

Preliminary action centred on supplying relief to the victims. CAS SS in December 2010 waded in to access the conflict and provide humanitarian aid. In January 2011 CAS without specific reference to which particular sector, initiated separate peace meetings with the Native Administration leaders of the Zaghawa and the Birgid tribes. The discussion targeted the initiation of collaborative efforts with the capacity to restore harmony to both communities. Similarly, an initial response (by local government officials and leaders) to investigate the

⁷⁵⁸ UNAMID, "The Dynamics", 3

⁷⁵⁹ *ibid*, 3

assassination of the 17 civilians and forestall impending retaliation attacks, was reportedly thwarted by an ambush mounted by local militias. In April 2011 CAS held a meeting with the Shartay of the Shangil Tobaya and the head of the Shangil Tobaya transitional committee on how to establish a platform for both parties to express their grievances, resolve the conflict and be reconciled to one another. CAS continued to monitor the conflict until 2013 when a substantial initiative for peace emerged.

In November 2013 CAS organized a workshop for 30 Native Administrators and community leaders of Dare Salam and Kalimando localities in El-Fasher. It was tagged “Strengthening Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanism”⁷⁶⁰ The central team bordered on reviving the diminished legitimacy of indigenous leaders as well as on the resuscitation of mechanisms for peace and reconciliation. The workshop objectives included:

1. To facilitate a joint interactive discussion between Dar al salam and Kalimando rival parties and to gauge their perception on prospects of peaceful coexistence among them.
2. To enhance the Traditional Conflict Resolution and Management Mechanisms to become relevant in resolving the conflict in Kalimando and Daru-salam localities.
3. To give the participants an opportunity in a participatory approach to share ideas on conflict analysis and the best practical ways of resolving conflicts by Traditional Conflict Resolution and Management Mechanisms.⁷⁶¹

The workshop created the “space” for belligerent groups to establish a compromise amidst apparent differences that had emerged as a result of prolonged fighting. It provided the opportunity for both parties to discuss the path towards revivifying communal harmony contingent upon Darfur’s peace-making heritage. Guest speakers reminded the parties of the era during the Sultanate when traditional leaders beyond exhibiting political astuteness, utilized Darfur’s mechanisms for peace and reconciliation, to preserve societal coherence and maintain stability. The workshop equally created the platform for participants to discuss in groups around the following questions:

- a. Is the Judiyya a relevant mechanism to successfully resolve the post 2003 conflicts in Darfur?

⁷⁶⁰ UNAMID, *UNAMID-Civil Affairs Section: A Workshop report on Strengthening Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms for the Community of Darussalam and Kalimando Localities*, (El-Fasher, Darfur: Civil Affairs Sector North, 2013).1-5

⁷⁶¹ UNAMID, “A Workshop report”, 1

- b. How to revive traditional peace mechanisms to successfully resolve conflicts in Darfur
- c. Whether the key community religious leaders and Native Administration can play an active role in resolving current conflicts in Darfur
- d. What measures are required to ensure peaceful co-existence among rival tribes in the two localities?⁷⁶²

The workshop concluded with the formation of a nine-member follow-up committee comprising members from both communities charged with the responsibility of implementing recommendations from the workshop.

The idea behind CAS's adoption of the workshop approach in the Shangil Tobaya conflict can be linked to Lederach reflections on the "Elicitive Model". The elicitive approach according to the author:

*"Starts from the vantage point that training (workshops) is an opportunity aimed primarily at discovery, creation and solidification of models that emerge from the resources present in a particular setting and respond to needs in that context" ... "Participants and their knowledge are seen as primary resource for the training, whether or not they initially see themselves as such..."*⁷⁶³

Likewise, the author finds that:

*"The foundation of this approach is that this implicit indigenous knowledge about the way of being and doing is a valued resource for creating and sustaining appropriate models of conflict resolution in a given setting... Primary emphasis is placed on first discovering and identifying what people have in place and already know about the strength and weaknesses of their own models of conflict resolution".*⁷⁶⁴

These reflections from the author, allows the reader make sense of the workshop approach as a technique CAS utilizes to reinvigorate traditional leaders to the level of conscious detachment from political sentiments, towards the rediscovery of their erstwhile position as advocates of social re-engineering.

⁷⁶² *ibid*, 2

⁷⁶³ John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 55.

⁷⁶⁴ *ibid*

CAS has therefore refrained from imposing on the conflict in the Shangil Tobaya locality, an approach to peace that the people cannot relate to. Instead it reconnects traditional leaders to their cultural peace-making heritage reliant upon the workshop approach.

Similarly, participants acknowledged the “*strengths and weaknesses of their own model of conflict resolution*”.

Reacting to the first question tabled for discussion:

“Is the Judiyya a relevant mechanism to successfully resolve the post 2003 conflicts in Darfur?”

Participants acknowledged the current challenges facing indigenous peace-making mechanisms in Darfur. Deliberations culminated with the conclusion that the efficacy of the Judiyya can be revamped as well as sustained, and ultimately utilised in the resolution of the post 2003 conflicts in Darfur, if adopted in its undiluted form.

Underscoring this position further, participants noted the imperativeness attached to “selecting neutral mediating members who are aware of the general context, the root causes of the respective conflicts and interests of the rival groups”. As a concluding statement, participants suggested:

“the empowerment, training, support and protection of the mediators, so as to enhance their positive contribution to activities of reconciliation”.⁷⁶⁵

In response to the second question on how to revive traditional peace mechanisms to successfully resolve conflicts in Darfur, participants uncovered additional factors capable of undermining the effectiveness of Darfur’s peace-making resources: the appalling proliferation of weapons and a corollary predilection for the use of weapons and violence in addressing discontent. This has corroded (among Darfuri youths) the essence of a peaceful and non-violent approach to conflict as defined by Darfur’s indigenous mechanisms for peace. In order that posterity may be reconnected with Darfur’s peace-making heritage, participants suggested the:

⁷⁶⁵ UNAMID, “A Workshop report”, 3

“Documentation and dissemination of traditional conflict resolution mechanism and norms within the community, in schools and universities to transfer the experience to new generations”⁷⁶⁶

Another debilitating factor confronted the participants while examining the third question, which investigated into the role of women and youths in achieving peace and resolving conflicts in Darfur. Participants identified that the role of women, specifically in the conflict under review, was misplaced. Women with particular reference to the Hakkamat for example, (traditional singers) must replace the role of “singing war supporting songs” with the chants of peace. Recommendations specified further:

“That women and youths should be trained on conflict resolution management and reconciliation to positively contribute to conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence.”⁷⁶⁷

Participant’s general assessment of the workshop rated: very good. Yet, there is no way of ascertaining further, whether indeed changes did occur in the attitude and perception of the leaders to both rival groups, and whether these changes were transferable to conflict itself. What may be certain nonetheless, is that with the workshop approach, CAS SN evidenced what Lederach suggests is the attitude of a trainer operating within the rubrics of an elicitive approach:

“I do not have the answer (CAS SN), but I can work together with others (Traditional leaders) on a process (Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms) that may help us find it”

9.7 Conflict five:

The conflict between the Beni Hussein and Abbala/ Northern Rizeigat in north Darfur.

9.7.1 Introduction

The last conflict that I will be examining occurred in the north of Darfur in 2013. It is considered to be one of the major violent escalations between two Arab groups: The Beni Hussein and the Northern Rezeigat also referred to as the Abbala tribes. Observers of the Darfur conflict seem to possess wider knowledge about the on-going confrontations between Arab and Non-Arab

⁷⁶⁶ UNAMID, “A Workshop report”, 3

⁷⁶⁷ *ibid*

groups, vis-a-vis the GoS backed militias and the war against the rebel movements. Only little is known about the current trend of conflict eruptions in Darfur.

In recent years, it has become possible to speak about intra- Arab conflict escalations. Arabs have also become the victims of what the authors of Darfur's Gold Rush refers to as: "State-Sponsored Atrocities".⁷⁶⁸ The conflict between the Beni Hussein and the Abbala over rights to the gold mines in Jebel Amer (El –Sereif Locality in north Darfur), broke out precisely on the 5th of January 2013. As of 2013 it was regarded as the cause of the biggest humanitarian crisis Darfur had experienced in recent years.⁷⁶⁹ It recorded hundreds of casualties and resulted in the displacement of over 30,000 civilians.⁷⁷⁰ While history has it that both Arabs groups have co-existed peacefully, the recent occurrences tend to lend credence to the "politicized tribal war" narrative spreading across all of Darfur. Even though the Beni Hussein are an Arab group, the GoS was unable to co-opt them into the Para-military forces purposed for the counter-insurgency war against the armed movements.

