Persuasive Dialogues
in Shakespeare's Dramatic Work

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1. Prof. Dr. Wolfgang G. Müller
2. Prof. Dr. Uwe Baumann

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1. Introduction

Shakespeare's plays present us with a "universe of dialogues" ("ein Universum der Dialoge"[1]), and the immense variety of dramatic dialogues in his works is indeed astonishing. Within this universe, the persuasive dialogue is but one form, which, though it represents but a small number of Shakespeare's dialogues, provides some of his most memorable scenes. Despite his indisputably exceptional position as a playwright, Shakespeare is also symptomatic of his time which has frequently been characterized as a dialogic period or, more specifically, as an age "giving priority to the mode of dialogic scepticism over monological dogmatism"[2]. Since dialogue is a constitutive element of drama, and drama is "the outstanding literary genre of the age"[3], Shakespeare's universe of dialogues might be seen as one indication of the priority which dialogue had over monologue in the Renaissance. The 'dialogic scepticism' achieving pre-eminence in the Renaissance is unquestionably related to the developing focus on the individual which is also highly characteristic of the age. Surely, it is quite significant in this context that Bloom ascribes the invention of the "inner self" and of "the human as we know it" to Shakespeare's dramatic art.[4]

Persuasion, which is the original and thus perhaps the most authentic province of rhetoric, has frequently been (mis-)understood as an essentially one-sided process. This has cultural and historical reasons, since in the Renaissance the power of rhetoric was commonly thought to be virtually unlimited. As Vickers points out, it was an "idea almost universal throughout the Renaissance, that rhetoric cannot be resisted."[5] The rhetorician was seen as the "emperour of mens minds" (Henry Peacham) and rhetoric itself "as a matter of power and control, not debate and dialogue"[6]. However, as Müller demonstrates, rhetoric is widely used in Renaissance drama in a genuinely dialogic manner, for example when rhetorical figures serve as turn-taking devices.[7] What may have inspired the rather narrow view of rhetoric as a monological instrument, is its close

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[1] Müller, Wolfgang G., "Zur literarischen Gesprächskultur in der englischen Renaissance: Die Funktion von Tropen und Figuren im Dialog", Bodo Guthmüller (ed.), Wolfenbütteler Renaissance-Mitteilungen, 25, 2001, 5.
[2] Müller, Wolfgang G., "Dialogue and Dialogicity in Renaissance Drama", Fritz-Wilhelm Neumann and Sabine Schülting (eds.), Anglistentag 1998, Erfurt: Proceedings, Trier 1999, 212.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Bloom, Harold, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human, London 1999, 714.
[5] Vickers, Brian, "'The Power of Persuasion': Images of the Orator, Elyot to Shakespeare", James J. Murphy (ed.), Renaissance Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1983, 418.
[6] Rebhorn, Wayne A., The Emperor of Men's Minds: Literature and the Renaissance Discourse of Rhetoric, Ithaca and London, 1995, xii.
[7] Müller, 1999, 213.

association with common features of the persuasive discourse and with the tradition of the persuasive speech, the *oratio*, which was treated in rhetoric books. Unlike dialectic, as Mack points out, rhetoric developed from a monologic background, as it originated "from the political or courtroom oration"[8] An inherent feature of persuasive discourse in general, as will be argued in chapter 3, is that the relationship of the parties involved in the persuasion is typically an asymmetrical one. If the persuasion is successful, this asymmetry manifests itself in the superior position of one of the characters who obviously manages to control the opinions and behaviour of other characters. Thus, superior characters who control their interlocutors appear to be more 'active', whereas characters who are influenced seem to be passive recipients of a persuasive 'message'. This study will demonstrate that such a view of persuasion as a one-sided act is contradicted by Shakespeare's dramatic art, which offers a remarkable variety of examples of dialogic persuasion.

In recent years dialogue as a focus of study has received increasing attention, a development which is in part due to linguistic approaches subsumed under the terms 'discourse analysis', 'conversation analysis', or 'dialogue analysis'[9]. However, the analytical techniques developed and used in these fields have only rarely been applied to dramatic dialogue. Their utilization for an analysis of Shakespeare's dramatic dialogues is, for example, convincingly undertaken by Coulthard, by Hermann, and by Gilbert.[10] Already Kennedy points out that the interactive character of Shakespeare's dramatic texts is not sufficiently considered in analyses: "Most studies of Shakespeare's verbal style show a surprising neglect of dialogue as a focus of attention."[11] Also Herman, though in more general terms, perceives the need to investigate dramatic

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[8] Mack, Peter, "Humanist Rhetoric and Dialectic", Jill Krayne (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, Cambridge 1996, 83.

[9] The widespread interest of linguists in language use and communication has given rise to a juxtaposition of different fields of study which defy a clear distinction, as their objects of study as well as their approaches overlap considerably. These fields of study which are in some way concerned with dialogue are discourse analysis, conversation analysis, and dialogue analysis. A comparison of their individual goals and methods is offered by Stephen C. Levinson [Pragmatics, Cambridge 1983, 286-294] and by Edda Weigand ["Discourse, Conversation, Dialogue", Edda Weigand (ed.), Concepts of Dialogue: Considered from the Perspectives of Different Disciplines, Tübingen 1994, 49-76.]. The central assumptions which underlie the present study are taken from the field of dialogue analysis. Thus, as will be explained in chapter 5, individual utterances in a dialogue are not viewed as independent speech acts, but as dependent, dialogical turns. Weigand points out that the awareness of the "interdependence of initiative and reactive acts" in dialogue is a characterizing feature of dialogue analysis [68].

[10] For example Gilbert, Antony J., Shakespeare's Dramatic Speech, Lewiston, Queenston, and Lampeter 1997; Herman, Vimala, Dramatic Discourse: Dialogue as Interaction in Plays, London 1995; Coulthard, Malcolm, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis, London 1977.

[11] Kennedy, Andrew K., Dramatic Dialogue: The Duologue of Personal Encounter, Cambridge et al 1983, 262.

dialogues as interaction.[12] Apparently, the importance of the dialogue in Shakespeare's dramatic works has not yet been fully realized, and literary criticism has hardly been able to do full justice to this aspect.

This study's pronounced interest in matters connected with dialogue is inspired by Shakespeare's dialogic representation of persuasion. Throughout his works there are scenes in which Shakespeare dramatizes persuasion in dialogic situations, that is, with the participation of the persuadee. The person who is to be persuaded is not simply present as a passive listener but actively shares in the discourse. It is this characteristic feature of persuasive dialogues which lends a special interest and dramatic tension to these scenes. The persuadee's participation in the persuasive discourse makes the view of him or her as merely a passive victim of the persuasion problematic. Rather, it is suggested that s/he too shapes the persuasive discourse and contributes to its development. Such a concept would, however, contradict the traditional assumption about persuasion as a type of communication dominated and controlled by only one speaker.

In an attempt to weigh these two contrary concepts of persuasive dialogues against each other, namely the notion of the persuadee's influence on the development of the persuasion on the one hand and the assumption of the persuader's extensive control on the other hand, the primary question raised in this dissertation will be, to what extent each interlocutor influences the persuasion. Hence, the central aim of this study is to determine how far both interlocutors contribute to the development of the persuasion and are responsible for its result. This study will therefore inquire into the general problem of the extent to which the persuasive discourse is dialogized with respect to both form and quality, as well as into the more specific question whether in dialogic persuasion the persuadee is to be seen as a victim or as a co-creator of the persuasion. That the persuadee cannot be understood as merely a recipient of a persuasive message, has already been pointed out, yet the question remains, what effects and significance can be attributed to his or her participation in the dialogue.

In order to investigate these issues, the following analysis will draw on linguistic methods of analysing dialogues, specifically on methods developed within the field of dialogue analysis. The characteristic feature of such methods, as Marková, Graumann, and Foppa assert, is "a perspective which focuses on the interacting *dyad* rather than on

[12] Herman, 16.

two interacting *individuals*."[13] In this respect they are more suitable to our purposes than, for example, speech act theory which is not able to capture the peculiarities of dialogue, since it is not especially suited to investigate interaction but focuses on the intentions of individual speakers.[14] In contrast to speech act theory, dialogue analysis employs a methodology which can do justice to aspects of interaction and of the interlocutors' mutual generation of communication which are constitutive elements of dialogue. Another aspect of dialogue analysis, pointed out by Linell and Luckmann, is that it allows the critic to gain insight into the relationship of the interlocutors and into "less transparent phenomena [of their interaction, such as] deeper asymmetries, hidden meanings, silent misunderstandings, etc."[15] without making the mistake of speculation, because such an analysis depends on a close reading of the text, of "phenomena which are *demonstrably there*."[16] In accordance with this practice of close reading, Linell and Luckmann support the "analytical principle to search for explanations of social interaction in the concrete encounter itself."[17] For an analysis of dramatic dialogue, this approach seems especially profitable, since 'the concrete encounter itself', the actual words spoken, provides the only reliable basis for understanding the characters' relationships and the dynamics that influence it.

An application of such linguistic methods to literary dialogues, however, is not entirely unproblematic. Originally, they were developed to examine authentic communication. Hence, their applicability to literary discourse is a controversial issue. Although dramatic dialogues do, of course, imitate actual dialogues[18], they frequently transform their mechanisms for dramatic purposes: "The principles, norms and conventions of use which underlie spontaneous communication in everyday life are precisely those which are exploited and manipulated by dramatists"[19]. Critics do however observe, that this manipulation of the conventions, that shape an authentic dialogue, typically does not result in an essentially different nature of literary dialogues which would render them unfit for a dialogue analysis . As Hess-Lüttich argues,

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[13] Marová, Graumann, Foppa, xii.
[14] Weigand, 1994, 72.
[15] Linell, Per and Thomas Luckmann, "Asymmetries in Dialogue: Some Conceptual Preliminaries", Ivana Marková and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Asymmetries in Dialogue, New York et al 1991, 17.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Hundsnurscher, Franz, "Dialoganalyse und Literaturbetrachtung", Edda Weigand (ed.), Concepts of Dialogue: Considered from the Perspective of Different Disciplines, Tübingen 1994, 82;
Coulthard characterizes drama texts as "scripts for the performing of pseudo-conversations [which] can be successfully approached with techniques originally developed to analyse real conversation." Coulthard, 182.
[19] Herman, 6.

literary dialogues, though they may be 'unrealistic', are not artificial in the sense that they follow rules entirely different from those underlying natural conversation. Rather, their 'unrealistic' appearance is due to their concentration of the features of natural dialogues.[20] Hence, this compression might even necessitate an approach to Shakespeare's dramatic dialogues with methods developed for authentic conversation. Gilbert is aware of this necessity when he argues: "He [Shakespeare] exploits speech for dramatic effect. We must then turn our attention to natural conversation […] to see more clearly the scale of Shakespeare's achievement as a writer of performance texts."[21] Hundsnurscher argues similarly, when he suggests that it is legitimate and advisable to employ linguistic methods for an analysis of literary texts if they are able to contribute to the task of literary studies, namely to illuminate the artistic nature of such texts.[22] Under this premise he acknowledges that dialogue analysis offers an appropriate methodology for the analysis of dramatic dialogues.

Another objection against analysing literary dialogue with such linguistic methods is raised by O'Connell who claims that 'simulated' dialogues written by an author are in fact monological and therefore present "neither accurate nor legitimate examples for the empirical purposes of the social sciences"[23] While a literary text, due to its status as a work of art, seems indeed no appropriate object of analysis to gain (an empirical) insight into social phenomena, this does not automatically question the appropriateness of dialogue analysis to gain insight into literary phenomena. Furthermore, O'Connel is mistaken in his assumption that fictional dialogues are monological since they are written by only one person. As a short survey of the concept of the dialogue will show (chapter 3), the dialogic nature of a text does not depend on the presence of more than one speaker, nor does it seem plausible that a dramatist (and especially a dramatist of the inventiveness of Shakespeare) should not be able to create characters with truly different perspectives, which is a prerequisite of a dialogic text.

An analytic device which seems less problematic in its application to Shakespeare's dramatic texts than dialogue analysis is classical rhetoric. Already in the Middle Ages and even more so in the Renaissance, rhetoric and poetics were, as

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[20] Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W.B., "Sechs Ansichten vom Dialog", Erwin Hasselberg, Ludwig Martienssen and Frank Radtke (eds.), Der Dialogbegriff am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts: Internationale wissenschaftliche Konferenz anlässlich des 225. Geburtstags von Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Berlin 1996, 24f.

[21] Gilbert,1.

[22] Hundsnurscher, 77.

[23] O'Connell, Daniel C. and Sabine Kowal, "Language Use and Dialogue from a Psychological Perspective", Erwin Hasselberg, Ludwig Martienssen and Frank Radtke (eds.), Der Dialogbegriff am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts: Internationale wissenschaftliche Konferenz anlässlich des 225. Geburtstags von Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Berlin 1996, 148.

Rebhorn puts it, 'conflated'[24]. The notion of "rhetoric's universal applicability", as he demonstrates, was widespread in the Renaissance. "[M]any Renaissance writers […] do not limit rhetoric to formal speeches; they conceive of it instead in the widest term as being present practically wherever communication and persuasion are occurring."[25] Thus, rhetoric was surely believed to be a necessary and effective part of dialogical persuasion, and can be easily recognized in fictional persuasive dialogues. Renaissance writers "were taught to think of rhetoric and 'poetry' […] as virtually identical in character […] [, so that] it should hardly be surprising to discover a significant rhetorical dimension in literary texts from the period."[26] This rhetorical dimension goes far beyond the use of tropes and figures as a means to have a certain effect on the play's audience or reader. As Rebhorn equally points out, it also manifests itself in the representation of 'rhetorical processes'. In a dramatic text, the persuasion of one character by another is perhaps the most explicit representation of rhetorical processes. Thus, Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues already have a pronounced rhetorical dimension because they are concerned with persuasion which can be seen as the prototypical rhetorical process. For a historically adequate explanation of such dialogues one must then return to their rhetorical background, which shapes the representation of persuasion. The awareness of this background, both with respect to the tradition of the rhetorical speech that will be investigated in chapter 4 and with respect to the use of tropes that will at appropriate points be considered in the textual analysis. is meant to complement the linguistic methods used for this study and to avoid an overly narrow approach.

The corpus examined in this dissertation comprises ten examples of dialogic persuasion taken from plays as early as *Richard III* and as late as *The Tempest*. The fact that persuasive dialogues can be found in plays from all periods of his literary development, can be seen as an indication of Shakespeare's unceasing interest in dialogic persuasion. Due to the combination of the contrasting aspects of an active participation of both interlocutors on the one hand and the persuader's control of the discourse on the other hand, the rhetorical processes and relationships between characters offer great dramatic potential. Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues vary greatly in their form and occur under very different conditions. Hence, the examples of persuasion are purposefully chosen for this study from a variety of texts. They form

[24] Rebhorn, 4.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., 17f.

part of historical plays (*Richard III*), tragedies (*Othello*, *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, *King Lear*), Roman plays (*Julius Caesar*), comedies (*Much Ado About Nothing*), and romances (*The Winter's Tale*, *The Tempest*). Scenes from these plays were selected in an attempt to cover a wide range of different types of persuasive dialogues, in order to make the flexibility of this kind of dialogue in Shakespearean drama apparent. For Shakespeare, there is no prototypical situation or context in which persuasive dialogues are set and by which they are shaped. The components of a persuasive dialogue can differ remarkably from scene to scene. Persuasion, in other words, has no fixed characteristics. It can be used for evil as well as for morally flawless purposes. The persuader may be rather open about his or her intentions or s/he may try to conceal them. Moreover, the persuadee may be very active or rather passive, and the persuasion may either succeed or fail. This list of contrasting features might at will be continued in this manner, but should be sufficient enough to indicate that each of the examples represents a quite singular combination of characterizing features.

The following short account of the essence of the selected dialogues is meant to acquaint the reader with the corpus and to demonstrate the heterogeneity of Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues. Although some of the scenes resemble each other, there are significant aspects which give each of them an individual quality. Two of the dialogues are taken from *Richard III*. Due to their similarity they can be understood as 'parallel scenes'[27]: Richard, who wants to marry strategically to increase or consolidate his power, in each of these scenes woos a woman. In I/ii he woos Lady Anne, whom he made a widow, while she still laments over the corpse of the late King Henry VI, her father-in-law and Richard's most recent victim. In IV/iv, Richard attempts to persuade Elizabeth to support him and to advise her daughter to accept his proposal of marriage. Since in IV/iv he talks to the mother of the object of his wooing, the situation is significantly different from that in I/ii and, in contrast to the earlier persuasive dialogue, his endeavours are not successful. In *Much Ado About Nothing* (IV/i) persuasion occurs in the context of a dialogue in which Beatrice and Benedick declare their mutual love to each other. After Benedick's friend Claudio has completely ruined the reputation of Beatrice's cousin Hero, whom he originally intended to marry, Beatrice persuades Benedick to avenge Hero and to kill his friend Claudio. The dialogue between Brutus and Cassius in *Julius Caesar* I/ii sets persuasion in a more public, political context. Cassius wants to win Brutus for a conspiracy against Caesar. Since Caesar's

[27] Clemen, Wolfgang, Kommentar zu Shakespeares Richard III, Göttingen 1969, 266f.

outstanding position is seen as a threat to the republic, the conspirators have decided to kill him. Cassius tries to win the honourable Brutus for the conspiracy in order to justify it to the public. A personal dimension is added to this persuasive dialogue by Brutus and Caesar's friendship. A personal conflict of Hamlet and his mother is solved by persuasion in the so-called 'closet scene' (III/iv). Hamlet attempts to convince Gertrude of the immorality of her hasty remarriage shortly after her first husband's death and makes her resolve to behave in accordance with her loyalty to him, that is, to change her conduct and to lead a morally better life. In the spectacular persuasion of Othello in III/iii and IV/i Othello's ensign Iago, without the help of a single piece of substantial evidence, deludes his commander into believing that his wife Desdemona has been unfaithful to him with the soldier Cassio. A somewhat similar instance of persuasion takes place in *King Lear* I/ii, where Edmund deceives his father Gloucester and convinces him of the disloyalty of his legitimate son Edgar whom he falsely accuses of planning to rebel against Gloucester. Although the central components of the situations, namely the persuaders' complete departure from the truth and their malicious slandering of an innocent person who is very dear to the persuadee, are identical in the scenes from *Othello* and *King Lear*, the latter is unique insofar as it is set in the context of a family and is in part caused by the problem of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of children. Moreover, Edmund, who seeks to replace his brother to rise in the hierarchy, has a concrete motivation, whereas Iago's motive is not clearly defined and at times seems to be implanted in his sheer evilness, which gives the situation another dimension. In two scenes of *Macbeth* (I/v and I/vii) Lady Macbeth persuades her husband to murder his guest King Duncan in order to fulfil the prophesies of the witches, who address Macbeth as the prospective king. In this persuasive dialogue the persuadee's doubts need to be overcome, yet Macbeth is already predisposed towards accepting the idea of regicide. A comparable situation is the persuasion of Sebastian in *The Tempest* II/i. Also in this dialogue, the persuadee is incited to commit regicide in order to replace the king. Yet in contrast to Macbeth, Sebastian at the outset of the dialogue reveals hardly any inclination to make a great effort for his own political advancement. As the younger brother of the king Alonso, he seems to be contended with his position and is far less ambitious than the renowned and victorious warrior Macbeth who has just been promoted by the king. Moreover, Antonio, the persuader in this dialogue, tries to establish himself as a role model for Sebastian. Antonio's successful removal of his brother Prospero serves as an effective argument in favour of

Sebastian's murder of his own brother. In *The Winter's Tale* (II/iii) persuasion is used for an attempt to save an innocent woman who has unjustly been accused of unfaithfulness to her husband. This woman, the queen of Sicily, Hermione, becomes the victim of Leontes' obsessive jealousy and is imprisoned despite the advanced stage of her pregnancy. The faithful Paulina hopes to soften his heart by presenting him his newborn daughter and to convince him of the fidelity of his wife by pointing out the similarity of the infant's and his own features. Although Paulina fails, this dialogue is a remarkable example of an attempted persuasion which, furthermore, illustrates the crucial significance of the persuadee's disposition to the failure or success of the persuader.

Before we enter into an analysis of these dialogues, central concepts that are essential for the analysis will be defined in detail. First, the concept of the dialogue will be discussed (chapter 2). One focus of this second chapter will be to determine the necessary conditions for a discourse to be considered a dialogue. The classification of a text as a dialogue is not always as unproblematic as one might initially presume. Particularly the necessary distinction between dialogic form and dialogic quality may raise difficulties with respect to such a classification. Next, the general features of teleological discourse will be investigated to arrive at a useful definition of persuasion (chapter 3). The aim of this chapter is to identify features of persuasion that shape the roles and relationships of the parties involved in such discourse.

The textual analysis will be conducted in chapters 4 and 5. The division of the analysis into these two chapters follows the distinction between dialogic form and dialogic quality made in chapter 2. While the fourth chapter offers a spectrum of categories describing different manifestations of the dialogic form of persuasion, an additional qualitative analysis, which is based on these categories, will be attempted in the fifth chapter. The purpose of the analysis of chapter 4 is to determine, in a strictly quantitative sense, the extent to which each interlocutor contributes to the persuasive discourse, or, in other words, the extent to which persuasion is dialogised. In order to identify substantial contributions to the persuasion, as opposed to those that do not form an essential part of the persuasive discourse, the texts are in this chapter set against the foil of the *oratio,* the persuasive speech, which can be seen as a background of such dialogic treatments of the phenomenon of persuasion. Due to a general awareness of the conventions and the structure of an *oratio* in the Renaissance, its traces can be found in Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues. Therefore, a comparison of the elements of an *oratio* to the substance of the persuader's and the persuadee's utterances is useful to identify the actual significance of their contributions to the persuasion, and specifically the persuadee's role in the development of the persuasion.

The qualitative approach of the fifth chapter is meant to complete and counterbalance the results of the fourth. Its analysis will seek answers to the question of the speakers' responsibility for their contributions to the persuasion. The difficulty of this question arises from the interaction of two significant aspects of persuasive dialogues, namely of the persuadee's active participation and contribution of his or her own perspective on the one hand, and the persuader's control of the development of the dialogue on the other hand. These two aspects create a paradoxical situation in which one interlocutor shares in shaping the dialogue, which is yet largely controlled by another interlocutor. However, this seeming contradiction will be explained by distinguishing between contributions of different quality, namely those for which the speaker is fully responsible and those for which his or her responsibility is to a varying degree limited. As a result of this investigation, it should be possible to recognize the true extent of the persuadee's contributions to the persuasive discourse and to understand the significance of these contributions with respect to the persuadees' roles in the persuasion and their respective disposition. Furthermore, the analysis will reveal some of the persuaders' methods of controlling their interlocutors' utterances through the dialogue. In a final conclusion the dialogic and monologic influences in Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues will be summarized, and the persuadee's paradoxical position will be characterized as a mixture of victim and co-creator of the persuasion.

2. Definitions of Dialogue

2.1. The Prevalent Interest in Dialogue

Dialogue is both a subject and a method of many disciplines, such as philosophy, linguistics, sociology, psychology, political science, theology, medicine, didactics, and many more. It should come as no surprise then that many attempts have been made to define dialogue. Naturally, these definitions are as varied as the sciences in which they are used. Foppa's assertion that being engaged in dialogical activities "*is* human nature"[28] may offer an (admittedly unspecified) reason for the remarkably widespread interest in dialogue. Schrey seems to perceive dialogue as being especially characteristic of a more or less recent time. When he remarks that ours is a dialogical age[29], one might well wonder how, with regard to time, he defines 'our age' – when actually did the 'age of the dialogue' start (if, indeed, it is one)? One would have to make out a rather early starting point. According to Hess-Lüttich, philosophy (and thus also rhetoric) represent the origin of a systematic reflection on dialogue as a medium and a method ('als Medium und Methode')[30]. Although in Greek Antiquity dialogue was of importance mainly as a literary genre, Socratic dialogue was first and foremost a form of discourse which was used to come to a greater understanding of different problems and, by way of discussion, to increase one's knowledge and arrive at truth. The fact that dialogue was perceived as reflecting the process of thought, finds its expression in Plato's view of thought as 'discourse of the soul with itself'[31]. This notion of dialogue as a method of generating knowledge is still prevalent in modern philosophical approaches. Potepa, for example, understands dialogue as a process of collective thinking of the interlocutors.[32] For a systematic account of the dialogue which can be used for the purposes of this investigation, we will turn to linguists, sociologists, and psychologists who, in the last century, have developed detailed descriptions of the different features of dialogue, and have thus provided a basis for a closer understanding of dialogue, especially with regard to its nature, mechanisms, and usage.

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[28] Foppa, Klaus, "About the Psychology of Dialogue – even though Psychologists are not Interested in it", Edda Weigand (ed.), Concepts of Dialogue: Considered from the Perspective of Differents Disciplines, Tübingen 1994, 145.
[29] Schrey, Heinz-Horst, Dialogisches Denken, Darmstadt 1991, ix.
[30] Hess-Lüttich, "Dialog", Gert Ueding (ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, Tübingen 1992, 608.
[31] Heinrichs, J., "Dialog, dialogisch", Joachim Ritter (ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Basel and Stuttgart 1972, 226.
[32] Potepa, Maciej, "Im Dialog gemeinsam denken", Hasselberg, Erwin, Ludwig Martienssen and Frank Radtke (eds.), Der Dialogbegriff am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts: Internationale wissenschaftliche Konferenz anlässlich des 225. Geburtstags von Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Berlin 1996.

2.2. Distinction Between Dialogic Form and Quality

To account for the variety of definitions even within individual disciplines it is, first of all, necessary to note that these definitions focus on different aspects of the concept of dialogue. A general distinction can be made between formal and qualitative definitions. Weigand as well as Krauss, Fussell and Chen distinguish between a 'traditional' formal and a functional concept of dialogue. The latter, wider concept which is termed 'dialogicity' by Weigand obviously follows Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of 'dialogism' according to which every utterance is inherently dialogical insofar as it is shaped with respect to an actual or assumed addressee.[33] In their three-volume studies on dialogue, Marková, Foppa, and their interdisciplinary study group similarly differentiate between dialogue in a narrow, formal sense and in a wider sense which includes dialogic qualities "of mind and language" and which is investigated in its social, historical, and cultural contexts. In accordance with Bakhtin, they employ the term *dialogism* for the latter approach. These two concepts of dialogue are perceived as "different yet complementary".[34] Mukarovský uses the cover term 'dialogic nature' which includes the dialogic form of an utterance, that is, its "division into individual replies", as well as its 'dialogic quality'.[35] In the following, we will adopt Mukarovský's terminology and distinguish between 'dialogic form' and 'dialogic quality', as well as speak of 'dialogic nature' to refer to both aspects of dialogue. As both concepts of dialogue are of interest for the analysis of the dialogic nature of a text, it is necessary to devote some space to a more detailed account of the concepts and to single out the essential features of dialogue that can be derived from each definition.

2.2.1. A Formal Definition of Dialogue

A formal definition of dialogue, which is often considered to be the 'traditional' or 'narrow' concept, states that dialogue is "a face-to-face interaction between two or more individuals using a system of signs."[36] According to Mukarovský, the distinction between monologic and dialogic form depends on "whether the utterance comes from

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[33] Weigand, 1994, 50;
Krauss, Robert M., Susan R. Fussell, and Yihsiu Chen, "Coordination of Perspective in Dialogue: Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Processes", Ivana Marková, Carl F. Graumann, and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Mutualities in Dialogue, Cambridge 1995, 127.

[34] Marková, Ivana and Klaus Foppa, "Conclusion", Ivana Marková and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Asymmetries in Dialogue, New York et al 1991, 259.

[35] Mukarovský, Jan, "Two Studies of Dialogue", Burbank, John and Peter Steiner (transl. and ed.), The Word and Verbal Art: Selected Essays by Jan Mukarovský, New Haven and London 1977, 107f.

[36] Marková, Graumann, and Foppa, xi.

one or more subjects".[37] Hence, the essential feature of a dialogic form of discourse is the presence of at least two active participants who engage in alternate speech. The term 'presence' can be understood more or less literally. Some definitions contend that individuals engaged in dialogue share both time and place with one another and that, hence, "temporal and spatial *immediacy*" is a fundamental feature of dialogue.[38] Weigand, on the other hand, argues that individuals can also be engaged in a dialogue without actually being 'face-to-face', for example in a telephone conversation. She proposes to define a dialogic form on the basis of time, rather than time *and* place. In other words, individuals are engaged in a dialogue if they converse with each other at the same time; yet they need not necessarily be in the same place.[39] This broader definition of dialogic form includes types of interaction which lack the dimension of nonverbal behaviour, since the interlocutors may not see each other. Some definitions of dialogic form focus explicitly on verbal interaction. Other definitions, as for example the one by Marková, Graumann, and Foppa quoted above, are phrased so as to cover both verbal and nonverbal behaviour.

Another important aspect of dialogue is the influence of the immediate context, i.e. "the physical environment [interlocutors] share"[40], which affects the dialogue even if it is not explicitly made a subject of conversation because "every discoursive process is situationally embedded"[41]. Bergmann introduces the term *local sensitivity* to describe a principle that, as he maintains, operates in every kind of discourse. "Local sensitivity is meant to capture the tendency built into every topic talk to focus on elements of the encounter's context which are situated or occur in the participants' field of perception"[42]. Besides offering topics for the conversation, the context may help interlocutors to ensure mutual understanding of each other's utterances. Together with other sources, such as feedback from the interlocutor or previously acquired knowledge about the other participant(s) in the dialogue, it provides additional information which makes an adequate assessment of the meaning of an utterance possible. Mukarovský names three

[37] Mukarovský, Jan, "Monologue and Dialogue – 'Hidden' Meaning", John Burbank and Peter Steiner (transl. and ed.), On Poetic Language, Lisse 1976, 60.
[38] Luckmann, Thomas, "Social Communication, Dialogue and Conversation", Ivana Marková and Klaus Foppa (eds.), The Dynamics of Dialogue, Hemel Hempstead 1990, 52.
[39] Weigand, Edda, Sprache als Dialog: Sprechakttaxonomie und Kommunikative Grammatik, Tübingen 1989, 42.
[40] Krauss, Fussell, Chen, 129.
[41] Bergmann, Jörg, "On the Local Sensitivity of Conversation", Ivana Marková and Klaus Foppa (eds.), The Dynamics of Dialogue, Hemel Hempstead 1990, 207.
[42] Ibid.

"necessary and thus omnipresent aspects of […] dialogue"[43]. One of these refers to dialogic quality, while the other two, namely the existence of two active participants and the "relationship between the participants of a discourse and the real, material situation which surrounds them at the moment of the discourse" refer to aspects of dialogic form. With respect to this 'real, material situation', Mukarovský states that it can penetrate the discourse in a variety of ways, both directly and indirectly. "The material situation is therefore omnipresent, if not always actually, then at least potentially, in a dialogue."

Considering that sensitivity to context is one of the constituent aspects of a dialogic situation, the 'broader' definition of dialogic form presented above becomes somewhat problematic. Interlocutors who converse with each other only at the same time share less common context than interlocutors who partake in a dialogue at the same time *and* in the same place. Their mutually shared context is, so to speak, reduced. Thus, Weigand's broader concept of dialogue could be criticized for including types of discourse with a diminished dialogic form. Nevertheless, as long as interlocutors share a minimum of mutual context it is justified to speak of a dialogue.

A tendency in dialogue that counterbalances the principle of local sensitivity is that towards abstraction, i.e. "the ability of co-interactants to refer […] to elements which transcend the situation in space or time."[44] As Luckmann argues, the opposing forces of abstraction, on the one hand, and sensitivity to context, on the other hand, are related to different stages of the development of language. Ontogenetically as well as phylogenetically, an early stage of communication is highly deictic. Only later does the development of the faculty of abstraction enlarge the possibilities of dialogue.[45] To what extent an individual dialogue is characterized by abstraction and by local sensitivity varies significantly and depends on several factors, for example on whether or not it can be classified as institutional discourse which is restrained in its topical development by certain rules.

The essentiality of an alternation of speakers for the dialogic form of a discourse can be explained by the fact that dialogue, as a specific form of communication, depends by definition on an *exchange* of signs.[46] This aspect is highlighted in O'Connell and Kowal's definition of dialogue as a "sign-bound face-to-face

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[43] Mukarovský, 1977, 86f.
[44] Bergmann, 205.
[45] Luckmann, 51.
[46] Hess-Lüttich, 1992, 606.

communication which involves [a] high degree of immediacy and *reciprocity*"[47]. Reciprocity, as Graumann shows, is an integral characteristic of dialogue. Rather than a technical term it is a universal norm or 'moral principle' of behaviour which refers to "returning in kind or in degree"[48]. As opposed to related terms, such as 'mutuality' or 'commonality' which can also be used to describe basic features of dialogue, reciprocity is "more directly tied to the dialogical activity itself, referring to the circumstance that, in the co-presence of others, any act by one actor is […] done with the purpose or expectation that the other will do something in return, i.e. respond or […] reciprocate the action."[49] Reciprocity is thus a central aspect of dialogic form.

A point that has significant implications especially for an analysis of the formal organization of dialogues is made by Graumann when he draws attention to the obligatory nature of reciprocity which follows certain rules.[50] This binding character of reciprocity and its connection to 'rules' influenced the kind of approach towards dialogue which was taken by linguists in the 1970ies. At that time, dialogue became of central interest for linguists who made significant discoveries concerning the structure and development of natural conversation. With regard to the alternation of speakers these discoveries include the rules of turn taking which were formulated by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson.[51] According to the turn-taking system, the transfer of speakership is managed locally, namely at every point of possible completion of a turn. Such points, or "transition-relevance places"[52] occur after each sentence or other lexical unit (clauses, phrases, or even single words). At such points there are three possibilities of proceeding: the current speaker selects a next speaker, the next speaker is determined by self-selection, or the current speaker continues his or her turn. A current speaker may select a next speaker by addressing him or her with an utterance which forms part of an adjacency pair, that is, a pair of connected utterances such as greeting-greeting or question-answer. Such turns are connected insofar as the first part of the pair places the addressee under an obligation to respond with the respective second part.[53] Adjacency pairs are clear instances of reciprocity, of 'returning in kind or in degree'.

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[47] O'Connell and Kowal, 147, emphasis added.
[48] Graumann, "Commonality, Mutuality, Reciprocity: a Conceptual Introduction", Ivana Marková, Carl F. Graumann and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Mutualities in Dialogue, Cambridge 1995, 5.
[49] Linnel and Luckmann, 3.
[50] Graumann, 1995, 14.
[51] Sacks, Harvey, Emanuel A. Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson, "A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn Taking for Conversation", Jim Schenkein (ed.), Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction, New York 1978, 7-47.
[52] Ibid., 12.
[53] Ibid, 44.

Another aspect of the form of a dialogue which is investigated empirically with the help of linguistic methods is its possible asymmetry. In their analysis of the turn-taking system, Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson point out that turn size varies considerably, first because the construction of sentences allows for an expansion of the utterance even before the first point of possible completion, and second because at such points a current speaker may always continue his or her turn unless s/he is interrupted by another speaker.[54] If the turns of one speaker are constantly longer than those of other speakers, the dialogue is characterized by asymmetry in a quantitative sense. In their volume on asymmetries in dialogue Marková and Foppa use 'asymmetry' as a cover term for inequality or imbalance at different levels of dialogues. Hence, asymmetry is an intrinsic feature of dialogue which may refer to formal as well as to qualitative issues. Linell and Luckmann distinguish between four types of dominance in dialogue, one of these being 'quantitative dominance' which "concerns the relation between parties in terms of amount of talk, measured simply, e.g. in terms of number of words spoken."[55] The other three types of dominance identified by Linell and Luckmann are interactional, semantic and strategic dominance. While the last two refer to qualitative aspects of asymmetry, interactional dominance is closely related to the rules of the turn-taking system, and specifically to adjacency pairs. Since the first part of an adjacency pair impels the addressee to respond with a relevant second part, the former kind of turns can be categorized as 'strong', the latter as 'weak' interactional moves. Consequently, asymmetry with respect to the form of a dialogue may arise if the turns of one of the interlocutors for the most part comprise initiatives whereas the utterances of the other interlocutor are mainly responses elicited by these initiatives.

The essence of dialogic form becomes more conspicuous when it is contrasted with a definition of monologic form. Mukarovský answers the question 'what is dialogue' with such an opposition: "From the linguistic viewpoint it is one of the two basic patterns of speech, the opposite of monologue."[56] With respect to form, the main distinctive feature between monologue and dialogue is *not* the presence or absence of an addressee or of two participants. As Bakhtin has argued, every utterance is in some way addressed to someone. Even "in the absence of a real addressee, an addressee is presupposed"[57]. Rather, the salient feature that distinguishes dialogue from monologue

[54] Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 19f.
[55] Linell and Luckmann, 9.
[56] Mukarovský, 1977, 113.
[57] Morris, Pam (ed.), The Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev, Voloshinov, London et al 1994, 58.

is the fact that in dialogue the participants are both active. Thus, "monologue means an utterance with a single active participant regardless of the presence or absence of other passive participants."[58] In accordance with Bakhtin's idea that "[e]very utterance presupposes at least two subjects between whom the linguistic sign mediates", Mukarovský states that "in monologue one of these subjects is constantly active, the second constantly passive, whereas in dialogue the roles constantly change"[59] As Weigand insists that the presence or absence of active interlocutors in dialogue refers to a shared time, but not necessarily to a mutually shared place of discourse, she defines monologic form by the disparity of both time and place. Considering these criteria, she concludes that in a monologic form the currently active speaker receives no (immediate) reaction from his/her addressee.[60] Mukarovský goes one step further when he claims that not only is monologue free from the influence of another person's feedback, but that also the material context tends to be of less consequence. According to him an utterance with a monological form "is in its continuity largely freed from a consideration for his immediate reaction and from a close bond with the actual temporal and spatial situation"[61].

On the whole, it should be added that Weigand's definition of monologue, as a form of discourse in which the participants share neither discourse time nor discourse place, is less problematic than Mukarovský's explanation of monologue as involving passive participants. The latter is somewhat ambiguous since the very idea of the presence of a passive participant, i.e. one who participates without communicating, is a paradox in itself. The problem becomes especially evident when one considers that communication involves nonverbal behaviour. Under these conditions it is virtually impossible to imagine a participant who is present (with respect to time and place) to be entirely passive. Unless participants unmistakably do not communicate, that is, unless they are asleep, unconscious or dead, their behaviour will be interpreted in the context of the speaker's utterances and will be understood as feedback. This holds also true when 'passive' participants do apparently nothing. In this respect it is even irrelevant whether participants in interaction do something with or without a communicative intention, since "anything in the communicative process that typically *can* be produced on purpose is habitually interpreted as a component of dialogue by the participants"[62].

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[58] Mukarovský, 1977, 81.
[59] Ibid., 96.
[60] Weigand, 1989, 42.
[61] Mukarovský, 1977, 113.
[62] Luckmann, 54.

According to Weigand's distinction, the addressee of a monologic discourse is not present at the time of the utterance, which means that his or her behaviour cannot be understood as feedback. The question is whether a definition of monologic form has to be limited to such unambiguous cases. Intuitively, there seem to be a number of examples of monologic discourse in which addressees are present at the time of the utterance. Mukarovský's definition which includes such cases reads like a compromise that, nevertheless, seems to resolve the problem: as quoted above, a speaker in a formally monologic discourse does not consider the immediate reactions of the addressee(s). Thus, even if addressees are present and, intentionally or unintentionally, communicate, the discourse can have the form of a monologue if their behaviour is not conceived as feedback by the speaker. However, this compromise gives rise to another problem, since it blurs the distinction between dialogic and monologic form. It should be rather problematic to decide at what point a speaker ceases to ignore the feedback of his or her addressees and allows it to become part of a dialogic discourse. There are two possible solutions to this dilemma. Either, nonverbal behaviour has to be excluded from a definition of dialogic form, which would then be limited to verbal exchanges, or one has to resolve ambiguities by turning to qualitative definitions of dialogue and monologue. In our analysis we will attend to both solutions.

To sum up, with respect to form, dialogue is defined by the active participation of at least two interlocutors who meet in a concrete context and constantly alternate the roles of speaker and listener. The context as well as the interlocutors' knowledge and perception of each other affect the development of the dialogue. Linguistic models which are used for an analysis of formal aspects of dialogues, such as adjacency pairs, have been criticized for not doing justice to the full nature of dialogues.[63] Although according to traditional or narrow concepts dialogue seems to be defined foremost by formal characteristics, there are also inherent features of dialogue that go beyond mere questions of form and that have to be summarized by a qualitative definition. As Luckmann maintains, "the definition of dialogue in […] formal terms is merely the first step" in an approach to the phenomenon of dialogue.[64]

[63] Weigand, 1989, 40.
[64] Luckmann, 56.

2.2.2. A Qualitative Definition of Dialogue

Dialogic discourse is not merely the result of an addition of the utterances of different speakers but of the processes between them. The outcome is – qualitatively – different from the sum of the individual parts. In other words, a single contribution to a dialogue is not represented by an utterance of one of the speakers but is "jointly produced by both speaker and listener." According to Farr and Rommetveit "[s]peaking and listening are […], within a dialogical paradigm, […] *complementary* components of acts of verbal communication."[65] Thus, an utterance within a dialogue is influenced by the fact that it is part of a dialogue to such an extent that, as Marková and Foppa maintain, "on its own [it] is only a potentiality and […] it obtains its particular meaning only through the following and preceding utterances."[66] The view that an utterance cannot be understood in isolation reminds one of Bakhtin's concept of dialogism according to which all utterances are intrinsically dialogic.[67] Apparently, there are features of dialogue which are independent of a dialogic form. The question then is what are these features, and what constitutes dialogue in a qualitative sense?

2.2.2.1. Encounter of Different Perspectives

In philosophical approaches, significant contributions to a qualitative concept of dialogue were already made in the 19th century, for example by Fr.H. Jacobi, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Schleiermacher. Criticizing philosophical theories which focused exclusively on an individual subject and its understanding of objects in its environment, they postulated that a subject, an 'I', can only conceive itself in relation and opposition to a 'you'. This process necessarily involves an interaction with others or, in other words, an encounter of the 'I' and the 'you'.[68] These approaches emphasize the dialogical dimension of human experience as it presents itself in the interaction with other subjects. To account for the individuality of a person's experience, psychologists have extended the conception of perspectivity, which originally was used with regard to the perception of concrete physical objects from a particular viewpoint, to include phenomena of cognitive experience, namely "the idea that an object of thought, such as a problem, is approached from a certain position"[69].

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[65] Farr, Robert M. and Ragnar Rommetveit, "The Communicative Act: an Epilogue to Mutualities in Dialogue", Ivana Marková, Carl F. Graumann and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Mutualities in Dialogue, Cambridge 1995, 272.
[66] Marková and Foppa, 265.
[67] Holquist, Michael, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World, London and New York 1990, 60.
[68] Schrey, 14f.
[69] Graumann, Carl F., "Perspectival Structure and Dynamis in Dialogue", Ivana Marková and Klaus Foppa (eds.), The Dynamics of Dialogue, Hemel Hempstead 1990, 109.

Thus, for a discourse to have a dialogic quality there have to be two (or more) perspectives that differ from each other and encounter each other in dialogue. A perspective is defined as an 'orientation' or a point of view which is built upon background knowledge and which shapes the way something (the subject of the dialogue, other interlocutors, the immediate context) is perceived and, consequently, influences utterances.[70] These perspectives have to be noticeably different from one another. According to Schleiermacher the dissimilarity of perspectives ("Verschiedenheit der Vorstellungen") forms the basis of a dialogue.[71] Also Mukarovský conceives the difference of perspectives as a prerequisite of dialogue when he refers to the "internal tensions [and] contradictions" that arise from their encounter. Due to this difference, an encounter of perspectives in discourse results in 'semantic reversals' which reveal the different evaluations ascribed to the subject of the dialogue by each perspective. Mukarovský takes these semantic reversals as a measure of the dialogic quality of a discourse: "The more 'dialogic' the dialogue is, the more densely it is saturated with semantic reversals"[72].

An important point which accentuates the difference between dialogic form and quality is that a perspective is not necessarily connected to a concrete person. This independence of perspective and individual speaker has, of course, far-reaching consequences for the relationship of dialogic form and quality. Since they need not be connected to each other, one can identify instances of discourse in which form and quality do not coincide, and which have to be described as 'monologic dialogues' or 'dialogic monologues'. This means that utterances that are based on one perspective can be ascribed to different speakers or that an individual person can express more than one perspective.[73] The latter may be identified by semantic reversals occurring within utterances instead of at the boundaries of replies. Rather than being the exception, such types of discourse, as Mukarovský claims, come close to being a rule. At least with regard to the cases of monologic quality in a dialogic form, he states that this is a tendency to be observed in almost every discourse since "as a rule one of the speakers makes an effort to dominate the talk".[74] Here, he refers to the basic asymmetry which, in various forms and on different levels, is an inherent feature of every dialogue. While it does not seem particularly practical for an analysis to take every manifestation of

[70] Marková and Foppa, 264.
[71] Weigand, 1989, 39.
[72] Mukarovský, 1977, 109.
[73] Ibid., 96.
[74] Ibid., 109f.

asymmetry in a dialogue as a sign of a monologic quality, the concept in general is illuminating, especially with respect to clearer examples of a discrepancy of form and quality.