The Northern Rezeigat on their part, also Arabs, have earned notoriety as the government back militia dubbed the "Janjaweed". The Janjaweed have perpetrated numerous atrocities against innocent civilians since the outset of the war in 2003. Before proceeding further, it is imperative at this juncture, to provide background information to both Arabs groups. It will become explicit why the Beni Hussein as a group, rejected enlistment into the GoS proxy forces.

9.7.2 Background to the tribes:

The Northern Rezeigat:

The Northern Rezeigat are camel herders who trace their origin to Chad. They are mainly located in the North, West and Central parts of Darfur. It is common in Darfur to differentiate between the Northern Rezeigat (Abbala tribes) and the Southern Rezeigat (Baggara). In contrast to the Abbala, the Baggara inhabit the Southern part of Darfur and earn their livelihood as cattle herders. While the Southern Rezeigat are a landowning Arab group, with traditional rights to Hakura in Darfur, the Abbala based on their nomadic lifestyle are a landless group. They own

⁷⁶⁸ See, Omer Ismail and Akshaya Kumar, "Darfur's Gold Rush: State-Sponsored Atrocities 10 Years After the Genocide," Enough Satellite Sentinel Project, last modified May 2013, <http://www.enoughproject.org>.

⁷⁶⁹ UNAMID, *Report on conflict between the Beni-Hussein and Abbala tribes in Darfur*, (El-Fasher: Civil Affairs Section, 2013) 1

⁷⁷⁰ UNAMID, *Conflict between the Beni Hussein and Abbala/N. Rezeigat, in North Darfur*, (El-Fasher: Civil Affairs Section, n.d). 1

what in Darfur is referred to as Damrats (Settlement villages) around the Kutum town. As alluded to earlier, the Northern Rezeigat were enlisted into the government's auxiliary forces and later incorporated into the GoS's Border Guards and Central Reserve Police. With the outset of the War in 2003, the Abbala are known to have been financially, militarily and politically bolstered by the government in Khartoum.

The Beni Hussein:

The Beni Hussein have inhabited the El-Sererif locality, northwest of the Kabkabiya in northern Darfur since the British Colonial era. They are a pastoralist group also majorly engaged in sedentary farming. Unlike the Abbala Arabs of northern Darfur, the Beni Hussein are a land owning Arab group as well. It is believed that their refusal to be aligned especially with the counter insurgency war stems from their ability to lay claims to their own traditional homeland (Dar). Since the eruption of the conflict in 2003, the Beni Hussein Native Administration have successfully steered its community clear from embroilments in the cancerous battles between the GoS and the rebel movements.⁷⁷¹ Regardless of hostilities, between the Beni Hussein and the Zaghawa in 1992, the group is considered the most peaceful Arab tribe found to maintain a harmonious co-existence with neighbours like the Fur, Massalit and the Gimir.

9.7.3 The Conflict:

Since the discovery of gold in the Jebel Amer, El-Sereif locality in 2011, the area has attracted over 60,000 gold mine workers from within Darfur, other parts of Sudan as well as from neighbouring countries like Chad, the Central African Republic and Nigeria. Mining activities are said to have proceeded peacefully under the control of the Beni Hussein (the traditional owners of the land on which gold was discovered). A local committee created by Native Administrators of the Beni Hussein, specifically to oversee all mining activities, mitigated conflicts among the mineworkers and preserved security in the area.⁷⁷² In fact, the committee equally controlled the licensing of mining permits in the area.⁷⁷³ Interested miners acted in conformity with the modus operandi specified for extraction by the landowners until a group

⁷⁷¹ See, Mahmood Mamdani, "Civil War, Rebellion and Repression," in *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009), 261.

⁷⁷² UNAMID, Dynamics of Conflict between Beni Hussein and the Northern Rezeigat (Abbala) in Jabel Amir (El-Sereif Locality), (El-Fasher: Civil Affairs Section, 2013).

⁷⁷³ Ismail and Kumar, "Darfur's Gold Rush." "7

of Abbala Arabs invaded the locality to commence mining activities without the formal notification of committee members.

Controversy ensued, in which the Beni Hussein assertively demanded for the Abbala to terminate its activities till all protocols were duly observed. The face-off resulted in the killing of one N. Rezeigat, while three committee members sustained injuries.⁷⁷⁴ As tension continued to mount, both parties began to record an increase in the number of casualties: 8 killed and 15 injured from the Beni Hussein, 30 dead and 50 injured from among the Abbala. This happened on January 4, 2013. The day after, on January 5, the Abbala mobilized its members. A devastating assault on the minefield and on 65 Beni Hussein villages precipitated the displacement of about 100,000 civilians.⁷⁷⁵ Intense fighting continued until January 13, 2013

9.7.4 Mitigating the conflict, and searching for peace

The initial action taken by CAS SN Crisis Management Cell (CMC) between January 13 and 14 was to embark on a verification mission to the affected locality. An analysis of the conflict was conducted to ascertain the local dynamics and deliberate on the most appropriate approach to handling the conflict.⁷⁷⁶ Successfully, attacks were brought to a halt on January 17, when the North Darfur Sate Government negotiated the cessation of hostilities based on the agreement signed between the warring parties in the Saraf Umra locality. Regardless of the ceasefire agreement fighting resumed between February 21 and 23. Renewed hostilities stemmed from a breach in the signed agreement⁷⁷⁷ by members of the Abbala who reportedly commenced mining activities in the El-Sereif locality.

Besides the assumption that violent hostilities resurged due to resumption in mining activities, the ceasefire agreement was putatively perceived as non-inclusive. One the one hand it was understood to be incapable of addressing the root causes of the conflict.⁷⁷⁸ On the other hand it lacked the support of top leaders from the Abbala tribes, seen as being capable of restraining its people from further attacks against the Beni Hussein.⁷⁷⁹ In signing the ceasefire agreement,

⁷⁷⁴ UNAMID, Title Withheld: Not for Circulation, (El-Fasher: Civil Affairs Sector North, 2013) 1

⁷⁷⁵ UNAMID, " **Dynamics of Conflict** ", 4

⁷⁷⁶ UNAMID, " **Report on Conflict** ", 1

⁷⁷⁷ The ceasefire Agreement signed by the Beni Hussein and Abbala tribes stipulated that mining activities should cease until security arrangements are reached and put in place in *ibid*, 3

⁷⁷⁸ UNAMID, *Conflicts in Kabkabiya, Saraf Omra and El-Sereif areas*, (El-Fasher: Civil Affairs Section, n.d). 1

⁷⁷⁹ UNAMID, " Title Withheld: Not for Circulation," , 4

the parties consented to participation in a reconciliation conference, which was scheduled to hold on April 15, 2013. As the violence continued unabated, a renewed commitment to maintain ceasefire became imperative.

On March 2 therefore, leaders from both tribes converged to a meeting convened by the Walis of North and West Darfur in Saraf Umra. A second ceasefire agreement ordered the removal of all roadblocks to allow for unhindered access to civilians in the conflict area, in need of humanitarian relief. While a second ceasefire failed to completely restrain further attacks, other initiatives geared towards the restoration of peace in the affected locality began to emerge.

A Joint Reconciliation Mechanism (JRM) was established early March by the northern Darfur state government, in a meeting, which had UNAMID, UNDP, civil society organizations, and the Native Administration in attendance. The obligations of the JRM as specified in the terms of reference included the: “monitoring of potential clashes, resolving reported cases of loot and theft, ensuring the removal of roadblocks and enforcing adherence to suspend extraction in the goldmine for the time being”. The JRM was to be supported by a sub-mechanism: “daira” (circle) created in each of the affected conflict areas in the Jebel Amir to mitigate security concerns that may obstruct preliminary initiatives towards the slated reconciliation conference. The “dairas” reportedly “co-ordinate on a daily basis to facilitate quick response to security incidents involving the two tribes as well as engage in conflict resolution. It is said to have mitigated a number of “skirmishes, looting, cattle rustling and harassments involving both tribes”⁷⁸⁰

Regardless of the recognized presence of civil society organization, UNDP and the Native Administration, there was no attest to any role specifically linked to them. Still, on the part of UNAMID, beyond the demand for logistical support to the activities of the mechanism, the State Government made a further entreaty to secure UNAMID’S participation in the reconciliation process.⁷⁸¹ The Governor’s request to UNAMID served as a formal approval for CAS to operate within the ambit of a reconciliation “space” strictly controlled by the government. In fact, one report confirmed that:

⁷⁸⁰ UNAMID, “Conflict in Kabkabiya“, 3

⁷⁸¹ UNAMID, "Dynamics of Conflict." 6

*“For the first time, the government has opened the possibility for UNAMID to participate substantively in the reconciliation itself”.*⁷⁸²

This statement goes a long way to revealing that CAS might be confronted with a number of constraints as it endeavours to accomplish the stipulations of the mandate that authorizes it to carry out reconciliation activities on the grassroot level in Darfur. In the light of a perceived leeway to become involved in the reconciliation process as specifically requested by the government of North Darfur, UNAMID sees the need to thread softly on grounds assumed to bear the political imprints of the GoS.

Inflammatory comments such as: “Land belongs to everybody”⁷⁸³ within the context of the conflict, tends to reveal the position of the local government. Similarly, it not only calls to question, the government’s competence in accomplishing lasting peace contingent on the JRM, but casts doubt on its capacity to remain unbiased as it plays the lead role within its established framework for peace and reconciliation (JRM). Indeed, this captures the exact concerns vocally expressed by leaders of the Beni Hussein during a pre-reconciliation workshop separately organised by the CAS SN for both parties to the conflict. Such concerns notably remained non-manifest among members of Abbala tribe who expressed complete satisfaction with the established mechanism.⁷⁸⁴

Undeniably, a separate report noted that the JRM “duplicated the functions of already existing frameworks and bodies”. It listed, as part of such frameworks and bodies, Darfur’s indigenous reconciliation mechanism: the “Judiyya”.⁷⁸⁵ In the light of such perceived “duplication of functions” it should be appropriate to question the rationale behind what seems like the calculated fencing of the “Judiyya” process from efforts tailored towards the reconciliation of the warring Beni Hussein and Abbala tribes. Bearing in mind that a Judiyya process never involves Ajaweed mediators from among the parties in conflict. In so doing, the process is regarded as neutral, reliable and effective.

Be that as it may, CAS SN once again resigned to channelling support to the JRM through its capacity building programme. UNAMID may have judged this step to be appropriate based on

⁷⁸² UNAMID, "Title Withheld: Not for Circulation." 5

⁷⁸³ UNAMID, "Report on conflict between Beni-Hussein and Abbala tribes." 4

⁷⁸⁴ UNAMID, " Title Withheld: Not for Circulation" 5

⁷⁸⁵ UNAMID, "Dynamics of Conflict between the Beni Hussein and the Northern Rezeigat." 1

the confronting exigency for CAS to promote peaceful co-existence among conflicting parties. At the same time, UNAMID is cognisant of fact that such engagements challenge the mission's principle of "neutrality".

9.7.5 CAS maps out the path towards Reconciliation

Lederach noted:

"That the engagement of the conflicting groups assumes an encounter, not only of people but also of several different and highly interdependent streams of activity. He further averred "Reconciliation must find ways to address the past without getting locked in a vicious cycle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past. People need opportunity and space to express to and with one another the trauma and loss and their grief at that loss, and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of the injustice experienced... Reconciliation, in essence, represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns about the past and the further can meet"

UNAMID's CAS may have understood these salient issues as captured by Lederach when it noted some of the significant themes on which the Reconciliation Conference should be based on, so that the envisaged peace becomes attainable and durable.

- That the conference must ensure to address the conflict as a resource-based conflict instead of focusing attention on tribal dimensions.
- That the issue of ownership of the gold mines must be addressed especially in the face of opposing views expressed by both parties. (The Beni Hussein lay claims to the gold mines based on the traditional system of land ownership. The Abbala tribes maintain the same view of the goldmine area as expressed by the government. "That all people regardless of tribal affiliation, should have equal access to the gold"⁷⁸⁶)
- The need for both sides to apologize and express remorse, as this can facilitate inter-tribal dialogue and smoothen the part towards the reconciliation of both parties.
- That genuine reconciliation can be achieved if the imbalance in power between both tribes is adequately managed, so as to circumvent the exploitation of the weaker tribe: The Beni Hussein.

⁷⁸⁶ Lederach, "Building Peace", 26-27

- That the Reconciliation Conference must ensure the payment of the “diya” to the victims. In so doing resurgence in the conflict will be averted.⁷⁸⁷

Against the backdrop of ensuring that both parties are engaged in fruitful deliberations during the Reconciliation Conference, CAS proceeded to conduct 2 separate reconciliation workshops for the Beni-Hussein and the Abbala in El-Sereif and in 5 Arab settlements in the localities of Kutum and Kabkabiya. According to a report from CAS, the workshops:

“Sensitized participants on peaceful co-existence and imparted knowledge on conflict analysis, conflict management, negotiation, and meditation”

... it also aimed at convincing the youths to choose dialogue over retaliation.⁷⁸⁸

CAS conducted these workshops from April 9 to 11, 2013 in preparation for the Conference slated for April 17. The Reconciliation Conference was however rescheduled for May the 15. Again CAS, with the aim to build on its ground laying efforts towards the Reconciliation Conference, conducted four preparatory reconciliation workshops for 167 women and youths of the Beni Hussein and for 155 women and youths of the Abbala tribe, held in El-Sereif and Kabkabiya respectively. The workshops objective was to: “develop constructive views about reconciliation and to sustain dialogue between the tribes”⁷⁸⁹.

Lamentably, the Reconciliation Conference was postponed indefinitely. As at 2014 when the researcher visited CAS SN, there were no reports stating whether or not the conference eventually held.

9.7.6 Conclusion

CAS posits that:

“It is worth recognizing the vigour and responsiveness of the Native Administration in different parts of Darfur in containing the Abbala- Beni Hussein conflict.” It claims that it is “an attestation that capacity building programmes (through workshops, seminars and meetings) by Civil Affairs are succeeding in invigorating local mechanism to decisively engage in conflict management and reconciliation at the local level”⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁷ UNAMID, Title Withheld: Not for Circulation, 6-7

⁷⁸⁸ UNAMID, “Conflict between the Beni Hussein and the Abbala”, 1

⁷⁸⁹ *ibid*

⁷⁹⁰ UNAMID, “Report on conflict between the Beni-Hussein and Abbala tribes”, 4

These assertions were made with respect to the Beni Hussein – Abbala conflict of 2013. It may therefore not be applicable to the other four conflicts analysed in this study. Especially where CAS ostensibly became constrained towards organizing the same peace building programmes for the parties in conflict. Similarly, assertions like these constitute CAS own assessments of the programmes it organized in honour of the conflict. There is no way of measuring whether this same optimistic opinion resonates with Darfuris at all levels of the affected population or even with the government of North Darfur, as co actor in the process to reconcile both parties to the conflict.

When I discussed with a former Minister of Darfur during my 2014 visit. He responded to my question:

“Do tribal leaders have a role to play in the current conflict”?

By clarifying on the types of conflicts that have played out on Darfur’s terrains since 2003. He wanted me to understand that these wars were not tribal but political. They are political because they have been fomented by the government to fragment Darfur and divert the people’s attention from the oppressive regime in Khartoum, as controlled by citizens from riverine Sudan.⁷⁹¹

“They want to make us busy with the wars, so they can fulfil what they have in their hearts.”⁷⁹²

It is on the basis of this notion that the former Minister argues against the efficacy of indigenous mechanism and its custodians in the current conflict. He underscored that:

“No tribal leader has power over their people anymore. They are weakened... and the horizons of their people are opened to see... it was a factor in the past. Not anymore”.⁷⁹³

When I investigated further to know if indigenous mechanisms and their custodians could play a role if empowered to tackle the kinds of conflict that have prevailed since 2003”

⁷⁹¹ Khalil A. Abdulkarim, Personal interview, UNAMID headquarters El-Fasher Northern Darfur, April 21, 2014.

⁷⁹² Abdulkarim, “Do tribal leaders have a role to play in the current conflict”?

⁷⁹³ *ibid*

His response was as quoted:

“In the past, the Native Administrator was the unique person. He was the teacher, the police and the judge. What role can he play in the modern system of governance? He continues to be the head of the clans under him, but in matters of conflict he is not effective at all. Not even the Ajaweed is useful... Ajaweed will not solve a political issue. Ajaweed solves social issues. The conflict has been politicised and for these you need political tools”⁷⁹⁴

It is in the same light that the Director Peace Research Institute University of Khartoum, who I interviewed during my visit in 2014, argued, when confronted with the same question:

Researcher: “What in your opinion is the role of indigenous leaders in Darfur’s current conflict”?

He started by explaining to me that the problem in Darfur can no longer be delineated as a rift between pastoralist and sedentary farmers because it had mutated to a civil war in which the government is involved.

He responded further as quoted below:

“Definitely they have a role to play (Indigenous mechanisms) but you cannot put all of this in one basket... Traditional authority lost the kind of clout it had. The youths no longer listen to their leaders... in fact the youths accuse the traditional leaders of being co-opted by the government... There is something wrong with the mechanism. Personally, I am not waiting for any miracle out of this mechanism”⁷⁹⁵

In my last question to him, I wanted to inquire if traditional mediators like the Ajaweed, had a role to play in reconciling the parties in Darfur’s conflict even on the level of the tribes.