2.2.2.2. Mutual Perspective-Taking

The terms used to describe an encounter of different perspectives in dialogue are 'perspective-setting' and 'perspective-taking'. These terms denote "defining features of dialogicity."[75] Perspective-setting, which is the first step in dialogue, refers to the expression of one's own point of view. Thus, every utterance of a participant represents his or her own view which is offered as a potential perspective for others or, as Graumann terms it, a "communicable perspective"[76]. The conception of perspective-taking was developed by G.H. Mead who realized that the cognitive skill of taking another person's perspective is a prerequisite of true interpersonal communication. According to Mead, "[c]ommunication […] requires participants to 'take the role of the other' – that is, to view the situation from the vantage point of the other participants' background knowledge, plans, attitudes, beliefs, outlooks, etc."[77] Thus, perspective-taking is one aspect of the mutual responsiveness which is constitutive of dialogue.

A precondition of perspective-taking is that a subject who perceives objects from his or her point of view discovers "that some of the objects have a perspective of their own" and, in turn, perceive the subject from their perspectives. Due to this recognition which implies that other perspectives are different from one's own perspective and offer a different view of objects, the "originally absolute Ego perspective becomes relative"[78]. It seems that the capacity to take other persons' perspectives, which Graumann deems "the elementary communicative competence"[79], is for a large part dependent on another basic communicative skill, namely on empathy – the ability to imagine oneself in the position of other persons and thereby to hypothetically share and acknowledge their individual experience of the world. The question how interlocutors take another perspective and, for example, assess someone else's knowledge about the world is investigated by Krauss, Fussell, and Chen who identify several sources of information concerning another perspective. These include indications contained in the interlocutor's utterances (*inter*personal perspective-taking) and inferences made on the basis of his or her "group or social category memberships" (*intra*personal perspective-

[75] Marková and Foppa,264.
[76] Graumann, 1990, 114.
[77] Krauss, Fussell, and Chen, 126.
[78] Graumann, 1995, 12.
[79] Graumann, 1990, 114.

taking)[80]. Linell and Jönsson, who apparently emphasize the last aspect and view interlocutors in terms of their social roles, define perspective as "a certain position, or role, in a given activity type"[81]. Yet, it is important to note that the concept of perspective primarily deals with a phenomenon of individual subjectivity.

The mutual perspective-taking that forms part of a dialogue is a prerequisite for cooperation and for producing coherent talk since only by this process can different perspectives be attuned to each other and actually respond *to* each other instead of being merely voiced alternately. This sort of cooperation is not to be understood as a general agreement of the interlocutors. Rather, as Graumann points out, to 'take' a perspective can mean "either to adopt, to reject, or to modify it"[82]. Even the rejection of an offered perspective ensures the coherence of the dialogue since "the refusal of one argument is also the challenge to bring in a more 'relevant' one"[83].

The result of the 'perspective-taking process' is that speakers shape their utterances by taking their listeners' perspectives into account. To illustrate the ensuing influence of different perspectives on each utterance, Bakhtin describes the word as "a bridge thrown between myself and another" which is thus "territory shared by both addresser and addressee"[84]. Consequently, an utterance in a dialogue can be understood as an attempt to mediate between different perspectives and to bridge the gap between them. In dialogue, "the various utterances are individual products only in the trivial sense that the words are said by one or the other interlocutor."[85]

Yet, dialogue is not only a process of attuning one's words to the assumed perspective of the interlocutor in order to ensure a correct interpretation of one's own utterances or to elicit a desired response. In other words, perspective-taking does not only work forward, with respect to subsequent utterances. Rather, in addition to this kind of influence that considerations of other perspectives have on an utterance, perspective-taking also involves a backward influence. In this respect, an utterance always contains an interpretation of and a comment on the preceding utterance. Any current speaker at the same time expresses his or her own point of view, comments on

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[80] Krauss, Fussell, and Chen, 126ff.
[81] Linell, Per and Linda Jönsson, "Suspect Stories: On Perspective-Setting in an Asymmetrical Situation", Ivana Marková and Klaus Foppa (eds), Asymmetries in Dialogue, New York et al 1991, 77.
[82] Graumann, 1995, 3.
[83] Ibid, 1990, 115.
[84] Morris, 58.
[85] Linell, Per, Lennart Gustavsson, and Päivi Juvonen, "Interactional Dominance in Dyadic Communication: A Presentation of Initiative-Response Analysis", Linguistics, 26, 1988, 438.

the interlocutor's perspective, as it becomes manifest in the preceding utterance, and thereby interprets this preceding utterance.

Bakhtin connects this backward orientation of utterances with the construction of meaning in dialogue when he claims that "[t]o understand another person's utterance means to orient oneself with respect to it" and that "meaning is realized only in the process of active, responsive understanding."[86] An utterance as such has no definite meaning; it has the meaning on which all participants agree in the course of the dialogue. Meaning is, thus, subject to a kind of 'negotiation'; it is "constructed jointly" by the participants[87]. Since the process of interpretation and reinterpretation is continued in each utterance, meaning in dialogue (and dialogue itself) is intrinsically dynamic. The meaning of an utterance, as it is intended by the speaker, can be changed to a considerable extent by the utterances of subsequent speakers. According to Bakhtin, such a change of meaning is based on a reevaluation.[88] If interlocutors do not come to an agreement in the course of the dialogue, the meaning is at no point fixed, but *oscillates between competing versions*. It is important to note that in such cases the different views do not coexist unconnectedly in dialogue, that competing interpretations do not merely alternate without reciprocal influence. Unless interlocutors actually talk at cross-purposes they are mutually aware of the difference of perspectives and of their attempts to assert their own interpretation at the expense of others. Due to this awareness interlocutors still participate in a common attempt to jointly construct meaning, though this meaning may constantly oscillate between irreconcilable extremes.

2.2.2.3. Intersubjectivity

The issue of a joint construction of meaning is closely related to a third characterizing feature of dialogue in a qualitative sense, namely the establishment of an intersubjectivity which emerges from the encounter of different perspectives. Both phenomena refer to different aspects of mutuality in dialogue. While reciprocal perspective-taking and the joint construction of meaning represent the *process* of mutuality, intersubjectivity can be understood as the outcome of this process. Hence, it ultimately refers to what is being shared by the interlocutors of a dialogue.

In philosophical approaches the idea of intersubjectivity is first included in concepts of dialogue in the 20th century by Ferdinand Ebner, Martin Buber, and Gabriel

[86] Morris, 35.
[87] Marková and Foppa, 1991, 265.
[88] Morris, 37.

Marcel.[89] Buber explicitly speaks of an area 'between' the interlocutors where the verbal interaction takes place. According to him the words spoken exist in a special sphere which is shared by the interlocutors: "das Wort, das gesprochen wird, [existiert] in der schwingenden Sphäre zwischen den Personen, der Sphäre, die ich *das Zwischen* nenne und die wir niemals in den beiden Teilnehmern aufgehen lassen können"[90]. What Buber calls 'das Zwischen' is described as "a temporarily shared world" by Farr and Rommetveit. This shared world is constructed in the course of the dialogue in which the different perspectives engage.[91] Since utterances, as has been argued, have to be understood not as individual products but as bridges between at least two perspectives and, thereby, as territory of both, they are an indication of the common ground shared by the speakers.

When O'Connell and Kowal speak of a "mutual, reciprocal consciousness"[92], that evolves in the course of the dialogue, they imply that the different perspectives, by approaching each other, are changed in the interaction. This aspect of intersubjectivity, namely the modification of the original perspectives, is an important feature of dialogic quality. "Verständigung im Gespräch ist nicht ein bloßes Sichausspielen und Durchsetzen des eigenen Standpunktes, sondern eine Verwandlung ins Gemeinsame hin, *in der man nicht bleibt, was man war*."[93] With respect to the idea of something common being created in dialogue, Graumann points out that etymologically the word *dialogue* (dia- = *through*) already contains a "metaphor of *moving* from two or more positions toward the same place"[94] This alteration of the individual perspectives is a quasi-automatic, general process which is part of every dialogue: "When humans talk they influence themselves as well as others."[95] In addition, it can be caused by intentional attempts to influence interlocutors' perspectives. O'Connell and Kowal take this intentionality to be constitutive of dialogue in general when they claim that "dialogue involves [...] a reciprocal intention to influence one another's consciousness"[96]. Although it is certainly important to realize that dialogue always involves a mutual influence of the participants, one should still make a distinction between such influence in general and more conscious, deliberate attempts to influence

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[89] Hess-Lüttich, 1996, 21.
[90] Schrey, 61, emphasis added.
[91] Farr and Rommetveit, 271.
[92] O'Connell and Kowal, 146.
[93] Hans-Georg Gadamer, <u>Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik</u>, Tübingen 1990, 384, emphasis added.
[94] Graumann, 1990, 106.
[95] Farr and Rommetveit, 273.
[96] O'Connell and Kowal, 144.

interlocutors. The latter type of influence is more characteristic of some kinds of dialogue (e.g. persuasive dialogues) than it is of others.

Foppa, who perceives 'mutual understanding' as the goal of communication, offers a further aspect of what is shared by interlocutors as a result of an encounter of their perspectives in dialogue.[97] A precondition for arriving at mutual understanding is the establishment of 'common ground'. This is created by the process of conversing which involves a "coordination of interpretative strategies"[98]. Yet, this is not meant to suggest that the different perspectives necessarily make equal concessions to each other in their establishment of common ground. Rather, the opposite is frequently the case. Interlocutors, in the perspective-taking process, attempt to dominate each other. In negotiating their positions, each of them tries to establish his or her own perspective as the one that is commonly accepted by all co-interactants. Accordingly, dialogues are typically marked by what Linell and Luckamnn have termed *semantic dominance*. Interlocutors are semantically dominant if they "determine[…] the topics sustained in a discourse, and impose[...] interpretive perspectives on things talked about."[99] In such cases, the 'common ground' or the meaning on which interlocutors agree is influenced to a greater extent by one of the perspectives than it is by others. However, some degree of cooperation of all participants in the process of perspective-taking is necessary to ensure that interlocutors create a perspective which is original in that it differs from either of the initial perspectives. That in this context the term 'cooperation' is used in a wider sense, which is inherent in all coherent talk (including such examples a quarrels and arguments), has been pointed out before [see 2.2.2.(b)].

We can then summarize that the main characteristics of dialogue in a qualitative sense are the existence of at least two different perspectives or points of view which encounter each other and by way of mutual perspective-taking, which is part of an interpretative process, try to establish a common meaning or interpretation. In this process the individual perspectives undergo a transformation. Naturally, these are also the main points that distinguish dialogic from monologic quality. With respect to its quality, monologue is characterized by the existence of only one perspective. This has consequences for the semantic structure of the discourse which displays an

[97] Foppa, Klaus, "On Mutual Understanding and Agreement in Dialogues", Ivana Marková, Carl F. Graumann and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Mutualities in Dialogue, Cambridge 1995, 149.
[98] Gumperz, John J., "Mutual Inferencing in Conversation", Ivana Marková, Carl F. Graumann and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Mutualities in Dialogue, Cambridge 1995, 101.
[99] Linell and Luckmann, 9.

"uninterrupted logical continuity without semantic reversals."[100] Since it is not confronted with a different perspective, the perspective which shapes the discourse undergoes no change; it is marked by a lack of development.

2.3. Dialogue versus Monologue

An issue that has preoccupied the minds of theorists is the question whether dialogue or monologue is the most pervasive force in language or, more specifically, which is the 'natural', unmarked form and which is the more artificial one. Two extreme points in this debate are occupied by Lev Yabuinsky and Gustave Tarde. Whereas Yabuinsky perceives dialogue as primary, that is, as the basic, 'unmarked' form and monologue as the "'artificial' superstructure of dialogue", Tarde proclaims the priority of monologue, arguing that phylogenetically dialogue must have developed after monologue "according to the law whereby the unilateral always precedes the reciprocal."[101] As opposed to this diachronic explanation, Yabuinsky argues that the essence of language is to be found in human interaction which, by definition, is bilateral. Yabuinsky's claim of the priority of dialogue over monologue is supported by Bakhtin, who maintains that the actual reality of language is its use in verbal interaction, that is, in dialogue.[102] With his theory of dialogism Bakhtin goes beyond the "narrowly linguistic"[103] approach of Yabuinsky who limits the realm of dialogue to formally linguistic features. Basically, he perceives dialogue as a guiding force not only of language but of human experience in general. Hence, his claim of the prevalence of dialogue is based on the broad assumption that "what we usually call life is […] an activity, the dialogue between events addressed to me in the particular place I occupy in existence, and my expression of a *response* to such events from that unique place."[104] According to this view any utterance is part of a dialogue in that it responds to some previous utterance and will be responded to in turn. The logical consequence of this assumption is that, factually, monologue does not exist, but is an abstraction. "Any monologic utterance […] is an inseverable element of verbal communication" and, thereby, part of a larger dialogue.[105]

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[100] Mukarovský, 1977, 110.
[101] Ibid., 82f.
[102] Morris, 49.
[103] Holquist, 57.
[104] Ibid., 48f.
[105] Morris, 35.

Mukarovský's view seems to be a compromise between extreme positions in the debate on the relative status of dialogue and monologue. Instead of upholding either hierarchy, he perceives dialogue and monologue as having equal significance and the same status in the reality of language use. Due to this equality, he characterizes the relationship of monologue and dialogue as one that is based on constant competition. Thus, "monologue and dialogue must not be conceived as two mutually alien and hierarchically gradated forms of the utterance but as two forms which always struggle with one another for predominance, even in the very course of the utterance."[106] According to this view monologue and dialogue exist as two forces that – openly or latently – are always present in language and can predominate alternately to the effect that a single discourse may change from monologue to dialogue or vice versa.

Since the relation between monologue and dialogue can be viewed as a "dynamic polarity"[107] in which neither is clearly superior to the other one, the question is raised what influences cause the predominance of either force at a given point in a discourse. With respect to this question Mukarovský states that whether a discourse becomes monologic or dialogic depends on the milieu and the time.[108] Moreover, this question can be settled by more or less deliberate decisions made by the speaker, who tries to make the discourse suit his or her intentions. Furthermore, it also depends "on the relationship between *both* the parties participating in the discourse"[109]. Consequently, several factors are involved in determining whether a discourse at any given point is monologic or dialogic. For example, even if a speaker finds the monologue more desirable for his or her purposes, other participants might turn the discourse into a dialogue. Apparently, some types of discourse are suited better for monologue while for others dialogue is the more 'natural' manifestation.

In the case of persuasive discourse, as will be argued in the next chapter, the relation of monologue and dialogue is a rather complex issue. When seen from a cultural-historical perspective, monologue seems to be the more natural, unmarked manifestation of persuasion. Yet the participants or the concrete context may cause the discourse to take on a dialogic nature. In any case, an analysis of persuasive dialogues has to consider that a truly dialogic nature includes both a dialogic form and a dialogic quality. Since form and quality are quite independent of one another, there are several

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[106] Mukarovsky, 1977, 102.
[107] Ibid., 85.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid, 82.

possibilities for a combination of monologic or dialogic form and quality, as the following thought, which summarizes Mukarovský's account of the relation of form and quality, suggests: "The dialogic and monologic qualities are […] both present at the very origin of every utterance, whether its apparent form is monologic or dialogic."[110] With regard to the selection of the corpus it should be added at this point that for the analysis scenes were chosen on the basis of their dialogic *form*, that is, on the more obvious aspect of dialogic nature. How far this form corresponds to a dialogic quality is a question that will be answered by the textual analysis.

[110] Mukarovský, 1976, 62.

3. The Concept of Persuasion

3.1. A General Definition

For a general definition of persuasion which is frequently used, one could, as an example, refer to Lakoff who describes persuasion as "the attempt or intention of one participant to change the behavior, feelings, intentions or viewpoint of another by communicative means."[111] Similar definitions emphasize that this alteration of thoughts, feelings, and/or behaviour is to be effectuated "in some predetermined manner."[112] 'Predetermined' means that this influence is intended and prepared by the persuader. Both Kopperschmidt and Lewandowski share this general definition, yet each of them distinguishes it from another, according to Kopperschmidt, narrower concept of persuasion. Kopperschmidt himself supports the narrow definition which explains persuasion as a kind of communication which, by way of arguments, attempts to reach a consensus among the participants.[113] Lewandowski uses a different terminology for this distinction. In accordance with the wide definition, he describes persuasion as a process or method which influences opinions, attitudes, and behaviour[114]. For the narrow concept of persuasion he uses the term 'persuasive communication' which he defines as a verbal form of influencing someone by arguments, thereby reaching a consensus[115]. Thus, instead of using both definitions for the term persuasion, Lewandowski applies the term 'persuasion' only to the wider concept. Considering that persuasion as such is already defined as a kind of communication, the usefulness of the distinction between persuasion and persuasive communication appears to be questionable. Therefore, it seems more valuable to include both definitions in the concept of persuasion. However, the notion that persuasion is that communication which tries to attain a consensus among the participants has to be specified by considering that in persuasion consensus is ideally realized in complete favour of the perspective of one participant and at the expense of the other. Hence, in an ideal case of persuasion, the consensus is entirely asymmetrical. One participant, who is being persuaded, agrees to the views of the other one, the persuader. If this asymmetry is taken into account, the narrow and the wider definitions of persuasion, as Kopperschmidt terms them, turn out to be virtually identical. Since

[111] Lakoff, Robin Tolmach, "Persuasive Discourse and Ordinary Conversation With Examples from Advertising", Deborah Tannen (ed.), Analyzing Discourse: Text and Talk, Washington, D.C. 1981, 28.
[112] Brembeck, Winston L. and William S. Howell, Persuasion: A Means of Social Influence, Englewood Cliffs 1976, 11.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Lewandowski, Theodor, Linguistisches Wörterbuch, Heidelberg und Wiesbaden 1990, 790.
[115] Ibid., 791.

the consensus is reached by the persuadee's acceptance of the apparent views of the persuader, s/he is being influenced in his or her opinions by the persuader. Consequently, it could be stated that persuasion is a type of communication in which the persuader seeks to influence the thoughts, feelings, and/or behaviour of the persuadee. Lakoff points out that "the intent to persuade is recognized explicitly as such by at least one party to the discourse."[116] He thus indicates that the persuadee need not be aware of the persuasion. In such cases the lack of awareness necessarily adds to the asymmetry of the interlocutors' relationship.

In order to influence their interlocutors' attitudes and/or behaviour in some predetermined manner, persuaders have to change the way in which persuadees perceive and understand reality. If their perception of an object changes, their attitudes towards it tend to change accordingly. As Mulholland mentions, persuasion shapes reality in the minds of the receivers. Language, she maintains, "can supply people with both the means to interpret the world, and a set of methods by which to influence their own and other's perceptions of the world"[117]. Crucial for the persuader, then, especially if s/he wants to manipulate the persuadee, is to present a distorted picture of reality or, at least, one that is likely to create the desired attitudes. Vickers calls the result of this process "a vision made out of words"[118] – a phrase which neatly illustrates the relationship between language and reality. Sornig reinforces this view when he argues that persuasion does not change reality but rather the interpretation of reality.[119] According to Hoffmann, persuasion means a reinterpretation of reality for the addressee and a modification of his or her codes of interpretation. This can also mean that the interpretation promoted by the persuader does not necessarily reflect his or her true picture of reality, but rather a picture that leads the persuadee to beliefs and actions favourable for the persuader's intentions.[120]

These codes or patterns of interpretation which are the object of persuasion can be modified in different ways. Basically, such a modification can be either a qualitative or a quantitative one. Hoffmann speaks of a 'modification of value' and a 'modification

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[116] Lakoff, 28.
[117] Mulholland, Joan, Handbook of Persuasive Tactics: A Practical Language Guide, London and New York 1994, xviii.
[118] Vickers, 1983, 435.
[119] Sornig, Karl, "Bemerkungen zu persuasiven Sprachstrategien", Franz Hundsnurscher and Edda Weigand (eds.), Dialoganalyse: Referate der 1. Arbeitstagung Münster 1986, Tübingen 1986, 249.
[120] Hoffmann, Michael, "Persuasive Denk- und Sprachstile", Zeitschrift für Germanistik, 6, 1996, 300-304.

of degree'.[121] Brembeck and Howell make a similar distinction: "the change [of attitudes] may be a change in *position* on an acceptance-rejection scale or a change in *intensity*, that is, the firmness with which the position is held."[122] The change of position seems to be a qualitative change, while a change in intensity obviously corresponds to a quantitative modification. They further add that qualtitative changes do not only include the actual alteration of an existing opinion but also the creation of a new one.[123] This would, for example, be the case if a persuader brought an object to the attention of the addressee on which the latter had not yet formed an opinion because it was new to him or her. Apart from this possibility, quantitative modifications usually use techniques of diminishing or increasing the importance persuadees attach to specific attitudes. On the other hand, qualitative modifications are, for example, realized through techniques of belittling, revaluing, simplifying, complicating, or refuting certain objects, persons or events.[124]

There are several options available to a persuader to produce such changes in a concrete interaction. In order to change a particular attitude held by the addressee, persuaders might demonstrate that the existing attitude is incorrect or inadequate. Another strategy would be to prove that the object itself on which the attitude in question is held has changed. In this context Brembeck and Howell emphasize the difference between the "judgement of the object" and the "object of judgement"[125]. Yet a third possibility is to show that even though an attitude seems justified, the information on which it is based is incomplete. The full information, as the persuader might indicate, would then modify the picture and a revision of the attitude would be the consequence. Changed attitudes supposedly lead to a parallel alteration of behaviour. If, however, someone's behaviour is to be influenced without also changing this person's opinions, the persuader might "seek out and emphasize existing inconsistencies between […] a professed attitude and a given behavior. He, then, can indicate how the dissonance can be reduced or resolved" by a change of behaviour so as to fit the persuadee's attitudes.[126]

Since the persuader ultimately seeks to influence the behaviour of his or her interlocutor, s/he intends to realize an aim that goes beyond the communicative

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[121] Ibid., 304.
[122] Brembeck and Howell, 13.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Hoffmann, 305.
[125] Brembeck and Howell, 145.
[126] Ibid., 137.

situation. This characteristic is noted by Kopperschmidt as well as Lewandowski, who point out that persuasion is a mediated attempt to attain the persuaders's goals because s/he uses his or her interlocutor for its realization.[127] Hoffmann maintains that this aim is of an essentially selfish nature, since persuaders primarily seek their own benefit[128]. Even though this view is justified, it should be enlarged by considering that there might be cases in which the persuader pursues the interest of his or her adressee and in which s/he is motivated by the wish to do him or her good. Indeed, this possibility is dramatised in the dialogues chosen for the present analysis from *Hamlet* and *The Winter's Tale*. In Shakespeare, persuasion is not entirely restricted to a ruthless pursuit of selfish interests at the expense of those who are being persuaded.

For a useful definition of persuasion it is important to delimit it from other forms of communication. A common distinction is that between teleological and non-teleological discourse. As has been pointed out above, persuaders seek to realize certain aims by communication. Hence, persuasion can be characterized as teleological, purposive speech. It has, however, become a widely accepted notion, not only of speech act theory which is concerned with the communicative intentions of speakers[129], that every utterance is meant to have an effect. Mulholland articulates this view as follows: "Every communication has a goal or a set of goals that it tries to achieve."[130] Also Sornig states that there is no such thing as a 'pure' utterance without any purpose.[131] Apparently, the distinctive feature of persuasion is that the exertion of influence is its primary intention. This aspect is reflected in Lakoff's distinction between persuasive and 'ordinary', that is, non-teleological discourse: "ordinary conversation is not persuasive in the sense of having persuasion *as its major goal*."[132] To sum up, it is not so much the influence in itself that characterizes persuasion, but the fact that influencing the persuadee is its primary if not sole purpose.

Just as a distinction between teleological and non-teleological discourse contributes to a definition of persuasion, further characteristic features of persuasion may be recognized by contrasting it with other forms of communication that seek to influence their addressees, such as propaganda or indoctrination. Mulholland emphasizes that persuasion puts considerably less pressure on its intended addressees

[127] Lewandoski, 791; Kopperschmidt, Josef, Allgemeine Rhetorik: Einführung in die Theorie der Persuasiven Kommunikation, Stuttgart et al 1976, 69.
[128] Hoffmann, 297.
[129] Levinson, 1983, 15ff.
[130] Mulholland, xi.
[131] Sornig, 249.
[132] Lakoff, 27, emphasis added.

than propaganda does. According to her, the persuadee is always free to refuse being influenced : "persuasion acts rather to encourage the other person to share the view of the user, than to insist on imposing it; the persuader simply presents the best case possible, and then leaves it to the other to accept or reject it."[133] It then follows that the addressee of a persuasive message is entirely free to choose whether or not to accept that message. The persuader seeks to *win* his or her addressee with the help of arguments. The change of opinion is not to be brought about by force. Moreover, in contrast to propaganda, persuasion is typically not supported by an ideology. The persuader has to rely entirely on his or her verbal skills. Brembeck and Howell share the view of the persuadee's ability to decide freely whether the influence will be successful: "We define persuasion as communication intended to influence choice. […] [T]he word choice reflects the view that the receiver has options available to him."[134] These options are that "the receiver of the message […] can accept or reject the persuader's recommendation."[135] By contrast, "[p]ropaganda uses strong and mainly covert tactics, and hardly allows for resistance to its influence"[136] Mulholland implies that propaganda, as opposed to persuasion, uses manipulative strategies and pressure to exert influence. As will be shown later in detail, however, this distinction does not hold. At times, persuaders also make use of manipulative techniques and covert tactics in order to influence their interlocutors more effectively. And frequently the persuasive message operates too forcefully to pass as mere 'recommendation', as Brembeck and Howell term it. Kopperschmidt differentiates similarly between persuasion and other forms of communication that are meant to influence their addressees, such as commanding. He, too, uses pressure as a criterion for distinction. While a command uses social pressures to make its addressee conform to it, persuasion, he maintains, can be viewed as a qualitative alternative to such pressure[137]. In contrast to this notion, it is assumed here that persuasion represents not so much a qualitative alternative to pressure but that it, too, uses pressure which is, however, of a different quality than that used for propaganda, indoctrination, commands and other such rigidly authoritarian forms of communication.

Due to its complex nature, persuasion is studied by many disciplines. Brembeck and Howell claim that “persuasion as a study is intrinsically

[133] Mulholland, xvi.
[134] Brembeck and Howell, 19.
[135] Ibid., 13.
[136] Mulholland, xvi.
[137] Kopperschmidt, 73.

multidisciplinary" since it includes a wide range of fields, among others communication theory and psychology. [138] However, its earliest and perhaps still closest connections are those with traditional rhetoric. The relationship between rhetoric and persuasion is typically described by two slightly different definitions. According to the first definition, rhetoric is understood as *ars persuadendi*, the art (or science or *techne*) of persuasion. [139] The other definition maintains that persuasion is the "aim and end" of rhetoric. [140] "Rhetoric not only produces or organizes speech as expression, but above all things it controls speech *for persuasion*."[141] As it seems, these two definitions do not contradict, but rather complement each other, as they stress different aspects of the same situation. Plett uses both of them without noting any apparent contradictions. [142] Taking both definitions into consideration, rhetoric can be viewed as a craft which is employed for the purpose of persuasion.

At the time of the Renaissance there was a wide consensus about the power of persuasion. It was understood that "rhetoric cannot be resisted."[143] McAlindon speaks of "the humanist conviction that speech is the most powerful instrument for evil as well as good available to humankind"[144]. Müller demonstrates how highly the power of speech was universally regarded, when he points out that its force was compared to physical kinds of power, and that rhetoric was at times believed to be even more effective than the art of warfare. [145] That such notions have survived unto the present is perhaps illustrated by Kopperschmidt's remark that persuasion is a form of violence, comparable to physical kinds of violence. [146] Nevertheless, this estimation is not shared unanimously by all scholars. Mulholland rather doubts the power of persuasion when she argues that persuasion cannot "alter people's fixed prejudices or long-term habits, nor can it easily modify a belief to which someone has been committed for a long time."[147] While these observations may be justified with respect to authentic communication, they are of little value for an analysis of Shakespeare's persuasive

[138] Brembeck and Howell, 6.
[139] Ottmers, Clemens, Rhetorik, Stuttgart and Weimar 1996, 9; Hunter, George K., "Rhetoric and Renaissance Drama", Peter Mack (ed.), Renaissance Rhetoric, New York 1994, 103; Rebhorn, 3.
[140] Nash, Walter, Rhetoric: The Wit of Persuasion, Oxford 1989, 37.
[141] Vickers, 1983, 417, emphasis added.
[142] Plett, Heinrich F., Einführung in die Rhetorische Textanalyse, Hamburg 1991, 4.
[143] Vickers, 1983, 418.
[144] McAlindon, Tom, "The Evil of Play and the Play of Evil: Richard, Iago and Edmund Contextualized", John M. Mucciolo (ed.), Shakespeare's Universe: Renaissance Ideas and Conventions, Aldershot 1996, 151.
[145] Müller, Wolfgang G., Die Politische Rede bei Shakespeare, Tübingen 1979, 11.
[146] Kopperschmidt, 150.
[147] Mulholland, xvii.

dialogues. In accordance with the spirit of his age, Shakespeare created examples of persuasion which, especially to a modern audience, may seem exaggerated, in order to demonstrate the virtually unlimited power of speech.

However, the unrealistic appearance of some of Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues does not go so far as to forbid a comparison of them to authentic dialogues. In fact, while we witness the development of the discourse on stage, it seems entirely plausible. Frequently, while the individual steps of a persuasion appear quite credible, the dialogue as a whole, due to its condensation of the development, seems less realistic. In Shakespeare's dialogues processes which would take considerably more time in authentic conversation may be concentrated within a few verses. Hence, in Shakespearean drama persuasion can easily do what, according to Mulholland, is impossible so that extreme changes of opinion are often effectuated within a single dialogue. Shakespeare reveals that speech does have the potential to bring about such astonishing results. As Vickers expresses it :"Shakespeare agrees that speech is powerful and that persuasion succeeds."[148] Though there are also examples of persuaders who fail to convince their interlocutors, these constitute a definite minority. On the other hand, the success of some persuasive ventures, as for example the persuasion of Lady Anne by Richard, is so overwhelming that they appear almost grotesque.

3.2. The Dual Structure of Persuasion

There have always been pronounced differences of opinion about persuasion, which are possibly caused by the rather complex nature of persuasion itself. Hoffmann as well as Ottmers observe that the influence exerted by persuasion can be both intellectual and emotional.[149] This dual structure is one of the basic features of persuasion and it is, therefore, crucial for an understanding of its concept. According to classical rhetoric, persuasion consists of a rational and an emotional element. The rational element makes use of intellectual arguments and logical evidence, while the emotional part depends on psychological strategies to arouse certain feelings. The rational aspect of persuading which essentially draws on common sense and reasoned discourse is described as 'teaching' or *docere*. *Docere* means to inform persuadees about the subject matter in question and, subsequently, to convince them by arguments which should either be supported by verifiable facts or be based on logic, that is, on

[148] Vickers, 1983, 423.
[149] Hoffmann, 297; Ottmers, 11.

induction or deduction.[150] Already Aristotle distinguishes between these different kinds of proof: deduction uses the enthymeme, or probable syllogism, and depends on widely acknowledged general premises from which one concludes in a logical way. Induction is based on a specific example from which it tries to draw a more general truth. As it is hardly ever practicable to examine all possible cases in order to verify that general conclusion, proof based on induction is not as forceful as proof based on deduction.[151] With respect to the emotional component of persuasion one can further distinguish between two different aspects, namely *delectare* and *movere*. *Delectare* means to arouse 'mild' feelings. Its purpose is to delight the audience by providing some sort of aesthetic pleasure for its own sake. Nevertheless, it also tries to win the persuadee's goodwill and to make the persuadee be favourably predisposed towards the persuasive message. On the other hand, *movere* aims at the arousal of fierce and intense emotions, such as hate or fear, which move and stimulate the audience.[152]

With respect to means of influence available to persuaders, Aristotle promotes a three-part system. In his *Rhetoric* he lists three modes of persuasion: *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. *Ethos* refers to the character of the persuader and to his "posture, tone and demeanour"[153] which "dispose[…] his audience toward the speaker by evincing his intelligence, virtue, and good will"[154]. Persuaders are thus advised to create the impression of sincerity and to win the favour of their addressees by eliciting mild emotions.[155] By the use of *pathos* the persuader can "attempt to manipulate his audience's sentiments through emotions"[156]. *Pathos* means that the subject is presented in a way that aims at rousing strong emotions, such as anger, fear, love, envy, or pity in the audience.[157] Finally, *logos* refers to the use of logical proof as a means to convince the persuadee. It "entails the speaker's selection and use of enthymemes, maxims, example, and their common topoi" as well as style and arrangement of the evidence.[158] As Ottmers points out, the full persuasive effect is only accomplished by a combination of the three means of persuasion, as they form complementary aspects of the persuasive communication. Means of *logos* are concerned with the factual aspect of the issue,

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[150] Plett, 1991, 5.
[151] Ueding, Gert, Klassische Rhetorik, München 2000, 33f.
[152] Ottmers, 123; Plett, 1991, 5-6.
[153] Nash, 41.
[154] Kennedy, William J., Rhetorical Norms in Renaissance Literature, New Haven and London 1978, 9.
[155] Nash, 42.
[156] Kennedy, 1978, 9.
[157] Ottmers, 118f.
[158] Kennedy, 1978, 8.

pathos is concerned with the persuadee, and *ethos* pertains to the persuader.[159] However, according to Aristotle these aspects are not absolutely equal in effect; he asserts that *ethos* is "the most potent of all means to persuasion."[160] A speaker of probity, he affirms, is readily trusted, especially since the problems that belong to the rightful province of rhetoric are issues which are debatable because they are "outside the realm of exact knowledge"[161]. Quintilian slightly alters Aristotle's terminology. He especially modifies the distinction between *ethos* and *pathos*, suggesting that they have more things in common than points that separate them. According to him, "[*p*]*athos* and *ethos* are sometimes of the same nature, differing only in degree"[162]. *Ethos* refers to the persuader's display of benign emotions that are supposed to remain constant over a long time, whereas *pathos* temporarily incites stronger emotions in the persuadee.[163] Plett apparently supports this view when he associates both *ethos* and *pathos* with the emotional element of persuasion. While *ethos* is used for creating mild sentiments, and therefore connected to *conciliare* and *delectare*, *pathos* (the Greek word for passion) is related to *movere*. In accordance with Quintilian, Plett also differentiates between the two with reference to the duration of their effect. As opposed to *ethos*, he claims, *pathos* does not designate constant sentiments, but a momentary outburst of emotions.[164] Analogously, *logos* can be associated with the rational element of persuasion and is connected to *docere*.

Apart from the concept of the dual structure of persuasion, there have also been attempts to introduce alternative theories, for example an approach called *Argumentationsstilistik*. This theory reduces persuasion to the emotional, affective part and declares manipulation to be its main goal. According to this view, insidious methods and sly deceptions make up the nature of persuasion, and its purpose is to serve the usually selfish interests of the persuader. Scholars who support this theory do not consider rational, intellectual reasoning to be part of persuasion but claim that it should be regarded as an independent concept, which could best be described as 'argumentation'. They hold contradictory ideas about the relationship of argumentation and persuasion. One opinion is that these two concepts are incompatible. Another opinion states that even though argumentation and persuasion pursue different goals,

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159 Ottmers, 119.
160 Brembeck and Howell, 253.
161 Ibid., 252.
162 Ibid., 10.
163 Ibid., 10-11.
164 Plett, 1991, 6.

argumentation can make use of persuasive methods. Yet a third opinion maintains that persuasion is merely a stylistic variant of argumentation. Arguments can, for example, be selected to a manipulative effect by highlighting minor aspects of an issue or by neglecting other aspects that would be relevant. Thus, persuasion can omit, support, or modify argumentation.[165] These contradictory ideas suggest that *Argumentationsstilistik* does not deny the classical theory about the dual structure of persuasion. It seems to be useful as a complement to the classical theory which it might be able to illuminate in greater detail. Especially the third opinion about the relationship of argumentation and persuasion displays how inextricably appeals to the intellect and those to emotions can be interwoven.

Brembeck and Howell dismiss such attempts to separate nonlogical and logical methods of influence, since they "see no defensible case for excluding what has been called 'logical proof' from the province of persuasion." As they point out, it is extremely difficult to separate logical and nonlogical arguments in a discourse.[166] Ottmers reinforces this view by emphasizing that both elements belong to the concept of rhetoric and cannot be separated. He suggests that the dual structure of persuasion gives rise to misunderstandings concerning its nature. Hence, persuasion is frequently understood to encompass two spheres which can strictly be separated from one another.[167]

3.3. Persuasion and Ethics

The dualism of a rational and an emotional component of persuasion has often been subject to evaluations which approve of the rational part as morally unobjectionable, whereas condemning the emotional element of persuasion as its immoral counterpart, which not infrequently is even suspected of employing manipulative methods.[168] Such essentially critical views go back to Plato whose captious attitude towards rhetoric is based on its potential of manipulation. Consequently, Plato distinguishes between rhetoric and dialectic, to contrast rhetoric with its incorrupt counterpart. "There are, he argues, two forms of persuasion, one producing belief without knowledge, the other knowledge [...]. All too often rhetoric guarantees only the former, whereas dialectic always generates the latter."[169] If

[165] Hoffmann, 295-96.
[166] Brembeck and Howell, 14.
[167] Ottmers, 117.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Kennedy, 1978, 7.

knowledge can only be generated by an appeal to the intellect with the help of arguments based on logic or on verifiable facts, the rational element of persuasion corresponds to what Plato calls dialectic, whereas the emotional element coincides with his category of rhetoric. Thus, Plato attacks the rhetorician as "a glib manipulator of language and image, an imitator with a treacherous talent for giving probability to lies and fancies, [...] stirring up men's passion at will and providing them with the semblance of knowledge and wisdom without the reality."[170] Hence, the ideal speaker, as Plato maintains, relies entirely on logic and rational arguments.[171]

It is interesting to note that theories like *Argumentationsstilistik* bear similarities to Plato's theory. Their assumption that persuasion is incapable of rational argument but rather employs devious tricks to deceive its audience corresponds to Plato's criticism of rhetoric as a method of manipulation. The differing use of terminology may obscure this analogy. While Plato distinguishes between two aspects of persuasion, referring to its rational element as 'dialectic' and to its emotional component as 'rhetoric', the approach of *Argumentationsstilistik* uses the term 'persuasion' to refer only to the emotional element, and terms the rational element 'argumentation'. In either case the initial assumption is that these two aspects of persuasion can clearly be separated; an assumption which is not shared in the present study, since an analysis of Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues reveals that rational and manipulative elements often occur together in a highly mingled fashion. *Argumentationsstilistik* thus seems to revive Plato's strict separation of the two components of persuasion. However, the account of the possible relationships of persuasion and argumentation, which were explicated above, subverts this initial attempt to clearly distinguish between the two spheres. Hence, it ultimately fails to offer an alternative to the comprehensive concept of persuasion which is used in the present study. According to this concept of persuasion, rhetoric incorporates different methods, including the more restricted set of techniques on which dialectic is based: "Dialectic concentrates on argument, which [...] is exemplified in the syllogism. Rhetoric teaches a variety of means of persuasion, including self-presentation, manipulation of the audience, emotional appeals and the use of figures of speech, as well as arguments."[172]

Another point of Plato's criticism of rhetoric is its indifference towards moral principles. Plato deems rhetoric amoral when he states that the rhetorician "has no need

[170] McAlindon, 149.
[171] Ueding, 28.
[172] Mack, 1996, 83.

to know the truth but merely has to discover an effective technique of persuasion"[173]. This assessment is based on the Sophists' utilitarian approach to rhetoric and their belief that the rhetorician is able to prove anything. As Ueding observes, they shared a confidence in the omnipotence of rhetoric which they thought capable of making virtually anything plausible.[174] Consequently, Plato criticizes that Sophistic rhetoric does not abide by any moral values, but rather accepts whatever opinion, with the help of rhetoric, is made more convincing than competing views. Rhetoric itself does not separate the useful from the dangerous and harmful.[175]

The opinion that persuasion employs manipulative devices, with its background in Plato's attacks on rhetoric, is still shared by scholars today. This is due to the fact that persuasion, as Mulholland notes, is often equated with manipulation.[176] In other words, the potential of manipulation, which is ascribed to the emotional element of persuasion, has influenced the perception of the entire concept of persuasion. Thus, persuasion is often felt to have an inherently insincere quality. Both Hoffmann and Kopperschmidt characterize persuasion as deceitful since its influence works on an imperceptible level. Here lies its special potential of manipulation. Since the persuadee cannot be aware of such imperceptible means of influence, s/he is deprived of the ability to make independent decisions.[177] Similarly, Lewandowski denies that persuasion uses logical arguments; he rather stresses its affective and manipulative tendencies. He claims that persuasive discourse is not characterized by the transfer of information or the presentation of arguments, but by an affective utilization of the connotations of words or of the meanings of sentences in order to elicit certain emotions.[178] In accordance with Lewandowski who thus emphasizes how persuasive strategies make use of language in an apparently manipulative fashion, Brembeck and Howell maintain that persuasion "operates by manipulating symbols"[179].

Consequently, it is often felt that persuasion tends to exert "improper influence"[180] over others which accounts for Sornig's claim that it constitutes a 'perverted speech act'.[181] Kopperschmidt maintains that persuasion can be regarded as a type of violence which frequently occurs together with other kinds of violence.

[173] Kennedy, 1978, 7.
[174] Ueding, 25.
[175] Ibid., 18-28.
[176] Mulholland, xv.
[177] Hoffmann, 297 and Kopperschmidt, 150.
[178] Lewandowski, 790.
[179] Brembeck and Howell, 10.
[180] Mulholland, xv.
[181] Sornig, 250.

Analogously, Hunter associates persuasion with "a means of power over others, a process whose practical fulfilment [lies] in victory rather than understanding."[182] Such accounts presuppose that persuasion is an interaction between unequal participants of a very disparate degree of control over the situation. They claim that the relationship of the parties involved in persuasion is characterized by asymmetry. Minnick even goes so far as to declare that the persuader "controls all appropriate communication variables in an attempt to determine the response of the receiver"[183]. For an analysis of persuasive dialogues it is necessary to be aware of this inherent asymmetry of persuasive discourse which reinforces the asymmetry of Shakespearean dialogue in general.[184]

Despite the widely shared criticism, there are also defenders of rhetoric who do not acknowledge the potentially problematic ethics of persuasion. Ottmers, for example, claims that the theoretically possible misuse of rhetoric for manipulative ends is prevented by rhetoric itself. He argues that, first, rhetoric is supposed to work as a dialogue so that different positions have to compete, and in the process of this dialogue, deceit and attempted manipulation can be recognized and eliminated. Second, rhetoric has the double function of, on the one hand, creating plausibility and, on the other hand, of exposing false plausibility.[185] In other words, rhetoric has the means to manipulate its addressee, but at the same time, it also offers the means to reveal or prevent manipulation, thereby making misuse virtually impossible. The presupposition in Ottmers' argument is that both participants in the dialogue have the same rhetorical ability and skill and are, therefore, equal. Ottmers does not consider the asymmetry of persuasion and the possibility of one person having a greater rhetorical skill than the other one. It is obvious that in this case the inferior person is much more likely to be deceived than Ottmers' argument admits and that this person has very little chance to defend him- or herself against the manipulation. Apart from this kind of asymmetry which is, in fact, not rare in dialogue, persuasion, as Kopperschmidt points out, often works imperceptibly.[186] As a result, the addressee might not even be aware of the persuader's intentions and of the strategies by which s/he is being persuaded. Consequently, the persuadee has no means of repulsing the influence which s/he is

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[182] Hunter, 103.
[183] Brembeck and Howell, 77.
[184] Truly symmetrical dialogue is rare in Shakespeare. Müller argues that it emerges mainly in the genre of the comedy, especially in dialogues between female characters. (Müller, 1999, 218).
[185] Ottmers, 12.
[186] Kopperschmidt, 150.

subjected to without his or her own knowledge. This, of course, adds to the possibility of rhetoric being misused for manipulation.

During the Renaissance there were contradictory views of persuasion. Vickers speaks of an "amazing optimism about the innate goodness of speech and rhetoric"[187], and he concludes that "in England […] during the Renaissance, rhetoric had a surprisingly good press, perhaps an unhealthily favorable one. […] There is a striking inability, or unwillingness, to conceive that language could be applied to evil ends, or used to deceive or corrupt."[188] However, it seems questionable whether this statement presents a fair account of the attitudes that were prevalent in the Renaissance. Plato's disapproving judgement, as his ideas about persuasion in general, was of course quite influential at that time. This ambiguity is reflected in Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues. In his plays Shakespeare frequently depicts persuasion as "ambivalent or downright evil"[189]. Indeed, the most memorable persuaders in Shakespearean drama are deceivers and manipulators who unscrupulously impose their wills on their victims, with frequently destructive results. As an evidence of "the importance Shakespeare attached to the demonstration of evil speech", Vickers cites the fact that two of the three longest speaking parts in Shakespeare's plays are those of Richard III and Iago – both of them remarkable examples of the misuse of rhetoric for immoral purposes.[190] Cases of thoroughly righteous persuasion in Shakespeare, though they are scarce, can be found as well. For example, the attempt of Paulina in *The Winter's Tale* to save her queen from unjust treatment depicts an instance of persuasion which is motivated by the admirable courage and integrity of the persuader. Obviously, Shakespeare holds no fixed views about the morality or immorality of persuasion. Since in his plays it is used for moral as well as for immoral ends, it is more appropriate to assume that Shakespeare regards it as amoral instead of adopting either extreme.