The respondent contended in this light:

“We have a lot of tribal conflicts where these mechanisms have not worked even between the same tribes... You cannot think of reconciliation when the war is still on. Darfur is an active zone of conflict. Any strategy for post war scenario is misleading.”⁷⁹⁶

⁷⁹⁴ Abdulkarim, “Do tribal leaders have a role to play in the current conflict”?

⁷⁹⁵ Munzoul A. Assal, Personal interview, Khartoum, Sudan April 13, 2014.

⁷⁹⁶ Assal, “The role of indigenous leaders in Darfur’s current conflict”

My interview with the head of the humanitarian section also corroborates all of the above assertions from a different perspective.

In response to my question: “What role can Darfur’s indigenous peace-making mechanisms play in the current conflict”?

My respondent made me understand that indigenous mechanisms can be applied to tribal conflicts. However, it is difficult to confirm that indigenous mechanisms alone can address the kind of conflicts, which have erupted since 2013. In terms of accountability for example, my respondent stated that:

“It is a challenge for human rights to draw the line between principles underlying modern and informal views of accountability”.⁷⁹⁷

She made me understand that a good number of Darfuris no longer wish to be conformed to justice as defined by indigenous conception. Where the payment of the diya is tantamount to justice served and conflict resolved. Most of the victims seek justice the formal way.

She noted that the payment of the “diya” is becoming commercial. On that account, it had started to lose its potency as a viable tool for conflict resolution.

Finally, my respondent avowed that the kind of conflicts that have erupted since 2003 are characterized by human rights violations which traditional mechanisms and custodians cannot address.

“Traditional systems are not gender sensitive. How then do you apply that kind of traditional framework for conflict resolution to a human right violation such as rape, which in the case of the conflict after 2003 has become rampant?”⁷⁹⁸

It is amidst these conflicting views that CAS builds on the hope that its initiatives can impact positively on Darfur’s indigenous mechanism. CAS is mandated to assume its position at the centre of these occurrences. CAS as the external peace actor stands at the vantage position to access to what degree an impact is being made in relation to durable peace and reconciliation. However, it remains questionable.

⁷⁹⁷ The head of humanitarian section (Names withheld by researcher), Personal interview, UNAMID headquarters El-Fasher Northern Darfur, April 13, 2014.

⁷⁹⁸ Head of humanitarian section, “The role of indigenous peace -making mechanisms in Darfur’s conflict”

Observers outside the entire scenario or even Darfuri's as evidenced in my key interviews, may be in the best position as well, to draw such conclusions. Nonetheless, a conclusion based on the CAS statement at the beginning of this concluding section, see prospects in Darfur's indigenous mechanisms based on programmes organised to elevate custodians to the level where they can be perceived as adequately equipped to tackle the nature of the conflicts which have emerged in the unfolding years since 2003.

Chapter Ten

Conclusions

This thesis set out predominantly to investigate into the prospects of indigenous peace-making mechanisms in modern conflicts. Using Darfur as the case, the research unpacks its overarching question by examining the interface at the local level, between Darfur's indigenous peace-making institution and the AU-UN hybrid peace operation. In addition to the main research question, the study also addressed the binary objectives of the study. The first aimed to understand: How the international community has responded to the exigency for durable peace in Darfur, since the conflict erupted in 2003. This task was ventured into with the intention to focus specific attention on mainstream peace-making processes and strategies applied in the de-escalation of the conflict prior to the arrival of UNAMID in 2008.

The second objective centred on gaining insight into whether the current peace actor adopts a "comprehensive model" that is geared towards securing durable peace for the province. As noted in the chapter on conflict transformation, the fulfilment of examined pre-conditions, creates the enabling environment for transformation to occur in a protracted conflict like that of Darfur. In this light, a mandate based on the complementarity of mainstream and indigenous approaches, as reflected in the peace actor's "multidimensional" framework, was investigated. Based on findings, the study surmises that UNAMID's CAS recognizes Darfur's indigenous peace-making methods. CAS currently operationalizes the mandate for grassroots intervention by cooperating with tribal leaders and corollary processes towards achieving reconciliation, stability and order.

It is worthy of note that the assumptions underlying the school of conflict transformation served as the investigative tool, which the research hinged on to examine what may constitute the gap created by mainstream approaches applied by the international community at the initial stages of response to the Darfur conflict in 2003. John Paul Lederach's model on "Protracted Internal Conflicts"⁷⁹⁹ constituted the framework employed in the analysis of interventions strategies applied to a real-time protracted conflict. It also provided the link to the empirical chapters of the thesis.

⁷⁹⁹ John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 201-222

The remainder of the conclusion chapter will unfold in this manner: Section one illuminates on the thesis central findings, with the aim to understand what implications these findings may have on the prospects for indigenous peace-making in Darfur. Section two unearths inferences drawn from the frameworks and theories applied in the study. The third section concludes on the practicability for conflict transformation in Darfur. The final section provides concluding thoughts, pending questions, limitation and sheds light on probable future research areas.

10.1 Central findings

The thesis examined five major and minor conflict eruptions within the scope of the study: 2003-2014. These five conflicts tested for the operationalization of Lederach's propositions in real-time conflict scenarios. As the thesis found, UNAMID operates within a "comprehensive framework" as advanced by Lederach. This sanctions the integration, into the peace process, of all levels of the affected population and authorizes within a single framework, the application of conventional and non-conventional approaches to peace. Accordingly, the study provided illumination on the implementation of UNAMID's mandate on the grassroot, as performed in conjunction with the selected stakeholder for the research: Native Administration (NA) and its integral parts. The study reveals the NA's diminishing legitimacy. Of major essence nonetheless, is to understand how the peace actor responds to and manages the issue of legitimacy on ground. Does UNAMID capitalize on the declining authority of Darfur's indigenous mechanisms to impose its initiatives for peace on conflict eruptions on the grassroot? Or has Lederach's proposition for the empowerment of "contextual resources" and a revival thereof, found validity in the interactions between CAS and Darfur's indigenous actors and processes? The thesis based on empirical evidence concludes in affirmation of the second question.

Firstly, the study found that the attitude of CAS (with specific reference to SN in northern Darfur) towards Darfur's peace-making institution corresponds with the elicitive approach to peace, as expounded by Lederach.⁸⁰⁰ This approach places the external actor on the path towards "discovery", so that peace initiatives are geared towards the "solidification" of models that emerge from the resources available within the conflict setting"⁸⁰¹. In addition, such an

⁸⁰⁰ See, John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 55.

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.

approach to peace-making enables the peacemaker to recognize “indigenous knowledge as a “valued resource”. The study contingent on “Conflict one”⁸⁰² substantiates this claim with the successful employment of the Ajaweed and Judiyya as a “valued resource” in the restoration of harmony within the Korma locality of northern Darfur.

In examining conflicts four and five, the thesis reveals similarly that SN’s grassroots engagements are tilted to the quest for “discovery and the “solidification of contextual resources”. In conflict four for example, CAS adopted the workshop approach to peace. Diana Francis differentiates between two types of workshops: the training and the dialogue workshops.⁸⁰³ CAS SN relies on both. The dialogue workshop organised for 30 Native Administrative leaders in 2013, is one prominent example. That workshop was tagged “Strengthening Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms”. Chapter 9 documents the outcome of that workshop. The employment of the workshop approach by CAS SN may be misinterpreted by some, as evidence on the grassroots, of the external peace actor’s imposition of non-conforming intervention strategies on the grassroots. This technique on the contrary, conforms to the proposition to re-empower tribal leadership within the locality of the conflict and demonstrates the creation of “space” by CAS SN, for conflict parties to engage in dialogue and ultimately reconciliation. In deed prior to the 2013, CAS SN had been involved with organising workshops as well as meetings geared towards the restoration of social harmony. It engaged Native Administrative leaders of the Zaghawa and Birgid tribes, in 2011.

Conflict five provided empirical evidence with respect to UNAMID’s activities towards the solidification of Darfur’s indigenous mechanisms. Further investigation exposed some factors that militate against the successful implementation of UNAMID’s mandate (for conflict resolution and reconciliation) in partnership with actors on level 3 of the affected population. Such challenges were initially highlighted by the thesis in conflict 2 and became even more outstanding in conflicts 3 and 5. The thesis found that indigenous mechanisms became inapplicable to the conflict in the Kutum and Alwaha localities (conflict 2). The conflict defied the capacity of indigenous mechanisms and actors, on grounds of its political characterizing. It must be noted that tribal conflicts in Darfur tend to demonstrate political undercurrents. Such conflicts are considered to be emblematic of the GoS biases and firm support towards one of

⁸⁰² See, chapter 9 for details on the conflict

⁸⁰³ See, Diana Francis, *People, Peace, and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 22 -23

the parties to the conflict. In most cases the favoured have been members of Arab tribal groups. Such illicit support takes the form of manipulation. New initiatives are superimposed on indigenous peace-making so that they are rendered absolutely redundant.

Conflict 2 also unveils a measure of inconsistency in the attitude of the government towards conflicts that bear its atrocious imprints and those of intra-Arab characterizing as in conflict 5. In conflict 2, the government imposed stringent regulations on the “space” for grassroots reconciliation. It is such restrictions that putatively handicapped the activities of CAS in the conflict and ostensibly precipitated its disengagement from the indigenous peace actors. In contrast conflict 5 evidences the creation of frameworks that were non-complimentary to the available mechanisms on ground. The establishment of the Joint Reconciliation Mechanism (JRM) for peace purportedly duplicated the functions of indigenous peace processes. It was assumed to be a government tactics to fence out indigenous peace-making mechanisms and strip the reconciliation process of all neutrality. The reader must be reminded that regardless of the distinctive feature of conflict five: conflict between two Arab groups, the government still found an ally in that conflict. This was captured in the GoS support that was ostensibly tilted towards the Northern Rizeigat. In stark contrast to conflict 2, where UNAMID was required to seek the consent of the north Darfur government to participate in the peace process, conflict 5, saw the government itself officially extend the hand of cooperation to the external international actor.

The result from conflict 3 tended to vary. Indigenous mechanisms were applicable to the point where hostilities derived from competition over land. When they mutated to a politically motivated conflict indigenous actors and mechanisms became inconsequential to the search for peace and reconciliation. CAS refrained from intervening in conflict 3. It cited the proliferation of arms as justification. Such inaction tends to reveal some of the constraints of an organization whose mandate derives from chapter VII of the UN Security Council.

10.2 Prospects of indigenous mechanism in Darfur’s conflict

What are the implications of these findings on the prospects of achieving conflict transformation in partnership with indigenous actors, and how does this investigation sum up

the most significant component in the transformation agenda? “Reconciliation”. The thesis, based on its findings, categorically arrives at the following conclusion:

Firstly, it is evident that the “reconciliation space,” is controlled by the GoS. This is specifically the situation in the northern part of Darfur where this research was conducted. This means that regardless of a “multidimensional” intervention framework, UNAMID cannot operate in full capacity. It is assumed that the GoS is cognizant of the resilience demonstrated by indigenous mechanisms, notwithstanding pitfalls such as the waning legitimacy of tribal authority and a paucity of viable formal state apparatuses for conflict resolution. This awareness tends to propel the GoS into profusely and calculatedly obstructing the prospects for conflict resolution and stable peace based on Darfur’s indigenous methods. Should the GoS sanction UNAMID with the full leverage to implement its mandate through initiatives that empower tribal leaders for example, Darfurians might gradually transcend conflict. It may then become conceivable to anticipate relational change and reconciliation; which advocates have identified as the core element of conflict transformation.

Second, as long as weapons remain in the hands of the youths and a transition to non-violent change remains far-fetched as a result, tribal leadership is compromised. A step in the direction to restore the diminishing legitimacy of tribal leadership in Darfur is, among other factors, to ensure that both sides of the conflict: the armed movements and the government-backed militias alike, surrender to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program supported by UNAMID. It is impossible to envisage a weapon free Darfur if the DDR process concentrates entirely on confiscating arms from one side of the warring parties. In recent times, extant literature has focused exclusively on publishing stories of the successful disarmament process of rebel groups.⁸⁰⁴

Third, should tribal conflicts maintain a political undertone, the Native Administration and its integral parts unfortunately cannot suffice as adequate mechanism for peace to prevail in Darfur. Under such circumstances UNAMID’s efforts to incorporate indigenous mechanisms, re-empower them and extract dividends for the peace process, becomes crippled. The agenda for reconciliation ostensibly becomes scotched, as the government-backed adversary may never fully submit to or adhere to the demands of a reconciliation processes defined along indigenous

⁸⁰⁴ See, Zurab Elzarov, "DDR in Darfur: Progress Challenges and Outlook," Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, last modified May 7, 2015, <http://ssresourcecentre.org>

lines. Likewise, should the government perceive such politically motivated conflicts as occasion to create self-engineered mechanisms that supplant the existing ones, it automatically grants itself easy access to steer proceedings to its favour. Even the manipulation of handpicked loyalists becomes overly simplified. Such cases tend to demonstrate the GoS efforts at suffocating the quest for justice. It follows that when parallel mechanisms are created for intervention in tribal conflicts, the potentials for peace and reconciliation in its pristine form, as may be administered by neutral members of the Ajaweed, is neglected. In so doing, the prospects for durable peace also become undermined.

Fourth, there are attestations to secretly organized peace deals as evidenced in chapter eight of this study. This implies that interference in reconciliation processes by the “third hand”⁸⁰⁵ is perceived as a serious impediment to peace in Darfur. The government must therefore revert to the stance on non-biased intervention; it must distance itself from directly influencing the outcome of reconciliation processes. The neutrality of the government and its role as implementer of outcomes deriving from Ajaweed mediation processes delineates the position of the government particularly during colonial administration. In deed this constraint to stable peace, mirrors accurately the concerns of the Ajaweed elders I was privileged to interview in 2014.

Should the government’s interference hugely persist, Darfurians would be left with basically two options: either to adopt clandestine means of securing their own peace, on the premise that the people are tired of the war and wish for a better future or surrender to the government’s manipulations and remain at war amidst age-long resolution mechanism, which are capable in a redefined manner, to deliver peace and harmony to Darfur’s rural configuration. Should Darfurians cower to endless fighting instead, the GoS would have gained upper hand. Ultimately, this would give credence to the assertions of one of my respondents:

“They want to make us busy with the wars, so they can fulfil what they have in their hearts”. (See chapter 8).

Fifth, the re-empowerment of indigenous actors in Darfur (to that level where diminished legitimacy is fully restored and perceived as efficacious to grassroot peace-making as in the days of old) does not singlehandedly lie within the jurisdiction of the external actor: UNAMID. Lederach’s propositions have found validity to the extent that UNAMID evinces the authorised

⁸⁰⁵ As coined by one of the anonymous key Informants of the study

incorporation of “contextual resources” –track III actors into the peace process. This is sufficient on the policy level, but inadequate to engender conflict transformation in Darfur. From the era of the sultans and during the condominium, the Native Administration prior to its abolition derived full legitimacy from the government of the day. This study demonstrated that UNAMID requires the full backing of the government to implement the mandate of peace and reconciliation at least on the level of intertribal rivalry. On the one hand this implies that the mission cannot act in isolation towards the achievement of the ultimate goal. On the other hand, it can be interpreted as compelling the mission to submit to the devices of the government. Observers may perceive such unwarranted loyalty as overly yielding to the GoS on issues where autonomous action sanctioned by Chapter VII, is necessitated. UNAMID based on that, might risk compromising UN intervention principles of neutrality, and may lose the confidence of Darfuris. At that point, the purpose for authorizing intervention on the grassroot is ultimately defeated.

Finally, that unavoidable question: Under what circumstance can indigenous methods become effective and relevant to the search for durable peace in African contemporary conflicts. The three cases of conflict earlier examined in this study provide the platform for comparison and conjecturing.

In the case of Darfur nonetheless, since this hybrid mission is the first of its kind, the study recommends that future hybrid missions glean a lesson from this experience. Authorizers must critically evaluate a conflict to determine prior to intervention whether indeed a “conflict transformation approach” or a multidimensional framework as the case may, appropriately tackles or manages on-ground realities to the extent that peace in its durable form is attained.

10.3 Theories and Frameworks: implication for the conflict in Darfur

10.3.1 Conflict Management and Resolution theories

This research evolved from theoretical and conceptual underpinnings and culminated with the establishment of a correlation of the findings with the empirical data gathered by the researcher in Darfur. To critically comprehend the rationale behind the instruments employed (by the international community) in the search for peace in Darfur and in pursuit of addressing the second objective of the research, it was significant for the researcher (I) to engage in a theoretical exploration of assumptions underlying two fields of inquiry: Conflict Management

and Conflict Resolution. The study shows that each field tends to proffer intervention mechanisms in consonance with its conception of conflict and in conformity with underlying principles guiding intervention.⁸⁰⁶

Correspondingly, the thesis reveals that assumptions undergirding both fields have been at play in the Darfur crisis. Theoretical foundations aligned with CM principles ostensibly informed the intervention tools initially applied to the conflict. Informal mediation in its classical state centric capacity, became evident in the initial response to the conflict as administered by Idriss Derby of Chad. That peace talk terminated with the signing of the Abeche Agreement in 2003. Ceasefire violations from the GoS and the movements precipitated the signing of the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement in 2004. Both agreements amounted to a temporary cessation of hostilities. Nonetheless, there was an almost immediate resurgence of the violence. The study noted that the 2004 N'djamena Agreement failed to effectively address the aggression but constituted the basis on which the instrument of peacekeeping was introduced to the conflict.