3.4. Towards a Dialogical View of Persuasion

It seems that persuasive discourse is especially suited for a dialogical quality, because it is strongly "receiver- or audience-centered"[191]. The persuader not only has to consider the attitude s/he wants to impose on his or her addressee but also the persuadee's disposition and current sentiments. Hence, s/he may have to take two very

[187] Vickers, 1983, 422.
[188] Ibid., 412.
[189] Ibid., 423.
[190] Ibid., 430.
[191] Brembeck and Howell, 14.

different perspectives into account and to set them against one another in the discourse. Therefore, persuasive discourse has a potential for a dialogic quality. In persuasive dialogues, this potential is even more explicit, since the dialogic form might be expected to correspond to a dialogic quality. In a formally dialogic discourse two different interpretations of reality, two perspectives, typically confront each other. Thus, in contrast to monological persuasion, the explicit confrontation of different perspectives which is promoted by the dialogic form, displays the process of influencing the persuadee's views and codes of interpretation in all its complexity. This means, for example, that the reactions of persuadees are articulated and that persuaders possibly have to deal with contradiction, counter-arguments, and rejection. These conditions hold certain dangers but also chances for the persuader. On the one hand, s/he might be hindered in his or her venture by the persuadee's influence on the development of the conversation. By the reactions of the persuadee s/he is, on the other hand, able to witness the effects of his or her strategies and, if necessary, to adjust them as the dialogue progresses.

Theoretical approaches to persuasion hardly ever devote their attention to its dialogic potential. Brembeck and Howell, within their comprehensive concept of persuasion, try to classify persuasive interaction according to the degree of emotionality displayed in the responses of persuadees. The approach of this classification is unusual insofar as the question of emotional or intellectual influence is posed not only by focusing on the linguistic behaviour of those who exert influence but also of those who are subjected to it. This method provides the useful opportunity of understanding the quality of a persuasive communication by determining its *actual* effect, as it supposedly shows in the response of the persuadee, instead of ascertaining only its *intended* result. Such an approach seems to be well suited for an analysis of persuasive dialogues since it considers the utterances of the persuadee. Yet it is obviously not sufficient to fully capture the dialogic nature of such texts, since the persuadee's utterances are merely understood as responses to the persuader's arguments. The persuader and the persuadee are not understood as interlocutors who are equally capable of shaping the persuasive discourse.

Brembeck and Howell establish four different categories ranging from rational assessment of the message to bursts of passionate emotions in reaction to the persuader's words. These categories are: reasoned, reasoned-emotional, unemotional-suggestive, and suggestive-emotional interactions. In a 'reasoned' interaction, responses are "thoughtful with little automatic reaction or emotion"[192]. Persuadees carefully reflect on what the persuaders say – a behaviour typically expected in reaction to logical arguments. Brembeck and Howell call an interaction reasoned-emotional, if "significant emotion is produced as a result of critical deliberation, and indeed, would not have occurred if a receiver would not have subjected the message to thoughtful examination"[193]. The difference between these two categories is, obviously, that a 'reasoned' response does not involve emotions of significant weight. Both, however, are based on calm and thorough reflections. The third category, unemotional-suggestive communication, is characterized by an "automated" way of reacting to insinuative remarks which are not intended to arouse emotion. Bremback and Howell illustrate their account by comparing this kind of interaction in which the persuader predominantly makes allusions and "the receiver uses habit responses to incoming stimuli" to hypnosis: "What is said by the persuader is accepted by the persuadee, and requested responses are given immediately and uncritically, in push-button fashion."[194] What this denotes is, basically, that the persuadee does not pay close attention to the development of the communication and of the direction it ultimately takes. S/He does not realize what actually happens to him or her during the interaction. Under such circumstances, the persuasion works imperceptibly, which enables the persuader to manipulate his or her interlocutors. Finally, in a suggestive-emotional interaction, the "persuader bypasses the critical faculties of his audience and achieves his intended response by touching on topics that are known to be laden with emotion."[195] As a result, their addressees quickly burst into strong emotions which "makes it unlikely that thoughtful examination of the message can take place."[196] What the last two categories, unemotional-suggestive and suggestive-emotional interactions, have in common is the automated response of the persuadee. Persuaders attain such mechanical reactions by different methods: in the first case they influence their audience imperceptibly; the second technique works by provoking emotional outbursts.

On the whole, the control a persuadee has over the situation can be seen to diminish continuously from reasoned to suggestive-emotional interaction. While in a reasoned interaction s/he seems to have virtually full control of his or her utterances, the persuadee's control lessens as soon as emotions, which always have an irrational aspect,

[192] Brembeck and Howell, 177.
[193] Ibid.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Ibid., 178.
[196] Ibid.

play a significant role in the interaction. In situations where the persuadee is made to act automatically, it is clear that s/he has given at least part of his or her control away to the persuader. Brembeck and Howell's distinction indicates that in most types of persuasive dialogues the persuader has greater control of the development of the discourse than the persuadee has. Hence, persuasive dialogues are typically characterized by a certain degree of asymmetry. This degree varies according to the extent to which the persuadee is dominated by manipulation and thereby in part deprived of his or her control of the dialogue.

It seems that in establishing their categories of persuasive interactions Brembeck and Howell start from the responses of the persuadee, even though at times they explain a category mainly by focusing on the behaviour of the persuader. The question, which is thus inevitably raised, is whose behaviour ultimately determines the tenor of a persuasive interaction. The traditional concept of persuasion clearly starts from the persuader who chooses either to use rational arguments or to stir emotions. Brembeck and Howell take the persuadees' responses into consideration which can be reflective or emotional. Nevertheless, they do not seem to realize the full implications of this extension, namely the additional dialogic dimension which results from the interlocutors' interaction. Due to the dynamics of the dialogue the persuadee might, for example, fail to respond as planned by the persuader. Thus, a discourse that is intended to be emotive could be refused by the persuadee in a deliberately rational manner. In other words, in a dialogue the persuader is not the sole creator of the persuasive discourse. This rather simple statement has far-reaching consequences for the persuasion, as will be shown in this study.

4. Persuasion In A Dialogical Context

4.1. The Monological Background of Persuasion

As becomes apparent in the preceding chapter, the concept of persuasion is inextricably connected with classical rhetoric. Due to rhetorical theory persuasion has long been the subject of systematic study. Classical rhetoric is primarily concerned with persuasion in the form of a monologue. In this respect it can be contrasted with dialectic since "[d]ialectic originates from the disputation (a debate conducted by question and answer, as in Plato's *dialogues*), rhetoric from the political or courtroom *oration*."[197] Although persuasion is explicitly understood as a monological concept, one of its essential features is that it is always aimed at another person. In other words, a persuasive speech is no soliloquy but a monologue. The significance of its orientation towards an addressee has frequently been accentuated. Kennedy aptly states that "[r]hetoric by its very nature entails the participation of an audience: 'Persuasive means persuasive to a person'"[198] Already Aristotle in his distinction between three general types of speeches claims that the addressee is the guiding factor in the speech situation: "The species of rhetoric are three in number; for such is the number to which the hearers of speeches belong. A speech consists of three things: a speaker and a subject on which he speaks and someone addressed, [1358b] *and the objective of the speech relates to the last (I mean the hearer).*"[199] Ueding and Steinbrink paraphrase Aristotle's argumentation with regard to the significance of the addressee for the persuasion as follows: "Die Redekunst […] ist die auf praktische Umsetzung zielende Behandlung der durch die Dialektik gewonnenen Erkenntnisse, die sich nicht allein auf die Richtigkeit des Schlusses bezieht, sondern auch auf die Erkenntnisfähigkeit des Zuhörers, denn der Zuhörer 'ist richtunggebend.'"[200] According to rhetorical terminology a persuasive speech is called *oratio*. Rhetoric books regulate the structure of an *oratio*, which means that they offer guidelines or instructions for its composition, primarily regarding how many and what parts it should have, what functions each of these parts are to perform, and in what order they should be arranged.

Theories concerning the composition of an *oratio* differ but slightly from one another. Some critics rather emphasize the weight of these differences. Lanham, for

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[197] Mack, 1996, 83 , emphasis added.
[198] Kennedy, 1978, 9.
[199] Aristotle, <u>On Rhetoric</u>, book I,ch.3, George A. Kennedy (transl.), New York and Oxford 1991, 47, emphasis added.
[200] Ueding, Gert and Bernd Steinbrink, <u>Grundriss der Rhetorik: Geschichte, Technik, Methode</u>, Stuttgart and Weimar 1994, 25.

example, points out the diversity of theories with particular regard to the varying number of constituent parts of an *oratio*: "From the Greeks onward, the various parts of an oration have borne a body of theorizing so dense and extensive as almost to defy summary. Various theorists argue for various numbers of parts, from two up to seven […] or even more when one further subdivides."[201] Lausberg presents an impressive compilation of different systems which might support this impression.[202] This quantitative diversity is, however, not mirrored by an equal diversity with regard to the content. Instead, it is counterbalanced by what Ueding describes as 'the constancy of the system with respect to its most important elements'[203]. The common basis of these theories is a four-part structure which evolved from Aristotle's theory on rhetoric.[204] According to Ottmers, most of the deviations from this basic structure can be explained by specifications or subdivisions of individual parts. After listing some of these variations, he claims that the basic four-part structure is not affected by the various modifications.[205]

According to this basic system, an orator begins his[206] persuasive speech by raising his addressee's attention, interesting him in the subject of his speech, and by obtaining his goodwill towards the speaker himself (*exordium*). He, then, informs his audience about the subject matter of his speech (*narratio*), i.e. he reports what he intends to prove afterwards. The process of providing different kinds of proof which persuade the audience of the truth of what has been claimed is called *argumentatio*. Finally, there is a short *conclusio* or *peroratio* which is used to summarize the main arguments and to rouse emotions in the addressee which lead to a desired action. In a narrow definition, the second step is only called *narratio* if the course of an action is recounted. The *narratio* might also be substituted by a short enumeration of the points which will subsequently be elaborated (*partitio*), or simply by a statement of which the addressee is to be persuaded (*propositio*).

The applicability of such a theoretical concept to literary texts may appear questionable. The rules of composing a classical *oratio* have, after all, not so much a descriptive but rather a prescriptive character. Carey rightly emphasizes "that the neat

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[201] Lanham, Richard A., A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms , Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford 1991, 171.
[202] Lausberg, Heinrich, Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft.
Stuttgart 1990, 148-9.
[203] Ueding, 53.
[204] Aristotle, book III,ch.13-19.
[205] Ottmers, 60.
[206] To avoid an awkwardness of expression, only the masculine pronouns are used in this passage. They are, however, meant to refer to both male and female individuals.

divisions in classical rhetoric are the product of schematization by theorists rather than oratorical practice."[207] Thus, an actual composer of speeches is not bound by these rules. In other words, a persuasive speech does not automatically abide by the theoretical structure of an *oratio*. Furthermore, the fact that the structure of a classical *oratio* can be subject to variation is already suggested in Renaissance rhetoric books. Thus, an *oratio* might start with the *argumentatio*, omitting an introductory part as well as the *narratio*; or the *narratio* might come after the *argumentatio*. According to Wilson, whose rhetoric book is described as one of the most popular compilations of its time[208], variations from the standard order can be used to gain certain desired effects"[209]. Consequently, an approach to Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues based on this theoretical concept has to be a very cautious one, allowing for material deviations from the theory and taking individual features and singular qualities of each dialogue into account. An analysis quickly reveals what might seem a commonplace, namely that each of the persuasive dialogues is different from the rest, has its own peculiar structure, and develops under unique conditions. Shakespeare does not repeat himself. Thus, prescriptive theories inevitably fall short of Shakespeare's imaginative craft, although some of them seem to be more suitable than others.

Another objection to this approach that could be raised is that classical rhetoric is concerned with speeches, not with dialogues. The reason that justifies an approach to Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues based on this rhetorical concept is that the classical *oratio* is a speech designed for persuasion. It seems reasonable to assume that such an obvious correspondence between the classical *oratio* and the dialogues that are to be analysed in the present study, namely the correspondence concerning their central purpose, also finds its expression in their form. In other words, since the form of a communication is shaped by its purpose, the overall structure of a persuasive dialogue might be expected to resemble that of an *oratio*. However, it is not attempted in this chapter to show that each of the dialogues strictly conforms to the typical structure of an *oratio*. The parallels that can be drawn between the dialogues and an *oratio* refer to their general organization, i.e. to the succession of different phases. In most cases these dialogues begin with a part that broadly corresponds to an *exordium*, end with a part that bears similarities to a *conclusio*, and they present arguments of various kinds in

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207 Carey, Christopher, "Rhetorical Means of Persuasion", Amélie O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London 1996, 405.
208 Vickers, 1987, 393.
209 Rauh, Miriam Joseph, Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language, New York 1947, 26.

their main part. Some dialogues seem to follow the structure of an *oratio* more closely, so that for example even a *narratio* can be clearly be identified; others are structured with greater freedom.

In the past, there have been convincing attempts by critics to show that the structures of individual dialogues from Shakespeare's works in which one character is persuaded by another character closely resemble the conventional structure of an *oratio* as it is presented above.[210] In these cases the parts of a persuasive dialogue can be related to the different stages of an *oratio* because similar functions are performed within them. Evidently, in dialogues persuaders need to raise their addressees' attention, need to inform them of their 'case' and provide sufficient evidence just as they do in speeches. Nevertheless, since the focus of the present study lies on dialogue, it cannot be the aim of this chapter to simply prove that persuasive dialogues fit into a pattern that is used for monological communication. Instead, the analysis is meant to illuminate how the traditionally monological concept of persuasion is given the shape of a dialogue.

As was explicated in chapter 2, one has to distinguish between various definitions of dialogue, most notably between a formal and a qualitative one. These definitions complement each other insofar as they illuminate different aspects of the dialogue. Hence, which of these definitions is best suited as a basis of an analysis depends on the aim of the analysis. For the question to be answered in this chapter it is necessary to basically rely on the definition that understands dialogue as a concept concerned with aspects of form. Since this concept of dialogue defines it by formal criteria, such as turn-taking and an alternation of speakers, an issue that is relevant to the analysis is the question whether only one of the participants speaks or whether both of them are involved actively in the communication. Naturally, since all of the texts that are to be analysed are dialogues, the persuadees do speak at some point. Nevertheless, the contributions of the persuadee might be so rudimentary as to actually limit the persuadee to the role of a listener or addressee. However, this criterion is by itself not sufficient for the investigation, which will not be confined to the question whether during a persuasive communication both the persuader and the persuadee participate actively in a dialogue. Apart from this general question an additional interest will be taken in a more specific aspect of the dialogical form of persuasion, namely the issue of a dialogical treatment of the substance of an *oratio*. In other words,

[210] See for example Müller, 1979, 91-100 and Plett, Heinrich F., "'Action is Eloquence': Zur rhetorischen Aktionstypik in Shakespeare's *Othello*", Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift, 32, 1982, 1-21.

there will be a distinction (especially concerning the persuadee's words) between utterances that make up an essential part of the persuasive communication as it might be contained in an *oratio*, and utterances which seem to be interposed between parts that represent the substance of the persuasion. In dialogues that contain the former type of utterances, persuasion is given a truly dialogical form, whereas in dialogues with mainly the latter type of utterances, persuasion is presented *within* a dialogue, but not *as* a dialogue. This distinction will be explained in greater detail during the analysis.

While it seems then that a central part of the analysis will be concerned with substantial contributions to the persuasion made by the persuadee, this is not to be understood in a qualitative sense. Contributions to the content of the persuasion cannot in each case be taken for a sign of truly setting one's own perspective and of having control over the communicative processes and the development of the persuasion. Such qualitative aspects are largely ignored in this chapter. The main concern of the analysis is a more specified aspect of dialogical form, namely one that refers to the dialogization of the substance of the persuasion, which is traditionally understood as a formally monological discourse. Thus, it will be attempted to introduce a spectrum of different forms of realizing persuasion in the context of a dialogue.

The value of explicitly investigating the surface level of the texts and perhaps arriving at conclusions that are not applicable to qualitative aspects of persuasive dialogues might not be particularly obvious. Yet, its incompatibility with an analysis of qualitative aspects may be the very merit of this approach. Since the dialogical form of a scene does not necessarily reflect its dialogical quality, this analysis may help to reveal disparities between form and effect. This knowledge might illuminate certain methods employed by persuaders to influence their addressees. Furthermore, it might be demonstrated that the form of persuasive communication may indeed have an impact on its content or its development, (for example due to the active participation of the persuadee). Consequently, this chapter is designed as a basis of the subsequent chapter which will be concerned more explicitly with the dialogical quality of persuasive communication.

The extent to which Shakespeare makes persuasion dialogical varies not only among the dialogues but also within individual dialogues, so that some stages of the persuasion tend to be 'more dialogical' than others. In order to illuminate such differences the main stages of persuasion will be analysed individually with regard to their dialogical forms. Quantitative differences between the individual dialogues are quite obvious. Even at first sight it is evident that in some dialogues the persuader talks considerably more than the persuadee and makes long utterances which rather remind one of monologues, while in other dialogues utterances are fairly equally distributed between the participants of the conversation. The dialogues from *Hamlet* and *Macbeth* clearly belong to the former, less dialogical type, while those from *Othello, King Lear*, or *The Tempest* are examples of persuasion that is put into a dialogical form more extensively. Traces of the background of the classical *oratio* are fairly evident in all of them. However, the choice of the basic structure of an *oratio* for the organization of this chapter does not sufficiently express our understanding of Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues. On the one hand, it seems rather obvious that in his persuasive dialogues Shakespeare is conscious of the tradition of the persuasive speech. Even a superficial knowledge of the importance of rhetoric for Shakespeare and for his fellow Elizabethans should make it clear that an awareness of rhetoric is always illuminating for a discussion of Shakespeare's work. Yet it is perhaps even of greater interest to see how he deviates from established patterns to absorb them into his dramatic art.

4.2. *Exordium*

In most of the dialogues that are analysed in the present study a part that corresponds to the *exordium* of an *oratio* can clearly be identified. The criterion for such an identification is not simply that the *exordium* is the first part of the dialogue but that it 'prepares' the persuadee for the influence that is then exerted on him or her. Therefore, it is typically marked by the persuader's effort to entangle the persuadee in a conversation, to raise his or her attention [*attentum parare*], to make him or her well disposed towards the persuader [*benevolum parare*], and to introduce the subject of the persuasion [*docilem parare*][211]. According to rhetoric books, these are the main functions of the *exordium* of an *oratio*. An investigation of the openings of the dialogues reveals that these functions are also typically performed in dialogical persuasion.

Not all of these functions are equally apt to be performed jointly by the persuader and the persuadee. While it seems almost self-evident that it is solely the persuader who raises the persuadee's attention and interest, the topic of a persuasive dialogue may, of course, be jointly introduced by the participants. In what formally different ways this is achieved is of central interest in this section. As none of the

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[211] Lausberg, 150-57.

dialogues sets in with a formally monological passage, the persuadee does in each case participate actively in the opening stage of the respective dialogue. Yet, differences can be observed with respect to the fundamental question whether the persuadee in his or her utterances introduces significant aspects of the topic and thus contributes to the initiation of the 'persuasive message' which then follows in the *narratio* and the *argumentatio*, or whether the persuader introduces the topic without such 'assistance'. In the first case, the dialogical adaptation of the persuasion, due to its distribution among utterances assigned to different speakers, is of a higher degree than it is in the second case. For this reason, examples of a joint introduction of the subject matter can be regarded as instances of *exordia as* dialogues (4.2.2.), whereas the dialogical form of an *exordium*, in which the persuadee does not contribute substantially to an introduction of the topic, can be described as *exordium within* dialogue (4.2.1.).

A dialogue which, at this point, has to be excluded from the analysis is that between Richard and Elizabeth. In his dialogue with Elizabeth Richard can hardly be claimed to employ any preparatory strategies. Instead, he almost immediately reveals the reason why he wants to talk with her. Therefore it must be concluded that this dialogue does not start with an *exordium* – unless one wants to understand Richard's command "Stay, madam: I must talk a word with you." [*Richard III,* IV/iv,199] as a very rudimentary version of an *exordium*.

4.2.1. *Exordium* Within Dialogue: Introduction of the Topic by the Persuader

As was indicated above, the phrase '*exordium* within dialogue' is meant to refer to those cases in which the persuadee participates in the opening phase of the persuasion without *directly* contributing to the introduction of the topic which is to become the subject of the persuasive dialogue. The following analysis will identify such examples of *exordia*, which have a restricted dialogic form since the essence of the *exordium* is contained in the utterances of only one interlocutor, and it will inquire into the question what kinds of utterances the persuadee's turns constitute.

The *exordium* of Hamlet's persuasion of his mother is clearly dominated by Hamlet with respect to the initiation of the subject of their dialogue, to which Gertrude's utterances do not contribute in a material way. This can be explained by Hamlet's use of insinuation which is so obscure that Gertrude can hardly know what he is aiming at. Since she is rather at a loss as to the meaning of Hamlet's words, Gertrude is prompted to ask questions, as in the following example:

Ham.	Leave wringing of your hands. Peace sit you down, And let me wring your heart; for so I shall If it be made of penetrable stuff, If damned custom have not braz'd it so, That it be proof and bulwark against sense.
Queen.	What have I done, that thou dar'st wag thy tongue In noise so rude against me? [*Hamlet*, III.iv,34-40][212]

In this passage, Hamlet vaguely alludes to what he perceives as Gertrude's loose living. Earlier he has started to introduce this topic when, in response to Gertrude's reproach for having killed Polonius, Hamlet answers: "almost as bad, good mother,/ As kill a king and marry with his brother." [28/29] Though he speaks in general terms ('a king') and does not directly refer to Gertrude's conduct, the antithesis ('as bad, good mother') has a clear ring of irony with regard to the attribute 'good' about it which marks the utterance as an implicit accusation of Gertrude. However, the full meaning of these insinuations does not seem to be clear to Gertrude who therefore cannot join in the pursuit of a topic so obscurely raised, but has to ask for explanations [30, 39/40]. Hence, Hamlet's use of cryptic language provides the initial part of the dialogue with a dialogical shape. At the same time, it leads to a pronounced asymmetry as the topic of the dialogue is determined solely by Hamlet. That the rest of their dialogue will be equally asymmetrical is implied by Hamlet's authoritarian behaviour in the beginning. As becomes apparent in the passage quoted above, Hamlet denies Gertrude the right to influence the dialogue and, instead, orders her about, claiming the right to set the agenda of their conversation ('let me wring your heart; for so I shall'), which also includes the choice of a topic. The imperatives used at the beginning of this passage ('Leave', 'sit you down') aim at making Gertrude a more or less passive recipient of his message. On the whole, Hamlet seems to be a persuader who attempts to monopolize the conversation. He uses cryptic language to control the development of the dialogue. Gertrude's share in its opening is quickly reduced to helpless questions, by which she responds to Hamlet's introduction of the topic. As a sort of metacommunication they reveal her bewilderment but also her urge to participate more substantially in the dialogue and to defend herself against his verbal attacks.

The dialogue between Cassius and Brutus seems to start out similarly asymmetrical. Cassius, too, introduces the topic he wants to discuss with Brutus by insinuations and claims the authority to set an agenda. He importantly alludes to

[212] Quotations refer to The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare. Hamlet, Harold Jenkins (ed.), London and New York 1982.

"Thoughts of great value" [*Julius Caesar*, I,ii, 49][213] which he intends to reveal to Brutus, and prepares the topic of Caesar's unjustified position by mentioning the "age's yoke" [60] under which the Roman republic is groaning. These insinuations are not only meant to carefully introduce the subject of the persuasive dialogue, but also to raise the attention and interest of Brutus to find out what weighty matters Cassius is so cautiously introducing. Cassius sets the agenda of their dialogue when he announces:

> […] I, your glass,
> Will modestly discover to yourself
> That of yourself which you yet know not of. [I,ii,67-69]

Thus he raises a second aspect of what he intends to be the topic of their dialogue. Not only does he address the present state of Rome, but he also wants to talk about Brutus. In what way these two aspects may be connected with each other is, at that point, not obvious to Brutus. His share in the introduction of the topic is extremely limited, yet somewhat greater than Gertrude's, for his remark that "the eye sees not itself/ But by reflection, by some other things" [51/52] initiates Cassius' metaphor of the mirror which may reflect Brutus' "hidden worthiness" [56]. Nevertheless, he can hardly be claimed to contribute substantially to the introduction of the subject of their dialogue. Instead, his role seems to be largely confined to that of a commentator. His observation that Cassius has him "seek into [himself]/ For that which is not in [him]" [63/64] is a metacommunicative reaction to Cassius' insinuations of which he seems to disapprove but which are at this point not quite clear to him.

Also the initial part of the dialogue between Antonio and Sebastian, though it has a strongly dialogic form, is marked by the interlocutors' disparate contributions to the introduction of the topic. Antonio uses insinuation to secure Sebastian's attention and to cautiously introduce a delicate topic. When the king and his courtiers suddenly fall asleep, they first, in a rather aimless, small-talk fashion, discuss this phenomenon, until Antonio in verse 198 begins to use purposeful language by hinting at more than he explicitly says:

> Seb. What a strange drowsiness possesses them!
> Ant. It is the quality o' th' climate.
> Seb. Why
> Doth it not then our eyelids sink? I find not
> Myself dispos'd to sleep.
> Ant. Nor I; my spirits are nimble.
> They fell together all, as by consent;
> They dropp'd , as by a thunder-stroke. What might,
> Worthy Sebastian? – O, what might? – No more: –

[213] Quotations refer to The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare. Julius Caesar, T.S. Dorsch (ed.), London 1955.

And yet methinks I see it in thy face,
What thou shouldst be: th'occasion speaks thee; and
My strong imagination sees a crown
Dropping upon thy head." [*The Tempest*, II,i,194-204][214]

Antonio uses the context for insinuating the idea that if the king and his courtiers were dead instead of merely asleep Sebastian himself might become king.[215] The simile in line 199 connects two different spheres: the sight of the sleeping courtiers who have literally dropped down to sleep, and the idea of someone being struck by lightning and dropping down dead. Such an unexpected connection of different ideas is an appropriate technique of insinuation since the connecting element 'as' suggests that the different thematic levels share one or more features which are not specified and are, therefore, left to the imagination of the addressee.[216] Death is not mentioned directly, but the idea is clearly evoked. The two questions that follow immediately after this simile extend the insinuation as Antonio hints at the consequences which the death of the king might have. The subjunctives ("what might?") point to yet unknown possibilities which are meant to stimulate Sebastian's curiosity and imagination. In the following, Antonio's allusions become clearer; he pretends to see in Sebastian's face "What thou *shouldst* be" [202, emphasis added], thereby implying that he is really destined to be in a different position from where he is at that point. When he finally pictures Sebastian as king, imagining a crown being placed on his head, Antonio leaves the realm of insinuation and rather outspokenly establishes the topic of their conversation which he has prepared by the prior insinuations, namely Sebastian's prospects of becoming king.

Sebastian's utterances in reaction to this topic being so obscurely raised are of a metacommunicative nature. He asks for explanations ("What is it thou didst say?",207) and signals his partial comprehension of Antonio's implications ("There's meaning in thy snores.",213). He does not, however, at this point attempt to add any new aspects to the topic. Hence, the topic is introduced entirely by Antonio, whose crucial utterance is however framed by Sebastian's turns. The introduction of the topic of the persuasion thus occurs *within* a dialogue.

Also in Richard's wooing of Lady Anne, it is only the persuader who introduces the topic, although Anne actively participates in this phase of the dialogue. After her initial curses and abuse directed at Richard, he makes several attempts to introduce a

[214] Quotations refer to The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare. The Tempest, Frank Kermode (ed.), London and New York 1958.
[215] Magnusson, A.Lynne, "Interruption in *The Tempest*", Shakespeare Quarterly, 37, 1986, 60.
[216] Plett, 1991, 55.

topic that might put him in a more favourable light and that he deems to be an appropriate topic with which to begin the wooing of Lady Anne. He wants to defend himself against her accusations and asks for Anne's permission to excuse himself and to demonstrate that he is not guilty of the alleged crimes:

> Rich. Vouchsafe, divine perfection of a woman,
> Of these supposed crimes, to give me leave,
> By circumstance, but to acquit myself.
> Anne. Vouchsafe, diffus'd infection of a man,
> Of these known evils, but to give me leave,
> By circumstance, t'accuse thy cursed self.
> Rich. Fairer than tongue can name thee, let me have
> Some patient leisure to excuse myself.
> Anne. Fouler than heart can think thee, thou canst make
> No excuse current but to hang thyself. [*Richard III*, I,ii, 75-84][217]

The subject of the persuasive dialogue is initiated by the terms 'acquit' [77] and 'excuse' [82]. Richard's method of thus introducing a topic is, at least at this point, also based on insinuation. He tries to raise Anne's curiosity and interest by suggesting that these crimes were merely 'supposed' but were not really committed by him and by vaguely hinting at the existence of circumstances which may excuse him. The politeness ('Vouchsafe') and the complimentary periphrase are meant to evoke some goodwill from Anne. Richard here turns to a more conventional way of opening a persuasion than during the previous phase of the dialogue, in which he openly provokes her. As Smith observes, Richard readily tests different verbal strategies and is able to change them quickly if necessary.[218]

Anne responds to Richard's insinuations by expressing her conviction of his guilt and thereby the uselessness of discussing the possibility of his innocence. Hence, her utterances can be understood as comments on Richard's attempts to establish the common topic of their dialogue. She does not contribute directly to its introduction. The mutually accepted topic is finally established successfully by Richard's manoeuvre of provokingly suggesting "Say that I slew them not?" [89]. Anne's topically coherent reply, "Then say they were not slain" [90], indicates that she accepts the topic. Hence, in the initial part of the dialogue, Richard changes between aggressive and conventionally careful language. The former is, however, clearly predominant. Anne, due to the strong hostility with which she meets Richard, does not join in the

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[217] Quotations refer to The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare. King Richard III, Antony Hammond (ed.), London and New York 1981.
[218] Smith, Denzel S., "The Credibility of the Wooing of Anne in *Richard III*", Papers on Language and Literature: A Journal for Scholars and Critics of Language and Literature, 7, 1971, 200.

introduction of the topic of the persuasive discourse but meets it with a counter-discourse.

The dialogue between Paulina and Leontes at times hardly seems to be a dialogue at all because Leontes frequently does not answer Paulina directly but addresses other persons in order to talk about her in the third person. In consequence, he at first ignores her attempts to introduce a particular topic. Paulina who otherwise uses a very direct language starts her attempted persuasion of Leontes by trying to awaken his interest with the remark that she brings "some gossips for [his] highness" [*The Winter's Tale*, II,iii,41][219] and alludes to the purpose of her visit in a subordinate clause "– Unless he [Antigonus] take the course that you have done,/ Commit me for committing honour –" [48-49]. She thereby hints at Hermione's unjustified committal to prison. Leontes' reactions betray that he has no desire to discuss his treatment of Hermione with Paulina. He does not refer to her initial insinuations which are meant to lead to this topic, but tries to evade the dialogue with Paulina by turning to her husband: "Away with that audacious lady! Antigonus,/ I charg'd thee that she should not come about me." [42/43] Only when Paulina abandons insinuation and blatantly states "I come/ From your good queen." [57/58] is he sufficiently provoked to address the same topic with the exclamation "Good queen!" [58]. He thus recognizes this as the topic of their encounter, which he, however, seeks to evade and which he at no point helps to introduce. Although Paulina manages to make Leontes understand what she wants to talk about, she does not sufficiently secure his attention and is far from obtaining his goodwill. These failings are clearly obstacles to Leontes' participation in the initiation of a subject.

On the whole, in persuasive dialogues, in which only the persuader introduces the topic, the *exordium* is given a very limited dialogic form. Hypothetically, the persuader's utterances would be sufficient if the introductory part of the dialogue were to be rewritten so as to form the *exordium* of an *oratio*. In these dialogues, the persuadee's utterances can frequently be described as some sort of metacommunication by which s/he responds to the persuader's introduction of the topic. The questions, what kinds of response these are and what effects they have on the development of the dialogue, belong, however, to more qualitative issues which are to be considered in chapter 5.

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[219] Quotations refer to The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare. The Winter's Tale, J.H.P. Pafford (ed.), London 1963.

4.2.2. Exordium As Dialogue: Joint Introduction of the Topic

If the persuader and the persuadee jointly introduce the topic of the persuasion, the *exordium* is given a truly dialogic form. The idea that the persuadee may participate in the introduction of the topic of a persuasive dialogue might at first seem somewhat odd. Usually only the persuader becomes involved in a dialogue with the preformed intention to introduce a particular topic whereas the persuadee is, in most cases, not aware of this intention and seems to have no preconceived plans with regard to the subject matter of the dialogue. However, instances in which a persuadee happens to contribute to the introduction of the topic that the persuader intends to launch as the subject matter of the dialogue are rather frequent. In this section, such cases of a formally highly dialogical *exordium* will be presented. Moreover, it will be considered how the joint introduction of the topic is formally organized, that is, whether the persuadee's utterances contain the central idea or just minor aspects of the topic.

In a passage of the *exordium* of the dialogue from *Julius Caesar* which comes after the one discussed in 4.2.1., Brutus, without being aware of the fact, contributes actively to the introduction of the topic that Cassius is trying to raise. It could be argued that the part of this dialogue that functions as an *exordium* develops from a restricted dialogic form, in which Brutus' remarks have a metacommunicative character, towards a stronger dialogic form, in which he directly adds to the introduction of the topic. Inspired by an incident in their physical environment (the stage direction reads "Flourish and shout"), he remarks "What means this shouting? I do fear the people/ Choose Caesar for their king." [I,ii,78/79]. Brutus thus for the first time clearly addresses the issue of Caesar's advancement and the alarming prospect of his soon becoming all too powerful, while Cassius, up to this point, has only vaguely alluded to the 'age's yoke'. Thus, Brutus happens to raise the subject that Cassius has been seeking to subtly force upon him. Cassius immediately develops this idea further and suggests that Caesar's accession to the throne might yet be prevented. Moreover, he tries to ascertain the implications of Brutus' exclamation, especially concerning Brutus' readiness to act in accordance with his sentiments: "Ay, do you fear it?/ Then must I think you would not have it so." [79/80]

Although only Cassius enters the dialogue with preconceived plans as to its development, Brutus vitally contributes to the introduction of their mutual topic. In fact, his share in it almost seems to be more substantial than Cassius' contribution. This impression is created by the fact that Brutus directly and outspokenly addresses the issue of the threat that Caesar might be chosen for a king, whereas Cassius only indirectly alludes to it. This observation is, of course, based only on an investigation of the *form* of the exchange, which means that qualitative issues are at this point entirely neglected.

Also in the dialogue between Lady Macbeth and her husband the topic is raised jointly by the interlocutors. When Lady Macbeth greets her husband joyfully

> Great Glamis! worthy Cawdor!
> Greater than both , by the all-hail hereafter!
> Thy letters have transported me beyond
> This ignorant present, and I feel now
> The future in this instant. [*Macbeth,* I,v,54-8][220]

she uses several cryptic expressions that all hint at her plan for Macbeth to reach for the throne. That the periphrase "Greater than both" is supposed to mean 'king' and that the 'future' refers to a time when Macbeth will be the sovereign of the country can, however, be easily understood by Macbeth. He knows instantly what her allusions refer to because the two of them share the necessary background knowledge contained in his letter to Lady Macbeth. The function of her insinuations, it seems, is mainly cautiousness. Not only does Lady Macbeth raise one aspect of the topic of their dialogue, she also very discreetly attempts to fathom her husband's willingness to become king. Will he answer to her oblique reference "Greater than both" or will he reject such allusions?

Since the insinuations of his wife are easily intelligible to Macbeth, he does not need to ask for explanations. Instead, he, in reaction to Lady Macbeth's allusions, turns their dialogue to the immediate circumstance of the king's visit, thus introducing another aspect of their dialogue's topic. The initial part of the persuasion is given the form of a dialogue not because of the persuader's insinuations but due to the context: Macbeth comes to his wife with the intention to inform her of Duncan's arrival. This information is a precondition of the next step in the introduction of the topic. With the help of a pun ('to go' refers to the end of the king's visit as well as to his death) Lady Macbeth cautiously alludes to the possibility of regicide:

> Macb.: My dearest love,
> Duncan comes here to-night.

[220] Quotations refer to The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare: Macbeth, Kenneth Muir (ed.), London and New York 1984.

Lady M.: And when goes hence? [I/v,58-59]

This *exordium* is dialogical insofar as both speakers join in the approach to the subject matter of the persuasion. They share about equally in this aspect of the dialogue, since they alternately introduce essential points of this subject into the discourse.

An equally collective introduction of the subject matter can be observed in the *exordium* of the persuasive dialogue from *Much Ado About Nothing*. Inspired by the nonverbal behaviour of the persuader, namely by the sight Beatrice as she weeps, it is Benedick who first introduces the general topic of their dialogue with the assertion "Surely I do believe your fair cousin is wronged." [*Much Ado*, IV,i,259][221], which is meant to comfort Beatrice and to demonstrate his sympathy with her. With the help of insinuation Beatrice then turns the dialogue to the issue of revenge. Her exclamation "Ah, how much might the man deserve of me that would right her!" [260f] seems to be a fairly obvious introduction of the topic. Yet the general phrasing ('the man') makes it only an implicit request of Benedick to undertake the revenge. The ensuing exchange between Benedick who understands this implicit request and Beatrice who is curiously reticent on this subject is a joint approach to the ultimate topic of the dialogue, namely the question whether Benedick should kill Claudio to avenge Hero:

Bene. Is there any way to show such friendship?
Beat. A very even way, but no such friend.
Bene. May a man do it?
Beat. It is a man's office, but not yours. [262-65]

Benedick tries to offer his help and to find out what he would have to do to "right" Hero. Beatrice's replies indicate that it would be in his power to help her ("A very even way", "It is a man's office"), but she then rejects his implied offers without giving any reason why Benedick should not be qualified to right Hero. Benedick, who in all probability is unable to make any sense of these obscure remarks, is thus encouraged to renew his offers, or, more correctly, to make them more explicit. Whereas his earlier offers are quite implicit and noncommittal and would have left room for excuses had she then told him that she wanted him to kill Claudio, his final offer "Come, bid me do anything for thee." [287] binds him. It seems then that the use of insinuation of a very opaque kind rather puts the addressee at the mercy of the persuader. Benedick can hardly help being drawn into the dialogue which develops on Beatrice's terms. With her request "Kill Claudio!" [288] she finally makes the topic of their dialogue explicit. Thus, Beatrice and Benedick raise the topic collaboratively. Benedick gives the first

[221] Quotations refer to The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare. Much Ado About Nothing, A.R. Humphreys (ed.), London and New York 1981.

impulse to the introduction of this topic, which is then established in an (at least quantitatively) fairly symmetrical dialogue. It seems, however, that the development of this dialogue has to be forced out of Beatrice by Benedick, whose turns comprise mainly questions and offers of his help. Hence, on the surface, Benedick appears to be the interlocutor who is more active in this joint introduction of the topic.

Another example which is to some extent comparable to the *exordium* of *Much Ado* with respect to its dialogical form is the *exordium* of the dialogue between Edmund and Gloucester. At first, Gloucester is stimulated by the nonverbal behaviour of Edmund to make the faked letter, that is to ruin Edgar, a topic of their conversation:

> Glou. […] Edmund, how now! What news?
> Edm. So please your Lordship, none. [*Putting up the letter.*
> Glou. Why so earnestly seek you to put up that letter?
> Edm. I know no news, my Lord.
> Glou. What paper were you reading?
> Edm. Nothing, my Lord.
> Glou. No? What needed then that terrible dispatch of it into your pocket?
> [*King Lear,* I/ii,26-33][222]

Edmund's subsequent reluctance to reveal any information about the letter has a similar effect as insinuation. His words contain, of course, no implications in themselves. However, when one considers the context in which they are uttered, the insinuation is quite obvious. Especially the connection of his words and his action after Gloucester's initial question is significant. Gloucester may well refer to the letter when he asks his son what news he got. Edmund's answer and his putting away the letter stand in a curios contrast to one another: if the letter actually contained no news there would be no need to hide it from his father. Accordingly, this creates suspicion and Gloucester asks further questions concerning the letter. Edmund's behaviour insinuates that the letter contains something that is of interest to Gloucester but that, for some reason, Edmund wants to keep from him. When Gloucester articulates his suspicion that the letter contains something unpleasant ("The quality of nothing hath not such need *to hide* itself.", 33/34), Edmund uses a more informative mode of insinuation to introduce further aspects of the topic, namely that the letter was written by his brother Edgar and that it contains information which would particularly displease Gloucester: "I find it not fit for your o'erlooking" [38]. Due to Edmund's feigned reluctance to speak, his use of insinuation, and the context in which Gloucester encounters him, they both contribute to the introduction of the subject of their dialogue. In other words, the

[222] Quotations refer to The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare. King Lear, Kenneth Muir (ed.), London and New York 1985.

exordium is not entirely the creation of Edmund, but the product of his interaction with Gloucester. The impression that the persuadee is the more active interlocutor in the introduction of the topic, is even stronger in this dialogue than it is in *Much Ado About Nothing*.

Also the part of the persuasion that prepares Othello to hear about the unfaithfulness of his wife is given a highly dialogical form. Othello participates in and contributes to the introduction of main issues of their dialogue, as the following example illustrates. Here, Othello turns their conversation to Cassio after Iago refuses to explain why he expresses such discomfort at the sight of him talking to Desdemona:

> Iago. Ha, I like not that.
> Othello. What dost thou say?
> Iago. Nothing, my lord, or if – I know not what.
> Othello. Was not that Cassio parted from my wife? [III/iii,35-38][223]

The insinuation of Iago's cryptic exclaim raises Othello's attention. When Iago declines to explain his words, Othello becomes suspicious and attempts to linger on the subject to which Iago, with the deictic element "that" obviously referred. He does so by focussing on concrete elements of the context ('Cassio', 'my wife'). Iago's pose of being reluctant to speak induces Othello to introduce further aspects of their topic on his own. When Iago is apparently striving to maintain silence when questioned about his opinion of Cassio, Othello finally raises the issue of Cassio's integrity:

> Iago. I did not think he had been acquainted with her.
> Oth. O yes, and went between us very often.
> Iago. Indeed?
> Oth. Indeed? Indeed: discern'st thou aught in that?
> Is he not honest? [III,iii,100-104]

Due to Iago's persistent use of insinuation, Othello's share in the introduction of the subject matter of their dialogue seems remarkably substantial. Since he directly articulates key words and phrases ('Cassio', 'my wife', 'Is he not honest?') to which Iago only indirectly alludes, he actually brings up the central aspects of the topic.

As in the dialogue from *Julius Caesar*, the dialogical form of the persuasion of Sebastian in *The Tempest* changes within the *exordium*. While in the beginning it is only Antonio who raises the topic, Sebastian joins in with its introduction in a later passage of the *exordium*. When Antonio appeals to his ambition, Sebastian informs him of his indecisive disposition:

> Ant. I am more serious than my custom: you
> Must be so too, if heed me; which to do

[223] Quotations refer to The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare. Othello, M.R. Ridley (ed.), London and New York 1958.

Trebles thee o'er.
Seb. Well, I am standing water.
Ant. I'll teach you how to flow.
Seb. Do so: to ebb
Hereditary sloth instructs me. [*The Tempest*, II,i,214-18]

In this passage, Sebastian introduces the topic of the hereditary impediment to his advancement, namely the fact that his older brother Alonso is the rightful king. Though Sebastian's first metaphorical statement is meant to indicate that he is not ambitious enough to reach for the throne, he might also deliberately raise the issue of impediments to hear what remedy Antonio may suggest. Antonio continues the metaphor to allude to his intention to persuade Sebastian (217), which meets with Sebastian's approval ("Do so"). It almost seems that Sebastian then mentions the cause of his lack of ambition ('Hereditary sloth') in order to indicate what issues Antonio would have to address to make his persuasive efforts effective.

In persuasive dialogues, in which the persuader and the persuadee jointly approach the topic, the *exordium* is to a great extent adapted to the dialogic form. A curious similarity of nearly all of the examples that were considered in this section is the impression that, on a formal level, it is especially the persuadee who promotes the introduction of the topic or who initiates central aspects of this topic. Hence, in some of the dialogues the persuadee's contributions to the establishment of the topic seem to be even more substantial than the persuader's contributions. Typically, this impression is created because the persuader's use of insinuation, that is, of cautious and purposeful language is contrasted with the persuadee's directer and franker language.

The results of this chapter are, however, only meant as interim findings, since, as was pointed out in chapter 2, form and quality of a discourse do not necessarily coincide. Qualitative assessments concerning the question how far interlocutors manage to influence each other in their utterances are largely ignored in this chapter, which is restricted to the formal issue whether or not both interlocutors actively participate in the introduction of the topic of their dialogues.

3. Narratio and Argumentatio

Narratio and *argumentatio* constitute the central part of the classical persuasive speech. An *argumentatio*, which is the core of the persuasion, can clearly be identified in each of the dialogues. More problematic, however, is the identification of the *narratio*. For one point, the distinction between *narratio* and *argumentatio* is not always an unambiguous one. As already Lausberg points out, the *narratio* is in itself a kind of proof (*probatio*) in the form of a narration because it presents the subject matter in a biased way.[224] Moreover, as Ottmers argues, the concept of the *narratio* is mainly relevant to the classical oration used in legal cases where it is clearly defined as an account of the course of events in a crime. "Trotzdem hat die Rhetorik von der *narratio* – im Gegensatz zum *exordium* – kein festumrissenes Bild geliefert. In den nichtjudizialen Redegattungen ist damit oft nur ein bestimmtes narratives oder deskriptives Darstellungsverfahren gemeint [...], das sich kaum als eigenständiger Redeteil definieren lässt."[225] Some of the dialogues may be compared to an oration in a legal case. Hamlet accuses his addressee of an offence, Iago, Beatrice and Edmund charge another character with a crime, and Paulina defends another character. Yet even in these dialogues, a *narratio* cannot in each case be clearly identified. This might me due to the context, especially to the fact that in these dialogues (with the exception of the dialogue from *The Winter's Tale*) the persuasion is directed at only one addressee in a private situation. Ueding and Steinbrink note that a *narratio* is necessary in public speeches but not in private contexts (*deliberationes privatae*).[226]

An analysis of the dialogues reveals wide differences in the dialogical form of the *narratio* and the *argumentatio*. Many of the dialogues at some point display a striking monological tendency. This means that the persuader makes utterances of such length that they remind one of monologues, though they are, of course, still part of the overall dialogical structure of the scenes. On the other hand, there are passages with a genuine dialogical form, which means that both the persuader and the persuadee participate actively in the discourse and contribute to the persuasive dialogue.