Similarly, the response by AMIS notably conformed to the traditional kind of peacekeeping. The study observed that the mandate was restricted to monitoring the ceasefire agreement. On the initial capacity of 120 military observers and 350 troops, the impact of a military intervention could hardly be fathomed⁸⁰⁷ Even when the AU's assumed the obligation to moderate the inter-Sudanese peace talks and eventually the Abuja mediation, the emerging authorization for an upgraded mandate proved ineffective towards securing the lives of Darfuri citizens from the heinous acts of violence meted out by the Janjaweed but also by the armed movements. AMIS unfortunately grappled with a plethora of challenges and thus became another demonstration of inadequate mandates authorized in the face of a complex humanitarian crisis. AMIS regardless of its timely response ostensibly lacked the capacity by every standard to deliver a successful peacekeeping operation.

In the meantime, formal consultations administered by AU representatives, pooled the GoS and the movements once again to the negotiating table in Abuja. That mediation process eventually birthed the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. A thorough interrogation of the peace process revealed some lapses in the final stages of the proceedings that lead up to the moment of signing. The thesis detected a change in strategy as the AU and its international partners

⁸⁰⁶ See chapter 3 for details.

⁸⁰⁷ Flint and De Wall, *The New History*, 174

resorted to applying the “deadline diplomacy” tactics, where threats and sanctions played a vital role towards forcibly securing the consent of the rebel movements. In the final analysis, the Minni Minawi faction of the SPL/A became the only signatory with the GoS to the Darfur Peace Agreement. The process was denied its natural flow; it drifted towards imposing an outcome on the parties and deprived the parties the ownership of the peace process. The mediation process was compelled to terminate and, on that note, considered a failure by the document’s non-signatories. Darfuri’s whose adversity continued to know no bounds also rejected the DPA.⁸⁰⁸ The study concludes that up till that point formal mediation had proved to be inadequate in the search for peace in Darfur. In the aftermath of the DPA, the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and other attempts at official mediation have unsuccessfully translated to peace and stability of any kind.

In like manner, when Problem Solving Workshops are applied to conflicts characterized by protractedness, scholars and practitioners who organize them aim towards enhancing communication between the conflicting parties. Their ultimate goal is focused on altering attitudes and perceptions that have obstructed efforts at resolving the conflict. This factor, but also the shortcomings of the DPA, as observed by the study, was the motivation for applying PSW as a strategy of the field of conflict resolution to the Darfur crisis. The thesis illuminates on two of such Problem-Solving Workshops organized in 2009 and 2011 by the Sudan Task Group in Siena Italy. The organizing scholars from the George Mason University in the US responded to the crisis first, by creating a neutral environment for “enhancing communication” (among splintered groups) ruined due to the process of fragmentation. In attendance were representatives of faction whose division occurred in the aftermath of the 2006 DPA.

The study discovered that changes from the workshop were transferable to the Doha talks, which commenced in February 2009. The Liberation and Justice Movement emerged as a coalition group formed from a number of smaller factions. Although the changes from the 2009 workshop proved insufficient towards the bigger picture of peace and stability in Darfur and also inadequate to elicit a comprehensive peace document, the study observed that such changes sufficed to attract the consent of the only signatory to the Doha talks: Dr. Tijani Sese the erstwhile leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement.

⁸⁰⁸ See, Irit Back, *Intervention and Sovereignty in Africa: Conflict Resolution and International Organizations in Darfur* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), chapter 4

The workshop organised in 2011, targeted civil society groups. The organizers understood the imperative for Darfur's peace process to engage other levels of society. On that account, mid-level actors comprising representatives from the academia as well as non-governmental NGO became participants of the number two workshop. The study has identified this effort as a course charted in the right direction. It is a contribution towards the transformation of altered perceptions and attitudes; nonetheless it was impossible to deduce either the indirect or direct impact of the second workshop on the peace process or on the conflict on ground in Darfur.

By examining theoretical underpinnings (from both fields) that have inspired intervention in the Darfur crisis, the study successfully threaded the objective to comprehend how the international community initially responded to the Darfur crisis. Presently, the Darfur crisis has remained a recipient of mainstream forms of intervention. UNAMID as the current peace actor follows up on formal mediation to ensure that all parties in conflict participate in the negotiation of a peaceful settlement. It also continues to administer peacekeeping albeit in its multidimensional form. While these instruments of intervention continue to be applied to the Darfur conflict, there is no gainsaying the fact that inadequacies have continued to abound which, bolster the plausibility of the debates emerging from the school of conflict transformation around the early 1990s.

10. 3. 2 Contextualising analytical frameworks

10.3.2a. Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict

The Darfur conflict was located within the post-cold war discourse even when the conflict had not erupted in the immediate aftermath of the cold war. This characterisation derives from the notion that decades after the termination of the cold war, the patterns exhibited by the Darfur conflict are akin to the defining features of those kinds of conflicts captured by Edward Azar. In his seminal contribution to the conception of protracted conflicts, the author delineated three salient characteristics of such conflicts, which ultimately unfolded on the African conflict terrain, most notably after his death. One assertion from the author underscores this vividly.

He states that: *The blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors, the lack of either a clear starting or terminating point and fundamentally, the presence of prolonged violence.*⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰⁹ See, Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases.* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990).

The Darfur conflict ostensibly manifests these features to a large extent. While it is possible to trace the overt expression of the Darfur crisis to the year 2003, the fresh eruption of inter-tribal wars on the grassroot level since 2012 nonetheless reveals a complex dimension that obscures the capacity to predict a “terminating point” especially not of conflict that prevail on the tribal level.

The conflict in like manner exhibits blurred demarcations between internal and external sources and actors”. The study provides validation in this regard by identifying the erstwhile Libyan leader: Muammar Gaddafi, as one prominent external actor in the Darfur conflict. His impact on the conflict traces back to the 1970s. This was around the period when Darfur endured a devastating famine. Consumed by an Arab supremacist agenda, Gaddafi pursued the institution of an ideology that penetrated deep. Darfur in need of aid myopically embraced the path to own destruction. The human “need” for relief ostensibly unlocked the gates for the flow of arms into Darfur. ⁸¹⁰It was noted further that the infiltration into Darfur, of Chadian insurgent groups, aggravated tensions on an already volatile terrain by providing safe sanctuaries for such conflict exacerbating agents. The formation of FROLINAT: Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad (Chad National Liberation Front) under the leadership of Ibrahim Abatcha was a typical example.

Also, contingent on the author’s framework, the study concluded that it is correct to dub the Darfur crisis as a “protracted” conflict. This conclusion derives from drawing a parallel between the “Genesis Component” and the Darfur crisis. Going by Azar, three components: The Genesis, Dynamics and Outcome serve as preconditions to the emergence of protracted social conflict. The thesis found the elements underpinning the “Genesis”⁸¹¹ component to be largely coherent with the conditions that fuelled the Darfur conflict albeit with identified divergences. “Land” was pinpointed as Darfur’s ‘basic need’ because land as a depleting resource, constitutes one “precondition” that almost accurately portrays the core underlying cause of aggression in Darfur. On the one hand, climatic conditions have precipitated land exhaustion as well as competition over its scarcity. On the other hand, the un-assuaged “land” need and the “landless status” of non-landowning tribes in Darfur has ostensibly fomented profound

⁸¹⁰ See, Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *Darfur: a new history of a long war* (London and New York, Zed Books, 2008 (chapter 3)

⁸¹¹ See, Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990

discontentment among affected tribes. The GoS has therefore capitalized on such grievances and discontentment. It has exploited these avenues successfully and has most notably relied on land enticements to lure specifically Abbala Arabs, recognized as prominent Janjaweed members, into fighting the counter-insurgency war against the Darfur's rebel movements.

In like manner, Azar's framework illuminates on the "communal content" precondition as a legacy of colonialism which has haunted a number of post-colonial societies and indeed British colonies like the Sudan. Reinforced by the policy of divide and rule, such ethnic configurations have perpetuated violent aggression, where one political entity perceived to exercise dominance over the other. While the thesis found no rational link between the Darfur case and Azar's "communal content" "precondition", a representation of the British "indirect rule", redesigned to suit the Darfur case, as well as the pursuit of a "conservative policy" in the region, ostensibly created imprints which in modern day discourses are termed "legacies of colonialism". Many years after independence successive post-colonial Sudanese, regimes have notably propagated the inequity and marginalization agenda in the peripheries, with no exception to the Darfur region

10.3.2b. Across border affiliations

The thesis found that the Darfur crisis strongly demonstrated one major defining feature of the conflicts that prevailed in the postcolonial phase of Africa's history, as delineated by Araoye⁸¹²: "the interconnectedness of conflicts". He noted that across frontiers affiliations merged with conflict drivers to fuel and escalate conflict in the originating state. The empirical chapters evidence such across border affiliations among the Zaghawa in Chad whose ethnic loyalties lie with the Zaghawa in Darfur, most notably with the rebel movement by the name of JEM (Justice and Equity Movement).

10.4 Applying Transformatory peace building to Darfur

The transformation approach to intervention in protracted conflicts was adopted by the study as an analytical model utilized in testing the applicability of its underlying assumptions in Darfur's protracted conflict. As considered in the third theoretical chapter proponents of the field advocate for an inclusive approach to peace. Scholars view the transformation approach

⁸¹² See, Lasisi Ademola Araoye, *Sources of Conflict in the Postcolonial African State* (Trenton [u.a.]: Africa World Press, 2014)

as complementary to other conventional strategies. They acknowledge as significant to a peace process the input obtainable from “all” levels of actors within the society. (See chapter four for details) Most significantly the study advanced that conflict transformation makes the case for the inclusion of track III actors. In accordance with this line of argument, the study noted that all levels of the Darfuri population have been drawn into the peace process,⁸¹³ with the aim to extract their relevant quota as part of the task to building peace from below.

Beyond the notion of “limitation and termination” viewed as the desired out come in conflict management and conflict resolution, the study notes that attention is also directed at relational change as aligned with conflict transformation. This intervention strategy relies on indigenous peace-making actors and cultural resources, whose prerogative it is to mend broken relations and deliver the most significant component for relational change: reconciliation. These efforts may be conceived in line with the restorative kind of justice. Complementarity within Darfur’s conflict scenarios is reflected in the pooling together of track I, track II, and track III strategies and actors to accomplish the demands of a single intervention framework for sustainable peace.

10.4.1 Lederach’s Comprehensive Framework for peace

In order to establish the merits of a Transformatory approach to peace, the thesis relied on propositions expounded by one of its major proponents: John Paul Lederach. The three propositions as listed below, constitute the core message of the author’s “comprehensive framework.”⁸¹⁴ They formed the basis on which UNAMID’s modus operandi in Darfur was examined.

1. Establishing and infrastructure of peace
2. Building a peace constituency
3. Long term and short-term perspectives (See chapter four)

In line with **proposition one**, the study established that via it’s supporting components, UNAMID in contrast to AMIS, operates from top to bottom through its political affairs component, but also from bottom to top. CAS as one of UNAMID’s supporting components

⁸¹³ See appendix for a list of the stakeholders on the grassroot.

⁸¹⁴ John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 201-222

effectuates bottom up intervention in Darfur by focusing specifically on grassroots intervention. CAS accomplishes this task in conjunction with level 3 actors of the affected population in Darfur. The study identified matching stakeholders located on level 3, however for their role on the grassroots level of Darfur's inter-tribal conflict, members of the institution of the Native Administration and its integral components were selected as the most significant stakeholders for the study's analysis. A multidimensional approach by UNAMID in Darfur poses as an attest to the legality of the "Space" which CAS has created for the Native Administration. It also endorses the treatment of such actors as legitimate to the peace process.

The **second proposition** underscores the essence of drawing on human and cultural resources available within the conflict terrain. In societies where such resources have been undermined, Lederach recommended the "empowerment" of attendant actors and the revival of pragmatic aspects of cultural peace-making. In the case of Darfur, the researcher conceives of such activity as a "re-empowerment effort", especially considering the status of indigenous mechanisms in times past. These actors and accompanying methods are perceived to possess the capacity to contribute to the transformation of the conflict. UNAMID as established by the study, recognizes the role of the Ajaweed elders in reconciliation. The hybrid mission at the same time attests to the relevance of the Judiyya mechanism as integral to the fulfilment of its mandate to restore broken relationships on the grassroots level in Darfur.⁸¹⁵ Nonetheless, the Judiyya and its custodians and indeed the entire institution of the Native Administration have suffered a crisis of diminishing legitimacy traceable to its initial abolition in 1970. UNAMID has therefore adopted a number of initiatives aimed at re-instating the institution's undermined authority within the community. In this regard, the study validates based on empirical findings the role of CAS in the re-empowerment process of Darfur's Native Administration through techniques such as reconciliation and dialogue workshops, meetings and conferences.⁸¹⁶ The thesis finds that such efforts portray the potential to inject confidence into the system. It also changes the perception and attitudes of tribal leaders at war with each other as well as yields the gains as evidenced in chapter 9.

Most notably also and despite the weakening of its umbrella institution, the Ajaweed mediators have maintained relevance as reliable peacemakers. Similarly, a seemingly constant

⁸¹⁵ See chapter 7 for details

⁸¹⁶ See chapter 7

predilection for the Judiyya peace process cannot be discounted ⁸¹⁷This proves to be the case where formal institutions have failed to sufficiently address the needs of its citizens, and in so doing have created the vacuum for society to fall back on an age long heritage for peace-making. The Darfur case has not been exempted. Accordingly, it is not out of place for the study to assume that CAS 's cooperation with Darfur's "contextual resources" denotes the international community's estimation of the proceeds derivable from the adoption of a "culturally sensitive" approach to peace in Darfur. It illustrates an ostensible connection between UNAMID'S mandate and Lederach's "comprehensive framework "and demonstrates a palpable enthusiasm on the part of the international peace actor to support Darfur on the path towards transcending conflict and achieving transformation.

Proposition 3 advocates for short and long-term perspectives when planning intervention in conflicts characterized by protractedness. The thesis demonstrated that the intervention framework authorized by the AU conformed to short-term perspectives that focused on achieving negative peace. AMIS was therefore restricted to monitoring the ceasefire agreement between the GoS and the rebel movements. Proposition three suggests according to Lederach that a "comprehensive framework" accords equal prominence to both short term and long-term perspectives.⁸¹⁸

In contrast to AMIS, UNAMID's operational mandate derives from a framework that makes provision for both perspectives as well as incorporates different approaches to peace as may be aligned with different timeframe perspectives. Intervention through the political affairs component of UNAMID majorly involves actors on level 1 and focuses on advancing mediatory talks, and based on agreements reached, supports military action geared towards terminating the effects of unabated violent attacks on the citizens of Darfur. On one hand, that level of intervention falls within short-term perspectives albeit functioning as part of a continuum of strategies embedded in the current multidimensional framework hinged on the longer duration perspective. On the other hand, a long-term commitment as captured by the study, constitutes those activities of UNAMID's component: CAS, tailored towards creating the enabling environment on the grassroot level, for protagonists of intertribal disputes to converge on a neutral space, seeking to accomplish the re-learning of a culture of peace through dialogue.

⁸¹⁷ See chapter 8

⁸¹⁸ John P. Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 201-222

From a larger perspective, UNAMID duration of stay in Darfur may be considered. The hybrid mission made its debut on Darfuri soil in January 2008 following the authorization of resolution 1769 by the UN Security Council in July 2007. On June 29, 2017 resolution 2363 extended the mission's stay for another year.⁸¹⁹ In 2017 UNAMID will be close to marking 10 years in Darfur. The thesis finds that the authorizers of UNAMID recognize, the significance attached to investing longer time frames in a protracted internal conflict like Darfur. UNAMID's continued stay in Darfur (with reference to its new form) is indicative of the international community's grasp of the structural violence that engendered the conflict in the first place but most importantly also, connotes a clear discernment of the deep-rooted patterns that have accrued from prolonged violence, those which cannot be transformed within a short period of time. This understanding mirrors Lederach's recommendations for longer time frames to be contemplated when seeking to stabilize conflicts characterized by intransigence and longevity. It is assumed that a long duration time frame furnishes CAS with the opportunity to establish "an infrastructure for peace as well as build a peace constituency"⁸²⁰ Ultimately, it implies that when UNAMID finally departs from the terrain of conflict, the anticipated positive peace, should remain relatively sustainable, reliant on the resources from within.

10.5 "Contextual Resources"

When the study referred to "contextual resources", it alluded to actors and processes significant to peace-making in Darfur. Accordingly, the study examined the evolution of Darfur's peace-making institution through the phases of its history. A peace-making and governing institution was traceable the era of the sultans. The period of the sultanate represents the years when Darfur prevailed as an autonomous state. Despite a strong ambition to centralize the state and withdraw absolute power from the Fur chiefs, the sultans succeed in configuring the state to exist in alignment with systems established in the pre-sultanate phase of Darfur, albeit with modifications to suit their own purpose. The traditional land tenure system known as the Hakura, which set the modalities for land ownership in Darfur became one avenue through which the sultans obtained the loyalty of the Fur chiefs. The thesis uncovered the pivotal role

⁸¹⁹ United Nations, "Security Council Renews Mandate of African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2363 (2017)," UN: Meetings Coverage and Press releases, accessed July 18, 2017, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2017sc12893.doc>

⁸²⁰ Lederach "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Conflicts", 201-222

of the tribal chiefs within the sultanate. This was noticeable from around the 15th and 16th century. During the sultanate, tribal chiefs oversaw judicial matters and maintained law and order contingent on the tenets of Darfur's customary law. With the arrival of the British a number of changes were effected to Darfur's peace-making and governing institution, however from that point on the institution became christened with the appellation of "Native Administration". The adoption of the indirect rule model favoured and elevated the institution of the Native Administration. The colonialist relied heavily on the institution but bolstered the capacity of tribal chiefs to provide security for Darfur. They resolved conflicts and became significant in judicial and financial affairs of Darfur under the British. The thesis found that the legitimacy, in which the Native Administration basked, soon began to diminish and deteriorate. This was the undoing from the Nimeiri administration in 1970. The study found that from that point on till date, the Native Administration has remained in a position of struggle, striving to gather the momentum it lost years ago.