For a textual analysis it is important to realize that rather than a clear dichotomy of formally monological and dialogical passages there seems to be a continuum of different degrees of dialogical form. Even in a passage that appears rather monological there are elements which show that these passages belong to a formally dialogical discourse. Similarly, in passages with an alternation of speakers differences can be observed with respect to the nature of the persuadee's contribution to the persuasion. While at times the persuadee's utterances seem to be merely a reaction to the persuasion, in other situations they actually form part of the persuasion. The latter can be said to be more dialogical than the former since the persuasive utterances themselves are distributed among the two speakers.

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[224] Lausberg, 163. This point is also mentioned by Ueding, 72.
[225] Ottmers, 56f.
[226] Ueding and Steinbrink, 261f.

For the sake of clarity, this continuum will here be analysed in a simplified version, namely by establishing different broad categories which are then investigated individually with regard to their dialogical features. Section 4.3.1. will be an investigation of dialogical elements in passages that lack the alternation of speakers which characterizes the dialogic form of a discourse. In 4.3.2. the focus will be on passages within which turn-taking takes places. These passages will be distinguished further according to whether the utterances of the persuader could hypothetically by themselves make up a *narratio* or *argumentatio* (4.3.2.1.) or whether the utterances of the persuadee would necessarily have to be included if the dialogue were to be rephrased as an *oratio* (4.3.2.2.)

4.3.1. Passages Without Turn-Taking

Whenever the persuader monopolizes the conversation and talks considerably longer than would commonly be expected in a dialogue while the persuadee keeps silent and is restricted to the role of a listener, a monological effect is produced. Also Pfister observes that a dramatic text takes on a monological dimension if the turns of one character are unusually lengthy.[227] However, it is necessary to keep in mind that these passages, though they have a monological appearance, are part of a larger dialogical context. It would be misleading to infer that these passages are examples of 'monological dialogues' in which the speaker ceases to pay attention to the persuadee. Instead, the dialogical elements that can be found in such passages reveal how far the persuader is from disregarding his or her interlocutor. The question that is to be answered in this section is concerned with the influence of the dialogical context on such passages. The central purpose of the analysis is to illuminate in how far dialogical elements can be identified in monological passages of persuasive dialogues.

4.3.1.1. Dialogical Elements in Passages Without Turn-Taking

4.3.1.1.(a) Emphatic Address

A phenomenon that is to be noticed frequently and that seems to be prevalent in dialogues that are monopolized by persuaders is that these persuaders give their words a dialogical appearance. A conspicuous possibility to create a dialogical impression is to address the persuadee in a very emphatic manner. Thereby, the addressee is encouraged to feel involved in the persuader's words. Moreover, the persuader thus shows that s/he recognizes the presence of his or her addressee as a participant in the communicative

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[227] Pfister, Manfred, Das Drama: Theorie und Analyse, München 1982, 182.

situation who could, theoretically, reply to his or her words. Since an emphatic address tends to provoke a response, it indicates the potential of a dialogic form inherent in the passages.[228]

There are different variants of such an emphatic address. Persuaders might, for example, insert questions into their utterances as Lady Macbeth does at the end of her *narratio* in which she gives a detailed description of the planned murder and how it will successfully be committed. She concludes by asking

> […] when in swinish sleep
> Their drenched natures lie, as in a death,
> What cannot you and I perform upon
> Th'ungarded Duncan? what not put upon
> His spongy officers, who shall bear the guilt
> Of our great quell? [*Macbeth,* I/vii, 68-73]

It instantly becomes clear that these questions are not asked *after* the *narratio* in true expectation of an answer. The initial 'when', with which also the previous sentences of this passage begin, points to its narrative character. Moreover, they are rhetorical questions which do not require an answer but by implication make a statement[229], namely that it will be easy to safely murder Duncan since his guardians will be asleep and can afterwards be blamed for the murder. This scenario is presented in the form of questions which are emphatically directed at Macbeth who is, thus, involved in the process of imagining it.

At an earlier stage, Lady Macbeth uses questions with a similar effect for the *argumentatio* [I/vii,35-45]. This passage consists entirely of questions. Due to this accumulation, the argument that is made by the questions gains special force. With the help of reproaches such as "Art thou afeard/ To be the same in thine own act and valour,/ As thou art in desire?" [I/vii,39-41] she implicitly argues that his behaviour is not in accordance with his values; that since he desires the crown he should take measures to secure it. Also Rauh argues that rhetorical questions can be used effectively as arguments since by them "one may affirm or deny an assertion as clearly as by mere statement, and in a more lively and stirring manner combining emotion with thought."[230] To be directly addressed in such a vigorous way in every single sentence throughout this passage animates Macbeth to follow the arguments closely. His involvement as a passive participant in the communication is thus intensified. The

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[228] The beneficial effect of an emphatic address of persuadees is illustrated in the forum scene (III/ii) in *Julius Caesar* in which Antony is the more successful rhetor because he tends to involve the audience more strongly than Brutus does. (Müller, 1979, 141f.)
[229] Yule, George, Pragmatics, Oxford and New York 1996, 54-55.
[230] Rauh, 246.

questions imply that he could theoretically answer them if Lady Macbeth would only give him the opportunity.

Similarly, Cassius, whose *argumentatio* [I/ii,133-159] is interrupted not once by Brutus, creates a dialogical impression by questions with which he emphatically addresses him. This emphasis is rhetorically reinforced by the use of *amplificatio* (three successive questions) and *epistrophe* ("one [only] man"):

> When went there by an age, since the great flood,
> But it was fam'd with more than with one man?
> When could they say, till now, that talked of Rome,
> That her wide walks encompass'd but one man?
> Now is it Rome indeed, and room enough,
> When there is in it but one only man. [*Julius Caesar*,I/ii,150-5]

Also these questions do not require an answer. Instead, they form an argument that draws on the republican tradition of Rome. Rome, as Cassius implies, is not herself if ruled by a king instead of the Roman citizens. Müller has demonstrated that the last of these questions represents an abbreviated syllogism.[231] Consequently, it embodies a rational argument, though in a quite emphatic form.

The same effect of generating a dialogical impression can be observed in Beatrice's question "Is he not approved in the height a villain, that hath slandered, scorned, dishonoured my kinswoman?" [*Much Ado*,IV/i,300-1] which is part of her *narratio*. Although a question in form, its phrasing identifies it as an assertion. The beginning 'Is he not' betrays that Beatrice does not really ask for Benedick's opinion about Claudio's character but expresses her conviction. In their *Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language* Quirk et al make a distinction between several types of questions according to the kind of reply they expect. Analogously, though rhetorical questions do not expect answers, they distinguish between rhetorical *yes-no* questions and rhetorical *wh*-questions. "A positive rhetorical *yes-no* question is like a strong negative assertion, while a negative question is like a strong positive one."[232] Hence, the negative phrasing of Beatrice's question has the effect of an assertion, such as 'Surely he is … a villain'. With this question she presents Claudio's blameworthy conduct towards Hero which serves as a basis of her argumentation that Claudio is indeed her enemy and should be challenged by Benedick.

In none of these cases rhetorical questions, that can be found in passages of the *narratio* or of the *argumentatio* without turn-taking, are meant to elicit a response from

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[231] Müller 1979, 99.
[232] Quirk, Randolph et al, A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language, London and New York 1985, 825.

the addressee but to present an argument or a statement. The form of a question makes these passages seem more dialogical than they really are.

Apart from questions also imperatives can be used for an emphatic address, since imperative sentences are the typical form of what is termed 'directives' in pragmatics[233]. Directives "are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something"[234] which ideally means that in response the addressee is stimulated to a specified action. Paulina, though she has but few opportunities to speak at length, manages to remain uninterrupted when she presents her main argument, namely that Hermione's baby resembles Leontes in such obvious ways that her identity as his legitimate daughter is unquestionable. In this formally monological passage she emphatically addresses the bystanders, drawing their attention to the individual features of the infant's face:

> *Behold*, my lords,
> Although the print be little, the whole matter
> And copy of the father: eye, nose, lip […] [*The Winter's Tale*,II/iii,97-99]

Characteristic of this scene and possibly one of the causes of her failure to convince Leontes is the fact that she neglects to address Leontes personally but speaks of him in the third person. Nevertheless, her emphatic appeal to her addressees, in this case the bystanding lords, gives her utterance a dialogical appearance.

An emphatic address may also be realized by the use of deictic elements, such as demonstrative pronouns. By the persuader's pointing at something that is directly before their eyes, the persuadee is encouraged to share more intensely in the words of the persuader since what is said refers to the immediate situation in which s/he participates. Demonstratives even make it necessary to look at the object that is pointed out in order to understand the persuader's words since "their reference depends on the context shared by speaker […] and hearer"[235] Therefore, pointing at something the persuadee can perceive is an invitation to actually look at it and thus 'activates' the addressee. Such elements reveal that these passages without turn-taking are part of a discourse which has a dialogic form. References to the mutually shared context, as was pointed out in 2.2.1., are characteristic of dialogical forms of discourse, whereas the immediate context is typically neglected in a formally monologic text.

In his dialogue with Lady Anne, Richard's argumentation develops from a very dialogical form in the first part towards a part with hardly any alternation of speakers.

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[233] Quirk et al, 827.
[234] Levinson, 1983, 240.
[235] Quirk et al, 372.

In this formally monological passage he uses deictic elements that dramatically support his arguments. As a proof of his love he refers to their eyes to argue that her beauty affects him more than the most tragic situations of his life and has even moved him to tears:

> *Those* eyes of thine from mine have drawn salt tears,
> Sham'd their aspects with store of childish drops;
> *These* eyes, which never shed remorseful tear,
> No, when my father York and Edward wept
> To hear the piteous moan that Rutland made
> When black-fac'd Clifford shook his sword at him
> Nor when thy warlike father, like a child
> Told the sad story of my father's death [*Richard III*,I/ii,157-64]

The account that follows these words, presenting past events in which Richard refused to weep, could also be understood as the *narratio* of the persuasion. It is unmistakeably characterized by a strong narrative quality. However, this narration definitely has the function of an argument. Richard describes grievous incidents to compare their effect on him with the effect of his torment as a frustrated lover who is not loved by the lady he adores. This comparison is meant to reveal that nothing has as much power to stir his emotions as Lady Anne. It is thus supposed to prove the genuineness of his love. Such a report of past events naturally tends towards a monological form. By using deictic elements to connect it with the immediate context of their encounter Richard manages to address his words to Lady Anne with special emphasis and thus gives them a slightly dialogical appearance. After this account Richard once more appeals to Anne vigorously by referring to their immediate context with the help of deictic elements:

> Lo *here* I lend thee *this* sharp-pointed sword,
> Which if thou please to hide in *this* true breast,
> […]
> [I] humbly beg the death upon my knee. [*Richard III*,I/ii,178-82]

At this point, Richard resorts to *actio* to involve his addressee to an even greater extent. As will be demonstrated later, this usage of nonverbal behaviour leads to a further type of dialogical form. Richard holds out his sword to Lady Anne and impels her to accept it. This action is supposed to be the final proof of the sincerity of his love. Apparently, Richard is even ready to die at the hand of his beloved lady. By using demonstrative pronouns to point at different objects he directs Anne's attention at what he intends her to do. This emphatic appeal 'activates' Anne; she is induced to take his sword.

In a passage from *Hamlet* different means that can be used for an emphatic address are combined for a greater effect. Hamlet's persuasion of his mother is an extremely asymmetrical dialogue; especially the *narratio* [III/iv,40-65] and the *argumentatio* [66-157] have a rather monological appearance. As a part of the *narratio*, in which Hamlet obscurely alludes to the misdeed of which he accuses Gertrude, he presents the portraits of her late and of her present husband in an *evidentia*: "*Look here* upon *this* picture, and on *this*,/ The counterfeit presentment of two brothers." [III/iv,53-54] In this vigorous address he both focuses intently on Gertrude and draws her attention to his *probatio inartificialis*, the two portraits. This marked awareness of his addressee gives Hamlet's words a dialogical appearance. The repetition of the demonstrative pronoun 'this' not only intensifies the appeal, but also introduces the contrasting descriptions of the two brothers that follows. By pointing at each portrait individually instead of saying 'Look here upon these pictures' Hamlet clearly distinguishes between the two persons. It is interesting to note that in this passage, Hamlet uses only demonstratives of 'near' reference (i.e. 'this' instead of 'that'). As Quirk et al point out "[t]he measurement of spatial proximity is a matter of psychological rather than real distance."[236] Next Hamlet turns to the portrait of his father to describe his aspect, again starting the sentence with an imperative: "*See* what a grace was seated on *this* brow" [559]. After having characterized his father as the very image of virtue Hamlet even increases the emphasis with which he addresses Gertrude. To the deictic references and imperatives he now adds reproachful questions:

> *This* was your husband. *Look* you now what follows.
> *Here* is your husband, like a mildew'd ear
> Blasting his wholesome brother. Have you eyes?
> Could you on *this* fair mountain leave to feed
> And batten on *this* moor? Have you eyes? [63-67]

These questions introduce the *argumentatio* which is based on the narrative evaluation of Gertrude's husbands. In a final question Hamlet again points at the two pictures in turn to highlight the contrast between them: "what judgement/ Would step from *this* to *this*?" [70-71] These repeated direct addresses to Gertrude in the form of questions and imperatives together with the emphatic reference to the pictures or to individual details in them helps to create a remarkably dialogical impression in Hamlet's extended utterance. It seems rather striking that in this exceedingly monological text, Hamlet puts a lot of effort into counterbalancing the monological character and creating an appearance of dialogue. The main point Hamlet wants to prove with the help of his reasoning is that Gertrude's choice of Claudius for a second husband is blameworthy because Hamlet's father was infinitely superior to Claudius. As a basis of this argument he uses the comparison of the two brothers which is drawn entirely on a physical level.

[236] Quirk et al, 374.

According to a belief that was prevalent in the Renaissance, physical beauty was seen as a sign of 'inner' beauty and integrity.[237]

4.3.1.1.(b) The Pretence of Two Perspectives

Another phenomenon that gives formally monological passages a dialogical appearance can be noticed when persuaders assume the point of view of their addressees and argue from their perspective, when, in other words, they say what they assume the persuadees could say. In these cases the words of the persuader take the place of a potential or hypothetical utterance of the persuadee. Since the utterance of the persuader contains different perspectives it creates a dialogical impression and, indeed, has a dialogical quality. In this context, the distinction between a perspective or a point of view and someone who holds this view, which was mentioned in chapter 2, is essential, since it allows for the possibility of different perspectives being expressed by one speaker. Graumann observes that speaking "in a different voice" is used as a means to "anticipate differing viewpoints or objections from the person [one is] talking to and [...] to incorporate them into [one's] own speech."[238]

Hamlet, for example, seems to anticipate Gertrude's (possible) objection to his reproaches when he says:

> *You cannot call it love*; for at your age
> The heyday in the blood is tame, it's humble,
> And waits upon the judgement, and what judgement
> Would step from this to this? [*Hamlet*,III/iv,68-71]

This utterance in the form of a complex syllogism is part of the *argumentatio*. Hamlet cannot in the least understand why his mother loves Claudius. This love in his eyes defies all common sense. His failure to comprehend her feelings and his conviction that Gertrude's behaviour is illogical are reflected in this rational argument. The rhetorical question, which implies that Gertrude's decision to remarry lacks all judgement, is the *praemissa maior*. The second step of the argument, the *praemissa minor*, states that Gertrude cannot have been blinded by love because mature people like her are able to show more judgement in their conduct than younger people. The *conclusio* of this syllogism is not stated but merely implied: since it was not love, some other force must have blurred Gertrude's judgement. Hamlet again alludes to this other force some verses later: "What devil was't/ That thus hath cozen'd you at hoodman-blind?" [76-77] With this kind of logic Hamlet tries to prove that Gertrude's remarriage has no

[237] Erlebach, Peter, Vernunft und Folgelogik in Shakespeares Tragödien, Heidelberg 1995, 138.
[238] Graumann, 1990, 122.

extenuating circumstances to it that could excuse her inappropriate choice, but that it is depraved in its entirety.

The interesting point of this argument is that the second step of the syllogism, the *praemissa minor*, is an assumed protest – an argument Gertrude might use in defence of her behaviour. By anticipating this potential objection to his accusation it seems as if two opinions were involved in arriving at the conclusion of the syllogism. This aspect gives the argument a distinct dialogical appearance.

A way of reasoning that has a similar effect is also used by Richard in his formally monological *argumentatio* [*Richard III*, IV/iv,294-324]. After heavy accusations from Elizabeth, Richard uses the following arguments to change her opinion of him in his favour:

> If I did take the kingdom from your sons,
> To make amends I'll give them to your daughter;
> If I have kill'd the issue of your womb,
> To quicken your increase, I will beget
> Mine issue of your blood upon your daughter. [IV/iv,294-98]

When he realizes that he cannot deny having killed Elizabeth's children for his own advancement, he admits being guilty of these crimes. At the same time he argues that he intends to compensate for the murder of Elizabeth's children. Since Elizabeth proves immune to Richard's attempts at exerting emotional influence, he uses a rather rational argument: to recompense Elizabeth for her sufferings he offers her something of 'equal value', as if he had merely caused her a material loss which he could simply pay back. This idea is also conveyed by his use of antitheses and parallelisms. The combination of parallel syntax and antitheses ('give' and 'take', 'kill'd' and 'beget') suggests that what is taken away and what is given back is of equal value or, in other words, that Richard would pay his 'debts' by marrying Elizabeth's daughter. The parallel periphrases Richard uses to refer to Elizabeth's deceased children and to his own future children suggest that they are exchangeable and that, consequently, her children can easily be replaced.

This crucial reasoning which is central to Richard's *argumentatio* has a noticeable dialogical aspect. It has the structure of thesis and antithesis with the theses [294, 296] representing Elizabeth's view and the antitheses consisting of his offers of compensation. This structure of alternating theses and antitheses closely resembles the idea of two different opinions meeting in a dialogue. That the theses are meant to reflect Elizabeth's perspective is quite obvious as she has confronted Richard with these very arguments earlier, for example when she states that her children were "by their uncle [Richard] cozen'd/ Of comfort, *kingdom*, kindred, freedom, *life*" [223-4]. Furthermore, the impression that these verses stand for Elizabeth's opinion is accentuated by the initial 'If'. Richard seems to paraphrase her arguments: 'if I did [indeed] take the kingdom from your sons [as you claim] …'. The reason for putting this chain of reasoning into a dialogical form might be to efficiently respond to Elizabeth's charges and to defend himself. Richard addresses specifically those crimes of which she has accused him and tries to moderate their impact by setting his promises of a future compensation against them.

Also Cassius makes efforts to involve Brutus in his rather extensive *argumentatio* by including his perspective into his reasoning. After first arguing only from his own point of view ("for *my single self*, *I* had as lief not be as live to be/ In awe of such a thing as *I myself*." [*Julius Caesar*,I/ii,93-5]), he suddenly extends his statement by turning to Brutus: "I was born free as Caesar; so were you" [96]. Here it seems as if Cassius would create one utterance out of two, namely of his own assertion 'I was born free as Caesar.' and of a hypothetical reaction from Brutus ('So was I.'). Accordingly, a momentary dialogical impression is created, so that the argument gains more relevance for Brutus. The argument that Caesar's dominant position is not justified because all Roman citizens are born equal is central to the *argumentatio*. Müller identifies it as the main thesis of Cassius' argumentation which highlights the principle of equality.[239]

Towards the end of the *argumentatio* this argument is employed again, this time illustrated with the help of names. Cassius appeals to Brutus as follows:

> Brutus and Caesar: what should be in that 'Caesar'?
> Why should that name be sounded more than yours?
> Write them together, yours is as fair a name;
> Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well;
> Weigh them, it is as heavy; conjure with 'em,
> 'Brutus' will start a spirit as soon as 'Caesar'. [I/ii,140-45]

In this example the attempted inclusion of Brutus' perspective into the discourse is quite evident. In an elliptical manner Cassius pronounces the names 'Brutus and Caesar' as if he wanted Brutus to visualize them. Because they do not appear in the context of a complete sentence, the reason for pronouncing these names is not clear from the beginning. The significance of this first utterance is then gradually revealed, so that Brutus can follow the reasoning and come to an insight step by step. The nature of these individual steps is remarkable for a striking dialogical semblance. In four parallel

[239] Müller 1979,93.

appeals Cassius addresses Brutus emphatically, urging him to compare the two names by different methods ('Write them', 'Sound them', 'Weigh them', 'conjure with 'em'). The statements after each of these instructions might be understood as a representation of Brutus' hypothetical perspective. They are to be seen as conclusions that would have to be drawn if Cassius' instructions were realized. In other words, they are the results at which Brutus would, according to Cassius, arrive if he acted on his advice. If he would write the names together he would realize that his 'is as fair a name' as Caesar's etc. Thus, there seems to be an alternation of two different perspectives. The comparison of the names 'Caesar' and 'Brutus' is used to illustrate the thesis that Caesar is not superior but equal to other Romans, as, for example, Brutus. However, the purpose of using names is not simply "to deflate Caesar's, to reduce it to a mere name, with the implication that the man behind the name is far less than he pretends to be"[240]. Rather, the significance of the names themselves is examined. Throughout the play the name 'Caesar' "takes on a supra-personal meaning"[241] of greatness and consequence. Not only others in his presence but also Caesar speak of himself in the third person, so that the name 'Caesar' takes on a special importance of its own.[242] Cassius tells Brutus to think of his own name as being equally significant and capable of 'conjuring up spirits', thereby alluding to the tradition of the name 'Brutus' (especially the person of Lucius Junius Brutus) which is closely connected with Roman republicanism. "In this way, Brutus and Caesar have been set side by side, with the issue of freedom and tyranny drawn [...], and an ancestral Brutus [has been] recalled as an example of bold patriotism."[243]

Tendencies towards a dialogical semblance can also be detected in Cassius' *narratio*. He recounts two anecdotes which demonstrate Caesar's physical weakness in order to contrast it with his pretensions to greatness.[244] In the second anecdote Cassius recalls how feeble Caesar looked when he was laid up with a fever in Spain:

> And when the fit was on him, I did mark
> How he did shake; 'tis true, this god did shake;
> His coward lips did from their colour fly,
> And that same eye whose bend doth awe the world
> Did lose his lustre; I did hear him groan; [I/ii,119-123]

[240] Doran, Madeleine, Shakespeare's Dramatic Language, Wisconsin and London 1976,124.
[241] Ibid., 125.
[242] See, for example, the remark "I rather tell thee what is to be fear'd/ Than what I fear; for always I am Caesar." [I/ii, 208-9].
[243] Doran, 124f.
[244] Müller, 1979, 95.

The incongruity of Caesar's weakness and his overwhelmingly powerful position is stressed by repetitions, the emphatic use of the verb 'did', and the paradoxical statement "this god did shake". Moreover, this special emphasis expresses Cassius' astonishment when he witnessed how cowardly "this god" actually behaved; a revelation that might not be expected from all that is known about Caesar's political impact. By emphasizing that this did really happen, Cassius anticipates Brutus' potential incredulity at the news. He speaks as if Brutus had already expressed a disbelief which he now attempts to dispel. This impression is created most markedly in line 120: the affirmative "'tis true" and the repetition that Caesar "did shake" seem to be an answer to a hypothetical expression of doubt from Brutus after the first half of the verse. Therefore, it could be argued that the *narratio*, which otherwise appears to be quite monological, at this point displays a somewhat dialogical feature.

The *argumentatio* in the dialogue from *The Tempest* only sparsely displays monological tendencies. In a comparatively lengthy utterance Antonio insinuates that, considering the great distance between Naples and the next heir of the throne, should the king die, Sebastian might easily replace him while Antonio could replace Gonzalo. The argument that the king and Gonzalo, who already are in a state comparable to death (namely asleep), are not qualified more than other people for the positions they hold and that it would, therefore, be no devastating crime to kill them, is introduced in an way that creates a dialogical impression:

> Say, this were death
> That now hath seiz'd them; why, they were no worse
> Than now they are. There be that can rule Naples
> As well as he that sleeps; [...] [*The Tempest*,II/i,255-58]

The first part of the sentence which functions as a proposition appears like a potential utterance of Sebastian since Antonio assigns this idea to him. Especially the initial imperative ('Say') marks these words as supposedly representing Sebastian's point of view – Antonio appeals to him to imagine that the king and his courtiers were dead. The second part of the sentence has the form of an inference that is drawn from the proposition. It starts with the interjection 'why' which makes it appear like a response to the first part of the sentence. Since this inference starts the actual argument it more clearly represents Antonio's perspective.

In all of these examples, though in very different ways, persuaders give their formally monological utterances a dialogical appearance by attempting or pretending to assume the point of view of their addressees. Typically, they make use of this supposed point of view to support their argumentation.

4.3.1.2. Nonverbal Dialogue

A materially different example of how a formally monological passage of the argumentation is shaped by its dialogical context can be found in *Richard III.* It is different insofar as the persuadee, though she does not speak, acts. This means that the persuadee's active participation and involvement in the communication is not simulated by the persuader but that it is real. As in a dialogue there is genuine interaction between the persuader and the persuadee; unlike in dialogue only one character speaks. The monological shape of the utterance makes it impossible to classify it as a dialogical passage. For a terminological clarification one might turn to Hess-Lüttich's distinction between communication, which can take the form of a dialogue, and interaction, which may but need not take the form of communication. Interaction is defined by behaviour which is influenced by the behaviour of other person(s) and which, in turn, influences the behaviour of this/these other person(s). In dialogue, which is a form of communication, this mutual influence is concerned with verbal behaviour.[245] Since dialogical form is defined by turn-taking, that is by an alternation of speakers, the term 'nonverbal dialogue' is, of course, an oxymoron. Considering the somewhat paradoxical situation of an interaction between two dramatic characters in which only one of them speaks it seems to be an appropriate term. It is chosen because the nonverbal behaviour of the addressee adds a dialogical aspect to this passage which lacks a truly dialogic form.

At the end of his *argumentatio*, in the course of which the asymmetry of the speakers increases considerably to his advantage, Richard attempts to enhance his credibility by offering his sword to Anne and pretending to be ready to die at her hand. Since he wants to prove his main thesis, namely that he murdered Anne's late husband and father-in-law because of his love for her, he uses conventional rhetoric of love: "if thou please to hide [this sword] in this *true breast*,/ And let the soul forth that *adoreth thee*, I lay it naked to the deadly stroke" [*Richard III*,I/ii,179-81]. These protestations of love as well as his submissive gesture of kneeling down before her are means of *pathos*. Richard flatters Lady Anne's vanity and softens her feelings towards him. As Lady Anne takes hold of Richard's sword and points it at him, a kind of 'nonverbal dialogue' develops:

[245] Hess-Lüttich,1992, 606.

he lays his breast open, she offers at [it] with his sword.
Nay, do not pause, for I did kill King Henry –
But 'twas thy beauty that provoked me.
Nay, now dispatch: 'twas I that stabb'd young Edward –
But 'twas thy heavenly face that set me on.
she falls the sword. [I/ii,183-86]

These lines comprise a summary of Richard's *argumentatio*: though he admits having killed Edward and King Henry, he lays part of the blame on Anne whose beauty, so he claims, has 'provoked' him. As noted above, Anne does not speak, but she obviously acts. The stage directions reveal that she first points the sword at Richard. Her subsequent actions can only be conjectured from Richard's verbal reactions to them. Apparently she alternately points the sword at Richard or moves it towards him and falters or lowers it. In reaction to her hesitations Richard incites her, only to hold her back again by reminding Anne of her share of the guilt. The dialogical form is accentuated by the beginning of both sentences ("Nay" [183,185]) which mark these sentences as responses to Anne's gestures. There is a genuine interaction between them which shapes Richard's words.

4.3.2. Passages With Turn-Taking

The portion of the main parts of the persuasion that has a truly dialogical form (defined by turn-taking) varies among the individual scenes. Nevertheless, it seems that it would not be sufficient to merely regard the quantity of dialogical passages to determine how far the persuasion is put into the shape of a dialogue. The aim of this section is to illuminate differences in the extent to which the substance of the persuasion is given a dialogical form in passages that are characterized by turn-taking. The somewhat vague expression 'substance of the persuasion' is meant to denote those utterances that would make up an entirely monological persuasion. Since the starting point of this analysis is the traditionally monological type of persuasion in the form of the classical *oratio* it is of vital interest to investigate how persuasive dialogues can be understood against this foil of monological persuasion.

In general, one can distinguish between two broad types of dialogical passages. In one of them the substance of the persuasion is given a dialogical form to a lower degree because the persuadee's utterances serve as 'comments' on or reactions to the persuasive utterances of the other speaker. In these cases, the utterances of the persuader would be sufficient if the persuasive dialogue were to be rephrased so as to compose an *oratio*. The utterances of the persuadee may have an influence on the development of the persuasion as, in fact, they invariably do. Yet, this is a matter to be discussed in the next chapter. What is decisive for the concern of this chapter and what makes these passages 'less dialogical' than the second type, is the fact that the persuadees' words do not by themselves contribute anything to the essence of the persuasion. In other words, the 'material' that might be found in an *oratio* is not divided between different speakers. This however, is the case in the second type of dialogical passages. In these cases the persuadee concretely adds to the substance of the persuasion. Therefore, in such passages persuasion is put into a dialogical form more persistently than in dialogical passages of the first type.

This distinction between two types of utterances by the persuadee corresponds to a concept used in semantics. Quirk et al differentiate between four classes of discourse functions, namely statements, questions, directives, and exclamations. "Statements are primarily used to convey information"[246] and thus characterize the persuadee's utterances in the more dialogical passages. "Exclamations are primarily used for expressing the extent to which the speaker is impressed by something"[247]. This discourse function is performed in what is here termed 'comments', because utterances that serve as exclamations do not add to the topic itself that is discussed in a dialogue, but rather operate on a metacommunicative level. The value of the concept of discourse functions is that it is still concerned with issues of form rather than quality. Pragmatic categories which would be suitable for a qualitative approach constitute a further level of distinctions, as the following example illustrates: "a statement can be used to make an assertion […], to make a prediction […], or to offer an apology […]. [These] are pragmatic categories that indicate how the semantic classes of sentences are used in actual utterances."[248]

4.3.2.1. The Persuadee as Commentator

Instances in which the persuadee's utterances seem to be merely additional comments on the words of the persuader which constitute the actual content of the persuasion can assume different forms. Two of the most prominent ones shall be investigated in greater detail in this section of the chapter.

4.3.2.1.(a) The Persuadee's Utterances as Feedback

At times, the persuadee's words have to be understood as a sort of feedback revealing the effect of persuasive arguments. They do not add but respond to the

[246] Quirk et al, 803.
[247] Ibid., 804.
[248] Ibid.

arguments of the persuader. A rather obvious example of this kind of dialogue occurs during Hamlet's persuasion of his mother. When he in a very offensive manner, which is reinforced by devices of *pathos*, accuses Gertrude of leading a dissolute life, Gertrude asks him to stop his reproaches since she cannot bear to realize her own depravity and the "black and grained spots" [III/iv,90] in her soul. Without regarding her plea, Hamlet resumes his reasoning. He argues that she can hardly wish to live in such an incestuous, shameful marriage to a man who not only murdered his own brother to illegitimately obtain the crown, but who moreover is infinitely inferior to her late husband. This argumentation which is meant to convince Gertrude of the baseness of her marriage is interrupted by her feedbacks:

> Ham. Nay, but to live
> In the rank sweat of an enseamed bed,
> Stew'd in corruption, honeying and making love
> Over the nasty sty!
> Queen. O speak to me no more.
> These words like daggers enter in my ears.
> No more, sweet Hamlet.
> Ham. A murderer and a villain,
> A slave that is not the twentieth part the tithe
> Of your precedent lord, […]
> Queen. No more.
> Ham. A king of shreds and patches - [*Hamlet*,III/iv,91-103]

Hamlet's argument would also be complete without Gertrude's interruptions, which means that it works independent of the persuadee's utterances. Her remarks indicate what an effect this reasoning has on her. They do not directly contribute to the argumentation. This verbal behaviour reinforces the impression of Gertrude's general passiveness.[249]

The scene from *The Winter's Tale*, in which the persuader has far less control over the development of the dialogue than is granted Hamlet, offers a comparable example. In her short *narratio* Paulina states that Leontes is altogether mistaken in his belief concerning the disloyalty of his wife and the illegitimate origin of Hermione's baby. She summarizes the situation declaring that Leontes' opinion "is rotten/ As ever oak or stone was sound." [*The Winter's Tale*,II/iii,89f] This straightforward account, as indeed Paulina's entire, self-confident behaviour greatly irritate and provoke Leontes who throughout this encounter sees his authority threatened by Paulina. His response to this *narratio* betrays his feelings about her frank, fearless statements: "A callat/ Of boundless tongue, who late hath beat her husband,/ And now baits me!" [90-92] This

[249] Eaton, Sara, "The Rhetoric of (Dis)praise and Hamlet's Mother", Iowa State Journal of Research, 62, 1988, 380. See also: Uéno, Yoshiko, "Three Gertrudes: Text and Subtext", Yoshiko Uéno (ed.), Hamlet and Japan, New York 1995, 156.

response is not concerned with the subject of Paulina's *narratio*; it is rather a comment on her discourse. It reveals Leontes' perception of Paulina's verbal behaviour which leaves him with the impression that she is used to dominating her husband and ordering him around, and that she now attempts to treat him in the same disrespectful manner.[250] He considers this self-confident behaviour highly inappropriate for women and is determined not to let her have any influence on his behaviour and beliefs. Hence, Leontes' reaction already indicates that he will deliberately disregard any advise or proof that Paulina can offer.

In an advanced stage of the persuasion of Othello, Iago reminds him of certain arguments in order to increase their persuasive effect on him. He works on Othello's emotions, mentioning, in a seemingly casual way, 'evidence' that has greatly shaken him before. Thus, he also reminds Othello of his main piece of evidence against Desdemona:

> Iago. But for the handkerchief –
> Oth. By heaven, I would most gladly have forgot it:
> Thou said'st (O, it comes o'er my memory,
> As doth the raven o'er the infected house,
> Boding to all) he had my handkerchief. [*Othello*,IV/i,18-22]

Othello's response displays that he remembers the fatal proof. It is not an utterance that contributes anything to the effect or significance of this proof (a *probatio inartificialis*) but it is a sort of self-reflective and metacommunicative comment revealing that Iago's casual remark has successfully set off a process of remembering, as becomes evident especially in the expression within the brackets.

An interesting parallel between these examples is that the response which serves as a feedback concerning the effect of the persuader's utterances on his or her addressee is in each case to some degree negative. Leontes expresses his ill opinion of Paulina and the disrespectful tone of her verbal behaviour. Gertrude repeatedly asks Hamlet to stop his harsh arguments against her marriage since she cannot bear to hear them any longer; and also Othello states that he would rather not have been reminded of the evidence of the handkerchief. An explanation of this correspondence might be that persuadees resort to metacommunication when they are exceedingly displeased with the development of the dialogue or the nature of the arguments. A comparison of the examples suggests that the success of the persuader's utterance does not depend on a favourable feedback. Gertrude and Othello, though they express their displeasure at the

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[250] Beyenburg, Romana, Die Frauen in Shakespeare's späten Stücken: Text und Aufführung, Trier 1995, 145.

arguments of their persuaders, are clearly influenced as intended by Hamlet and Iago. On the other hand, Leontes' annoyance can be seen as one of the factors that determine Paulina's failure, possibly because his indignation is of a more general kind, directed not simply at an individual argument, but at the person of the persuader.[251] Common to all of the examples is the fact that the persuasion is developed by only one speaker although two speakers participate actively in the discourse or, in other words, the fact that the utterances of the persuadee amount to a feedback.

4.3.2.1.(b) Demands and Requests for Arguments

Another category of passages which consist of the utterances of two speakers while only the persuader's words make up the 'substance' of the persuasion is characterized by the persuadee's requests or demands for certain arguments. Also in these cases the persuadee's words are connected to an element uttered by the persuader that is essential to the main part of the persuasion. In contrast to the type discussed in 3.2.1.(a), the remarks of the persuadee do not refer to a part of the *argumentatio* or the *narratio after* it has been contributed by the persuader, but are articulated *prior* to this part. In other words, they motivate the persuader to bring it up either at all or at this particular part of the dialogue.

This type of dialogue can be observed throughout Edmund's *argumentatio* in *King Lear*. Although it is structured by frequent turn-taking, the proofs themselves are all provided by Edmund. Gloucester's questions do, however, determine the course of the *argumentatio*. As in a cross-examination, Gloucester precisely tells Edmund what he wants to know and draws certain information from him. Having read the letter that seems to testify to Edgar's disloyalty and to his villainous scheme against his father, Gloucester tries to ascertain the authenticity of the letter. In a rational procedure he asks matter-of-fact questions such as "When came you to this? Who brought it?" [I/ii,56], "You know the character to be your brother's?" [60], and "Has he never before sounded you in this business?" [67] With these questions he sets the limits for Edmund's argumentation, who produces exactly the evidence he is asked for. All of his answers support the evidence of the letter. Gloucester learns that it was not directly given to Edmund but "thrown in at the casement of [his] closet" [58] – an action that fits to the treacherous and sly nature of the scheme suggested in the letter. Moreover, Edmund reports that he "heard him [Edgar] oft maintain it to be fit that, sons at perfect age, and fathers declin'd, the father should be as ward to the son, and the son manage his

[251] Beyenburg, 143f.

revenue." [68-71] An interesting circumstance that contributes to the success of this persuasion is that, due to Gloucester's rational questions, Edmund can provide what seems to be factual, indubitable proof. Especially the *sermocinatio*, supposedly repeating Edgar's own words, has an air of authenticity to it.[252]

In *Othello*, the dialogical form of several passages can be explained in a similar way. A noticeable difference is that Iago does not give his answers quite as readily as Edmund and that, consequently, Othello has to ask more than once for a proof of Desdemona's unfaithfulness. Demands like "Villain, be sure thou prove my love a whore" [III/iii,365], "I'll have some proof" [392], and "Give me a living reason, that she's disloyal." [415] finally move Iago to reveal what seems to be a significant circumstantial evidence. As he reports in an *evidentia*, Cassio has highly vivid and suspicious dreams about Desdemona [419-32]. Othello's demands for convincing evidence at these points are far less specifically phrased than Gloucester's precise questions. He leaves Iago considerably more freedom in the choice of the proof used for the *argumentatio*. Nevertheless, in both cases the contribution of the persuadee is to urge the persuader to bring up a piece of evidence of a particular kind which verifies the 'persuasive message' and which, therefore, belongs to the *argumentatio*. In the second encounter of Iago and Othello in which the *argumentatio* is resumed, Othello's share in the dialogue is of a similar kind. When the suspicion arises that Cassio has told Iago something which testifies against him, Othello demands to hear this additional evidence against Desdemona and Cassio:

> Oth. Hath he said anything?
> Iag. He hath, my lord, but be you well assur'd,
> No more than he'll unswear.
> Oth. What hath he said? [IV/i,29-31]

After hesitating for a while, Iago claims that Cassio indeed admitted Desdemona's adulterous intercourse with him and obviously even delighted in the graphic details, boasting that he lay "[w]ith her, on her, what you will." [34] This incriminating argument seems so convincing to Othello that he collapses in despair.

There is yet another of these passages at the end of the *argumentatio*, after Othello has become witness of a scene staged for him by Iago in which he sees the only piece of evidence against Desdemona, namely her handkerchief, handled by Cassio's mistress Bianca. Iago afterwards draws his attention to this weighty detail, asking "And did you see the handkerchief?" [IV/I,169] Othello, who has perhaps been too far away

[252] Plett, 1991, 67.

to clearly identify it as the handkerchief he once gave to Desdemona, asks for a confirmation of what he nevertheless already suspects: "Was that mine?" [170] He thus elicits a more elaborate response from Iago who turns the fact that this handkerchief was in Bianca's possession into an argument against Cassio and Desdemona by offering a specific interpretation: "Yours, by this hand: and to see how he prizes the foolish woman your wife! she gave it him, and he hath given it his whore." [171-73].

Also in the persuasion of Lady Anne, the development of an argument is dramatized in a dialogical passage in which only Richard's utterances contain the information that makes up the argument. Lady Anne's replies are demands [146] and requests [148] for this information:

> Rich. He lives that loves thee better than he could.
> Anne. Name him.
> Rich. Plantagenet.
> Anne. Why that was he.
> Rich. The selfsame name, but one of better nature.
> Anne. Where is he?
> Rich. Here. [*Richard III*,I/ii,145-48]

Richard's argument that he is suited better than Edward as a husband for Lady Anne is here developed in a rather awkward and circuitous way. Anne has to enquire twice for an explanation until Richard can finally make her comprehend his argument. This may be due to Anne's strong aversion to Richard whom, at this point, she does not in the least consider a desirable candidate for a prospective husband. Consequently, the strongly dialogical form of this passage has the dramatic function of illustrating Anne's genuine dislike of Richard and, thereby, to make Richard's subsequent success in the woong of her seem even more striking.

Elizabeth, too, enquires repeatedly for additional information or for further details and explanation of utterances, as in the following example.

> K.Rich. […] I intend more good to you and yours
> Than ever you and yours by me were harm'd.
> Eliz. What good is cover'd with the face of heaven,
> To be discover'd that can do me good?
> K.Rich. Th'advancement of your children, gentle lady.
> […]
> Eliz. Flatter my sorrow with report of it.
> Tell me what state, what dignity, what honour,
> Canst thou demise to any child of mine?
> K.Rich. Even all I have – ay, and myself and all [*Richard III*,IV/iv,238-49]

In this passage, Richard attempts to lay open his intention of marrying Elizabeth's daughter and to offer his services to Elizabeth's family. This is the part of the dialogue in which he informs Elizabeth of his plan, for which he later attempts to win her approval in the *argumentatio*. Thus it can be seen as the dialogical equivalent to the *propositio* in an *oratio*. It soon becomes evident that Elizabeth's motivation for requesting further information is not, as in Anne's case, that she does not understand Richard's utterances. Rather, the sarcastic and ironic tone that penetrates most of her remarks reveals that she only feigns a lack of comprehension to elicit clearer explanations from Richard. As soon as Richard's offers are made more explicit, Elizabeth reduces them to absurdity and undermines them by twisting his every word, understanding the complete opposite of what he meant to say and, thus, exposing his falsehood.

This difference between the two dialogues is not so much a question of dialogical form, but of dialogical quality. These matters will be addresses more profoundly in the next chapter. What is important at this point is the fact that in both cases the 'material' that makes up an arguments or the *propositio* is contained in the utterances of the persuader. Although in this respect the two passages can be compared to an *oratio*, they have a dialogical form. A characteristic feature of this form is that the persuader's words are directly motivated by the utterances of the persuadee which are explicit requests or demands for such responses.

<u>4.3.2.2. Persuasive Arguments Distributed in Dialogue</u>

Passages within the main part of the persuasion that formally have even less in common with monological persuasion can only be found in some of the dialogues. In these cases the persuadee actively shares in the generation of arguments, either by supplying arguments of his own or by turning information provided by the persuader into arguments.

<u>4.3.2.2.(a) The Persuadee's Arguments as Contributions to the Persuasion</u>

A circumstance that is favourable to Iago's strategy to conceal the control he has of the dialogue is that Othello is a very active participator in the discourse. This goes so far that he even offers Iago a vital new argument for the persuasion "when Iago seems to have come to an end of his first phase of operations"[253]. Just after he emphasizes his belief in Desdemona's honesty, which Iago cannot dare to oppose openly, Othello himself expresses doubts, raising the objection "And yet how nature erring from itself" [*Othello*,III/iii, 231]. With this thought he introduces an argument that forms an essential part of the persuasion. Iago immediately takes it as a point from whence to argue that Desdemona, in her choice of Othello as the object of her love, was not true to her nature; that a man "[o]f her own clime, complexion, and degree" [III/iii,234] would

[253]Ridley, M.R. (ed.), <u>Othello: The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare</u>, London and New York 1958, 107.

suit her much better; that, in short, the marriage of Desdemona and Othello was, from the start, an 'unnatural' one and thus bound to fail. That in his reasoning Iago wilfully misunderstands Othello's words is at this point irrelevant. Surely, Othello had meant to say that Desdemona, by perhaps feeling attracted to Cassio, would err from her true nature, namely that of a loyal wife. The aspect that is significant for the dialogical form of the passage is that an idea which forms an essential part of the *argumentatio* is formulated by the persuadee.