Postcolonial governments sought to fill the vacuum created by the Native Administration with modern governing institutions. However, Darfur's semi modern configuration saw a people maintain relative loyalty to a peace-making and governing institution connected to the people's cultural heritage. The thesis also found that the relevance of the Ajaweed and the Judiyya towards peace and reconciliation was preserved. The Diya retained relatively its effectiveness in the resolution of tribal conflicts and was accepted as the medium for compensation by defaulters. However, controversies over the Diya tend to abound as projected by the Humanitarian affairs of UNAMID. Chapter 9 illuminated on the emerging conflict of interest, which portrays the Diya's inadequacy in addressing human right violations according to international standard, especially considering the scale of the violence that has occurred.

In any case, this was the status quo of Darfur's peace-making heritage when the war erupted: relatively effective yet undermined and perceived as an institution which houses corrupt leaders who also putatively face co-option by the current ingaz regime. The thesis identified that the strength and legitimacy of tribal chiefs and eventually the Native Administration as a whole, lay in the firm support it obtained from the sultanate and the condominium. According to Lederach therefore, it is wisdom for the international peace actor to engage in the revival of peace-making mechanisms within the host environment. In order to map out the path towards sustainability, an empowerment of such mechanisms should fall in place. In the case of Darfur, the study concludes that the system should to be re-empowered. This enables indigenous actors

to assume the position of efficient and credible custodians of peace, which it maintained in the era of the sultanate and the condominium. It must also shun manipulation in the hands of the current regime. **It is against these findings that the thesis concludes that the current status of Darfur's Native Administration cannot sufficiently on its own contribute to the current crisis in Darfur.**

10 .6 African Indigenous peace-making: dividends for contemporary conflicts

A good number of African societies maintain a peace-making culture that is in conformity with the restorative kind of justice. Accordingly, the thesis has established that the imperative for relational change in the aftermath of conflict constitutes the missing link between the custodians-cum-mechanisms of peace-making in African traditional societies and the conflict transformation school of thought. The study endorses in alignment with the transformation approach, the essence for reconciliation in internal conflicts. This affirmation is based on the understanding that prolonged conflicts engender fear, hurt and trauma (residues of conflict). Such negative psychological impacts tend to present an even greater need for intervention strategies that seek to avert a relapse into violence.

In the case of prolonged internal violence, fighting may be forestalled by creating a platform for reconciliation, where parties can “let go” so as to embrace a restoration of broken relationships. The thesis points out that when an external peace actor's draw on a model that acknowledges the imperative for relational change, such intervention approach tends to automatically (via the component of “reconciliation”) establish a connection to contextual apparatuses and actors charged with the obligation to reconcile conflicting parties. Most notably, when such a framework is applied to an African conflict, it may be interpreted as the external actor's hand stretched forth in partnership to that institution of peace-making tasked with the constant obligation to preserve harmonious relations within the society.

Accordingly, reconciliation geared towards societal coherence as the thesis underscores, remains the hallmark of African communities. This is the case precisely with a good number of semi-modern societies, where formal structures exist, but where society continues to rely heavily on a cultural peace-making heritage. This stated fact aligns with the transformation school's advocacy for “inclusive peace”. It provided the basis for the study's probing into three

selected cases of conflicts.⁸²¹ The objective was to establish or refute the relevance of indigenous peace-making mechanisms in African contemporary conflicts, terminated or on-going. The thesis arrived at the conclusion that pragmatic aspects of indigenous mechanisms still hold potentials for building peace in a good number of African societies beset by conflict.

10.7 Final thoughts, pending questions, lessons learned, limitations and contributions

UNAMID is authorized to function under chapter VII of the UN Security Council, and on a territory of aggression, where the host government lackadaisically assumes its responsibility to protect its citizens but has given its consent to intervention by the international community. One question remains pending:

What explanations justify UNAMID's submission to the GoS regulations that impose restrictions on its ability to protect citizens of the war and ultimately restore stability? The answer to this question goes beyond the purview of this thesis, however they uncover terrains for scholarly investigation. Be that as it may, this dissertation has attempted to penetrate significant aspects within the study's scope of analysis. UNAMID's presence in Darfur is indicative of the international community's intention to stabilize the conflict and effect durable change in line with the peace building agenda. Although the study does not cover the entire spectrum of UNAMID's activities in this regard, this research may be viewed as an attempt to merge theoretical underpinnings in the field of peace building with empirical research on the grassroot.

The study has produced a piece of information with the capacity to advance furthermore, the existing body of empirical knowledge within the evolving field of conflict transformation. Extant literature documenting the international community's response to the Darfur crisis in the early aftermath of the conflict's eruption, informed either about the mediation processes in Abuja and Doha or reported on military intervention as conducted by AMIS. There has been no scholarly attempt from without the conflict terrain, to analyse, document and expose to the outside world, the merits of an inclusive, bottom up approach to peace as demonstrated by the activities of CAS's in partnership with indigenous actors. There is therefore a dearth in the literature that examines grassroot intervention in Darfur around the salient issue of resolving tribal fights, restoring social coherence in communities on ground Darfur and the ultimate goal

⁸²¹ See chapter 5 for details

of achieving relational transformation. In fact, the Darfur conflict seems to be a forgotten one. This ostensible information gap, due in part to restricted access into the region, is the deficit this thesis has sought to address in the smallest way possible.

Also, the study as noted earlier, specifically revealed the extent to which Lederach's "comprehensive framework" can be operationalized in a real-time conflict like Darfur. In the first place, the endorsement of a "multidimensional framework" by the UN Security Council evidences the link between scholarly research and the practitioner's practice. A hybridized intervention is emblematic of existing institutional endeavour on the trajectory of transformation. The challenges surrounding implementation nonetheless reveals the herculean task of achieving sustainable peace for Darfur. This is an indication that the practice of transformation stretches far beyond policy enactment, even when change commences with such initial steps. The study arrives at the conclusion that Lederach's propositions may have gained institutional acknowledgement as UNAMID's strategy for intervention. The transformation story, either of success or failure in Darfur regardless, is still a daunting work in progress. This conclusion does not however imply that the same propositions, when tested in or applied to other African conflicts for example, will yield similar results. Ostensibly, Darfur does exhibit peculiar impediments that may be non-existent in other conflicts around the continent.

The study is without doubt a contribution to on-going debates among African scholars now vociferously underscoring the merits of exploring and recognizing the African conception of peace building as an appendage to the normative agenda underlying international intervention in Africa.⁸²² These discussions have continued to accentuate the saliency of African indigenous peace-making mechanisms, while recommending a "re-enabling"⁸²³ of traditional structures to harness extant potentials of peace-making, so that in conjunction with conventional strategies internal conflicts might be on the part to sustainable peace.

The question of "generalization" does therefore bare the limitation of the thesis: that the study focuses on one state: North Darfur, out of the current five. The findings of this study cannot therefore, be judged as a comprehensive investigation into Lederach propositions. Even when Civil Affairs Sections cut across the Darfur states and indigenous actors and mechanisms

⁸²² See, David J Francis, *Peace and Conflict in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2008), 114-130

⁸²³ *ibid*, 117

remain homogenous in nature; conflict dynamics tend to present a measure of divergence. The vacuum of knowledge and information from the central, east, west, and south Darfur therefore begs to be filled.

Finally, the recent drawdown of contingents in Darfur in accordance with resolution 2363 was authorised with the objective to effectuate the transition of UNAMID into a full-fledged peace-building mission. This exposes the conflict terrain to deeper scholarly investigation into the international community's peace building agenda for Darfur. Indeed, this thesis has served as a stepping-stone for further research into the prospects for transforming the conflict based on a mandate that will now focus largely on level 3 of the conflict in Darfur.

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
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Appendices

Appendix 1

Lederach's Pyramid (Diagram One)



Appendix 2 (Diagram two)

Lederach's Comprehensive Framework as an Analytical Tool for Comprehending UNAMID's Grassroot Intervention Strategy for Darfur