Also the *argumentatio* of the persuasion of Sebastian in *The Tempest* has a remarkably dialogical form. Several times Sebastian articulates crucial arguments. That this can take quite different forms can perhaps be illustrated by two examples. In the first of these passages, Sebastian and Antonio analyse the issue of succession:

> Ant. […] Will you grant with me
> That Ferdinand is drown'd?
> Seb. He's gone.
> Ant. Then tell me,
> Who's the next heir of Naples?
> Seb. Claribel. [*Tempest*,II/i,238-40]

Sebastian is here drawn into a chain of reasoning. Together with Antonio he claims that Ferdinand, the heir of the king, is dead and he concludes that under these circumstances Alonso's daughter Claribel is the legitimate heir to the throne. Antonio then argues that, since she lives at a great distance from Naples, Claribel would not be a particularly suitable sovereign, thereby suggesting that this increases Sebastian's chance of becoming king himself. Instead of developing this somewhat weak chain of thought by himself Antonio deliberately makes Sebastian share in it. The result is a dialogical form of the argumentation. It is interesting, though, that those parts of the argumentation that are, so to speak, entrusted to Sebastian are the less dubious ones. That Ferdinand, who was separated from the rest of the company, is drowned seems rather likely after a violent tempest; and that Claribel would then be the next heir is simply a fact. Why the distance to Naples would keep her from accepting the title of Queen of Naples is, however, less evident. Antonio himself offers no sound reason for this assumption. He does not rely on Sebastian for this questionable aspect of the *argumentatio*, but hurries over an explanation of it, seemingly increasing its plausibility by means of *pathos*, such as the personification and the *sermocinatio* in the following lines:

> Ant. A space whose ev'ry cubit
> Seems to cry out, 'How shall that Claribel
> Measure us back to Naples? Keep in Tunis,
> And let Sebastian wake.' [*Tempest*,II/i,252-55]

Due to the dramatic vividness created by these means they have a special persuasive power and increase the credibility of an otherwise unsatisfactory argument.

Another example of how Sebastian contributes to the *argumentatio* occurs shortly after the first one. After Antonio has again insinuated that Sebastian would make a suitable king, while the present king could easily be eliminated and replaced, he asks for Sebastian's opinion in very general terms. Sebastian's response provides an argument that supports Antonio's reasoning:

Ant. And how does your content
Tender your own good fortune?
Seb. I remember
You did supplant your brother Prospero.
Ant. True:
And look how well my garments sit upon me;
Much feater than before: my brother's servants
Were then my fellows; now they are my men. [264-69]

This sudden inspiration on Sebastian's side offers a thoroughly new argument in support of the persuasion. Antonio uses Sebastian's thought of his own advancement under similar circumstances to point out the advantageous results for him. For this purpose he contrasts his present life with his life before he took his brother's place in order to illustrate his rise in the social hierarchy. This comparison is especially accentuated by the use of contrasting tenses and adverbs of time in the chiasm 'Were then …; now … are'. With this display of his personal promotion Antonio hopes to inspire Sebastian with ambition, a quality he entirely lacked in the beginning of their dialogue. Here, the circumstances under which Sebastian provides an argument differ significantly from those of the first example. By considering the immediate context of his contributions, namely the utterances of Antonio, qualitative differences might be revealed. However, if primarily the dialogical *form* of the argumentation is considered, the two examples can insofar be compared to one another as the arguments are distributed among the replies of different speakers.

4.3.2.2.(b) The Persuadee's Participation in the Generation of Arguments

At times, persuadees are involved into the generation of individual arguments. They draw conclusions from certain information which they obtain from the persuaders and thereby turn it into an argument. At times, this process might be compared to the reasoning of a syllogism, the individual steps of the syllogism or, in the abbreviated form, of the enthymeme being performed by different speakers.

This dialogical form can be found in the *argumentatio* from *Othello.* Since Iago is very scrupulous to maintain the semblance of his sincerity and credibility, he frequently presents his arguments under the guise of factual information and observations. The interpretation and evaluation of these 'facts' is then left to Othello. When Iago describes Cassio's behaviour in his sleep in an *evidentia*, he seems to avoid any evaluation of the situation, but only imparts his observations to Othello. In reaction to Othello's emotional outburst "O monstrous, monstrous!" [III/iii,433] which reveals that Othello understands the evidential value of his account, he seems to caution him, apparently denying that any conclusions can be drawn from Cassio's demeanour in his sleep: "Nay, this was but a dream." [433] Othello cannot be satisfied with this excuse; he formulates the deduction that inevitably suggests itself, namely that Cassio's dreams are caused by some previous experience of a presumably similar kind: "But this denoted a foregone conclusion." [434] Since Cassio dreams so vividly of a fulfilment of his love for Desdemona, so Othello's words imply, he must indeed have been intimate with her. As Erlebach evaluates it: "Othello […] folgert gleichsam reflexartig, daß dieser im Schlaf gespielten Szene der konkrete Beischlaf [...] vorausgegangen sein muß"[254]. Othello bases his deduction on the popular belief that dreams are not unmotivated but rather hint at previous experiences made in real life. With this conclusion Othello declares Iago's account to be a valid proof of Desdemona's unfaithfulness. Iago then eagerly agrees with him and accepts this view which conveniently adds to his yet meagre actual proof:

> Iago. 'Tis a shrewd doubt, though it be but a dream,
> And this may help to thicken other proofs,
> That do demonstrate thinly. [435-37]

Thus, the argument against Desdemona is made by the persuader and the persuadee in an abridged syllogism: the *praemissa maior* which consists of an account of Cassio's words and actions while he was sleeping is presented by Iago. The *praemissa minor* which states that dreams are originated by actual experiences is not uttered directly but seems to form the basis of the conclusion drawn by Othello, namely that Cassio's demeanour in his sleep mirrors an actual encounter with Desdemona that has already taken place. Iago's reply accentuates the significance of this 'proof' in the argumentation.

When they meet again, Iago increases Othello's distress by means that have changed remarkably from his initial cautiousness. He uses exceedingly provocative insinuations that reiterate the idea of intimate relationships between Othello's wife and other men:

[254] Erlebach, 137.

Iago. Or to be naked with her friend abed,
An hour, or more, not meaning any harm?
Oth. Naked abed, Iago, and not mean harm?
It is hypocrisy against the devil:
They that mean virtuously, and yet do so,
The devil their virtue tempts, and they tempt heaven. [IV/i,3-8]

Iago seems to suggest this idea without seriously considering the offensiveness of such behaviour. He pretends to believe that from the mere fact of Desdemona being "naked with her friend abed" it does not necessarily follow that an offence was committed. It is Othello who then draws the conclusion which clearly suggests itself. In his first question which sounds like an indignant exclaim, he repeats Iago's words ('not mean harm') in a way that vehemently rejects them. Othello insists on drawing the obvious conclusion that an offence of some kind inevitably follows from such behaviour. He thus treats Iago's insinuations like factual evidence from which it is possible to draw material conclusions. Although at this point neither of them explicitly mentions Desdemona, this short exchange is, of course, to be seen in the context of the overall subject of their dialogue. Consequently, their combined reasoning serves as an argument that strengthens Othello's conviction of Desdemona's guilt.

A similar effect is created by another passage from the *argumentatio*. Again, Iago alludes in a rather general way to circumstances that are connected with his accusations against Desdemona, only to pretend that he does not consider them substantial evidence. As in the previous example, Othello who is provoked by the references to his wife's indecent behaviour and by the obviousness of their implications draws an inference with which he asserts the conclusiveness of the 'facts' provided by Iago:

Iago. But if I give my wife a handkerchief –
Oth. What then?
Iago. Why then, 'tis hers, my lord, and being hers,
She may, I think, bestow't on any man.
Oth. She is protectress of her honour too,
May she give that? [IV/i,10-15]

Iago's vague insinuation, which is phrased in a general way but displays its relevance to their specific topic by the crucial word 'handkerchief', raises Othello's attention who asks him to go on. The word 'then' which is taken up by Iago in his next reply echoes the initial 'then' typical of the conclusion of a syllogism. Iago's conclusion that a woman should be allowed to give the presents she received from her husband to any man, which on the surface seems to be based on common-sense logic (since it is her own, she can do with it whatever she likes), cannot satisfy Othello but, on the contrary, provokes him. He challenges Iago's logic by a comparison between a present that is in the possession of a woman and her honour. This comparison in the form of a rhetorical question is meant to illustrate his view that not everything that is by rights hers may be given away by a woman, and to point out the moral implications of the protection or abandonment of such 'possessions'. Moreover, by this reference to the moral dimension, Othello emphasizes the significance of the handkerchief (which is obviously more than a simple object) as a proof of Desdemona's corruption. In short, he declares the fact that Desdemona gave away her handkerchief a weighty proof of the loss of her honour.

The persuasion of Gloucester resembles the dialogue between Iago and Othello insofar as Edmund rarely provides complete arguments but frequently only presents the 'facts' that form the basis of an argument. The meaning of these facts is, however, so clear that Gloucester cannot fail to arrive at the conclusion that turns the evidence into arguments. After he has read the letter that contains the mutinous scheme against him, Gloucester expresses his instinctive inference ("Hum! Conspiracy! […] My son Edgar!" [I/ii,52-54]) with which he indirectly declares the letter to be a valid proof of an actual intrigue being contrived against him. When Edmund reports what he claims are Edgar's own words in which he expressed his opinion that fathers of an advanced age should give up their property to their sons, Gloucester's response is as follows: "O villain, villain" His very opinion in the letter! Abhorred villain! Unnatural, detested, brutish villain!" [I/ii,72-74]. This reaction reveals that he has concluded from these words, which Edmund reports without adding any evaluative comments, that Edgar plans indeed to revolt against him. Edmund merely presents the 'facts' and leaves the reasoning to Gloucester who, as becomes apparent in his response, connects the evidence of the reported speech with that of the letter, thereby validating the authenticity of both. In consequence of the force of the accumulating evidence he infers that his son is an 'unnatural villain' or, in other words, one who seeks to overthrow the 'natural' hierarchy within the family.

Also, when they discus the question whether the letter was written by Edgar, it is Gloucester who finally proclaims: "It is his." [64] In this case his conclusion is based on what he perceives as Edmund's clumsy attempt to conceal Edgar's authorship. Even though Gloucester's reasoning is thus strongly guided by Edmund's insinuation, the fact remains that Gloucester utters an important point of the *argumentatio* when he declares that the handwriting in the compromising letter is Edgar's.

In all of the examples quoted in 4.3.2.2. the persuadee contributes actively to the persuasion so that vital arguments are uttered by him, even though the circumstances that lead to the articulation of an argument differ widely. These differences are primarily related to qualitative issues of the respective passage. If mainly formal aspects are considered, the passages discussed in this section can be compared to one another insofar as parts of the *argumentatio* are uttered by both participants of the dialogue. Such examples can only be found in a few of the dialogues, namely those from *Othello, The Tempest*, and *King Lear*. In other dialogues the 'persuasive material' is provided solely by the persuader. This is an indication that the degree to which persuasion is given a dialogical form varies among different persuasive dialogues.

4.4. *Conclusio*

As has become apparent by the analysis of different forms of passages, the central part of persuasive dialogues covers a great range from seemingly monological forms to decidedly dialogical examples. Similar to the *exordia*, the *conclusiones* of the different dialogues appear rather homogeneous with respect to formal criteria: the dialogue from *Hamlet*, is the only example among the dialogues analysed in the present study that ends with a formally monological *conclusio*.

The *conclusio* of a persuasion can be identified by the main functions it typically performs. As has been presented earlier, these include a recapitulation of the most important arguments, an appeal to the persuadee to decide in favour of the persuader's cause[255] and, in consequence of this altered view, a concrete call upon the persuadee or an advice to take special action.[256] These functions generate particular features that are characteristic of the language of a *conclusio*. Where persuaders summarize their main arguments, the style is marked by *brevitas*. For a call to action, imperatives are frequently used. As the *conclusio* offers the last opportunity for the persuader to exert influence on his or her addressee and to effectuate a change of opinion, this phase of the persuasion is also marked by the use of *pathos*.[257] The focus of this section will be on the final appeal to the persuadee to act in a certain way. It will be analysed how this part of the persuasion is given a dialogical shape and what differences can be noted in the degree of the dialogical adaptation of this aspect of persuasion.

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[255] Lausberg, 236.
[256] Perelman, Chaim, Das Reich der Rhetorik: Rhetorik und Argumentation, München 1980, 20f.
[257] Ueding and Steinbrink, 274f.

The reason for a confinement of the analysis to this element of the *conclusio* is not only one of limited space. The attempt to move the persuadee to some sort of action or to a change of behaviour can be seen as the ultimate goal of the persuasion. Rebhorn emphasizes this aspect when he states that "[a]s the Renaissance conceives it […], rhetoric is no language game; it is a serious business that aims to affect people's basic beliefs and produce real action in the world."[258] The recapitulation of arguments and the appeal to emotions are, in a way, means to accomplish the aim of 'producing action in the world', which might, of course, be represented by the fictional world of a drama. Thus, the call to action is of particular interest for an analysis of the *conclusio*, especially when this analysis is concerned with persuasion in drama. As the persuasive dialogues that are analysed in the present study never occur at the end of a drama, the question whether and how the persuasion has an effect on the persuadee's behaviour is dramatized in the development of the subsequent action. Furthermore, the *conclusio* of a dramatic dialogue presents an opportunity to motivate certain aspects of the plot of the next scenes and acts. Therefore, it may be assumed (although this would need further proof) that the issue of actions that result from the persuasive dialogue is given special attention in the context of a drama.

Most of the dialogues that are analysed here end with a part that can be recognized to perform the central function(s) of a *conclusio*. There is only one exception which has to be excluded from an analysis: in the dialogue from *The Winter's Tale*, the persuasion is broken off before Paulina can come to the *conclusio*. After she has pointed out the similarity of Leontes' physiognomy to that of Hermione's baby to prove that he is the father of the child, Leontes gives repeated orders to remove her [*Winter's Tale*,II/iii,111,121,123]. Finally, his orders are obeyed and Paulina is forced to leave the room. As she is led away she makes a desperate attempt to influence Leontes' future actions which, in all likelihood, is submerged by the general tumult:

Paul. I pray you, do not push me; I'll be gone.
Look to your babe, my Lord: 'tis yours: Jove send her
A better guiding spirit! What needs these hands? [II/iii,124-26]

4.4.1. *Conclusio* Without Turn-Taking

The dialogue between Hamlet and Gertrude provides the only example in the corpus of a *conclusio* in which the persuader is so dominant that the impression of a monologue is created. Towards the end of their encounter Hamlet goes into great detail

[258] Rebhorn, 4.

about how Gertrude should behave in the future. At the end of the *argumentatio* Gertrude informs her son that she feels irresolute and torn by inner conflicts. Hamlet who thus knows that he has already half convinced his mother attempts to complete the success of the persuasion by offering her a possibility to resolve these inner conflicts:

> Queen. O Hamlet, thou hast cleft my heart in twain.
> Ham. O throw away the worser part of it
> And live the purer with the other half. [*Hamlet*,III/iv,158-60]

Since he is motivated by a genuine wish to help his mother, Hamlet then offers detailed advice how this reformation is to be accomplished; how Gertrude can change her life for the better. Naturally, this amplification leads to a monological form:

> Ham. Good night. But *go not* to my uncle's bed.
> *Assume* a virtue if you have it not.
> That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat
> Of habits evil, is angel yet in this,
> That to the use of actions fair and good
> He likewise gives a frock or livery
> That aptly is put on. *Refrain* tonight,
> And that shall lend a kind of easiness
> To the next abstinence, the next more easy; [III/iv,161-69]

That this part belongs to the *conclusio* is made evident by the recurrent use of the imperative which is the most obvious form of realizing a call to action. This formally monological passage displays Hamlet's sincere concern for Gertrude's moral well-being: he does not simply confront her with a demand to alter her behaviour, but instead provides her with concrete recommendations how she might succeed to abandon of her morally depraved habits. Hamlet's advice for Gertrude is to first assume a virtuous demeanour so that she will, by force of habit, become truly virtuous. When he talks in general terms about the power of habit [163-67], Hamlet draws on the popular belief that the first step of an improvement of character is the most difficult. After the first measure of reform ('Refrain tonight'), as he reassures her, it will become easier to resist future temptations. However, Hamlet apparently does not intend to simply give his mother well-meaning advice. Instead, his words, since they are based on a disrespectful assumption, still have the character of accusations which contain a criticism of Gertrude. Without hesitation Hamlet presupposes that his mother is *not* virtuous and that her only chance of regaining his esteem is to *pretend* being virtuous.

It seems that several aspects of the situation lead to the monological form of this call for action. Gertrude's helplessness which makes her seek Hamlet's advice, on the one hand, and his claim to being morally superior as well as his desire to help her, on the other hand, have the effect that Hamlet elaborates on the measures he advises Gertrude to take and thus monopolizes the *conclusio* of this persuasive dialogue.

4.4.2. Call to Action Within Dialogue

At first glance, the part of the dialogue between Lady Anne and Richard that functions as a *conclusio* has a decidedly dialogical form. It is structured by frequent turn-taking by which, for a while, the individual replies are made up of only half a verse [*RichardIII*,I/ii,196-206]. However, a pronounced asymmetry soon becomes apparent: although the decisions are left to Anne, Richard is the one who offers the alternatives between which Anne is to chose. Thus he determines the conditions of her decisions. Since he plays the role of the humble and devoted lover[259], he involves Anne into the actual decisions, for example by asking for her permission to make these recommendations.

It is somewhat difficult to determine where the *conclusio* of this dialogue begins, since actions already play a vital role in the last part of the *argumentatio*, as the discussion in 4.3.1.2 has indicated. Lady Anne's decision not to kill Richard with his own sword ("Arise, dissembler; though I wish thy death,/ I will not be thy executioner." [I/ii,188-89]) and her resolution against ordering him to kill himself ("Well, well, put up your sword." [I/ii,200]), might be seen as parts of the *argumentatio* because they belong to the process of changing Anne's attitude towards Richard. As was shown in 4.3.1.2., Richard's utterances that lead to Anne's refusal to kill him have the function of arguments that are meant to alter Anne's opinion. The fact that she finally "falls the sword", as the stage directions announce, suggests that her attitude towards Richard does indeed change. Yet, the distinction between action that is employed in the *argumentatio* and action which is the aim of the persuasion as a whole and which is thus discussed in the *conclusio* is difficult. It seems reasonable to assume that an action or the deliberation on specific actions forms part of the *conclusio* when it refers to a wider context that goes beyond the immediate communicative situation of the persuasive dialogue. The reason of using this as a basis of the distinction is the fact that the aim of persuasion is to influence the persuadee's behaviour *beyond* the immediate situation, as was stated in chapter 3. On this basis, Anne's action of taking Richard's ring clearly belongs to the *conclusio* since it initiates their engagement and is a sign that

[259] Müller points out that Richard deliberately puts different social roles, such as that of the courting lover, to negative use: Müller, W.G., "The Villain as Rhetorician in Shakespeare's *Richard III*", Anglia: Zeitschrift für Englische Philologie, 102, 1984, 50ff.

Richard's wooing was successful. The exchange which accompanies this action is a short one:

> Rich. Vouchsafe to wear this ring.
> Anne. To take is not to give. [*Richard III*,I/ii,205-6]

The contributions of each speaker are evident: Richard states what he intends Anne to do, that is, he determines the nature of the action, while Anne makes the actual decision to take the ring. Next, Richard suggests actions to be performed by himself. He asks for the permission to "beg one favour at [her] gracious hand" [211]. As Anne encourages him to go on, Richard asks her to "leave these sad designs" [214], meaning the corpse of the late king, and to

> … repair to Crosby Place,
> Where, after I have solemnly interr'd
> At Chertsey Monastery this noble King,
> And wet his grave with my repentant tears.
> I will with all expedient duty see you. [I/ii,216-20]

As before, Anne merely accepts his suggestions in her response. Asked to be granted this wish, she replies: "With all my heart, and much it joys me too,/ To see you are become so penitent." [I/ii,223-24] Although she makes the decision, her replies are merely positive comments on Richard's suggestions, but no substantial contributions to a 'discussion' on their actions. Therefore, in spite of the frequent turn-taking which characterizes the greater part of this *conclusio*, it can be compared to the rather monological *conclusio* in *Hamlet* insofar as the plans and suggestions for future actions are only contained in the utterances of the persuader. Thus, this dialogue offers the ambiguous situation of a dialogical form with regard to the final part of the dialogue (by turn-taking) and of a similarity to monologue with regard to the 'call' to action that is a central part of the *conclusio* (since it is only contained in the persuader's turns). The dialogical form results from Anne's replies to Richard's suggestions which, as a positive feedback, have the function of commentary. Considering this nature of Anne's replies, the ambiguous form of this *conclusio*, being neither clearly dialogical nor monological, can be compared to the form of persuasion *within* dialogue discussed in 4.3.2.1. Another aspect that adds a dialogical aspect to this call to action is the fact that Richard determines actions to be performed not only by his addressee but also by himself. In other words, one might get the somewhat paradoxical impression that it is not only the persuadee whose behaviour is influenced by the dialogue but that, in consequence of their encounter, also the persuader modifies his behaviour or resolves to take certain actions.

On the surface, the *conclusio* of the dialogue between Richard and Elizabeth seems to be similar to this one. Also in this case the call to action is articulated only by the persuader. Elizabeth makes no suggestions of her own but comments on Richard's requests. These comments are shaped by Elizabeth's sharply ironic tone: the effect of her utterances is to undermine the surface meaning of her words. Due to the discrepancy between surface meaning and actual meaning which is typical of irony[260], Elizabeth's responses to Richard's appeal to aid him in his wooing of her daughter seem to be, on a formal level, a kind of feedback:

K.Rich. *Go* then, my mother; to thy daughter *go*:
Make bold her bashful years with your experience;
Prepare her ears to hear a wooer's tale;
Put in her tender heart th'aspiring flame
Of golden sovereignty; *acquaint* the Princess
With the sweet, silent hours of marriage joys,
[…]
Eliz. What *were I* best *to say*? Her father's brother
Would be her lord? Or *shall I* say her uncle?
Or he that slew her brothers and her uncles?
Under what title *shall I* woo for thee [?] [*Richard III*, IV/iv,325-40]

In these lines the ultimate aim of Richard's words is revealed: he asks Elizabeth to support him in his wooing of her daughter. He uses a number of imperatives to emphasize this call to action. Elizabeth's reply seems to be a request for more detailed recommendations how to accomplish this task. She appears to be uncertain how to inform her daughter of the identity of her wooer and therefore seeks Richard's advice.

Undoubtedly, this represents only the surface of the reply. The intended effect of Elizabeth's answer is quite the opposite of what it seems to be. Instead of asking constructively for advice how she might more effectively support Richard's cause, she rather subverts the suggestions he made before. By using different periphrases for Richard that highlight the awkward constellation of Richard being a close relative of the woman he intends to marry and, what carries even more weight, the fact that he is the murderer of other close members of the family, she draws his attention to the highly inappropriate nature such a connection would have. Not only is there the idea of incest to make the connection seem far from desirable, but also the crucial aspect of Richard being the murderer of the young Elizabeth's brothers. Hence, by suggesting to use these attributes for the wooing of her daughter, Elizabeth reveals the grotesqueness of his request and thereby implicitly refuses to act on his behalf.

[260] Plett, 1991, 93.

This is an effect which runs counter to the form of Elizabeth's utterance. On the surface it is a request for further recommendations concerning her approach to her daughter. The relevance of considering this exterior form becomes apparent when Richard ignores the implied meaning of Elizabeth's response and reacts only to its surface meaning. He takes her question "Under what title shall I woo for thee" seriously, suggesting "Tell her the *King*, that may command, entreats." [IV/iv,345]. Moreover, he offers a number of incentives that could make a marriage to him seem more agreeable, such as "*Infer* fair England's peace by this alliance." [343], "*Say* she shall be a high and mighty queen." [347], and "*Say* I will love her everlastingly." [349] The imperatives that begin each of these suggestions mark them as still belonging to the *conclusio*'s attempt to move the persuadee to specific actions. These calls to action are repeated in a similar exchange after an extended attempt by Richard to swear an oath in order to convince Elizabeth of his sincerity. He again appeals to her: "*Be* the attorney of my love to her;/ *Plead* what I will be, not what I have been" [413-14]. And, as before, an interpretation of Elizabeth's replies ("Shall I be tempted of the devil thus?" [418], "Shall I go win my daughter to thy will?" [426]) must take into consideration that the irony she uses causes a peculiar discrepancy between form and meaning. Also this time, Richard fails to comprehend the true import of Elizabeth's subversive questions. When she finally agrees to do what he asks of her ("I go. [...] you shall understand from me her mind." [428-29]), he obviously believes that the persuasion was successful, as can be seen by his triumphant remark "Relenting fool, and shallow, changing woman!" [431]

A comparison of the persuasive dialogues in *Richard III* reveals the necessity to clearly differentiate between form and quality. It has to be admitted that, on a qualitative level, the conclusions are widely different from one another. While Anne, believing in Richard's sincerity, accepts his suggestions for subsequent actions, Elizabeth rejects all of his propositions and appeals by cleverly undermining them. Her reactions persistently imply that in her eyes the actions requested of her by Richard are totally unacceptable. However, it is important to consider that for determining the dialogical *form* of the *conclusio* it is irrelevant whether the persuader and the persuadee have contrary opinions or whether they basically share the same view. Such questions refer to differences in the dialogical *quality* of the *conclusio*. With respect to the dialogical form of the final call to action, the two conclusions can be compared insofar as the plans concerning appropriate behaviour to be adopted as a consequence of the persuasive dialogue are made only by the persuader. As they offer no suggestions of their own, the persuadees do not contribute to the substance of the arrangement of ensuing actions. Instead, their utterances can be understood as comments or feedback. The material differences between the endings of the two dialogues result at least partly from the dissimilar nature of these comments.

4.4.3. Call to Action As Dialogue

In most cases the attempt to rouse the persuadee to action has a truly dialogical form, which means that in these dialogues the persuadee actively participates in it. In consequence, the utterances of both speakers contain suggestions for future action that in some way contribute to the decision at which they arrive at the end of the dialogue. In comparison with an *oratio*, where the final attempt to influence the persuadee's behaviour is frequently realized by a call to action, in the dialogical form, that is with the persuadee contributing to it, the nature of this attempt must be different. A dialogical treatment of this provocation to certain actions might be expected to take the form of a joint arrangement of such actions. The aim of this section, besides investigating the dialogic form of relevant texts, is to examine whether examples of dialogical *conclusiones* can actually be characterized as joint arrangements in which the persuader and the persuadee participate about equally.

In the persuasive dialogue from *Much Ado*, Beatrice reveals the aim of her communication at a very early stage of the dialogue. Even before the *narratio* and the *argumentatio* she lets Benedick know what she wishes him to do for her: "Kill Claudio!" [*Much Ado*,IV/i,288]. He immediately declines this request: "Ha, not for the wide world!" [289]. Beatrice then puts emotional pressure on him in order to make him alter this spontaneous decision. She questions the sincerity of his love and, by insinuations, his manhood. Throughout the *narratio* and the *argumentatio* she repeatedly exclaims, "O that I were a man!" [302, 305, 316], thus implying that she can think of nobody whom she believes capable of physically taking revenge, which traditionally is the province of men. Finally, she complains that virtues traditionally associated with manhood, such as courage, resolution, and the readiness to take action when it is necessary, are no longer to be found among courtiers. She harshly criticizes courtly customs whereby "manhood is melted into curtsies, valour into compliment, and men are only turned into tongue, and trim ones too" [316-18].

This criticism, of course, also applies to Benedick. He responds to it by again assuring her of his love: "Tarry, good Beatrice. By this hand I love thee." [324] As this answer does not satisfy Beatrice she once more insinuates that Benedick will not win her by merely protesting his love, but that he has to prove his sincerity by acting in accordance with his words: "Use it for my love some other way than swearing by it." [325f] The rather vague phrase 'some other way' clearly refers back to her earlier request "Kill Claudio." Yet in this concluding phase of the dialogue, after she has presented all of her arguments, Beatrice does not explicitly call on Benedick to perform a specified action; she restrains her attempt to influence Benedick to a vague insinuation. It is Benedick who pronounces what specific actions shall be taken. After an enquiry whether Beatrice truly thinks Claudio guilty and after her positive answer, Benedick proclaims his decision to challenge him:

> Bene. Enough! I am engaged, *I will challenge him*. I
> will kiss your hand, and so I leave you. By this hand,
> Claudio shall render me a dear account. As you
> hear of me, so think of me. *Go comfort* your cousin;
> I must say she is dead: and so farewell. [IV/i,330-34]

It seems as if this decision was solely made by Benedick, especially since it is not uttered immediately after Beatrice's insinuation but after his enquiry about her belief in Claudio's guilt. Therefore, the arrangement of actions is to some extent asymmetrical. While Beatrice in the beginning of the dialogue frankly bids Benedick do something for her, she later relies on insinuations to remind him of her request. On the other hand, Benedick seemingly decides on his own to take action, as he pronounces in detail what is to be done. He not only resolves to challenge Claudio but also advises Beatrice to go and console Hero.

A similar example in which it is left to the persuadee to decide on specific actions can be found at the end of the dialogue between Cassius and Brutus. Cassius ends the *argumentatio* with a series of emphatic rhetorical questions evoking the republican ideal and tradition of Rome to contrast it with the threat of being ruled by "one only man" [*Julius Caesar*,I/ii,155]. This is a kind of *epiphonema* in which he summarizes his main arguments.[261] This aspect together with the distinct *pathos* of the successive questions that is even highlighted by symploce ('When … one man?' [150f and 152f]) suggests that this passage introduces the *conclusio* of the persuasion, since its central features, namely a brief recapitulation of arguments and an appeal to the

[261] Müller,1979, 98.

persuadee's emotions, are fairly evident. The statement which follows these questions reveals the ultimate goal Cassius pursues:

> Cas. O, you and I have heard our fathers say,
> There was a Brutus once that would have brook'd
> Th'eternal devil to keep his state in Rome
> As easily as a king. [I/ii,156-59]

Instead of explicitly recommending Brutus to murder Caesar or to join a conspiracy against him, Cassius merely hints at Brutus' ancestor and namesake Lucius J. Brutus who was a vehement defender of Rome, and assumes what *his* reaction would have been, had someone attempted to establish himself as king of Rome. Due to the identity of names, which evokes Brutus' political lineage, this account is meant as an implicit exhortation. This can hardly be taken as a direct call to action, since Cassius chooses to express himself in rather vague terms. Not only does he not explicate what exactly Brutus' ancestor would have done in the present situation. Cassius is also silent on the significance of mentioning this former Brutus. Consequently, the task of deciding whether special measures should be taken and what these could be, is left to Brutus. At first, this is only done in a hesitant way by Brutus who, it seems, does not want to make a decision immediately, but rather postpones it: "What you have said/ *I will consider*; what you have to say/ I *will* with patience *hear*, and find a time/ Both meet to hear and *answer* such high things." [I/ii,165-67] However, the persuasion has an effect on Brutus' subsequent actions insofar as he expresses a desire to meet Cassius again for further discussions. He is then the one who arranges the details (time and place) of their next meeting:

> Bru. To-morrow, if you please to speak with me,
> *I will come* home *to you*; or if you will,
> *Come* home *to me*, and I *will wait* for you. [I/ii,301-3]

Although they have come to no final decision concerning the steps to be taken against Caesar, these arrangements could be seen as a preliminary decision on their immediate actions and as a preparation of more significant measures. Hence, as in the dialogue of Beatrice and Benedick, the persuadee seems to determine what shall be done independently of the persuader's utterances. This impression is reinforced by the contrast of the persuaders' use of indirect language and the persuadees' use of direct language, such as imperatives. An interesting aspect of dialogical persuasion is that in both cases the persuadee extends the resolution to the behaviour of the persuader: Brutus suggests that Cassius might visit him at home, while Benedick advises Beatrice to comfort her cousin. Due to the asymmetry in favour of the persuadee, the part of the *conclusio* dealing with subsequent actions does not seem to be a genuinely joint arrangement by both interlocutors.

It seems justified to ask why in these scenes the decisions seem to be made entirely by the persuaders. An illuminating point might be that both Brutus and Benedick have quite early in the dialogues expressed an apparent disinclination or dislike to being moved in a certain way. Benedick's spontaneous and distinct refusal of Beatrice's request "Ha, not for the wide world!" as well as Brutus' disapproving attitude towards what he suspects to be Cassius' aim[262] make it clear to the persuaders that a direct call for action would meet with resistance. Hence, they avoid such a direct approach at the end of the persuasion but choose to use a more cautious method, namely insinuation. Thus they leave the actual decision concerning the action to be taken in response to the persuasion to their persuadees.

This formal asymmetry is less pronounced in the dialogue from *King Lear* in which both interlocutors are engaged in a discussion. In this dialogue, the *conclusio* is initiated by Gloucester who, on acknowledging the weight of the evidence against his son Edgar and on declaring him guilty of treason, decides to take measures against Edgar and punish him: "Unnatural, detested, brutish villain! worse than brutish! *Go*, sirrah, *seek him*; I'll apprehend him. Abominable villain! Where is he?" [*King Lear*,I/ii,73-75] This decision does not only refer to the actions he will take ('apprehend him'), but also includes Edmund who, with imperatives, is ordered to help Gloucester find Edgar. The prospect of Gloucester confronting Edgar in Edmund's presence with the crimes of which he is accused, of course, poses a serious threat to Edmund's schemes: the insubstantiality of the accusations might be disclosed and Edmund's deception unveiled. Therefore, he proposes a different proceedings: "If it shall please you to suspend your indignation against my brother till you can derive from him better testimony of his intent, you should run a certain course" [I/ii,76-79]. His suggestion to postpone the prosecution is phrased in a less determined and more cautious way than Gloucester's resolution – he uses polite language ('If it shall please you') and no imperatives. This can certainly be explained by the difference in social rank between them as well as by Edmund's delicate position as a liar who may be unmasked. As Gloucester proves susceptible to Edmund's apparently sensible proposal and reveals that he is already half accepting it ("Think you so?" [86]) Edmund becomes bolder in his suggestions and already arranges the details of the steps they should take: "If your

[262] This is made manifest by remarks such as "Into what *dangers* would you lead me, Cassius" [62].

honour judge it meet, *I will place you* where *you shall hear* us confer of this […]; and that without any further delay than *this very evening*." [87-90] Edmund proposes to arrange time, place, and the method by which Edgar's intents might be fathomed. Gloucester who approves of this plan again makes the decision and gives Edmund orders what he shall do: "Edmund, *seek* him out; *wind* me into him, I pray you: frame the business after your own wisdom." [94-96] Although the difference in the style of their language makes it clear that Gloucester has the authority to decide how they should proceed, it is, at the end, Edmund's scheme that is implemented. Gloucester even explicitly authorizes him to 'frame the business' as he finds it fit. Edmund agrees to do what Gloucester has requested, and by this agreement their decision is made: "I will seek him, Sir, presently; convey the business as I shall find means, and acquaint you withal." [98-99] In spite of this difference, both participants contribute to the *conclusio*. While Edmund suggests the details of the steps they agree to take, Gloucester provides the initial impetus for this part of the dialogue; he is the one who expresses a need to seek Edgar in order to verify or falsify the claims against him; and he pronounces the final decisions. Thus, the persuadee and the persuader do indeed make joint arrangements for the action to be taken, although the nature of their contributions to the *conclusio* is rather dissimilar.

The persuasion of Sebastian provides an equally complex discussion between the persuader and the persuadee on the concrete course of action that is to be pursued. Following his argument of the insignificance of conscience Antonio starts in a rather verbose manner to suggest how they might remove the obstacles in Sebastian's way to the throne of Naples:

> Ant. […] *Here* lies your brother,
> No better than the earth he lies upon,
> If he were that which now he's like, that's dead;
> Whom I with *this* obedient steel, three inches of it,
> Can lay to bed forever; whiles you, doing thus,
> To the perpetual wink for aye might put
> *This* ancient morsel, *this* Sir Prudence, who
> Should not upbraid our course. [*The Tempest*,II/i,275-82]

The monological impression that might result from the wordiness of these lines is, with the help of deictic elements, counteracted by emphatic references to objects of their immediate surroundings. After the more theoretical discussion on the possible impact of conscience, this marked notice of the concrete context is also a way of introducing a new stage of the persuasion, namely the initiation of specific actions within this context. Antonio's plan is already a very detailed one. He wants to take advantage of the favourable circumstances of their victims being asleep and without defence to kill them at once, and he even assigns who of them should murder whom. Nevertheless, it is by no means a final decision but still a suggestion, as can be seen by the use of subjunctive verbs ("were" [277], "might" [280], "should" [282]). An interesting aspect that is pointed out in the Oxford edition of the text is that Antonio uses nonverbal behaviour to suggest how Sebastian should attack Gonzalo: the editor claims that with the words 'doing thus' "Antonio mimes stabbing Gonzalo."[263] Animating the addressee to imitate a particular gesture can be understood as a rather authoritative manner of proposing a course of action. There is a curious discrepancy between this attitude together with the elaborate plan and the cautious phrasing of the plan that marks it as a mere suggestion. Sebastian basically accepts Antonio's proposition and thus pronounces the decision that would be expected to be followed by deeds:

> Seb. […] *Draw thy sword*: one stroke
> *Shall* free thee from the tribute which thou payest;
> And I the King *shall* love thee. [II/i,287-89]

The difference in style (especially conspicuous by the verbs) is remarkable. Sebastian already speaks as from the position of a king who gives orders to his subjects. However, Sebastian does not entirely accept Antonio's proposition. Instead, he attempts to alter one crucial detail without drawing Antonio's attention to the fact. He accepts Antonio's offer to kill his brother Alonso and tells him to suit his action to his words. Yet, he does not seem eager to become a murderer himself. In his utterance there is no indication of an intention on his side to do as suggested by Antonius and draw his own sword to kill Gonzalo. Antonio, however, insists on this point:

> Ant. Draw together;
> And when I rear my hand, do you the like,
> To fall it on Gonzalo. [II/i,289-91]

He again arranges the details of their proceedings, this time in a bolder tone. He makes another attempt to move Sebastian to action by bidding him to follow his example, namely to draw his own sword when Antonio draws his, and to attack Gonzalo as Antonio attacks the king. In this dialogue the two speakers do not agree on a final decision about how to proceed since Ariel appears on stage and interrupts the conspirators. Still, it has become evident that both of them participate in forming a plan of possible actions they mean to undertake as a consequence of their dialogue. Neither

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[263] Orgel, Stephen (ed.), William Shakespeare: *The Tempest*, Oxford and New York, 1987, 142.

of them simply instructs the other one on what to do. Rather, they both bring up suggestions to arrange the details of their proceeding.

In the persuasion of Othello, much space is given to the *conclusio*, since Iago carefully induces Othello to committing himself to a specific plan of action. Early outbursts of Othello such as "I'll tear her all to pieces." [*Othello*,III/iii,438] and "O, blood, Iago, blood!" [III/iii,458] which already indicate Othello's wish to take revenge and, therefore, a readiness to act, are contradicted by Iago because they are too vague and do not really bind Othello. His objection "Patience I say, your mind perhaps may change." [III/iii,459] is, of course, meant to provoke Othello into declaring his immutable determination. Yet, it likewise expresses a realistic possibility: Othello might indeed shrink back from murdering his beloved Desdemona when he actually encounters her. When Othello, still in very general terms, commits himself by a vow to "ne'er look back […]/ Till that a capable and wide *revenge*/ Swallow them [his bloody thoughts] up." [III/iii,465-67], Iago joins in the oath and reassures Othello of his assistance in the realization of this revenge:

> Iago. Witness that here Iago doth give up
> The excellency of his wit, hand, heart,
> To wrong'd Othello's service: *let him command*,
> And to obey shall be in me remorse,
> What *bloody work* so ever. [III/iii,472-76]

However, he not only expresses his loyalty to Othello but also starts to make the plans more concrete by mentioning the 'bloody work' he is ready to do for Othello. In his response, Othello gives a detailed order concerning what shall be done about Cassio, namely that Iago is to kill him, and also settles the time within which the murder shall be committed: "Within these three days, let me hear thee say/ That Cassio's not alive." [III/iii,479-80] Iago accepts this plan concerning Cassio and raises the question of Desdemona's punishment by proposing to spare her: "My friend is dead:/ 'Tis done as you request, but let her live." [III/iii,480-81]. Othello, however, decides otherwise and resolves that Desdemona, too, has to die: "I will withdraw/ To furnish me with some swift means of death,/ For the fair devil" [III/iii,483-85].

On the surface there is a marked asymmetry in Othello's favour: first, he decides to act after he has heard Iago's arguments and introduces the idea of revenge. He then is the one who makes resolutions and who determines what actions are to be taken by whom. He fixes on the details of the course of action. Iago seemingly has little or no influence on the decisions that are made. His contributions to the surface of the decisions are hardly perceptible. Apparently, he merely offers to actively support

Othello in the realization of the revenge and introduces the question what should be done about Desdemona. Despite the marked (quantitative) asymmetry of their shares, both speakers join in the arrangement of immediate steps to be taken to punish Desdemona and Cassio. Also in this example the decisions they make are not only relevant to the behaviour of Othello, but concern the actions of both the persuadee *and* the persuader.

An interesting result of the analysis is that in most of the examples of a '*conclusio* as dialogue' there is a curious asymmetry in favour of the persuadee when the analysis is restricted to the surface content of the utterances. Although this asymmetry is not always as pronounced as it is in the persuasion of Othello, it is typically the persuadee who explicitly determines what is to be done. The persuadees state what they have resolved to do themselves and order their interlocutors to do certain things. Accordingly, their language at these points in the dialogue is marked by straightforward instructions and a directness of style. Within the system of four different semantic classes of sentences proposed by Quirk et al, which was already used in 4.3., the persuadees' utterances can frequently be classified as 'directives'.[264] Typically, The persuader's language is much more cautious and implicit than the persuadee's, so that his or her utterances tend to comprise fewer overt contributions to the formation of a plan of action. Prior to the persuadee's final decision, the interlocutors' share in the arrangements varies. In some dialogues, as in *Othello*, *Much Ado* or *Julius Caesar*, the imbalance is considerable, whereas in others, most markedly in *The Tempest*, there is greater symmetry on the surface level of the text.

4.5. The Range of Forms of Dialogic Persuasion

Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues occupy a somewhat ambiguous position between dialogue and monologue. This can partly be explained by an inherent ambiguity in the concept of persuasion itself. On the one hand, persuasive discourse seems to have a tendency towards dialogue. As was argued in chapter 3 the fact that persuasion is a type of communication which is particularly "receiver- or audience-centered"[265] and in which the persuader's as well as the persuadee's position have to be considered, seems to recommend a dialogical form for its realization. On the other hand, the inherently asymmetrical relationship between the participants in a persuasive discourse seems to promote a monological form, since one of the participants of the

[264] Quirk et al, 804.
[265] Brembeck and Howell, 14.

communication seeks to influence the other participant(s). In contrast to other forms of communication, as for example a discussion among equal participants, in which someone may finally adopt another person's opinion, the roles of those that convince and those that are intended to be influenced are clearly distributed among the participants of persuasive communication from the outset of the discourse. This is not only the case in persuasive speeches but also in Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues. Here, too, the roles of persuader and persuadee are clearly assigned from the beginning of the dialogues. There is no confrontation of opposed views of equal consequence in which one of them is found to be more convincing than the other one. Thus, even in dialogues persuasion is marked by a substantial asymmetry between the participants and a dominance of one speaker which, according to Pfister, promotes monological tendencies.[266]

As the analysis of this chapter has revealed, the structure of Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues largely follows the pattern of the classical persuasive speech. In these dialogues, different parts can be identified that perform the central functions of the parts of an *oratio*. For the sake of brevity, this was demonstrated exemplarily by individual functions, namely the function of introducing the subject of the persuasion [*docilem parare*] during the *exordium* and the call to action at the end of the persuasion, the *conclusio*. The passages quoted from the central parts of the dialogues either serve to state the persuader's case (*propositio*), recount events that occasion the persuader to talk to his or her addressee (*narratio*), or prove the persuader's claims (*argumentatio*).

It was already observed earlier that the form of some of the scenes can more clearly be identified as dialogical than the form of others. Among these are the dialogues from *Othello*, *King Lear*, and *The Tempest*. Persuasive dialogues which at times gain a somewhat monological appearance are those from *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, and *Richard III.* Such differences may be caused by the behaviour of the persuaders: while some of them clearly monopolize the conversation and repeatedly talk at great length (as, for example, Hamlet, Lady Macbeth, and Richard), others deliberately seek to engage their addressees in conversation (as do Iago, Edmund, and Antonio). Yet, differences in the form may as well be motivated by the verbal behaviour of the persuadee. Passive addressees of a persuasive discourse, as for instance Gertrude, who readily endure the tirades of the persuader support a rather monological form[267],

[266] Pfister, 184.
[267] Eaton points out that Gertrude's "minimal responses [...] make her an audience to Hamlet's performance", 380.

whereas more active persuadees like Elizabeth or Leontes might even speak more frequently than their persuaders could wish, whom they interrupt, thus giving the discourse a stronger dialogical form.

Another dimension of variation in form is that within individual dialogues. Interestingly, it is especially the opening and the closing stages of the dialogues which almost homogeneously display a dialogical shape. With few exceptions, the parts functioning as *exordia* as well as those functioning as *conclusiones* are structured by frequent turn-taking and the active participation of both speakers. As has become apparent by the analysis, there is a greater tendency towards formally monological passages within the central parts of the persuasive discourse. At the same time, the central parts of the dialogues are marked by a greater variety of form than the initial or the final parts: examples range from a remarkably dialogical shape to passages that appear monological in form. A further distinction within the middle parts of the persuasive dialogues is suggested by the fact that examples used in 4.3.1. ('Passages Without Turn-Taking') represent parts of both the *narratio* and the *argumentatio*, whereas for 4.3.2. ('Passages With Turn-Taking') only examples from *argumentationes* could be found. It seems that the variety of forms is particularly prominent in the *argumentatio*, while the *narratio* is more likely to have a monological form. For an explanation of the phenomenon that persuasive dialogues tend to be more monological in their central parts, one could turn to Ottmers who points out a fundamental difference between the parts of a persuasive speech with respect to their function: "Während die beiden 'äußeren' [Teile] *vorrangig der Kontaktaufnahme mit dem Publikum* und der Weckung (oder Dämpfung) von Emotionen dienen, steht in den 'inneren' Teilen der Redegegenstand im Vordergrund"[268]. That in the *exordium* and the *conclusio* the focus of the persuader's attention is primarily on his or her addressee might well be the cause of their strongly dialogical form. Moreover, the differences in form between the stages of persuasion account for the centre of the spectrum between dialogical and monological form with respect to the individual dialogues. Regarding their form, some dialogues cannot be classified as easily as, say, those from *Othello* and *Hamlet*. The dialogues from *Much Ado About Nothing*, *Julius Caesar*, and *Richard III* are quite dialogical during the phases functioning as *exordium* and *conclusio*, yet change to a rather monological form in their middle parts.

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[268] Ottmers, 54, emphasis added.

However, the aim of this chapter was not only to investigate the dialogic form of the scenes in general, but to show how far the persuasive discourse, which can be compared to the monological *oratio*, is given a dialogic form. For this purpose, a spectrum of different realizations of persuasion in dialogue was introduced. The basis for the categories of this spectrum was the content of an *oratio*. It was considered whether the persuader generates individual parts of the persuasion without being interrupted by the persuadee (passages without turn-taking: 4.3.1., 4.4.1.), whether the persuadee participates actively in the dialogue without contributing to the content of the persuasion that might be found in an *oratio* (persuasion *within* dialogue: 4.2.1., 4.3.2.1., 4.4.2.), or whether the persuadee's utterances contain aspects that might also be part of an *oratio* (persuasion *as* dialogue: 4.2.2., 4.3.2.2., 4.4.3.). Although individual dialogues frequently contain all of these three types of passages, one may conclude that persuasion is given a particularly dialogic form when a dialogue contains few or no passages without turn-taking and is characterised by passages that are labelled 'persuasion as dialogue'.

In cases of a persuadee being highly involved in the generation of the persuasive discourse, it has become evident that the persuadee's contributions appear to be remarkably substantial, and, not infrequently, seem to be even more so than the persuader's own contributions to the persuasion. The analysis of relevant passages functioning as *exordia* has shown that, if persuadees actively join in the introduction of the subject matter, their share in it usually seems quite considerable. It was demonstrated that this impression is created by the contrast of the styles used by either interlocutor. Persuaders tend to use indirect, cautious language, whereas persuadees pronounce 'the facts' more directly, thereby introducing them into the discourse. With respect to passages that function as a *conclusio* it can be stated that the persuadee, if s/he contributes to the discussion about appropriate action, tends to provide the crucial points of this discussion, most noticeably the final decision what either of the interlocutors is to do. The reason for this significant share in the *conclusio* is quite similar to the one that explains the persuadees' considerable share in the *exordium*.

An important point of the concept of dialogue used in the present study is that the form and the quality of a discourse do not necessarily coincide (chapter 2). In other words, a text that is formally dialogic might have a monologic quality and vice versa. An awareness of the possible discrepancies of form and quality seems to be essential for a proper understanding of Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues. Obviously it is not sufficient to merely analyse aspects of dialogical form. That the approach used in this chapter renders merely interim results might be indicated by the fact that it is at times necessary to include extremely different texts into the same formal category, such as passages from the two dialogues from *Richard III.* The obvious dissimilarity of such texts brought together in one category suggest that the methods of this chapter are not sufficient to fully explain Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues. Rather, to arrive at a broader apprehension of the variety of these dialogues, it seems profitable to combine an analysis of the various forms of dialogues with an interpretation concerning qualitative aspects of dialogical persuasion. Such a combination of formal and qualitative approaches might reveal varieties in the dialogical nature of the persuasive scenes more comprehensively than each of the approaches could do by itself. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake a qualitative investigation of the corpus to be set against the spectrum of persuasion between dialogical and monological form which was established here, and to complement and counterbalance the results of this chapter. This interpretation with an emphasis on qualitative issues of persuasive dialogues will be offered in the following chapter.

5. A Qualitative Analysis of Shakespeare's Persuasive Dialogues

5.1. Preliminary Remarks

As an interim result of the analysis of chapter 4 we might establish the following points. First, the dialogical form tends to vary within individual persuasive dialogues, so that an assessment of dialogical form has to use individual passages of dialogues as the unit of analysis. Second, with respect to form one can distinguish between (1) passages without turn-taking, (2) passages that comprise persuasion *within* dialogue, and (3) passages in which persuasion is presented *as* dialogue, since the utterances that make up the persuasive discourse are ascribed to both interlocutors. This raises the question how these results can be made useful to an investigation of the central issue of this study, namely how far both interlocutors contribute to and are responsible for the outcome of a persuasive dialogue. This question includes two slightly different aspects, one being concerned with the problem to what extent persuasion is dialogized (with reference to form and quality), and the other dealing with the question whether in persuasive dialogues the persuadee is to be seen as a victim or as a co-creator of the persuasion.

The general assumption that can be made with reference to these three types of persuasive discourse is that the persuadee is least involved in persuasion in the first type of passages and most involved in the last type. Consequently, it might be assumed that, since the (active) participation of the persuadee is greatest in passages of persuasion *as* dialogue and smallest in passages without turn-taking, his or her share of responsibility for the outcome of the persuasive discourse varies accordingly. In other words, one might conclude that from (1) to (3) the persuasion increasingly becomes the creation of both interlocutors, and that in instances of persuasion as dialogue the persuadee is not only a victim of the persuasion but also partly responsible for it, that s/he is less responsible in passages of persuasion within dialogue, and that s/he is merely a passive victim in passages without turn-taking.

The purpose of this chapter is to question and to relativize the different aspects of this general assumption in order to answer the central question of this dissertation with greater differentiation. For this purpose, we will attempt a qualitative analysis of each form of passages individually, focussing on the implications of the general assumption with respect to each form. The analysis of the passages without turn-taking will be guided by the question whether the persuadee, though s/he remains silent, influences the persuasive discourse indirectly. In order to identify such influence, the formally monological passages of discourse will be analysed with respect to their possible dialogical quality. The analysis of passages of dialogue in which the persuadee does not contribute directly to the persuasive discourse (i.e. persuasion within dialogue) will question the assumption that in these passages persuadees do not take influence on the persuasion. The aim of this part of the chapter is to ascertain in what ways the persuadee may either promote or hinder the persuasion despite the seeming restrictedness of his or her contributions to the dialogue. Finally, in the investigation of forms of dialogue that have been identified as persuasion *as* dialogue we will examine the supposition that in these cases both interlocutors meet on equal terms and are about equally involved in the generation of the persuasive discourse. By inquiring into the means by which the persuader might induce the persuadee to make certain contributions to the dialogue, it will be revealed how the dialogic nature of the persuasion might be manipulated or 'staged' by the persuader. This analysis aims at relativizing the impression that in such dialogues the persuadee is not so much the victim of the persuader, but significantly shares in the responsibility for what is being effectuated by the persuasion.

A concept which acknowledges the complementary nature of the interlocutors' turns and which therefore emphasizes the necessity of considering the utterances of both the persuader and the persuadee to account for the development of the persuasion is Linell's concept of communicative projects. Linell proposes this concept in an attempt to determine more complex units of analysis beyond elementary units, such as single utterances. He claims that dialogues are made up of several such projects which may in turn consist of smaller or 'local' projects.[269] This concept is based on the tenet of dialogism that "meaningful actions are collective accomplishments." [210] The idea of a 'project' performed together by the interlocutors implies that a communicative 'problem' is solved or that a task is worked out in interaction. [218] It further suggests that the interlocutors engage in a joint action which is "to *some* extent intended or 'projected'" in advance [218] insofar as they have an idea what they are doing and what effects their utterances have in their context. This means that participants in a dialogue make complementary contributions and pursue a common goal, though of course their individual goals and interests within this project may be divergent or even competing [214]. That a communicative project is performed by the complementary contributions

[269] Linell,Per, Approaching Dialogue: Talk, Interaction and Contexts in Dialogical Perspectives, Amsterdam and Philadelphia 1998, 213.

of both interlocutors also accounts for the dynamic nature of persuasion in dialogue. As Linell stresses, "a project […] is something *developed in the course of action*" [218].

A significant consequence of perceiving dialogue as a series of communicative projects carried out jointly by the interlocutors, instead of analysing their utterances as individual speech acts, is pointed out by Linell. He observes that "[s]uch a shift of theory from individual speech acts to collective 'communicative projects' involves a partial change of emphasis […] *from intentionality* (behind actions) *to responsibility* (for possible consequences of actions)." [211] Accordingly, the question of an interlocutor's responsibility for certain developments of the persuasive dialogue will be highly significant throughout this chapter. Since persuader and persuadee are engaged *together* in the different steps of the persuasion, it is to be investigated to what extent each of them (but particularly the persuadee) is responsible for the joint accomplishment of these steps, and, more specifically, to what extent they are responsible for their own contributions to the persuasion.

An implicit source of the question of individual responsibility for collective accomplishments is, of course, the presumption that interlocutors are not necessarily equally responsible for what happens in a dialogue. This idea, which seems quite important with respect to persuasive dialogues, is implied in Linell's general statement that "[c]ommunicative projects are collectively accomplished, but often, indeed characteristically, with an *asymmetry of participation*."[221] Hence, the following analysis aims at revealing not only an interlocutor's share in the accomplishment of different steps or 'projects' within the persuasion, but especially the extent of a speaker's actual responsibility for his or her contributions to these steps. The relationship between the involvement in a collective action and individual responsibility is an issue of permanent interest in this chapter.

5.2. Qualitative Differences in Passages Without Turn-Taking

In the formal analysis conducted in chapter 4 only those examples of passages without turn-taking were considered that exhibit dialogical elements on account of the presence of the addressee. In other words, such passages without any dialogical elements, which certainly exist within the dialogues of the corpus, were not included in the analysis. This limitation also suits the purposes of the present chapter. In order to arrive at a greater understanding of the persuadee's role in these formally monological passages, the examples offered in chapter 4 will be examined as to their possible dialogical quality which may find its expression in the dialogical elements identified so far.

As for example Müller has shown, a dialogic quality may also be found in soliloquies, that is, in monologues without an addressee or, to be precise, in which the roles of speaker and listener reside in one character. In such soliloquies the speaker is talking to and with himself; his or her language exhibits his state of being "im Widerstreit mit sich selbst"[270]. The aspect of dialogic quality that is to be revealed by the present investigation differs significantly from the one identified by Müller in various soliloquies, since it corresponds to a dialogical context. Hence, the type of dialogic quality that is of interest for our purposes is one which can be explained by the actual presence of another co-interactant who is not identical with the person of the speaker and who, throughout the formally monological passage assumes the role of the listener. This means that the dialogical elements identified in the previous chapter are not an expression of the speaker's dialogue with him- or herself, for example because different parts of his or her inner self are in conflict with one another, but (as has been argued before) are inserted by the speaker because s/he wants to address the persuadee more effectively. It might then be inferred that, if it can be shown that these passages have a dialogic quality, the persuadee is indirectly involved in its generation – if only due to his or her very presence.

In the following, a qualitative reconsideration of individual examples offered in chapter 4 will be presented in order to illuminate the dialogical or monological quality of the persuasive discourse at these points. The analysis will essentially follow the categories established in 4.3.1. and discuss each category individually (5.2.1.). To understand exemplary monological passages in their context and thereby to arrive at a more comprehensive picture of formally monologic passages, this part will be followed by a comparative analysis of two such extensive turns (5.2.2.). This analysis is meant to explain the use of dialogic elements in their context and thus to reveal indirect influences of the persuadees on the persuaders' use of these dialogic elements. Finally, the issue of the persuadee's influence and the question of his or her role as a victim or co-creator of the persuasion is approached from a complementary angle. This section will address the problem why persuadees at times remain silent and grant their interlocutors the right to speak at a length uncommon in dialogue (5.2.3.).

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[270] Müller, Wolfgang G., "Das Ich im Dialog mit sich selbst: Bemerkungen zur Struktur des dramatischen Monologs von Shakespeare bis zu Samuel Beckett", Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 56, 1982, 317.

5.2.1. A Qualitative Reconsideration of Passages Without Turn-Taking

5.2.1.1. Emphatic Address

While an emphatic address of the persuadee, as has been argued in chapter 4, tends to involve him or her into the *argumentatio* or the *narratio* of the persuader, a consideration of the constitutive features of dialogical quality instantly makes it clear that this dialogic element does not lend a dialogic quality to a formally monologic utterance. Indeed, as Müller claims, the address of someone in itself does not make a monologue (or a soliloquy) dialogic, but it provides the potential for a dialogic quality: "Durch die Anrede an einen Hörer wird die monologische Redesituation zwar in Richtung auf den Dialog aufgebrochen, sie wird aber noch nicht aufgehoben. Ein Sprechen vor einem oder mehreren Hörern ist höchstens ein potentieller Dialog."[271] A persuadee who is directly addressed, for example by a question, is addressed as a participant in the conversation who might potentially respond to the question. In the examples discussed in 4.3.1.1.(a) which include different instances of emphatic address, this potential is not realized, that is, the persuadee does not respond immediately and, consequently, the utterance remains monologic in form.

It can be shown that the three main forms of emphatic address which have been identified earlier, namely questions, imperatives, and deictic elements draw on a formal rather than a qualitative concept of dialogue. Hence, they do not create a dialogic quality within the respective monologic utterances. Rhetorical questions as well as imperatives are based on the presence of at least two active participants which constitutes one defining feature of dialogical form. Thus, their use in a formally monological utterance creates a dialogical semblance. In this respect, rhetorical questions seem to have a stronger effect than imperatives. While the latter, by moving the addressee to a certain action, create a (unilateral) interaction between the participants, but no alternation of speakers, questions instil the potential for a verbal interaction, and thus for an alternation of speakers, by exploiting the turn-taking system. Deictic elements rely on another, yet equally crucial aspect of dialogic form, namely on the relevance of the immediate physical context in which the dialogue is set. Since, as Mukarovsý argues, "a close bond with the actual temporal and spatial situation" is more

[271] Müller, 1982, 317.

typical of dialogic than of monologic form[272], the frequent use of deictic elements in a formally monologic utterance may be a means to emphasize the dialogic situation and thereby to minimize the impression of a monologue..

However, the main criterion that constitutes a dialogic quality, namely a structure characterized by semantic reversals, is not fulfilled by these forms of emphatic address. As was explicated in 2.2.2., semantic reversals occur when different perspectives encounter each other. When imperatives are not (verbally) responded to and questions are not answered, as is characteristic of the examples analysed in 4.3.1.1.(a), the discourse tends to present only one perspective, namely that of the persuader, which is not challenged by the persuadee's perspective.

By way of illustration we will reconsider a passage already quoted before. Lady Macbeth's description of the successful murder of Duncan, which in the manner of rhetorical *evidentia* presents the future events vividly so as to convince Macbeth of their plausibility, ends with two emphatic question:

> […] When Duncan is asleep
> (Whereto the rather shall his day's hard journey
> Soundly invite him), his two chamberlains
> Will I with wine and wassail so convince,
> That memory, the warder of the brain,
> Shall be a fume, and the receipt of reason
> A limbeck only: when in swinish sleep
> Their drenched natures lie, as in a death,
> What cannot you and I perform upon
> Th'ungarded Duncan? what not put upon
> His spongy officers, who shall bear the guilt
> Of our great quell? [*Macbeth*, I/vii,62-73]

As Kenneth Muir, the editor of the Arden edition, notes this plan is rather absurd.[273] It does not in the least make the impression of a sound strategy but, on the contrary, has decidedly weak points. Lady Macbeth pays most of her attention to the comparatively unproblematic aspects of the scheme, for example the prospects of the king's soon retiring to bed or the design to make the chamberlains drunk. Yet, she ignores the crucial question how they should escape from being accused of, or at least suspected of being in some way involved in the crime. With regicide being committed under their own roof it is indeed hard to imagine that the blame should so easily fall entirely on the king's chamberlains. In short, if scrutinized rationally this scheme could be subjected to serious criticism, and objections could easily be raised. Still, such a counter-perspective is absent from these lines. The entire utterance, including the final questions, gives

[272] Mukarovsý, 1977, 113.
[273] Muir, Kenneth (ed.), The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare: Macbeth, London and New York 1984, 44.

expression to a single point of view, namely that this scheme of regicide is an unproblematic venture which might easily and safely be carried out. Thus, Lady Macbeth's questions do not initiate a careful consideration of the chances and risks of the deed in order to reach a sound decision in favour of or against the murder. Instead, they propagate a single perspective – the point of view from which one would support the scheme. Consequently, the whole passage is meant to obscure the difficulties and the potential dangers of the plan.

This example illustrates that persuaders use an emphatic address of their interlocutors not for the sake of engendering a dialogic quality in their utterance by considering different points of view, but in order to reinforce its message.

5.2.1.2. The Pretence of Two Perspectives

As opposed to the forms of emphatic address, there are kinds of dialogic elements in extensive utterances which are based on a qualitative concept of dialogue. By claiming that at times persuaders argue from their addressees' point of view so that different perspectives manifest themselves in a formally monologic passage [see 4.3.2.2.(b)], we have already employed the terminology used to define dialogue as a quality. However, the question that needs a more thorough consideration in order to safely speak of a dialogical quality of the relevant passages, is whether in a close analysis of the texts semantic reversals, and thus different perspectives, can be identified. Another issue that will be addressed in this section are the implications of such a dialogic quality with respect to the persuadee's role in the relevant passages of the discourse and his or her possible responsibility.

It seems that there are differences between the examples in the extent to which a counter-perspective is given expression in an utterance. A passage from *Hamlet* provides an example of an extremely restricted allowance made for the competing point of view supposedly held by the persuadee. It was argued in the previous chapter that Hamlet includes and at the same time refutes Gertrude's possible defence of her behaviour, thus anticipating her potential objection to his argument:

> You cannot call it love; for at your age
> The heyday in the blood is tame, it's humble,
> And waits upon the judgement, and what judgement
> Would step from this to this? [*Hamlet*, III/iv, 68-71]

The representation of Gertrude's perspective in the first line is only an indirect one, namely in its negated form ('You *cannot* call it love'). It is shaped by Hamlet's rather than Gertrude's opinion. Consequently, there are no semantic reversals within the wording of Hamlet's utterance, as would have been the case, had Hamlet chosen to refute Gertrude's possible argument in a different way, as by saying, for example, 'You might call this love, but …'. Gertrude's perspective is merely implied, which means that Hamlet's utterance is phrased *as if* it had been expressed.

As has become apparent in chapter 2, the dialogic nature of an utterance involves its being connected and in some way referring to the prior and the next utterances, as it is understood in Bakhtin's concept of dialogism. Insofar, this utterance could be said to display a dialogic quality not in the sense that it *directly* contains different perspectives, but in the sense that it is phrased so as to be connected to an assumed or implied prior utterance by Gertrude which it forestalls and to which it responds. By referring back to it, it necessarily contains traces of this imaginary objection by Gertrude, that is, it *indirectly* contains different perspectives. This is why we, merely by reading or hearing Hamlet's argument, can imagine the content of Gertrude's potential utterance which would express her perspective. This interrelatedness of utterances in a true dialogue (that is, with the utterances of all participants actually being articulated) constitutes a main aspect of the dialogic quality. One might say that at this point Hamlet takes and rejects Gertrude's perspective.

In short, a dialogic quality may, with due reservations, be identified in the passage. The source of these reservations seems clear enough: Gertrude's objection itself is not articulated, it is merely implied. Moreover, whether it authentically represents her perspective is a matter of speculation. The implied rival perspective is not so much that of Gertrude but Hamlet's understanding of it. Hence, it is shaped by his bias and by his rhetorical strategies. Hamlet chooses a kind of argument for Gertrude which he can easily disprove, and which allows him to accuse her of depravity, thereby supporting a central aspect of his argumentation. By speaking for his addressee, Hamlet actually denies Gertrude the right to defend and speak for herself. In other words, he forestalls her counter-argument. The dialogic semblance produced by a dialogic quality without a dialogic form enables Hamlet to impose his perspective on Gertrude and to dominate the discourse. It leads to a profound asymmetry.

A similar kind of dialogical quality can be identified in a passage from *Julius Caesar* in which Cassius seems to answer a hypothetical expression of doubt from Brutus which, however, is not articulated:

> And when the fit was on him, I did mark
> How he did shake; 'tis true, this god did shake; [*Julius Caesar*, I/ii,119-120]

Also these lines display no semantic reversals, and the traces of a reference to an implied prior utterance by Brutus which were pointed out in chapter 4 are admittedly faint. Yet the special emphasis in line 120 is clearly meant to dispel the (real or potential) incredulity of the addressee and is thereby to some extent influenced by his perspective. As this perspective itself finds no direct expression in the utterance, one could at best speak of a restricted dialogical quality.

A genuine dialogical quality as it was defined in chapter 2 is, however, to be observed in a monological passage from *Richard III*. Here, the two opposed perspectives are both articulated:

> If I *did take* the kingdom from your sons,
> To make amends I'*ll give* them to your daughter;
> If I *have kill'd* the issue of your womb,
> To quicken your increase I *will beget*
> Mine issue of your blood upon your daughter. [*Richard III*, IV/iv,294-98]

The parallelisms of this passage highlight the semantic reversals, which are created by the substitution of a word by its opposite in a similar context. The central semantic reversals are here emphasized by italics. They concern not only the nature of Richard's actions ('take' – 'give', 'kill'd' – 'beget') but also the period of time on which each perspective focuses, namely the past versus the future ('did'/'have' – 'will'). The passage almost reads like an argument between Richard and Elizabeth in which Elizabeth accuses him first of having illegitimately taken the kingdom from her family by seizing the throne himself, and second of having killed her sons, and in which Richard confronts these accusations with counter-arguments that testify to his commendable intentions for the future. There are, then, two contrary perspectives within this passage that differ in their view of Richard. One view, which is identical with Elizabeth's perspective, is that of Richard as a cold-blooded, calculating homicide driven by self-interest and bringing disaster on Elizabeth's family. According to the other view, which is propagated by Richard himself, he is the prospective son-in-law of Elizabeth and thus an integral part and benefactor of her family.

A first analysis might come to the conclusion that Richard allows the perspective of his addressee to be expressed to a far greater extent than, for example, Hamlet does, and that in fact the two perspectives are equally given their due in this passage. It would, however, be a misconception to assume that the two perspectives are presented equally in every respect. While in a formally dialogical discourse each participant potentially has the chance to articulate his or her perspective so as to influence or dominate others (restrictions imposed by asymmetries that arise from the context being, for the moment, neglected) there is really no doubt which of the two views will be the dominating one in this passage. The way Richard phrases his utterance clearly favours his own perspective. Already the fact that the main clauses of the sentences contain Richard's perspective while Elizabeth's point of view is expressed in the subordinate clauses, points to an asymmetry of weight given to these two views. If reduced to their syntactic and semantic core, these verses will display only Richard's point of view. The 'if' that begins the verses representing Elizabeth's perspective seems to leave room for doubt concerning the verity of her accusations. Their truth is never fully acknowledged. Moreover, the main clauses of the sentences are phrased as 'answers' to the accusations. They counterbalance and thereby neutralize them. The phrases "To make amends" and "To quicken your increase" explicate the meaning of the actions proposed in the main clauses and suggest their compensatory effect. Such additional justification supports Richard's perspective at the expense of contrary views. In short, the different perspectives are not set against each other on an equal basis, but they appear in a syntax that already involves an evaluation in favour of Richard's perspective.

It can then be concluded that the consideration of the persuadee's point of view, even if it generates a dialogical quality in the strictest sense of the term, does not guarantee equal chances to each perspective. Within a lengthy utterance a persuader has the means to make his or her own perspective appear as the one that outweighs the counter-perspective. Thus, also in this case persuasive discourse with a dialogic quality but without dialogic form tends to be used by the persuader to impose his perspective on the persuadee.

Yet a different version of the use of different perspectives can be identified in the following passage from *Julius Caesar* in which Cassius seems to articulate Brutus' hypothetical reactions to his appeals:

> Brutus and Caesar: what should be in that 'Caesar'?
> Why should that name be sounded more than yours?
> Write them together, yours is as fair a name;
> Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well;
> Weigh them, it is as heavy; conjure with 'em,
> 'Brutus' will start a spirit as soon as 'Caesar'. [*Julius Caesar*, I/ii,40-45]

Unlike Richard who includes sentiments into his argumentation that were actually expressed by his persuadee earlier in the dialogue, Cassius articulates hypothetical attitudes of his addressee. Thus, like Hamlet, he simply assigns sentiments to his interlocutor that suit his argumentation. While Hamlet refers back to a past hypothetical utterance to refute it, Cassius in this example insinuates future hypothetical utterances which are to be inspired by his reasoning. The difference is crucial insofar as he does not want to disprove these attitudes but he wants Brutus to adopt them. In lines 142-45 in which two different perspectives, namely Cassius' instructions and Brutus' potential responses, alternate, they are linked in a syntax of co-ordination (rather than subordination) so that grammatically neither is subordinated to the other one. Since they do not contradict each other (note the absence of semantic reversals), both can be equally valid at the same time. Yet, there seems to be an implicit causal relationship between the main clauses. The clauses representing Brutus' desired perspective are in each case second so as to appear as a kind of inevitable result at which one arrives when following Cassius' instructions. Hence, these results constitute the semantic core of the lines. They contain the essence of the attitude Cassius wants to impose on Brutus. Cassius, too, does not include different perspectives into the discourse in order to do justice to Brutus' point of view, but rather to insinuate a certain view which will suit his intentions.

These examples have shown that although there are passages without turn-taking within persuasive dialogues in which different perspectives can be identified, the persuadee's true perspective is not necessarily considered. Typically, the persuaders' presentation of the perspective of their addressees is shaped by their rhetorical strategies. They exploit the dialogical semblance thus created to more effectively influence and dominate their addressees. Moreover, it could be argued that the dialogical impression of these passages may also help to conceal the manipulation of the persuader it facilitates.

5.2.1.3. Nonverbal Dialogue

In an instance of genuine interaction between the interlocutors which was also discussed in the previous chapter, Lady Anne's actions, it was argued, shape Richard's words which appear to be responses to her gestures of alternately pointing the sword at Richard and lowering it:

> *he lays his breast open, she offers at [it] with his sword.*
> Nay, do not pause, for I did kill King Henry –
> But 'twas thy beauty that provoked me.
> Nay, now dispatch: 'twas I that stabb'd young Edward –
> But 'twas thy heavenly face that set me on.
> *she falls the sword.* [*Richard III*, I/ii,183-86]

Due to the reciprocity of actions the dialogical impression that ensues is based on the formal definition of dialogue. Similar to an emphatic address of the persuadee by imperatives, one of the interlocutors is impelled but also restricted to nonverbal behaviour. Unlike in instances of emphatic address there is real interaction in this passage because Richard responds to Lady Anne's gestures. However, in their interaction Richard and Anne clearly are on unequal terms. Since Anne acts only nonverbally she is inferior to Richard who acts and speaks. Her speechlessness towards the end of the dialogue, as critics have observed, is also an indication of her surrender to Richard's power.[274]

Furthermore, apart from their interaction, the passage reveals yet another dialogic aspect. In Richard's reasoning two different perspectives seem to mix, or rather to alternate. These perspectives are in each of the sentences separated by dashes which on a typographic level could be said to indicate the contrast between the two points of view. Richard alternately gives expression to a perspective that stimulates Anne's hate and rage against him by reminding her that he is the murderer of people whose death she is still mourning, and to another perspective that imposes feelings of guilt on her, preventing Anne from stabbing him. The first perspective corresponds to Anne's point of view as she expressed it at the beginning of their dialogue in her curses directed at Richard. The second one corresponds to his own perspective that he attempts to impose on Anne, claiming her to be responsible for the murders that were committed out of love for her. With the help of this argument Richard has destroyed Anne's initial assurance with which she attacked him; she is thrown into an inner conflict and begins to waver. At this point of the dialogue, Anne's conflict is summarized as Richard expresses the two opposing impulses that influence her.

However, in his utterance Richard not only expresses Anne's conflict, he also influences the way she resolves it. He phrases the two perspectives so that the one favoured by him clearly dominates. In both sentences Anne's initial point of view is stated first, only to be then counteracted by the view which she is finally to adopt. This strategy becomes obvious by the anaphoric "But" that in both cases contradicts the first parts of the sentences. Hence, Richard creates a dialogic quality in order to manipulate Anne's process of resolving her inner conflict. That this manipulation is successful can be seen in her final reaction of letting the sword fall down. Anne decides against

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[274] Trotter, Jack E., "'Was ever woman in this humour won?': Love and Loathing in Shakespeare's *Richard III*", The Upstart Crow, 13, 1992, 40;
Smith, 1971, 201.

destroying Richard. The semantic reversals indicating a true dialogic quality are in this example created by the pronouns 'I' versus 'thy', thus claiming different persons to be responsible for the murder. Also this passage seems to confirm the impression that persuaders tend to utilize the dialogical semblance derived from a dialogic quality in the absence of a corresponding dialogic form to more effectively influence their addressees.

On the whole, all kinds of dialogical elements, independent of whether they are based on the formal or on the qualitative definition of dialogue, are to some extent motivated by the persuader's intention to more effectively influence the persuadee. Emphatic addresses are often used to reinforce the persuader's arguments. A dialogic quality is frequently created to manipulate the persuadee by imposing an attitude on him or her that in some way suits the persuasion. Dialogic elements in formally monological passages of persuasion hardly ever instil characteristics commonly associated with dialogue, such as a mutual influence of perspectives. The persuadee's view is typically not given an opportunity to exert influence on the discourse.

5.2.2. A Comparative Case Study

The reconsideration of exemplary passages was intended as a general qualitative evaluation of dialogical elements in passages without turn-taking, especially with regard to their actual usage and effects. An aspect that necessarily had to be neglected by this approach, as well as by the analysis of isolated passages conducted in the previous chapter, is the development of form and quality within individual dialogues. Nonetheless, the fact that the dialogical or monological form and quality may change within a discourse has been pointed out before and seems worth further illumination. Particularly, such an investigation should help to clarify the usage of dialogical elements in formally monological passages by providing an answer to the question why certain features are used at just the point where they occur. Thus, by considering the passages not in isolation but in their specific contexts in the dialogues it should be possible to gain further insight into the function of certain dialogic elements.

For this purpose, some space shall here be devoted to a comparative analysis of two rather extensive utterances from very different dialogues, namely a central part of Hamlet's *narratio* and *argumentatio* (III/iv,53-88) and a part of Richard's *argumentatio* from his dialogue with Elizabeth (IV/iv,291-336). These two examples were chosen first because they come from formally very different encounters. Hamlet's persuasion of his mother is dominated by passages without turn-taking, whereas the attempted persuasion of Elizabeth oscillates between stretches of monologue and passages of dialogue in which the interlocutors participate quite equally. It might be illuminating to investigate whether these formal differences are reflected in the use of dialogical elements in single extensive utterances. A second reason for this choice is that both stretches of formally monologic discourse contain several kinds of dialogical elements so that differences in their usage may be revealed. The analysis will focus on developments within each text and on its position within the dialogue as a whole.

The dialogue between Richard and Elizabeth can be characterized as a verbal duel between equal opponents. It might even be claimed that Elizabeth is superior to Richard in this dispute as she constantly subverts Richard's arguments and manoeuvres him into a defensive position. Tanner, for example, points out that in this scene "it is Elizabeth who makes the puns and twists the meanings."[275] Also Bevington remarks that "Queen Elizabeth remains in control throughout"[276], and even Clemen, who favours the view that she succumbs to Richard by the end of the dialogue, has to admit that Elizabeth is the dominant interlocutor until the end.[277] The formally dialogical passages that are often shaped by stichomythia are interspersed with two longer utterances by Richard (IV/iv,291-336 and 397-417) in which he attempts to take control of the discourse and to strengthen his position. In each case, however, he immediately loses the control he has momentarily gained over the discourse in its formally monological parts when it returns to its dialogical form.

Before Richard's first uninterrupted longer utterance, the dialogue does not develop in a way that could satisfy him or that is in any way favourable to his intentions. Elizabeth denies him an opportunity to explain his wish to marry her daughter as he intended, and forces him to defend his own person and establish his *ethos*, while she undermines the protestations of his sincerity by constantly exposing his false character. Thus he is distracted from his original purpose without a prospect of soon being able to change the dialogue in his favour. In this situation of perpetual contradiction and attacks, most of which are accusations of Richard as the murderer of Elizabeth's children, Richard finally makes an attempt to set his own perspective and to make Elizabeth's accusations ineffectual.

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275 Tanner, Stephen L., "Richard III Versus Elizabeth: An Interpretation", Shakespeare Quarterly, 24, 1973, 470.
276 Bevington, David, "'Why Should Calamity Be Full of Words?': The Efficacy of Cursing in *Richard III*", Iowa State Journal of Research, 56, 1981, 18.
277 Clemen, 264.

The utterance in which he thus takes control of the discourse covers almost fifty verses. It is, however, not simply an extensive representation of his position, but is structured so as to fit into the dialogic discourse of which it is a part. In a first part (291-309) he addresses the past crimes of which Elizabeth repeatedly accused him and specifically talks about his intention to compensate for them. Then, he focuses entirely on the "kindness" [310] he means to show to Elizabeth and her family in the future, leaving the issue of the ruin he has formerly brought upon them behind (310-324). Finally, he appeals to Elizabeth to act in his behalf and to make her daughter well disposed towards him and his cause (325-336). This general development within the utterance can be explained by the nature of the part of the dialogue that precedes it. In order to alter Elizabeth's unfavourable attitude towards him Richard first deals with the origin of this attitude in an attempts to counterbalance its effect. By doing so he hopes to make Elizabeth's accusations ineffectual. After attacking the basis of her point of view, Richard sets his own perspective, talking only about his laudable intentions and deliberately disregarding Elizabeth's view. His own perspective being sufficiently established and, as he seems to believe, imposed on Elizabeth, he finally asks for her support.

This account makes it clear that Richard is concerned with his addressee especially at the beginning and at the end of his utterance, that is, at the boundaries between formally dialogic discourse and the passages without turn-taking. With respect to the first part of the utterance this can be explained by Richard's need to produce a reply that is relevant, so that Elizabeth understands it as a continuation of their dialogue and does not withdraw her attention. Since formally monologic passages are not simply inserted into the dialogue but are part of it, they are thus influenced by the surrounding utterances. Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that formal aspects reflect the development of the content, and that dialogic elements occur especially at the beginning and at the end of the extensive utterance. The passage discussed in 5.2.1.2. as an example of two perspectives being used to impose Richard's perspective on Elizabeth, occurs almost at the very beginning of the utterance (294-98). Also in that first part of the utterance there is a similar instance in which Richard seems to argue from two points of view. Here, too, the manipulative intention of including this dialogic element is rather conspicuous:

> Your children were *vexation* to your youth,
> *But* mine shall be a *comfort* to your age;
> The loss you have is but a son being King;
> And by that loss your daughter is made Queen. [IV/iv,305-08]

The semantic reversals are especially obvious in the first two verses, due to the antithesis (vexation – comfort) and the conjunction 'but' indicating the beginning of a counter-argument. Interestingly, in the next two verses, Richard even denies that he is to be condemned for murdering Elizabeth's son, because this murder apparently has a happy result since only "*by* that loss" can her daughter become queen. Thus, Richard uses dialogic elements, namely by seemingly considering not only his, but also Elizabeth's point of view, in order to subtly force his own perspective on her. While the middle part of his utterance, in which Richard unfolds a glorious picture of the future ("What! We have many goodly days to see.", 320), contains no dialogic elements, they are again used more frequently towards the end. In this final part of his utterance, Richard employs especially the method of emphatically addressing his persuadee with the help of a number of imperatives. In the first verse the emphatic effect of the address is further increased by the *epanalepsis*:[278]

> *Go* then, my mother, to thy daughter *go*:
> *Make* bold her bashful years with your experience;
> *Prepare* her ears to hear a wooer's tale;
> *Put* in her tender heart th'aspiring flame
> Of golden sovereignty; […] [325-29]

These dialogic elements indicate that, by the end of his utterance, Richard is again acutely aware of his addressee and of their interaction. Of course, he uses the imperatives to influence Elizabeth's reaction to this lengthy utterance. On the whole, the position of the dialogic elements in this utterance seems to indicate that they also have the function of embedding a formally monologic passage in its dialogic context. Therefore, they occur especially in the beginning and at the end of this passage.

The encounter between Hamlet and his mother has already been described as a markedly asymmetrical dialogue with Hamlet being the dominant interlocutor. His quantitative dominance manifests itself in several lengthy utterances during which Gertrude remains silent. One of these monologues occurs when Gertrude, bewildered by Hamlet's obscure references to a disgraceful deed of which he blames her, inquires for the reason of his implicit accusations. Already before this utterance their dialogue is characterized by Hamlet's successful attempts to obtain a dominant position. As was shown in 4.2., he does so by the use of cryptic language of which Gertrude can barely make any sense, and by openly confining her to a rather passive role ("Peace, sit you

[278] "*Epanalepsis* repeats the same word at the beginning and end of the same line [...]." Vickers, 1987, 396.

down,/ And let me wring your heart" [34/35]). To all of these demonstrations of power Gertrude hardly resists. Almost from the beginning she accepts the role of the accused who is not allowed to defend herself. She voices nearly no protest but anxiously listens to Hamlet's extensive criticism and abuse. Critics aptly characterize her as a "soft, obedient, dependent" woman who is solely driven by her wish to please both Hamlet and Claudius.[279]

Since Hamlet's words do not meet with serious opposition, he does not pretend in his monologue to be very much concerned with Gertrude's point of view. Unlike Richard, who seeks to counteract his addressee's perspective and therefore creates a dialogic quality in his utterance, Hamlet's account is entirely an expression of his own perspective. The only instance of a dialogic quality in a broader sense is employed, as was argued above (see 5.2.1.2.), to more effectively attack Gertrude for her supposedly immoral behaviour, but not to disprove an actual counter-argument of hers.

Within the formally monologic passage there seems to be a development from a concentration of dialogic elements in the first part towards a second part that is almost devoid of such elements. The dialogic elements Hamlet uses abundantly are the different means of emphatic address (53, 55, 63-67,71), which do not create a genuine dialogic quality but serve to reinforce the persuader's view and to provide his words with greater emphasis. Thus, their heavy usage is an expression of (and arguably helps to establish) Hamlet's dominant position in the dialogue. In the first part of this utterance Hamlet uses the methods of emphatic address to forcefully impose his perspective on Gertrude and, by referring to the concrete evidence of the two portraits, to impress on her the conviction that her first husband was infinitely superior to his brother and that she has consequently erred in remarrying. Having by then sufficiently established his dominance and, possibly, secured her agreement, he argues more abstractly in the second part to further humiliate his mother with a sense of shame. Here, Hamlet speaks in more general terms, referring not to concrete objects in their immediate context but using abstract nouns ("*madness* would not err/ Nor *sense* to *ecstasy* was ne'er so thrall'd" [73/74, "And *reason* panders *will*." [88]), and, instead of directing rhetorical questions in a dialogic semblance at Gertrude, addresses "shame" [81] and "Rebellious hell" [82] to give expression to his outrage. To sum up, the dialogic elements are in this example concentrated in the first half of the monologue and

[279] Smith, Rebecca, "A Heart Cleft in Twain: The Dilemma of Shakespeare's Gertrude", Lenz, C.R.S., G.Greene and C.Th.Neely (eds.) The Woman's Part: Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare, Urbana and Chicago 1983, 194.

are part of an attempt to convince Gertrude with the help of concrete evidence towards which her attention is directed by imperatives ('Look', 'See') and deictic elements. In the second half the dialogical impression decreases while Hamlet self-confidently dominates the discourse with the declaration of his personal disgust at Gertrude's conduct. At no point does it seem necessary to him to seriously regard Gertrude's perspective.

The difference between the two monologic passages with respect to their use of dialogical elements can only be explained by central characteristics of the dialogues in which they are embedded. Both of them certainly are influenced by the fact that they form part of a dialogue. The persuader's heightened awareness of the presence of the persuadee may in any case be a reason for including dialogic elements into an uncommonly long utterance. Hence, one could argue that dialogic elements are an indication of the persuadee's indirect influence on the persuader's utterances. Beyond this general similarity, it seems that especially the disposition of the persuadee, as it shapes the dialogue that constitutes the context of such an extensive reply, explains differences between individual texts. Elizabeth, on the one hand, is a very active interlocutor who opposes the persuader to defend her own position. She is an antagonist who, rhetorically at least, is Richard's equal. Richard's use of dialogical elements, especially in the beginning of his utterance, can be understood as an attempt to overcome Elizabeth's resistance to the persuasion by pretending to give her point of view due consideration. In this case, the use of certain dialogic elements is to some extent necessitated by the verbal behaviour of the persuadee. On the other hand, Gertrude is remarkably submissive and passive. She does not counter Hamlet's claims with her own point of view but readily acknowledges his arguments. She is rather easy to dominate, and dominate her is what Hamlet openly does in his utterance. For him there is no necessity to consider Gertrude's perspective; she is attentive and willing to accept his arguments without an additional acknowledgement of her point of view. In accordance with his addressee's disposition Hamlet uses dialogic elements to give his arguments more vigour and to forcefully establish his point of view. On the whole, the fact that the notable difference between the two texts could be explained by the different dispositions of Gertrude and Elizabeth suggests that persuadees have an indirect influence on extended utterances of the persuaders. This influence does not only concern the fact that dialogical elements are used *at all*, but also the *kind* of dialogical elements that tend to be used.

5.2.3. The Question of the Persuadee's Responsibility

The analysis has so far produced two results. The first one is that the persuadee's view is typically not given an opportunity to directly influence a formally monologic part of the discourse, but is at best utilized by the persuader (5.2.1.). The second result gained from the investigation is that persuadees have an indirect influence on the form of such discourse or, in other words, on the manner in which persuaders present their own perspectives (5.2.2.). Persuadees have an indirect influence on the form rather than on the substance of a passage without turn-taking. There is some evidence, then, that in persuasive dialogues passages during which the persuader talks at unusual length are not conditioned solely by the persuader's perspective, but are to some extent also shaped by the interlocutors' interaction which forms the context of such an utterance.

However, the question remains whether persuadees due to this indirect influence can in some way be held responsible for what is being effectuated by the persuasive discourse. Or, to put the question differently, how far are interlocutors responsible for the discourse when they do not speak themselves but merely listen? At first sight, it seems that persuadees can merely determine how much effort is needed by the persuader to establish his or her perspective. If Elizabeth did not constantly counter Richard's arguments with bitter reproaches, he would hardly pay so much attention to his past misdeeds in a discourse with which he means to win her daughter. Gertrude allows Hamlet to ignore any issue that might not directly support his argument.

Yet these are mainly aspects concerned with the form of monologic passages. There is another crucial aspect to be considered in connection with the issue of the persuadee's responsibility. In passages without turn-taking persuaders inevitably gain a dominance which usually benefits their cause. Hence, it could be assumed that persuadees are responsible for allowing the persuader to gain such a dominant position. For a closer investigation of this issue it is first necessary to determine the conditions under which such lengthy utterances may occur within a dialogue. It is obvious that utterances of a length such as those analysed in this chapter are rather untypical of dialogue and are highly unlikely to occur in natural conversations, unless the dialogue is situated in an institutional setting which requires such extensive turns. Under normal circumstances, that is, without additional regulations, the conditions of the turn-taking system favour short turns. Points of possible completion are frequent in a long utterance. Whenever a semantic unit such as a sentence or a clause is finished, another interlocutor may self-select as 'next speaker' and begin his or her turn.[280] A participator who wishes to speak at greater length may be interrupted by other interlocutors before being actually finished. This knowledge of the turn-taking system justifies the question why at times persuadees let their interlocutors talk at an extreme length without, as would commonly be expected in dialogue, interfering at some point.

Apparently, it would be premature in such cases to automatically hold persuadees responsible for allowing persuaders to dominate them. Current speakers may use different means of preventing interlocutors from interrupting them. They may, for example, introduce a monological turn with a so-called *story preface*. A story preface can be described as an announcement of something that requires more time telling than other turns in the dialogue do. It indicates the speaker's wish to be granted more space than is common in dialogue.[281] Thus, it would be deemed rather impolite of the persuadee to not let the persuader finish his or her utterance after such a story preface.

In the corpus, some formally monologic passages clearly are motivated by story prefaces. Cassius, for example, distinctly introduces his *narratio* in a manner that prepares Brutus to listen to a kind of tale:

> Therefore, good Brutus, *be prepared to hear*;
> And since you know you cannot see yourself
> So well as by reflection, I, your glass,
> Will modestly discover to yourself
> That of yourself which you yet know not of. [*Julius Caesar*, I/ii,65-69]

When, instead of demonstrating patient attentiveness, Brutus demands to know "But wherefore do you hold me here *so long* ?" [82], Cassius explicitly refers to the monologic form in which he means to address Brutus by saying "Well, honour is the subject of my *story*." [91] The monologic shape of his utterance is additionally accentuated by the beginning of the first anecdote Cassius tells about Caesar. The phrasing "For once, upon a raw and gusty day" [99] draws attention to the narrative quality of what is to follow. Cassius thus ensures that Brutus will, at least temporarily, let him dominate the discourse.

In a similar fashion, Hamlet secures Gertrude's willingness to endure his monologues without intrusions. The lines already quoted before "Peace, sit you down,/ And let me wring your heart; for so I shall/ If it be made of penetrable stuff" [34-36]

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[280] Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 12f.
[281] Coulthard, 79.

introduce his *narratio* and can be understood as a story-preface. Also towards the end of the dialogue, in response to her question "What shall I do?" [III/iv,182] Hamlet begins his detailed advice to Gertrude with the words: "Not this, by no means, that I bid you do:" [183], thus indicating that a longer passage of recommendations how *not* to behave will follow. Typographically, this is also suggested by the colon which marks the beginning of a list of items. Story prefaces are used by persuaders to secure the right to talk at greater than ordinary length within a dialogue. They offer the possibility of temporarily monopolizing the discourse. On the part of the persuadees, to not let interlocutors monologize after such story prefaces would be against expectation, and would therefore be considered a breach of standard, unmarked behaviour. Unless persuadees have ample reason for interrupting their interlocuters, they let them finish their lengthy utterances.

Another method employed by persuaders to ensure that they will not be interrupted by their addressees exploits the possibilities of syntax. Speakers may reduce the number of points of possible completion in a turn and, thereby, also the likelihood of their being interrupted, by forming intricate sentences. Instead of uttering several shorter sentences with the opportunity for the persuadee to commence speaking after each sentence, persuaders at times add more and more information to a single sentence which it would be rude to interrupt. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson speak of the "expandability property of sentential construction before first possible completion"[282]. Richard seems to be particularly fond of this method. The end of one of his extensive turns in the conversation with Elizabeth discussed in 5.2.2., in which he emphatically appeals to Elizabeth to assist him in the wooing of her daughter, forms one entire sentence which comprises fourteen verses. After the passage already quoted before, the same sentence continues as follows:

> Put in her tender heart th'aspiring flame
> Of golden sovereignty; acquaint the Princess
> With the sweet, silent hours of marriage joys,
> *And* when this arm of mine hath chastised
> The petty rebel, dull-brain'd Buckingham,
> Bound with triumphant garlands will I come
> *And* lead thy daughter to a conqueror's bed;
> *To whom* I will retail my conquest won,
> *And* she shall be sole victoress, Caesar's Caesar. [*Richard III*, IV/iv,328-336]

This sentence, after the initial series of main clauses starting with imperatives, is a sequence of subclauses and main clauses that, due to the use of enjambments, may even

[282] Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 19.

exceed one verse and which are several times connected to previous clauses by the conjunction 'And' (331, 334, 336). Apparently, these links do not always correspond to a logical relation between the individual clauses, but primarily seem to serve the purpose of expanding the sentence and including yet another benefit of the marriage into the sentence before it is finished and Elizabeth again takes over. For example, from the point of view of logic, there is little need for verse 331 to belong to the same sentence as the prior verses. The connection really seems a little awkward. Likewise, the addition of the last two lines to the same sentence sounds somewhat forced, especially since the relative pronoun in line 335, referring back to 'thy daughter' produces no smooth transition but makes it appear like an addition to a sentence that already is complete. Thus, by delaying the end of the sentence, Richard manages to actually speak at great length about the advantages of the match for Elizabeth's family. The gloriousness of this match is accentuated by the imagery in lines 333/4 ("Bound with triumphant garlands", "to a conqueror's bed"), the syntactic inversion "will I come", and periphrases referring to himself as 'conqueror' as well as 'Caesar'. The *polyptoton* ("Caesar's Caesar") is a very potent finale of the monologic passage, of which it is also a pompous climax, as it summarizes the hopeful prospects in an extremely compressed form.
Also in his dialogue with Lady Anne Richard's monologue includes such deliberately long sentences (I/ii, 157-167, 177-182). At such points, his interlocutors cannot simply be blamed for allowing Richard to dominate the discourse and thus being indirectly responsible for its development since they do not become actively involved. By putting their arguments into such long-winded sentences, persuaders may systematically reduce the number of points of possible completion of their turns and, thereby, also reduce the opportunities of persuadees to actively participate in the discourse.

An objection that might be raised to this interpretation is that considering only full stops is an arbitrary method of determining the end of a sentence. One could argue that Shakespeare used punctuation sparsely[283], and that also a colon, a semi-colon, or a dash may mark the end of a sentence. Such an insistence on the potential of misconceptions about the typography would indeed be justified. However, in examples as the one quoted above conjunctions like 'and' indicate that the same sentence is being continued. To the persuadee (who, needless to say, cannot 'hear' the distinction between a full stop and a semi-colon) conjunctions, or other elements connecting clauses,

[283] Brook, G.L., The Language of Shakespeare, London 1976, 157.

likewise signal that the persuader's utterance is not yet completed. Unless s/he wants to risk appearing rude, the persuadee will then be likely to wait until the persuader has finished his or her turn.

With respect to the question raised at the beginning of this section, it can now be concluded that, if persuadees can be held responsible for the fact that monologic passages occur in persuasive dialogues, this can be done only with reservations. Certain rhetorical strategies, such as announcing their intention to talk at greater length or forming deliberately long sentences, provide persuaders with the means to restrain persuadees from participating actively. However, it has to be admitted that the silence of persuadees cannot always be explained by rhetorical means used by their interlocutors. For example, Lady Macbeth's lengthy utterances are neither introduced by story prefaces, nor does she form syntactic constructions that particularly ensure her longer utterances. It seems that Macbeth willingly chooses to remain silent during her passionate speeches. He lets himself be infiltrated by her enthusiasm for the murderous scheme. Consequently, critics have repeatedly remarked that Macbeth is quite willing to be persuaded by his wife. Lady Macbeth appeals to the dark, unscrupulous side of his character as he unconsciously wishes her to do.[284]

Also the highly reciprocal nature of the interaction between Richard and Anne in the passage that has been termed 'nonverbal dialogue' in this study makes it seem strange that Anne does in fact not speak. Interaction of this kind, one should expect, promotes the development of a dialogic form. Therefore, Anne's silence as she wavers between killing Richard and sparing him, requires a special explanation. Since the context makes it rather likely that Anne should become verbally active, her silence could be interpreted as a silence of compliance. Considering the development of Anne's active participation over the whole dialogue – from a speech demonstrating her (moral) superiority to Richard [I/ii,50-67] on to her vigorous opposition in a verbal duel [68-154] in which she proves "an able opponent"[285], towards this final silence – it seems that it symptomatically signals her loss of power in the dialogue. Thus, Shakespeare uses the monologic form at this point, created by Anne's unexpected but explicable silence, for a dramatization of her impotence. Anne's defeat is not only demonstrated by the fact that she "*falls the sword*" [186] but, perhaps even more impressively, by her

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[284] For a review of the critical literature on this point see Lordi, Robert J., "Macbeth and His 'dearest partner of greatness'", The Upstart Crow, 4, 1982, 95f.
[285] Trotter, 39.

disconcerting silence in this 'nonverbal dialogue' with Richard. This passage aptly illustrates a sense of the connection between language and power.

As a brief summary, one might conclude that the general assumption about monological passages, namely that in such phases of persuasive dialogues the persuadee is merely a passive victim, has to take into account that theoretically the persuadee has the possibility to interfere and to give the discourse a dialogic form. Consequently, persuadees more or less voluntarily decide against an active participation. They may insofar be held responsible for the development of the discourse as they allow persuaders to dominate it. At times, however, persuaders manage to restrict the persuadees' chances to get actively involved in the discourse. In such cases the persuader's dominance is not so much granted by the persuadee, but rather claimed by the persuader without the persuadee's consent.

The question, whether the persuadee has an influence on the discourse despite his or her silence, has to be answered somewhat cautiously. Such an influence can be detected, but only with respect to the form of the discourse. This restrictedness might be due to the fact that a genuine dialogic quality, as became apparent in the analysis, is rare in formally monologic passages. Regarding the effect of a dialogic quality it was found that without a dialogic form it merely creates a dialogic semblance and is used by persuaders for manipulative purposes.

5.3. Persuasion Within Dialogue

5.3.1. Methodological Preliminaries

The analysis of this part of the chapter aims at a qualitative reassessment of those passages of persuasive dialogues that have been classified as 'persuasion within dialogue'. This term was introduced to describe the constitutive feature of such passages, namely that, while the discourse has a dialogic form, central functions that are typically performed in the different stages of an *oratio* (introducing the topic, providing arguments, calling for concrete action) are only performed in the utterances of the persuader. The ultimate goal of the analysis, as was indicated in the beginning of this chapter, is to illuminate the nature of the persuadee's contributions to the dialogue and his or her influence on the persuasion. An initial supposition might be that the qualitative diversity of the dialogues arises from differences in the behaviour of the persuadee which either promotes or hinders the development, and ultimately the success, of the persuasion.

To reveal the dialogic nature of the passages that are to be analysed, an interactional approach is chosen. Utterances are analysed in terms of their function as initiatives and/or responses. A model that regards dialogues as consisting of initiatives and responses is especially fit to do justice to the interdependence of individual utterances in a dialogue. Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen define these aspects of utterances as follows:

> The initiative (or initiating) aspect(s) 'point forward' toward the next turn […], the response aspect(s) 'point backwards' to preceding turns in the dialogue. Initiatives carry on the dialogue by requesting (soliciting or inviting) a response from the interlocutor and/or by introducing new substance into the dialogue. Responses create coherence with the preceding discourse by linking up with what the interlocutor or the speaker himself has said before.[286]

It is important to note that initiatives and responses do not necessarily constitute entire utterances, but that a single utterance may accommodate both initiative and response aspects. Hence, they often contain a part addressed to the prior discourse as well as a part that advances the dialogue. Already Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson observe this feature of the structure of utterances when they remark that "[t]urns display gross organizational features that reflect their occurrence in a series. They regularly have a three-part structure: a part which addresses the relation of a turn to a prior, a part involved with what is occupying the turn, and a part which addresses the relation of the turn to a succeeding one. These parts regularly occur in that order"[287]. Of course, the value of such a rigid model might well be questioned. Especially in very short utterances it would at times be nearly impossible to distinguish between different parts. Linell's view seems more appropriate as it is applicable to a wider range of utterances, and allows for greater variation among them. He maintains that initiative and response are "abstract relational aspects of all turns" [288] and that, hence, each turn is in some way responsive as well as initiatory. Differences between individual utterances can be explained by varying degrees of initiatory or responsive features: "Some contributions exhibit roughly a balance between responsive and initiatory aspects […] [while in] other types of turns, either the initiatory aspect or the responsive aspect predominates."[289] The extreme points of this scale are then 'minimal reponses' (i.e. utterances with hardly

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[286] Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen, 417.
[287] Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 36.
[288] Linell, 1998, 233.
[289] Ibid, 169.

any initiatory features) and 'free initiatives' (that is, turns that seem virtually unconnected to the prior discourse).

That an utterance in dialogue has to be analysed in relation to other utterances because they are inextricably linked to one another is an important insight of linguistic approaches such as dialogue analysis. By being connected, it has been noted, utterances form more or less self-contained units that exceed a single turn. Hence, to account for the connectedness of individual turns, critics have proposed several units of analysis of varying size. Linell, for example, lists a hierarchy of discourse units, partly relating them to units discussed in earlier approaches. Apart from 'elementary units' that roughly correspond to an utterance by one speaker, his list includes units that by themselves constitute '(potentially) full interactions' such as *local sequences*, *episodes*, *phases*, and *encounters*.[290] Already the well-established concept of adjacency pairs or the recently more favoured unit of three consecutive turns [291] are based on the notion that individual utterances are typically connected to each other by initiating and responsive features. While it shall not be attempted here to discuss the value of the multitude of units of analysis that are used in the literature, this short account is meant to highlight the fact that the notion of the interrelatedness of utterances is generally accepted in pragmatic theories on dialogue.

Basically, the approach to dialogue as consisting of utterances that involve initiating and responding aspects is based on Bakhtin's concept of dialogism. As was indicated in chapter 2, this concept assumes the existence of a superordinate dialogue in a wider sense to which all utterances belong. Also in the context of such a dialogue any utterance "makes response to something and is calculated to be responded to in turn."[292] This dialogic context of utterances causes an interdependence between them. Hence, utterances can be understood as 'links' in a 'great chain'.[293]

The interactional approach of analysing the turns of persuader and persuadee in terms of how their utterances are connected with one another might help to illuminate the different ways in which an individual utterance may influence immediately surrounding parts of the dialogue, namely not only those that follow but also those that precede it. Specifically, it should be possible to determine the effects of the persuadee's

[290] Linell, 1998, 203.
[291] Foppa, 1994, 149; Käsermann, Marie-Louise, "Obstruction and Dominance: Uncooperative Moves and their Effect on the Course of the Conversation", Ivana Marková and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Asymmetries in Dialogue, New York et al 1991, 102f.
[292] Morris, 35.
[293] Holquist, 49.

utterances, which do not contain the essence of the persuasive discourse, on those parts of the dialogue that do so. With respect to the initiating aspect of a turn the analysis will focus on the question how utterances may, directly or indirectly, 'prepare' essential elements of the persuasion or, to use a more dialogic terminology, how a perspective is set in persuasive dialogues.

A basic distinction made in this section (5.3.2.) is that between, on the one hand, utterances of the persuadee that *directly* elicit essential elements of the persuasion and, on the other hand, instances in which the persuadee's utterances *indirectly* initiate persuasive utterances by the persuader who utilizes them for a preparation of parts of the persuasion. In the first case, the persuadee creates an opportunity for the persuader to set his or her perspective, that is, to 'strike' a theme and to provide clues about his or her point of view toward the topic.[294] In the second case the issue of perspective-setting is slightly more complicated. Since the persuadee does not intend the persuader to make a particular contribution to the dialogue, but the persuader utilizes what the persuadee said in order to establish his or her own perspective, it will be argued that in such cases the persuader stages a 'collaborative perspective-setting'. In both cases the interlocutors perform what Linell terms a 'communicative project', that is, their contributions to the dialogue have a common goal (although, as Linell acknowledges, participants may at the same time entertain divergent interests within the common project[295]). Yet, there seems to be a qualitative difference between the two cases, since in one of them persuadees participate in the communicative project of their own accord while in the other one they may not intend to initiate such a project. To what extent a persuadee's utterance is then misused by the persuader will be illuminated in 5.3.2.2.

Concerning the response aspect of utterances Holquist maintains that "an utterance is always an answer [...] to another utterance that precedes it, and is, therefore always conditioned by, *and in turn qualifies*, the prior utterance to a greater or lesser degree."[296] Foppa states that a response to an utterance always includes an interpretation of this utterance. As a consequence, interlocutors in a dialogue constantly negotiate the meaning of their utterances.[297] This explains why Linell claims that "[n]o part [of a dialogue] is entirely one single individual's product"[298]. In

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[294] Graumann, Carl F., "Perspective Setting and Taking in Verbal Interaction", Rainer Dietrich and Carl F. Graumann (eds.), Language Processing in Social Context, Amsterdam et al. 1989, 113.
[295] Linell, 1998, 214.
[296] Holquist, 60, emphasis added.
[297] Foppa, Klaus, "Dialogsteuerung", Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 46, 1987, 253f.
[298] Linell, 1998, 86.

accordance with the idea that utterances qualify preceding utterances, the analysis of responses will be guided by the question how meaning is constructed in persuasive dialogues. It will, for example, be shown in what ways and to what effects the persuader's arguments etc. are qualified by the persuadee's responses. Thus, this part of the chapter (5.3.3.) will be concerned with the issue of perspective-taking in persuasive dialogues.

The merit of an interactional approach to dialogues is easily to be recognized. By emphasizing the interdependence of the replies of different speakers it is possible to take into consideration what recent approaches to dialogue have revealed, namely the significant insight that an utterance in a dialogue is never determined solely by the speaker who articulates it, but is mutually shaped by the interlocutors. Thus, an active persuadee necessarily shares in shaping the persuasive discourse, even though s/he may not be directly involved in articulating it. How exactly this influence manifests itself in the dialogues, what dimensions it may assume, and what effects it has on the persuasion – these are the questions that will be answered by the following investigation.

5.3.2. The Initiation of Elements of the Persuasion

As has been indicated above, the interrelatedness of the replies of persuader and persuadee in a dialogue calls for a very cautious approach to the question which of the interlocutors is responsible for initiating a certain part of the persuasion. To identify a genuine influence of the persuadee, one needs to differentiate clearly between instances in which the persuadee directly asks or solicits the persuader for a particular contribution to the dialogue, and cases in which the persuader cleverly utilizes parts of the persuadee's utterances for an introduction of elements that belong to the substance of the persuasion. It is to be expected that such a clear differentiation will be difficult to make and might even be an arbitrary one because in dialogue no incident can be ascribed to only one participant. Still, it is assumed here that it is possible to identify tendencies concerning who of the interlocutors is *more* responsible for a certain development of the dialogue than the other one. Thus, we do recognize that the question whether the persuadee is indirectly responsible for parts of the persuasion cannot be answered by a simple *yes* or *no*, but only in terms of *more* or *less*. Yet, for the sake of clarity we propose to simplify the scale by distinguishing between only two main cases, namely those in which it is primarily the persuadee who is responsible for the introduction of elements of the persuasion (5.3.2.1.) and those in which s/he is less

involved in it than the persuader (5.3.2.2.). Within these two broad categories the analysis of relevant examples will reveal further differences to do justice to the qualitative diversity
among the dialogues, especially with respect to the role of the persuadees in the unfolding of the persuasive discourse.

5.3.2.1. Active Initiation by the Persuadee

In most of the dialogues it can be observed at some point that elements of the persuasion are actively initiated by its addressee. In such cases, an initiative by him or her creates an opportunity for the persuader to make a significant contribution to the persuasion. Utterances in which the initiatory aspect is especially prominent are, for example, questions or demands and invitations to the interlocutor to make a particular contribution to the dialogue. These forms of sentences can easily be classified as initiatives because their "proactive links"[299] are quite obvious: due to the conventions of adjacency pairs they necessitate a next utterance which responds to it. These points in the dialogues can be evaluated in different ways with respect to the question to what extent the persuadee is actually involved in shaping the persuasion's substance. In the following, answers to this question will be sought on the basis of several criteria. These criteria are meant to complement each other. In other words, it is presupposed that the issue of the persuadee's role at such points can (and ideally should) be approached from different angles.

<u>5.3.2.1.(a) Novelty</u>

A rather basic criterion for assessing the persuadee's indirect influence is the question whether the persuadee's initiative helps to introduce new substance into the persuasive discourse. Simple as this question may seem, there actually are cases in which the persuadee asks for information that has already been given by the persuader earlier in the dialogue. By such initiatives persuadees elicit something which already is part of the persuasion, and, apart from making their interlocutors repeat it, do not have a significant influence on the dialogue. Since they do not really occasion a piece of information to become part of the persuasion, the persuadee's contribution is a rather limited one.

An initiative of this kind is Gertrude's question "What shall I do?" [*Hamlet*, III/iv,182] during the *conclusio* of the persuasion. This question plainly refers to

[299] Linell, 1998, 175.

Gertrude's future actions and is thus concerned with matters which are typically dealt with in the *conclusio* of dramatic persuasion. Hence, it could be argued that Gertrude indirectly contributes to the persuasion insofar as she elicits information from Hamlet that is relevant to its final part. Yet, she confronts him with this question after he has already given her detailed instructions as to how to alter her habits and even practical, clear advice for the immediate future:

> Good night. But go not to my uncle's bed.
> […] Refrain tonight,
> And that shall lend a kind of easiness
> To the next abstinence, the next more easy; [161-69]

Thus, her question might seem redundant as it has already been answered. It can only lead to the repetition of a part of the persuasion. Consequently, Hamlet's response, though its content in large parts constitutes a repetition of his former instructions, in its form reflects his awareness of the superfluousness of this exchange. He repeats his advice in an ironic form, that is, he states the opposite of what he means, but marks the irony in the first verse:

> Not this, by no means, that I bid you do:
> Let the bloat King tempt you again to bed,
> Pinch wanton on your cheek, call you his mouse,
> And let him, for a pair of reechy kisses,
> Or paddling in your neck with his damn'd fingers,
> Make you to ravel all this matter out [183-88]

The function of this irony is, on the one hand, to make Gertrude realize that everything worth knowing on this subject has already been said and that it should be clear to her what she is to do, and, on the other hand to again emphasize his contempt of their marriage, which finds expression especially in derogatory adjectives ('bloat', 'reechy', 'damn'd').

However, in spite of the apparent redundancy of Gertrude's initiative, it has a conducive effect on the persuasion, since it shows Hamlet that Gertrude is still undecided. Her question "What shall I do?" does not reveal that she has not understood Hamlet's initial advice, which indeed is clear enough, but that she is still drawn between different impulses and has not yet decided what she shall do. She thereby causes Hamlet to reinforce his efforts to persuade her. He presents a new argument which finally dispels her hesitancy: Hamlet indirectly forces her to decide between her loyalty to Claudius and her loyalty to himself. Continuing his ironic tone he states that it were good to acquaint Claudius with Hamlet's ill opinion of him and with the truth about his feigned madness [189-93]. As has already been pointed out before, Gertrude's loyalty is about equally divided between Claudius and Hamlet. As she cannot betray her son she seems for the moment ready to take his advice. Consequently, this initiative, which elicits additional persuasive efforts from Hamlet, has a beneficial effect on the persuasion and contributes to its success. By indicating Gertrude's hesitancy it informs Hamlet that his endeavour has not been entirely successful, and that he still needs to reinforce his effort.

Another example of a seemingly redundant initiative occurs towards the end of the persuasion of Benedick. He, too, asks a question that has already been sufficiently answered. When Beatrice repeatedly urges him to take action and revenge her cousin Hero by killing Claudio, the person responsible for her suffering, Benedick asks: "Think you in your soul the Count Claudio has wronged Hero?" [*Much Ado*, IV/ii, 327/8] which is, of course, emphatically answered in the affirmative by Beatrice. Since her prior argumentation was meant to prove that Claudio's villainous treatment of Hero needs to be revenged, the response Benedick elicits with this question does not add new material to the persuasion. His indirect contribution to it is thus rather limited.

The fact that he, without further delay, resolves to challenge Claudio after Beatrice has given an answer which contained no additional argument that might have convinced him, indicates that the purpose of Benedick's question was to hear a confirmation of what he already knows. It seems that at the end of the dialogue he wavers and seeks for a final justification of the decision he then makes, namely to challenge his friend Claudio. He deliberately elicits a response from Beatrice which emphasizes the legitimacy of his decision. That the woman he is engaged to strongly believes in the guilt of Claudio seems to be ample reason, as Benedick's resolution suggests: "Enough! I am engaged, I will challenge him." [330] The idea of emphasis as a motivation for asking his question is supported by Benedick's use of the additional specification "in your soul". It seems that Benedick wants to make quite sure that Beatrice *really* (i.e. 'in her soul') believes Hero to be wronged by Claudio before he finally decides to give in and let himself be persuaded. Thus, at first sight Benedick's influence on the persuasion seems as limited as it could possibly be in a dialogue, since even indirectly his question cannot be said to contribute anything to the content of the persuasion, but merely leads to a repetition of part of its content. However, when viewed in its context, it becomes clear that this initiative does have a significant influence since it elicits a response that is the crucial factor in Benedick's decision.

In both examples, the effect of the persuadee's initiative thus goes beyond its apparent, limited influence of causing a repetition of elements of the persuasive discourse. Gertrude's initiative makes Hamlet aware of her hesitancy, thereby inducing him to continue his efforts, and also Benedick seeks to dissipate his doubts by having Beatrice renew what proves her weightiest argument. Both persuadees are at this point ready to be persuaded. They ask questions that are in some way beneficial to the persuasion. Hence, both of them are partly responsible for their interlocutors' success. However, if the persuadee's initiative elicits something that has not been stated before, s/he has a more obvious influence on the content of the persuasive discourse. In these cases [namely in all examples that will be discussed in 5.3.2.1.(b) and 5.3.2.1.(c)] the persuadee indirectly causes some part of the persuasion to be brought up either at all or at a particular point in the dialogue.

5.3.2.1.(b) 'Free' Versus Conditioned Initiatives

As has been pointed out before, virtually all utterances in a dialogue contain initiatory as well as responsive aspects. Differences between them occur with respect to the relative weight of either aspect, so that theoretically all utterances can be placed somewhere along a continuum between pure initiative ('free initiative' in Linell's terms) and pure response ('minimal response')[300]. Hence, also those utterances that are here investigated as initiatives because this feature dominates them, have a responsive aspect of varying significance. Questions which, unless they are rhetorical questions, are a typical form of initiatives are thus either primarily oriented towards the next utterance or are also meant as a response to a prior utterance. In other words, one can distinguish between questions which the persuadee freely decides on his or her own to raise, and which (since their link to the prior discourse is relatively weak) tend more towards a 'free initiative', and questions that are strongly conditioned by the prior discourse since they are to some degree provoked by the persuader's utterances. It is quite evident that a persuadee's contribution to the dialogue is more original and his or her influence greater when initiatives are less conditioned by the persuader.

Gertrude's question "What have I done that thou dar'st wag thy tongue/ In noise so rude against me?" [III/iv,39/40] which preludes Hamlet's *narratio* is an initiative that is strongly conditioned by its preceding turn. In this turn, as was argued earlier (see 4.2.1.), Hamlet introduces the topic of the persuasion by insinuations. The obscurity that, as a result, marks his words, induces Gertrude to ask for a clarification.

[300] Linell, 1998, 169.

Consequently, her question does not only initiate the *narratio* of the persuasion but is also a response to the *obscuritas* within its introductory part, as it signals her lack of comprehension. The first part of the *narratio* proves equally opaque since Hamlet merely dwells on the severity of her crime which he does not name but only refers to as "an act" [40] or "a deed" [45]. These vague periphrases of the crime of which she is accused provoke a second initiative by Gertrude in which again a responsive aspect can be recognized: "Ay me, what act/ That roars so loud and thunders in the index?" [51/52]. This question elicits a clearer response from Hamlet. He uses a more concrete language, especially by referring to two portraits that serve as *probationes inartificiales*, to make Gertrude realize what exactly constitutes her crime.

Since it is evident that Gertrude's questions, which initiate important elements of the persuasion, are provoked by the form of Hamlet's preceding utterances, Gertrude is only partly responsible for the development of the dialogue in response to her initiatives. Her influence is an extremely limited one. There are distinct manipulative tendencies in the way Hamlet's turns condition Gertrude's initiatives. It is no surprise, then, that these initiatives promote the persuasion. Due to them, it seems that Hamlet does not force his accusation upon Gertrude but, since she asked him, that this is a sort of 'natural' development of their dialogue which is not planned in advance by the persuader but mutually brought about by the interlocutors, namely by the persuadee's questions and the persuader's answers. This appearance of mutuality to some extent conceals Hamlet's control over this part of the dialogue.

Also Othello at times elicits parts of the persuasion from Iago by initiatives, that are, however, strongly conditioned by Iago's own utterances prior to these initiatives. The following passage, in which Iago as a proof begins a *sermocinatio*, namely an account of Cassio's own statements presumably about his relationship to Desdemona, may serve as an example:

Iago. What if I had said I had seen him do you wrong?
Or heard him say – as knaves be such abroad ,
Who having, by their own importunate suit,
Or voluntary dotage of some mistress,
Convinced or supplied them, cannot choose
But they must blab –
Oth. Hath he said anything?
Iago. He hath, my lord, but be you well assur'd,
No more than he'll unswear.
Oth. What hath he said?
Iago. Faith that he did … I know not what he did.
Oth. But what? [*Othello*, IV/i,24-33]

Here, Othello's initiatives are beneficial to the persuasion since they help to bring about an additional argument to convince him. Yet, it is also clear that these questions are far from being 'free initiatives'. It is mainly Iago's reluctance or refusal to be explicit about what he seems to know that provokes Othello's impatient questions. After arousing Othello's jealousy by insinuating that Cassio brags about his love affair with Desdemona, he uses delaying tactics, such as the insertion of a clause in verses 25-29 which is not really to the point, to make Othello eager to know what exactly Cassio said. As in the example from *Hamlet* it may be argued that the persuadee's involvement in the persuasion is partly staged by the persuader whose contributions to the dialogue do not satisfy the persuadee so that s/he attempts to elicit sufficient information. Thus, it is Hamlet's obscurity of expression and Iago's refusal to be explicit which make these initiatives necessary for a meaningful continuation of either dialogue. Since the initiatives are conditioned by the prior discourse, the persuadees' responsibility for indirectly introducing new content into the persuasion is extremely limited.

An initiative that is perhaps less strongly necessitated by the preceding discourse is the way in which Sebastian initiates the *argumentatio* in *The Tempest* by the following invitation:

> Prithee, say on:
> The setting of thine eye and cheek proclaim
> A matter from thee; and a birth, indeed,
> Which throws thee much to yield. [*The Tempest*, II/i,223-6]

Motivated by Antonio's insinuations which have been pointed out in 4.2.1., Sebastian thus seeks a response that is more straightforward and informative about the "matter" that Antonio apparently tries to discuss. The responsive aspect of this utterance is quite evident, as Sebastian explicitly refers to Antonio's verbal behaviour in their dialogue, and especially to his awkward way of introducing the subject he means to talk about. Hence, this initiative, which, as in *Hamlet*, is a kind of prelude to the main part of the persuasion, is conditioned by the more or less ambiguous expression of the persuader. Also Sebastian is only partly accountable for eliciting significant points of the persuasion, yet perhaps even more so than Gertrude since Antonio's hints are not quite as opaque as Hamlet's insinuations are.

Persuadees may, however, be more responsible for their initiatives than they are in the previous examples, namely when the responsive aspect of their utterance is weaker, that is, when their initiatives are not directly motivated or necessitated by the prior discourse. When a persuadee on his or her own accord asks, for example, a question that elicits a persuasive argument, s/he is involved to a considerable degree in the creation of the persuasive discourse to which s/he indirectly contributes on his or her own.

Accordingly, Gloucester in *King Lear* unknowingly 'assists' Edmund with preparatory utterances in the development of the *argumentatio* when he questions Edmund after having read the faked letter supposedly written by Edgar:

> Glou. When came you to this? Who brought it?
> Edm. It was not brought me, my Lord; there's the
> cunning of it; I found it thrown in at the casement
> of my closet.
> Glou. You know the character to be your brother's?
> Edm. If the matter were good, my Lord, I durst swear it
> were his; but, in respect of that, I would fain think it
> were not.
> […]
> Glou. Has he never before sounded you in this business? [*King Lear*, I/ii,56-67]

The questions help Edmund to introduce crucial points of the argumentation. They are not necessitated by anything Edmund said. Hence, these questions are obviously oriented towards the next turns, while their links to prior turns are relatively weak. Since Gloucester asks these questions on his own accord, he is actively involved in the persuasive discourse. It may even be argued that he deliberately tries to confirms the first impression created by the letter, namely that his son Edgar indeed conspires against him. Consequently, the faked letter is the crucial piece of evidence in the persuasion of Gloucester. After having read it, he is quite ready to believe in its authenticity. Still astonished at the news, as is made apparent by his spontaneous exclamations, "My son Edgar! Had he a hand to write this?" [54-55], he asks these questions to seek further evidence in support of it. Thus, after having read the letter, Gloucester is a rather willing interlocutor in the collaborative construction of the persuasion. A comparison of the examples of 'free' and conditioned initiatives reveals that in each case the persuadees' indirect contributions to the dialogues are to some degree provoked by manipulative strategies employed by the persuaders. While in cases of 'conditioned' initiatives the persuaders' means are purely verbal, Edmund's manipulation is of another kind, which will be further discussed in 5.4.

5.3.2.1.(c) The Persuadee's Awareness

A third criterion for a qualitative assessment of the persuadee's involvement in the persuasive discourse is whether s/he is aware of the effect of his or her contribution, or, in other words, whether s/he knows or should be able to infer what the persuader's response to a particular initiative will be. If a persuadee has enough knowledge or insight to be able to foresee the kind of response s/he will get, s/he is more directly involved in the persuasion, whereas s/he is only indirectly responsible for the effects of an initiative when they cannot be predicted.

For example, in the persuasive dialogue from *Much Ado*, Benedick sets off the short *narratio*, in which Beatrice describes Claudio's crime, with a question that is clearly not asked in total ignorance of the answer it will most likely elicit:

> Beat. You dare easier be friends with me than fight with mine enemy.
> Bene. Is Claudio thine enemy?
> Beat. Is he not approved in the height a villain, that hath slandered, scorned, dishonoured my kinswoman? [IV/i, 297-301]

Since the context makes it clear that Beatrice in line 298 refers to Claudio as her enemy, Benedick's question seems almost redundant, as the answer can only be an affirmative one. Benedick is obviously highly aware of what he initiates with his question, namely an explanation why Beatrice applies the term 'mine enemy' to Claudio. Probably, this question is also meant to challenge the appropriateness of the term. However, since there can be no doubts about the kind of answer he will receive, it must be concluded that Benedick more or less consciously asks for arguments in support of Beatrice's claim that there is sufficient reason for challenging Claudio. Therefore, he shares in the control over the development, and indirectly the content, of the persuasive discourse. Like Gloucester in *King Lear*, he is an interlocutor who, from some point on, is not entirely unwilling to be persuaded. Rather, his initiatives at times even assist the persuader.

In a similar way, it can be assumed that Lady Anne is at least partly aware of what she initiates, and therefore is to some degree accountable for the results of her initiatives in the following exchange:

> Rich. He lives that loves thee better than he could.
> Anne. Name him.
> Rich. Plantagenet.
> Anne. Why that was he.
> Rich. The selfsame name, but one of better nature.
> Anne. Where is he?
> Rich. Here. *Spits at him.*
> [I/ii, 145-48]

Her questions and demands help to establish a central argument of the persuasion, namely that Richard is desperately in love with Anne. It could be argued that Anne's initiatives are to some extent conditioned by Richard's utterances due to the *obscuritas* inherent in the periphrases he uses in reference to himself [145, 147]. However, within the context of the entire scene, it seems that Lady Anne should at this point be able to comprehend what Richard means to insinuate by alluding to someone who loves her better than anyone else could. Already twenty verses earlier Richard explicitly claims to be in love with Anne and from then on uses the typical Petrarchan imagery to attest his love (for example by comparing the effects of her beauty on him to the life-giving influence of the sun on the earth). Hence, she must be aware of what kind of argument she helps to bring about by these initiatives.

Even if one assumes that Anne's initiatives are meant as challenges, and that she only participates in establishing this argument in order to refute it afterwards, it has to be stated that in fact she promotes the persuasion. Anne does not introduce any efficient counter-argument, but only attacks Richard nonverbally by spitting at him. This, however, is a rather powerless action in a scene which exemplifies the extraordinary power of speech. Consequently, Anne is highly involved in developing the persuasive discourse because she assists Richard in establishing arguments, the essence of which she should be able to foresee. She is not merely an innocent and uninvolved victim of Richard's rhetoric, or, to be more precise, she lets herself be victimized.

At a later stage of the persuasion, Anne's role is less significant. Though she initiates Richard's suggestion regarding what actions should be taken, her contribution is of a more passive kind:

Rich. […]
And if thy poor devoted servant may
But beg one favour at thy gracious hand,
Thou dost confirm his happiness for ever.
Anne. What is it?
Rich. That it may please you leave these sad designs
To him that hath most cause to be a mourner,
And presently repair to Crosby Place [I/ii,210-216]

First of all, her initiative is strongly conditioned by Richard's prior turn in which he asks her to invite him to speak. Moreover, her role in the *conclusio* is more restricted than earlier in the dialogue since there is no way for her to guess that Richard will suggest to leave the corpse of the late king to him. At this point, Anne cannot know what effects her initiative will have. What she knows, however, is that she allows Richard to ask a 'favour'. Her consent to indeed let Richard ask for a favour indicates that she will also agree to grant his wish once she knows what it is. This initiative makes Anne indirectly responsible for the development of this final part of the persuasion. Thus, it reveals Anne's willingness at the end to let herself be persuaded.

Further examples of persuadees whose responsibility for certain developments of the persuasion is limited, because they have no means to know or infer by what response a particular initiative will be followed, have been discussed before with respect to different criteria. When Gertrude repeatedly inquires of what crime Hamlet accuses her at the outset of their dialogue, her questions are marked by a total ignorance concerning their possible answers. Although such total ignorance of a persuadee is rare, other persuadees have so few hints concerning the content of a prospective response that their awareness of the effects of an initiative is minimal. When Othello anxiously asks "What hath he said" [IV/i, 29] he might guess that he will hear some aspect of Cassio's love affair with Desdemona, since this is the major topic of the dialogue. This, however, is the standard awareness interlocutors have in any coherent dialogue that has advanced so far that a mutual topic has been established. There is no way for Othello to guess the content of Iago's reply. In this passage, Othello only supports the unfolding of the persuasive discourse insofar as his initiatives allow Iago to continue his argumentation. Also Sebastian, when he bids Antonio reveal what "matter" [II/i, 225] it is that he has such difficulties to introduce, has little information, beyond the insinuations related to his advancement, to guess what the answer will be. He, too, is not quite aware of what he is introducing with his initiative, and is thus only very indirectly responsible for what follows.

On the whole, it can be concluded that persuadees who actively initiate elements of the persuasion are partly responsible for the development and/or content of the persuasion, and that typically their contributions are beneficial to the persuaders' intentions. A striking exception to the latter statement is to be found in Richard's attempted persuasion of Elizabeth in which she elicits several arguments from him that do however fail to have an effect on her. On the surface, her participation seems to promote the persuasion since Elizabeth initiates parts of the persuasive discourse as in the following examples:

Eliz. What good is cover'd with the face of heaven,
To be discover'd, that can do me good?
K.Rich. Th'advancement of your children, gentle lady. [IV/iv,240-42]

Eliz. Flatter my sorrow with report of it.
Tell me what state, what dignity, what honour,
Canst thou demise to any child of mine?
K.Rich. Even all I have – ay, and myself and all
Will I withal endow a child of thine [IV/iv,246-50]

Yet, Elizabeth's awareness of Richard's evilness and her strong determination not to be taken in by this villain subvert the impression of collaboration. As has been indicated in chapter 4, Elizabeth's questions and statements are marked by a bitter irony and sarcasm, of which however Richard is not aware. Her initiatives are not sincere, that is, they cannot be taken at face value as Richard does. Elizabeth does not make these inquiries because she honestly seeks an answer, but to attack Richard with a bitter mockery of him and his scheme of wooing her daughter. This example reveals that factors on different levels must be considered to understand the nature and effects of the persuadee's role in the dialogue.

Apart from this example, persuadees do not (systematically) deceive their interlocutors about their true opinion. When they introduce elements of the persuasion by initiatives they usually promote the persuasion. How far persuadees are responsible for becoming actively involved in the development of the persuasive discourse varies. Persuadees who decide freely and without the persuaders' stimulation to initiate something and/ or are aware of what they indirectly contribute to the dialogue, that is, who know what the persuaders' response will most likely be, are responsible for the effects of their initiatives.

If, however, the persuadee's initiatives are more or less strongly conditioned by the prior discourse (or, in extreme cases, even arranged by the persuader), and s/he is not aware of the results of an initiative, his or her responsibility is more limited. It seems rather evident that there is a sort of scale of diminishing or increasing involvement and responsibility of persuadees, since there are no dual categories for determining the persuadee's awareness and the relative strength of responsive and initiatory aspects of an utterance, but only tendencies. Nevertheless, this analysis shows that in dialogue there are no simple answers with respect to the question who of the interlocutors is accountable for which developments of the dialogue. Since much in a dialogue is the result of collaborative processes, careful analyses of individual passages are necessary to determine the role of each interlocutor at a certain point of an entire dialogue.

5.3.2.2. Utilization of the Persuadee's Utterances

An investigation of the ways in which elements of the persuasion are 'prepared', and thus how the persuader's perspective is set in a dialogue, reveals that, although utterances that contain part of the persuasion are connected to a prior turn by the persuadee, s/he frequently does not initiate these elements. This means that the persuadee does not elicit parts of the persuasive discourse, but that the persuader introduces them entirely on his or her own accord. At the same time, the persuader makes his or her utterance locally coherent[301] and refers to something in a previous turn, so that it may at times appear as if both interlocutors were involved in setting the persuader's perspective. Thus, by utilizing the persuadee's contributions to the dialogue the persuader can forward his or her own interests. Consequently, although it is actually the persuader who introduces a new aspect of the persuasion, s/he involves the persuadee in it so that it seems as if the persuadee would actively participate in the setting of the perspective s/he is meant to adopt. His or her turns contribute to the persuasion in a way that is not intended by the persuadee. Under such circumstances, the persuadee's utterances do not *per se* help to establish an element of the persuasion, but they *are made* beneficial to it by the persuader. This is the crucial difference between instances in which the persuadee actively initiates something that constitutes part of the persuasion (5.3.2.1.), and instances in which the persuadee's contribution to the dialogue is afterwards utilized so as to support the persuasion.

In the following, it will be investigated how, due to the persuader's skill of taking advantage of opportunities that offer themselves in a dialogue, the persuadees' turns may be involved in the preparation of parts of the persuasion. The analysis will primarily be focussed on the question what kinds of dialogue contributions are most likely to be thus exploited. Accordingly, relevant examples will be categorized so as to reflect the centre of interest of the present chapter (5.3.), namely the role of the persuadee in these dialogues. Hence, there will be individual analyses of utterances in which the persuadee professes an attitude favourable to the persuader's interests [5.3.2.2.(a)], those in which s/he takes a stance that is neutral towards the persuader's scheme [5.3.2.2.(b)], and finally those that clearly express opinions which do not suit the persuader's interests [5.3.2.2.(c)]. The different methods by which persuaders manage to use their interlocutors' contributions will be considered within these categories.

5.3.2.2.(a) Utilization of Opportune Utterances

[301] Coherence is a rather broad concept. Aronsson summarizes the two definitions, that are widely accepted, as follows: "Coherence can be defined as local coherence (connectedness between individual statemtns) or as global coherence (connectedness pertaining to a conversation as a whole)." Aronsson, Karin, "Verbal Dispute and Topic Analysis: A Methodological Commentary on a Drama Case Study", Florence J. van Zuuren, Frederick J. Wertz, and Bep Mook (eds.), Advances in Qualitative Psychology: Themes and Variations, Den Haag, 1987, 195.

It seems that utterances which by themselves support the efforts of the persuader should most easily offer themselves for introducing further material into the dialogue in support of the persuasion. In *Julius Caesar*, Cassius uses Brutus' first expression of his goodwill towards him as an opportunity to begin making allusions to his intention of discussing important matters with Brutus. Thus, Brutus who, when accused of neglecting Cassius, assures him of his friendship, apparently provides the starting point of the *exordium* of the persuasion:

Bru. But let not therefore my good friends be griev'd
(Among which number, Cassius, be you one)
Nor construe any further my neglect,
Than that poor Brutus, with himself at war,
Forgets the shows of love to other men.
Cas. Then, Brutus, I have much mistook your passion;
By means whereof this breast of mine hath buried
Thoughts of great value, worthy cogitations. [I/ii,42-49]

Brutus' affirmation is in itself beneficial to Cassius' cause, because by declaring that he considers Cassius his friend, Brutus expresses his trust in Cassius' *ethos*, which is an essential prerequisite of the success of the persuasion. By implying a causal link between their turns ("Then", "By means whereof") Cassius establishes coherence and suggests that there is a logical reason for him to reveal his 'worthy cogitations' or, in other words, that Brutus' assurance of his esteem for Cassius not only provides a reason but almost obliges Cassius to share his thoughts with Brutus. There can be no doubts that the introduction of the general topic is entirely Cassius' doing. However, Cassius also creates the impression that Brutus initially instigates him to do so and thereby contributes to it.

Also Antonio seizes the opportunity to develop Sebastian's agreement with him, that the heir to the throne of Naples is probably drowned, further, thereby introducing the argument that Ferdinand's death increases Sebastian's prospects of becoming king:

Seb. I have no hope
That he's undrowned.
Ant. O, out of that "no hope"
What great hope have you! no hope that way is
Another way so high a hope, that even
Ambition cannot pierce a wink beyond,
But doubt discovery there.[*The Tempest*, II/i,233-38]

It seems clear that Antonio needs Sebastian's agreement with him about Ferdinand's death to introduce this argument. It actually is a pre-condition of this development of the persuasion. Antonio makes a pun on the word 'hope', thus responding to Sebastian's pessimistic wording of having 'no hope' and alluding to the positive implications of the situation which Sebastian characterizes in negative terms. Antonio connects their turns and creates coherence between them by repeating the key word 'no hope'[302], even explicitly marking the quotation with a deictic pronoun ('that'), and by stressing the causal link between them with the phrase "*out of* that 'no hope'/ What great hope have you!". He thus creates the impression that Sebastian's statement immediately leads to this association and therefore contributes to the introduction of this point. Antonio stresses a connectedness of these utterances which is not quite as self-evident as he makes it appear, but which to some extent is based on manipulation. Specifically the word 'hope' is used with reference to different contexts. Sebastian uses it to affirm his present conviction that Ferdinand is drowned. Antonio, in order to develop the topic of their dialogue further applies it to Sebastian's prospects for the future. The change of context is not overly evident since Antonio uses the same word in both contexts. By these methods of creating coherence, Antonio makes it seem as if it was in fact Sebastian who initiates this development of the dialogue, and that they are both actively involved in the introduction of the point of Sebastian's future prospects. To sum up, Antonio uses a favourable utterance of Sebastian as a starting point for introducing new aspects of the persuasion into the dialogue.

In these examples, the persuadees make statements that express a favourable attitude towards the persuaders, and they intentionally do so, that is, these statements are obviously *meant* to be either in accord with their interlocutor's perspective (*The Tempest*), or to ensure a mutual understanding and agreement (*Julius Caesar*). Brutus, when Cassius apparently expresses his discontent at being neglected, seeks to clear up the misunderstanding and to reassure him of their bonds of friendship. Likewise, Sebastian quite deliberately and of his own accord agrees with Antonio. Furthermore, in both examples, the persuader makes the persuadee's utterance seem to be actively involved in the preparation of elements of the persuasion. He, in other words, deliberately understands the utterance as an invitation for introducing these elements. Since the meaning and effect of an utterance is not determined solely by its speaker[303], the dynamics of a dialogue enable persuaders to supply their interlocutors' utterances with meanings that were not intended or foreseen by them.

5.3.2.2.(b) Utilization of 'Neutral' Utterances

[302] Linell lists the repetition of key words as one possible way to tie utterances together and thus to create local coherence. [Linell, 1998, 182.]

[303] As Linell phrases it, "a certain contribution embodied in an utterance by a speaker A is a joint accomplishment in the sense that its action meaning gets developed and co-defined by the interlocutor B's uptake." Linell, 1998, 173.

If a persuadee's attitude, as it is revealed in an utterance, is neither noticeably favourable nor unfavourable to the persuader's designs, it may be regarded as neutral. Such utterances it seems are equally fit to be utilized for the persuader's purposes as are plainly favourable ones. For example, Antonio quite easily uses a metacommunicative remark of Sebastian within the part of the dialogue functioning as an *exordium* to allude to its subject:

Seb. This is a strange repose, to be asleep
With eyes wide open; standing, speaking, moving,
And yet so fast asleep.
Ant. Noble Sebastian,
Thou let'st thy fortune sleep – die, rather; wink'st
Whiles thou art waking. [*The Tempest*, II/i,208-212]

Sebastian's remark is not evaluative in that it either agrees with or attacks Antonio, but is meant as a hint at his insufficient comprehension of Antonio's words. In reaction to Antonio's use of insinuations, Sebastian lightly mocks him for his 'sleepy language'. As in the example discussed above, Antonio takes up a key word of Sebastian's turn and places it in a different context to effect a change of topic, namely from Antonio's way of expressing himself to Sebastian's lack of ambition and his failure to seize opportunities as fate offers them. Antonio echoes the key word 'sleepy' [206] in a *paronymy*, and then extends the metaphor by introducing related words ('die', 'wink'st'). The *correctio* "sleep – die, rather" effectuates an intensification of the argument that Sebastian is about to let a chance offered by fortune pass by irrevocably. Hence Antonio, just as Sebastian, uses the key word 'asleep/sleep' metaphorically. He does so, however, in reference to different contexts and therefore with different implications. By utilizing Sebastian's remark to his own advantage, Antonio neatly ignores his implicit request to use a clearer language, bringing in further insinuations instead. Sebastian's metacommunicative remark is thus, against his own will made to contribute to the introduction of a part of the *exordium*, namely the crucial hint at an opportunity provided by fate of which Antonio wants to make him aware. The impression is created that both interlocutors, directly or indirectly, are involved in the initiation of this point.

In a similar way, Beatrice uses Benedick's attempt to avoid the controversy that is about to arise between them for bringing up another argument to persuade him. As she threatens to leave him, Benedick suggests "We'll be friends first." [*Much Ado,* IV/i,296], to which Beatrice sharply replies "You dare easier be friends with me than fight with mine enemy." [297/8]. Up to this point, her strategy of exerting emotional pressure had only involved the argument that his refusal to kill Claudio proved that he did not truly love her. Now she accuses him of cowardice. Benedick indirectly gives rise to this argument, since Beatrice not only takes up a key word of his turn, but also refers to its contents and regards it as evidence of his fearfulness. This argument indeed seems to carry some weight with Benedick who then is more ready to consider her request.

In *Othello*, the transition from the *exordium* to the *narratio* and the *argumentatio* is designed by Iago in a way that makes Othello partly responsible for it because he appears to play a significant role in the initiation of the main part of the persuasion. After Iago has sneakily 'warned' him against becoming a victim of jealousy, Othello, obviously to show that this advice is not needed, observes that he is not someone who is prone to suffer from jealousy or doubt, because he, rather than being governed by his feelings, is a man of action:

> Oth. I'll see before I doubt, when I doubt, prove,
> And on the proof, there is no more but this:
> Away at once with love or jealousy!
> Iago. I am glad of it, for now I shall have reason
> To show the love and duty that I bear you
> With franker spirit [...] [*Othello*,III/iii,194-199]

Iago then uses the opportunity to present the first points that are to serve as evidence of Desdemona's infidelity. First, he mentions the general depravity and double-facedness of Venetian women [205-208]; then, he draws Othello's attention to the fact that Desdemona was not entirely truthful to her father, which might hint at a fault of character [210-212].

Although Othello does not mean to initiate such a development of the dialogue, Iago treats his statement about his character *as if* it would necessitate or provoke a reply in which he begins the argumentation. By understanding it as part of an initiation, Iago virtually makes it one. Iago emphasizes the connectedness of their turns, and thus Othello's influence on his own contribution to the dialogue, by assuming a causal relationship between them ("for *now* I shall have *reason*"). Thus, he claims that Othello's remark directly induces him to offer evidence in support of his insinuations. Furthermore, the supplying of proof is described as an act of 'love and duty', that is, as something that Iago owes Othello and that he, as his subordinate, must reveal to him. Thereby, he transfers as much of the responsibility for his own dialogue contributions as he can from himself to Othello, to create the impression that he is the true initiator of the search for sufficient evidence. This is done by Iago partly to conceal or belittle his own decisive role in the dialogue, but also to increase Othello's readiness to accept something that he apparently elicited himself from Iago. It has to be noted, however, that Iago's claim of a causal link between their utterances is not entirely arbitrary. Othello's determination that he will not become a victim of jealousy "I'll see before I doubt, when I doubt, prove" can indeed be understood as an implicit request for factual evidence. Yet, it does not in itself represent an active initiative. Rather, Iago manages to use this potential of Othello's utterance for his own purposes.

5.3.2.2.(c) Utilization of Unfavourable Utterances

The suspicion of manipulation by persuaders that is involved in the utilization of their interlocutors' utterances for their own purposes is perhaps most acute in cases in which persuaders manage to use utterances to their own advantage which were originally meant to oppose the persuader's perspective. In their study on obstruction in dialogue, which they define as utterances that hinder the realization of the interlocutor's goals [50], Käsermann and Altorfer distinguish between several possible reactions to obstructions. The reaction most associated with verbal competence is described as "[i]ntegration of obstruction"[304]. Thus, persuaders who have sufficient rhetorical skills handle obstructions by integrating them in their responses in a way that enables them to pursue their original plans and by treating the obstruction like an utterance that suits their purposes. Hence, they create the impression that their response is relevant to the persuadee's obstruction. In such cases, the persuader tries to significantly alter the meaning of the persuadee's turn. Such a manipulation, it seems, cannot be successful unless the persuadee is not aware of it. The differing effects of the persuadee's utterances, depending on whether s/he becomes aware of the manipulation or whether the persuader manages to conceal it, are a matter worthy of investigation.

When Gertrude, in response to the murder of Polonius, reproaches Hamlet with the words "O what a rash and bloody deed is this!" [*Hamlet*, III/iv,27], one should expect that this criticism of his behaviour has an unfavourable effect on the persuasion. It is potentially harmful because it contains an implicit attack on Hamlet's *ethos*. This is all the more critical for Hamlet since he is about to rebuke his mother for her moral shortcomings. Hence, being accused of immoral behaviour himself, strongly endangers his credibility. Yet, Hamlet manages to divert Gertrude's attention from his own conduct to hers by changing the subject. He does so, however, not in an entirely abrupt way, but by utilizing her exclaim and adopting a key word: "A *bloody deed*. Almost as bad, good mother,/ As kill a king and marry with his brother." [28/29] In a responsive

[304] Käsermann, Marie-Louise and Andreas Altorfer "Obstruction in Conversation: A Triadic Case Study", Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 8, 1989, 53.

part, he first seems to agree with Gertrude's view, but immediately dismisses it in an initiatory sentence, in which he, by a *comparatio*, shifts the topic. By placing a key word of the persuadee's utterance in a new context, Hamlet sets his own perspective while at the same time creating local (but not global) coherence and, consequently, including the prior turn in this perspective-setting. Thus, Hamlet stages a 'collaborative perspective-setting'. That he is successful becomes obvious when Gertrude accepts the change of topic in her next turn. One reason for the success of this manoeuvre is that Hamlet simply accepts Gertrude's view, instead of arguing with her on the point, and quickly dismisses it. Her reproach is not only ineffectual, it also provides a key word for Hamlet's accusation. Thus, Gertrude is unwillingly made to promote the persuasive discourse.

When Brutus responds to Cassius' use of insinuations in the *exordium* with a disapproving metacommunicative remark, Cassius surprisingly succeeds in utilizing even this rejection to introduce a further significant aspect into the persuasion:

> Bru. Into what dangers would you lead me, Cassius,
> That you would have me seek into myself
> For that which is not in me?
> Cas. Therefore, good Brutus, be prepar'd to hear;
> And since you know you cannot see yourself
> So well as by reflection, I, your glass,
> Will modestly discover to yourself,
> That of yourself which you yet know not of. [*Julius Caesar*,I/ii,62-69]

Cassius uses the objection to prepare his monological *narratio* and *argumentatio* which he announces in this passage. The initial "Therefore" assumes a coherence of their utterances, that is, Cassius claims that his subsequent explanations will somehow answer the question and will thereby dispel Brutus' doubts concerning the credibility of Cassius' initial insinuations. Thus, by starting his turn with the adverb 'therefore', which indicates a causal relationship, Cassius creates local coherence as Gumperz defines it when he states that "each sentence in its surface form must contain some direct or indirect indication as to how it fits into the stream of talk."[305] Cassius does not answer Brutus' question directly; in a way, he even ignores it or, as Miles puts it, "brushes [it] aside"[306], but, at the same time pretends that his reply is coherent or relevant, and therefore addresses the objection. Similar to Hamlet, Cassius quickly dismisses unfavourable utterances. In Cassius' case, this is not as obvious as in the example from *Hamlet*, since Cassius does not change the topic. Moreover, he justifies his way of

[305] Gumperz, 119.
[306] Miles, Geoffrey, Shakespeare and the Constant Romans, Oxford 1996, 139.

continuing the dialogue not so much by local than by global coherence, which gives him more freedom with regard to the details of his turn.

It is interesting to note that Cassius dissipates Brutus' doubts about his credibility by highlighting his objectivity with the image of the mirror. This metaphor implicitly also deals with the persuadee's involvement in the persuasion. The image of the mirror is based on the assumption that Brutus does not simply learn about himself from Cassius, but that he actively realizes new aspects about himself by perceiving a reflection of himself and drawing his own conclusions. With respect to the persuasive discourse, which apparently is meant to be a sort of verbal mirror, this active role of the addressee can be compared to the sense-making process in which the persuadee is engaged while listening and responding.

While persuadees like Brutus or Gertude accept their interlocutors' utilization of an utterance, which either alters its meaning or fails to do justice to it (for example, by dismissing its true import), so that the persuaders can successfully create the impression of a 'collaborative perspective-setting', others oppose such attempts and thwart the persuaders' scheme of making an originally unfavourable utterance serve their interests. Several examples might be given from *Richard III.* On the one hand, Anne is highly aware of Richard's intention of reinterpreting her utterances to change their meaning and vehemently objects to these attempts. On the other hand, Richard does not subtly make her turns fit his intention, nor does he pretend to actually consider his interlocutor's (counter-)perspective before utilizing it, as Cassius and Hamlet do. His manner of making Anne's turns support his own argumentation is an obvious one that helps to introduce a perspective which extremely differs from hers.

After Richard confesses his 'love' to Anne, pretending that this was the reason of his murders, they are engaged in a conflict talk in which Richard utilizes her attacks for the introduction of arguments that support his cause. Nevertheless, this is not done in a provocative manner but in a way that aims at making Anne share his perspective:

> Anne. Never hung poison on a fouler toad.
> Out of my sight! Thou dost infect mine eyes.
> Rich. Thine eyes, sweet lady, have infected mine.
> Anne. Would they were basilisks, to strike thee dead.
> Rich. I would they were, that I might die at once;
> For now they kill me with a living death. [I/ii,151-56]

As Aronsson observes, one characteristic feature of conflict talk is topical conflict.[307] Participants talk about different subjects and try to force their topics upon each other,

[307] Aronsson, 197f.

thereby actually talking past one another. In this exchange, Anne curses Richard to express her hatred and to demonstrate that she is unaffected by his arguments. Richard in his replies attempts to change the topic and to talk about the story of his love. He utilizes Anne's curses by taking up key words which she uses, to initiate further protestations of love. Since they talk about quite dissimilar topics, Anne and Richard use these key words with different meanings or connotations. For example, Anne uses the verb 'infect' with a decidedly negative meaning: the sight of Richard, she argues to get rid of him, is unbearable for her. Richard repeats the word in a *polyptoton*, yet uses it to refer to his falling in love with Anne at the sight of her. Although Richard's pose of the suffering lover who is tormented by the refusal of his mistress might also be said to give his use of the word 'infect' a negative connotation, the situations that are described by it in each case are widely different from one another. It has to be noted that both speakers use the word 'infect' metaphorically. Since the metaphor can be quite innovative and allows for very striking combinations of images[308], words used in a metaphoric sense are especially apt to have widely different meanings. Moreover, Richard takes up the word 'dead' in a *paronymy* [dead-die-death] to emphasize the suffering he endures due to his unrequited love. Also in this case, he alters the meaning of words initially used by Anne. While her wish that her eyes might be capable of killing Richard is to be taken quite seriously, Richard does not use the idea of dying in a literal sense, which becomes clear in his paradoxical description of his present situation as 'a living death'. Thus, in this passage Richard gives Anne's words another meaning that supports the perspective he means to establish. Unlike similar examples earlier in the dialogue, his utilization of Anne's utterances is here not meant to provoke protest but to convince Anne. He arranges a collaborative perspective-setting which, although Anne at first resists him, proves successful in the long term.

In dialogue, persuaders frequently exploit their interlocutors' utterances to support the persuasion by introducing new material. These elements of the persuasion are closely connected to or based on the persuadee's turn, either further developing its idea or adopting parts of it, such as individual words or phrases. Therefore it seems as if both interlocutors participated in the initiation of elements of the persuasion. Since the persuader arranges this 'collaborative perspective-setting', the persuadee does, of course, not actively initiate these parts of the persuasion, nor does s/he actually

[308] Plett points out that metaphors differ with respect to their conventionality, and accordingly distinguishes between metaphors that have already become stereotypical and those that are more striking due to their novelty. [Plett, 1991, 88]

collaborate with the persuader. Rather, the persuader utilizes the persuadee's utterances against his or her will. Nevertheless, this strategy quite efficiently justifies that something is brought up in a dialogue. Since the persuader uses the prior turn as a basis for his or her own contribution to the dialogue, s/he avoids creating the impression that s/he forces something upon the persuadee. Instead, both interlocutors seem to share the responsibility for an element of the persuasion being initiated in the course of the dialogue, since both of them participate in the discourse.

As the range of examples discussed in 5.3.2.2. demonstrates, a clever persuader is able to use virtually anything for the introduction of an argument. The efficiency of the argument apparently does not depend on the attitude expressed by the persuadee. Persuaders utilize favourable utterances as well as those that seem to hinder the persuasion. While in the first case, the persuader may easily establish coherence between the turns, unfavourable utterances are frequently utilized by placing key words in a different context, thus altering their meaning. Coherence is then primarily created on a formal but less on a semantic level. As a result, the manner in which the persuader continues the discourse varies significantly with respect to its coherence. As an extreme, the dialogue can be characterized as a verbal battle with only superficial coherence.

5.3.2.3. Shared Responsibility

So far it was possible to clearly distinguish between cases in which persuadees actively initiate elements of the persuasion, and cases in which the persuader utilizes an utterance of the persuadee that was not meant to elicit such an introduction of elements of the persuasion. Due to the mutuality inherent in dialogue such distinctions are, of course, never entirely free of ambiguity. As was demonstrated, active initiatives by the persuadee may be more or less provoked by the persuader. On the other hand, a persuadee's utterance may at times be so in accord with the persuader's argumentation that it offers an ideal basis for a further argument. Accordingly, it may also occur that the individual contributions to the initiation of an element of the persuasion are so inextricably connected with and dependent on one another, that the persuader and the persuadee are about equally responsible for its introduction. As opposed to the passages discussed in the previous section, one can speak of an actual, instead of a staged, collaborative perspective-setting.

A collaborative initiation of the *narratio* occurs in *Julius Caesar*. Although the *narratio* itself is spoken only by Cassius, both interlocutors contribute on their own account to its introduction:

Bru. […]
But wherefore do you hold me here so long?
What is it that you would impart to me?
If it be aught toward the general good,
Set honour in one eye, and death i'th'other,
And I will look on both indifferently;
For let the gods so speed me as I love
The name of honour more than I fear death.
Cas. I know that virtue to be in you, Brutus,
As well as I do know your outward favour.
Well, honour is the subject of my story. [*Julius Caesar*, I/ii,82-91]

The first two verses quite obviously constitute active, direct initiations by Brutus, which might have been discussed in 5.3.2.1. Yet, his involvement in the introduction of the *narratio* becomes more intricate and subtle thereafter. He speaks hypothetically ('If it be') about its subject, speculating in detail that Cassius might intend to discuss a matter of great importance which might finally present him with the alternatives of either choosing to save his life or deciding to risk his life for honour. Furthermore, Brutus reveals what his decision would be in that case. He claims that arguments based on honour would invariably persuade him, even if he would have to accept death as a consequence. He thereby reminds Cassius of the specific disposition of his persuadee, namely that, according to Brutus' conception of himself, honourableness is his central trait of character. Thus, Brutus, by informing Cassius what kind of subject would interest and what kind of argumentation would impress him, implicitly asks Cassius to present an issue that is in some way motivated by honourable intentions. Consequently, one might argue that Brutus initiates the *narratio* in a rather specifying, restrictive manner and thus decidedly influences Cassius' response.

Yet, one might just as well argue that Cassius cleverly utilizes Brutus' speculations and repeats the key word 'honour' to ensure Brutus' interest and to make him biased in favour of the 'story' that is then recounted. Cassius explicitly refers to Brutus' conception of himself ('*that* virtue'), confirming him in this evaluation to secure his goodwill. Then, he claims that honour is indeed the subject he meant to discus. He utilizes Brutus' utterance not only to introduce the *narratio*, but to introduce it in a way that suits Brutus and that makes him well disposed towards it. Critics have argued that Cassius merely uses this key word as a strategy to meet the expectations of Brutus and to prejudice his mind in Cassius' favour. As Paris points out, the details of the *narratio*, in which Cassius dwells upon the physical inadequacies of Caesar, have little to do with honour.[309]

Interpretations of the characters of Brutus and Cassius differ remarkably in the literature. A central controversy concerns the question whether Brutus' honourableness can be taken at face value or whether it is a myth created by himself and others which is based on a misconception of himself. Similarly critics disagree as to the nature of Cassius' motivation for instigating a conspiracy against Caesar. While some hold that Cassius' reasons are entirely political[310], which means that his honour as a defender of the Roman republic is indeed a crucial factor, others maintain that Cassius is mainly motivated by his personal envy and hatred of Caesar[311]. If one agrees with the latter, Cassius' claim that honour is the subject of his story, seems merely a rhetorical trick to utilize Brutus' request in order to increase the chances of his success.

Both Brutus and Cassius appear to be more or less ambiguous characters.[312] This complexity needs to be considered when analysing their behaviour in dialogue. Since Brutus' reputation as an honourable man is generally accepted in Rome, and even is a prominent reason why Cassius wants to win him over to the conspiracy, it cannot simply be a myth. However, Brutus' conception of himself is so dominated by this one quality that for himself it assumes a myth-like status. Cassius seems to be aware of this and deliberately plays upon it. Cassius' own sincerity with regard to his political or personal motivation has repeatedly been questioned. The anecdotes he recounts about Caesar seem to testify to his personal envy of Caesar as he dwells upon his physical weaknesses which might be understood as an attempt to belittle him. Yet, as has been argued before [4.3.1.1.(b)], Cassius focuses on these examples of Caesar's vulnerability to argue that, as an ordinary human being, Caesar has no right to assume a position that places him far above the rest of the Roman citizens. Consequently, his political motives for persuading Brutus are to be taken seriously. Therefore, his claim that honour is the subject he wants to talk about is not merely a rhetorical trick. Though Brutus' speculations are quite convenient for Cassius, since they offer the key word 'honour'

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309 Paris, Bernard J., Character as a Subversive Force in Shakespeare: The History and Roman Plays, London and Toronto, 1991, 11.
Leggatt, Alexander, Shakespeare's Political Drama: The History Plays and the Roman Plays, London and New York 1990, 142f..
310 For example Müller, 1979, 96. However, Müller also acknowledges that in Cassius' attitude towards Caesar personal and political motives are inextricably mingled (102).
311 Gregson, J.M., Public and Private Man in Shakespeare, London and Canberra 1983, 207;
Thomas, Vivian, Shakespeare's Roman Worlds, London and New York, 1989, 72f., Paris, Bernard J., 1991, 115.
312 Leggatt, 152.

which he calculatingly takes up, there is no doubt as to his belief in the honourableness or the justification of his intention to defend republican ideals. Thus, in a rather complex collaborative endeavour or, in Linell's terms, in a communicative project, Brutus and Cassius are both involved in the introduction of the *narratio* that is to follow.

5.3.2.4. Prevention or Delaying of Elements of the Persuasion

For a comprehensive account of the different ways in which a persuadee may influence the initiation of elements of the persuasion, it is necessary to also consider examples in which the persuadee prevents the persuader from introducing certain parts of the persuasion into the dialogue, or in which s/he causes the introduction to be delayed. Unlike verbal behaviour of the persuadee that in effect promotes the persuasion (5.3.2.1. and 5.3.2.3.) or that can somehow be *made* to benefit the persuasion (5.3.2.2.), the persuadee's influence is, in these cases, either actually harmful or presents considerable obstacles to the persuader's success. Hence, these examples seem to be a (complementary) counterpart of those discussed so far in this chapter.

When Richard tries to assure Elizabeth of his sincerity and, as an argument of *ethos*, begins an oath , she repeatedly intervenes, each time denying him the right to appeal to some authority as a witness of his honesty:

K.Rich. Now by my George, my Garter, and my crown –
Eliz. Profan'd, dishonour'd, and the third usurp'd.
K.Rich. I swear –
Eliz. By nothing, for this is no oath:
[…]
If something thou wouldst swear to be believ'd,
Swear then by something that thou hast not wrong'd.
K.Rich. Now, by the world –
Eliz. 'Tis full of thy foul wrongs.
K.Rich. My father's death –
Eliz. Thy life hath it dishonour'd.
K.Rich. Then by my self –
Eliz. Thy self is self-misus'd. [*Richard III*, IV/iv,366-376]

Since she in a verbally aggressive behaviour cuts him short, as is emphasized typographically by the dashes at the end of his turns, Elizabeth keeps Richard from setting his perspective. At first, he tries to ignore her interventions. Although Elizabeth immediately discredits his 'witnesses' on the basis that Richard has dishonoured them, he continues the sentence in his next turn with the subject and verb 'I swear'. Elizabeth again interrupts him to argue more elaborately that Richard's oath by "[his] George, [his] Garter, and [his] crown" would be invalid, and to demand a valid vow from him.

She thereby forces him to start his sentence anew, this time not even allowing him to utter more than half a verse, cutting him short before the verb. In the same manner, Elizabeth insistently stops each new attempt by Richard to assure her of his sincerity, which would be a crucial point in this dialogue in which Richard's entire lack of *ethos* is the primal impediment to the success of the persuasion. In this passage, Elizabeth, due to her ability to see through Richard's deception, significantly delays Richard's protestations of his honesty which, when he finally gets the chance to complete it [397ff], has lost virtually all of its credibility. Elizabeth thus hinders the persuasion by restraining Richard from introducing an aspect that would contribute to a development of the dialogue which would suit his purposes. Slights concludes that "[s]he keeps him locked into the rhetoric of swearing for thirty consecutive lines, thus preventing him from shifting the grounds of his wooing as he had done so successfully in the parallel scene with Lady Anne in Act I."[313]

Yet, also in his dialogue with Anne, Richard is faced with a persuadee who, at least in the beginning of their encounter, proves a vigorous opponent and for some time prevents him from making a contribution to the dialogue that would significantly forward the persuasion. At an early stage of their encounter, Richard announces his intention to acquit himself of the murder of her husband and her father-in-law. Since Anne's hostility is raised by these crimes, it is a precondition of Richard's success to convince Anne that he is not the sole person to blame for the murders. Richard's claim that he is able to prove his innocence already prefigures his ingenious move of blaming Anne herself later on. At this point, however, Anne manages to delay his planned acquittal. She does so mainly by responses in which she rejects Richard's point of view as it is revealed in his suggestions. Therefore, Anne's behaviour will be discussed in detail in 5.3.3. For the present argumentation it is merely necessary to point out that Richard twice attempts to initiate defences of himself by begging leave to do so, and that each time she refuses to hear his excuses. First, he asks Anne "Of these supposed crimes, to give [him] leave,/ By circumstance, but to acquit [himself]." [76/77]. After being denied, he makes another attempt to initiate his defence, only to be inhibited again:

Rich. Fairer than tongue can name thee, let me have
Some patient leisure to excuse myself.
Anne. Fouler than heart can think thee thou canst make
No excuse current but to hang thyself. [81-84]

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[313] Slights, William W.E., "'Swear by thy gracious self': Self-referential Oaths in Shakespeare", <u>English Studies in Canada</u>, 13, 1987, 153.

Thus, Richard is finally able to commence his vindication only because he skilfully utilizes a remark of Anne's that was not meant to assist him but, on the contrary, to oppose his intentions in the dialogue [86-89]. Anne herself actively seeks to prevent him from introducing this point in the dialogue. Due to her rhetorical skills she is quite successful for a short time. However, as Richard's rhetorical power easily rises to hers, she cannot oppose him long until he seizes an opportunity to introduce his argument in spite of her rejections.

From the very beginning of their encounter, Leontes is decidedly unwilling to let Paulina talk to him. As the audience learns, he even gave orders to the effect that she should not be admitted to him, as he obviously foresaw her indignation at Hermione's imprisonment and her decision to try and help the queen. Consequently, Leontes is determined not to listen to Paulina. Instead of openly facing her, he seeks to avoid the dialogue, perhaps fearing the verbal power she demonstrated in her encounter with the guard in II/ii. By refusing to enter into a dialogue with Paulina and, for example, to take her hints during the *exordium*, 'aiding' her with questions in the introduction of the subject, Leontes actually hinders the persuasion to a considerable extent. The effects of this behaviour can be demonstrated by the example of the following passage which begins with the first words Paulina addresses to Leontes:

Paul. No noise, my lord; but needful conference
About some gossips for your highness.
Leon. How!
Away with that audacious lady! Antigonus,
I charg'd thee that she should not come about me.
I knew she would.
Ant. I told her so, my lord,
On your displeasure's peril and on mine,
She should not visit you.
Leon. What! Canst not rule her?
Paul. From all dishonesty he can: in this –
Unless he take the course that you have done,
Commit me for committing honour – trust it,
He shall not rule me. [*Winter's Tale*, II/iii,40-50]

In her first turn, Paulina clearly tries to raise Leontes' interest in the topic she intends to introduce. In a manner characteristic of discourse which is meant to perform the function *attentum parare* as an essential aspect of an *exordium*, she uses vague phrases, such as 'some gossips', meant to stir the interlocutor's curiosity, and even reinforces the effects of the insinuation by creating a sense of urgency ('*needful* conference'). Leontes' reaction is extremely discouraging. It does not in the least enable Paulina to reveal what she intends to tell him, but, on the contrary, makes it impossible for her to introduce the subject. Leontes does not attack Paulina but downright refuses to accept her as an interlocutor. He ignores her and addresses her husband instead, calling him by his name and using the pronoun 'thee' for a direct address. To Paulina he only refers in the third person, that is, he talks *about* but not *to* her. By calling her "that audacious lady" he clearly expresses his disapproval of Paulina's courage to approach him as well as his disinclination to become engaged in a dialogue with her. Since Leontes addresses Antigonus, he, according to the rules for turn taking, selects him as the next speaker.[314] Thus, he prevents Paulina from introducing the next step of the persuasion, for example by utilizing his utterance despite its unfavourable import. Leontes' next turn is a question directed at Antigonus who is, consequently, again selected as next speaker. Thus, Leontes also technically denies Paulina the opportunity to initiate any part of the persuasion. The exchange between Leontes and Antigonus is finally stopped by Paulina who interrupts it. Although Leontes' question clearly assigned Antigonus as the next speaker, Paulina "self-selects"[315] and answers in his stead. Her answer encloses further insinuations [48/49] that allude to the subject she seeks to raise. Paulina thereby on her own creates opportunities to initiate elements of the persuasion despite Leontes' efforts to silence her. That she is yet able to continue the persuasive discourse, disregarding the king's address of another person as a means to avoid a dialogue with her, is impressive evidence of her verbal force. Soon thereafter she is able to initiate the subject in more specific terms ("I come/ From your good queen." [57/58]), and later even manages to introduce detailed proof to support her claim that the child she carries is the legitimate daughter of Leontes [97-107].

However, Leontes' determination to silence Paulina finally proves stronger than her persistence with which she advances the persuasive discourse. He repeatedly addresses persons other than Paulina and in the end has her removed from the chamber before she can initiate the *conclusio* of the persuasion. His refusal to directly address Paulina, thereby denying her autonomy as a person, as Beyenburg rightly observes, is a major reason of Pailina's failure[316]. Part of Leontes' triumph over Paulina admittedly has to be attributed to the difference of power and social status between him and Paulina rather than the direct effect of his utterances. He has the means and the right to have her forced away before she has finished. Yet, as the analysis was meant to show, Leontes by selecting a person other than the persuader as next speaker significantly delays the introduction of elements of the persuasion.

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314 Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, 13.
315 Ibid.
316 Beyenburg, 148.

Interestingly, there do not seem to be material differences between the potentially harmful nature of the persuadee's utterances in these cases and in those discussed in 5.3.2.2.(c). What makes the one harmful and the other eventually beneficial is not so much the utterance itself, but rather what the persuader can make of it. This is an important result of the analysis which illustrates the point that in dialogue, *all* participants are responsible for the meaning and effect of any one reply and for the general development of the discourse. Which utterances of the persuadee actually benefit and which impede the persuasion is determined by the persuadee *and* the persuader.

5.3.3. Responses to Parts of the Persuasion

While in 5.3.2. different ways of perspective-setting in persuasive dialogues were discussed, we shall now turn our attention to its complementary process, namely to the issue of perspective-taking. Quite obviously, the persuadee determines the success of the persuader's efforts by either accepting or rejecting the perspective that is set by the persuader in the course of the dialogue. Unlike in a persuasive speech the question whether or not the persuader's words have the desired effect on the persuadee is directly answered in persuasive dialogues. Due to the interrelatedness of the interlocutor's utterances, the persuadee's response to a part of the persuasion necessarily reveals his or her attitude towards the persuader's statements, that is, it discloses whether s/he accepts an offered perspective. One should assume that the persuadee promotes the persuasion by accepting a point of view voiced by the persuader and hinders it by refusing to agree with the persuader. How this influence of the persuadee presents itself in the individual dialogues and, in consequence, either verifies or disproves such an assumption, will be set forth in the following investigation.

A central issue with respect to the persuadee's responses to elements of the persuasion which was already mentioned briefly in the beginning of this chapter (5.3.1.) is the mutual construction of meaning in persuasive dialogues. If a persuadee shares the opinion expressed by the persuader, the interlocutors agree on the meaning given to the subject(s) of the dialogue. This means that the mutually accepted meaning coincides with the one postulated by the persuader, *because* the persuadee decides to support it. The persuader cannot, on his or her own, determine the meaning of subjects discussed in the dialogue, or more clearly, the mutual point of view towards the subject is negotiated by the interlocutors.[317] If a persuadee does not (immediately) share the persuader's opinion but expresses a view of his or her own which differs from the persuader's point of view, the perspectives of the interlocutors are at a greater variance than in cases of immediate agreement. Consequently, the dialogic quality is greater in such examples, because the perspectives that encounter each other in the dialogue can more easily be distinguished as different perspectives. Meaning is then mutually constructed in a process in which the differing perspectives have to compete. Utterances in which the persuader's perspective is rejected challenge the meaning s/he assigns to particular 'objects' and initiate a negotiation of this meaning. The agreement on meaning is insofar of immediate relevance to persuasive dialogues as the development of a shared point of view, which ideally coincides with the persuader's own perspective, is the central goal pursued by the persuader in the dialogue. In contrast, interlocutors in non-teleological dialogues are not necessarily interested in agreeing upon a shared interpretation of things. As Foppa argues, it should not be assumed that mutual agreement is the primary goal of all dialogues. Rather, in some kinds of dialogue the opposite seems to be the case.[318]

5.3.3.1. Acceptance of an Offered Perspective

Persuadees crucially contribute to the success of the persuasion by accepting the perspective expressed in parts of the persuasion in their responses to them. In order to understand the extent of their own responsibility for such contributions, one needs to consider the specific circumstances of each case. Particularly, it is of interest how willingly persuadees accept the persuaders' views and whether persuaders use additional means to increase the probability of their words being accepted by their interlocutors. These issues will be taken into account in the following discussion of relevant examples.

5.3.3.1.(a) Uncritical Versus Restrained Agreement

Obviously, a persuadee who in a response fully and without hesitation accepts the view postulated by the persuader promotes the persuasion more effectively than s/he would by a more reserved agreement. Hence, to assess the persuadee's contribution to the dialogue, one needs to investigate how readily and how widely s/he adopts a perspective introduced by the persuader.

[317] Marková and Foppa, 1991, 265; Morris, 35.
[318] Foppa, 1987, 254.

Some persuadees hardly seem to reflect their interlocutors' claims before endorsing them, but almost immediately utter their full agreement. Gloucester, for example, apparently does not take the time to question the claims with which Edmund confronts him. His response to the letter echoes the perspective it contains:

> Glou. […] *Come to me,*
> *that of this I may speak more. If your father would sleep till*
> *I wak'd him, you should enjoy half his revenue for ever,*
> *and live the beloved of your brother,* EDGAR. – Hum!
> Conspiracy! 'Sleep till I wak'd him, – you should
> enjoy half his revenue.' My son Edgar! [*King Lear*, I/ii,49-54]

At first sight, this passage does not seem to have a dialogic form, since there is only one speaker. Yet, there are two distinct voices which take turns. One of them is supposedly Edgar's voice (though it actually represents the perspective Edmund wishes to impose on Gloucester). Although Gloucester by reading the letter speaks these words, they seem to be formulated by Edgar, as the signature at the end of the letter as well as the deictic references to persons which are based on Edgar as the 'subject' ('me', 'our father', 'his revenue'), attest. Since the media of the two 'speakers' differ – one uses the written and one the oral form – the dialogic form is not overtly recognizable.

The issue of the dialogic form of this passage is further complicated by Edmund's deception. The letter is supposedly written by Edgar and addressed to Edmund (who is referred to as 'you'). Gloucester is apparently not the addressee of the letter. Hence, his response seems to be outside the true communicative context. However, since the letter was in fact written by Edmund for the sole purpose to be read by Gloucester, the true communicative situation is significantly different. Gloucester is the addressee of Edmund's information about Edgar, or, in rhetorical terms, of Edmund's *narratio*. Of course, he is not aware of the fact that this information is not provided by Edgar himself but by Edmund. Gloucester's response is not outside but a part of the true communicative situation, and consequently the passage does have an (admittedly unusual) dialogic form.

With respect to quality, two different perspectives, namely Edmund's disguised perspective and that of Gloucester, encounter each other. That these perspectives initially differ is quite obvious. Gloucester's expression of surprise [53] clearly shows that his picture of his son Edgar is not in accordance with the way in which he is presented in the letter. Yet, his response also reveals how quickly Gloucester's opinion changes as a result of the encounter with an alternative perspective. Without further inquiries or reflection he immediately adopts the view suggested by the letter. His evaluative exclaim 'Conspiracy!' reveals that he interprets the context, or, more specifically, the person of Edgar in accordance with the perspective contained in the letter. He accepts the picture of Edgar as a traitor that is presented. It is remarkable how quickly and how fully Gloucester alters his view. He reflects the contents of the letter only briefly by repeating some of its central phrases (53/54). That he merely quotes the exact words, but does not comment on them in a modifying manner already indicates how uncritical Gloucester deals with these claims. He seems quite ready to be persuaded of the betrayal of his son.

This readiness may in part be explained by the wider context of the dialogue. Before he first addresses Edmund, Gloucester reflects on the sudden collapses of relationships that were formerly characterized by loyalty ("Kent banish'd thus! And France in choler parted!" [I/ii,23]. Afterwards, he interprets the import of the dialogue within this context: "Love cools, friendship falls off, brothers divide: in cities, mutinies; in countries, discord; in palaces, treason; and the bond crack'd 'twixt son and father. This villain of mine comes under the prediction; there's son against father: the King falls from bias of nature; there's father against child." [103-109] Apparently, the latest events have prepared him for yet another close relationship to break down. The circumstances have made him prone to quickly suspect Edgar and to believe in his deceitfulness. According to Kossick, he regards the recent events as an ill omen and "already sees the omen taking effect in the supposed villainy of his son Edgar"[319]. His suspiciousness, however, contrasts with Gloucester's credulity towards Edmund, which gives rise to the dramatic irony of the situation: due to Gloucester's readiness to believe in the betrayal of his son Edgar he becomes the victim of a betrayal of another kind by Edmund.

Also Gertrude quite readily takes the perspective offered by Hamlet and fully agrees with his account of her degenerate conduct. After Hamlet has extensively abused her, expressing extreme astonishment and disgust at her remarriage, Gertrude, instead of showing signs of indignation against his disrespectful attitude, completely surrenders to his perspective:

> Queen. O Hamlet speak no more.
> Thou turn'st my eyes into my very soul,
> And there I see such black and grained spots
> As will not leave their tinct. [III/iv,88-91]

[319] Kossick, S.G. "*King Lear*: Act I, Scene ii – The Character of Edmund", CRUX: A Journal of the Teaching of English, 16, 1982, 33.

This response shows that Gertrude without reservation accepts all points of Hamlet's criticism contained in his prior utterance [53-88]. She makes no attempt to defend her actions or to alter Hamlet's judgement in her favour. Moreover, she does not find alternative explanations of her ill choice of Claudius for a second husband. Like Hamlet she blames her own nature ('my very soul') rather than exterior circumstances for her mistake. As in the example from *King Lear*, the persuadee's use of evaluative language reveals that she accepts the persuader's view. Thus, Gertrude admits that Hamlet's words have made her aware of 'black and grained spots' in her soul. She thereby adopts Hamlet's interpretation of her behaviour as morally depraved and accepts the meaning he gives to it. This response by Gertrude reinforces the impression of her lack of strength and her willingness to assume a subordinate role in her relationships with others. Despite Hamlet's remarkably disrespectful and insulting verbal attacks, Gertrude does not protest but easily surrenders to his perspective. She lets herself be influenced by Hamlet without difficulty and thereby supports the persuasion. In his analysis of a dramatic dialogue in which one of the participants is similarly submissive and ready to accept her partner's perspective, Rommetveit concludes that the partner's dominance is "inextricably fused with and contingent upon [her] submission." Thus, interlocutors who are dominated by other speakers are insofar responsible for this inequality as they let themselves be dominated without "questioning [their interlocutors'] moral authority and premises for passing judgement."[320]

A persuadee, who even more willingly than Gertrude accepts the perspective introduced by the persuader, is Othello. He almost over-eagerly believes in the infidelity of Desdemona, never questioning the authenticity of Iago's "unsure observances" [III/iii,155]. This readiness even withstands Iago's apparent attempts to caution Othello as in the following example:

Iago. Fie, we may smell in such a will most rank,
Foul disproportion; thoughts unnatural.
But pardon me: I do not in position
Distinctly speak of her, though I may fear
Her will, recoiling to her better judgement,
May fall to match you with her country forms,
And happily repent.
Oth. Farewell, if more
Thou dost perceive, let me know more [*Othello*, III/iii,236-43]

Although Iago emphasizes that he speaks in general terms, and not particularly of Desdemona, Othello accepts his impertinent prediction concerning Desdemona's break

[320] Rommetveit, Ragnar, "Dominance and Asymmetry in *A Doll's House*", Ivana Marková and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Asymmetries in Dialogue, New York et al 1991, 209.

with him. Othello's response, though he makes no explicit comment on Iago's argument, reveals that he is ready to fully believe in its factualness. He gives expression to this acceptance by ordering Iago to inform him of future observations of a similar kind. Furthermore, when Iago takes his leave, Othello's despairing question to himself "Why did I marry?" [246] clearly shows that he has adopted Iago's perspective. Despite Iago's repeated warning to draw no premature conclusions about Desdemona, and to regard his observances with cautiousness, Othello already takes them for a fact:

> Iago. […]; in the mean time,
> Let me be thought too busy in my fears
> (As worthy cause I have to fear I am);
> And hold her free, I do beseech your honour.
> Oth. Fear not my government.
> Iago. I once more take my leave.
> Oth. This fellow's of exceeding honesty,
> And knows all qualities, with a learned spirit,
> Of human dealing; [III/iii,256-64]

Othello's response makes it clear that Iago's appeal to consider Desdemona innocent has no effect on him. Othello obviously regards him as an expert in questions of human behaviour and relationships and takes even his slightest suggestion for a fact. Thus he concludes, when he is left on his own, "I am abus'd, and my relief/ Must be to loathe her" [271/2]. Far from trusting in Desdemona's loyalty until substantial evidence of the opposite are presented, as Iago seems to advise him, Othello quickly accepts the perspective offered by Iago and shares his way of interpreting reality, for example by seeing Desdemona's kindness toward Cassio as a proof of her infidelity.

Othello's credulity, which is exposed by his striking over-eagerness to accept Iago's perspective, makes him a suitable victim of Iago's intrigues. Iago, of course, relies on Othello's lack of cautiousness. His warnings of prematurely condemning Desdemona are not to be taken seriously. A less susceptible interlocutor might take the advice to not immediately believe in Desdemona's guilt. With Othello, however, such advice has no effect. He accepts Iago's claims without reservation and determines that his love for Desdemona must change into hatred.

Lady Anne tends to be more critical. She is less eager to believe Richard and to adopt his views. Yet at times, especially towards the end of the dialogue, she too ignores her misgivings and accepts his perspective, though she entertains doubts about his sincerity. Thus, when Richard offers to kill himself at her bidding, the dialogue proceeds as follows:

Anne. I would I knew thy heart.
Rich. 'Tis figur'd in my tongue.
Anne. I fear me both are false.
Rich. Then never was man true.
Anne. Well, well, put up your sword. [*Richard III*, I/ii,196-200]

At first, Anne expresses serious doubts about Richard's trustworthiness. She strongly suspects that he deceives her [198]. She does not immediately adopt the persuader's perspective, as Othello, Gertrude, or Gloucester do, but for a considerable time maintains a contrary interpretation of reality. At this point, Richard's assurance of his honesty, which in itself does not seem remarkably convincing as it is not supported by any evidence, apparently changes her mind. Suddenly, Anne decides to trust him and to accept the perspective Richard offers her [200]. Anne's sudden change of mind after an argument, that is hardly fit to dispel her serious doubts, suggests that she is not truly convinced in a rational sense, but that she decides to deliberately ignore her doubts and to stop questioning Richard's motives. She is, at this point, rather willing to be persuaded. At the end of the dialogue, Anne is not only won by Richard's rhetorical dexterity, but also exhausted by his persistence. Giving up her resistance and accepting his perspective is finally easier for her than retaining her hostile attitude.

At times, the more critical persuadees agree with their interlocutors even less readily than Anne does, and take the time to reflect upon their perspective, thus seeming to accept it only partly. When Lady Macbeth first begins to 'pour her spirits in his ear' and already gives her husband detailed advice as to how he should conceal his treacherous schemes when facing his guests, Macbeth responds with a rather unenthusiastic and non-committal "We will speak further." [*Macbeth*, I/v,71] This seems a somewhat odd reaction to the elaborate suggestions Lady Macbeth has just made:

Lady M. Look like the time; bear welcome in your eye,
Your hand, your tongue: look like th'innocent flower,
But be the serpent under't. He that's coming
Must be provided for; [I/vii,64-67]

That Macbeth postpones the dialogue and thereby agrees to later continue their discussion of this topic is a first indication that he will finally accept the perspective of his wife and will adopt her plans. However, his primary motive for delaying the dialogue seems to be to win time. He does not clearly comment on his wife's suggestions, possibly in order to reflect upon them and to take his time for determining his own opinion, attempting to remain neutral in the meantime. It is, however, hardly possible at all to retain a neutral stance towards a perspective that is formulated in such a provokingly frank way. Indeed, Lady Macbeth is very outspoken in her advice. Her suggestion for Macbeth to act the part of the king's host, while planning to murder him, are so frank (the central idea is epitomized by the antithesis of the imperatives 'be' and 'seem', both of which belong to the most basic vocabulary of the English language) that it should provoke immediate protest if Macbeth was averse to the scheme of regicide. Since his reply involves no noticeable disapproval, one has to conclude that he accepts at least the general import of her words. However, although Macbeth accepts Lady Macbeth's blunt way of discussing their deception of the guests and their murderous 'business' of the following night, he is much more scrupulous than persuaders like Othello or Gertrude to adopt his interlocutor's perspective. He does not simply accept the point of view with which his wife confronts him but reflects upon it and takes his time to question it. In this respect, Macbeth is not as easily convinced as, for example, Gloucester is.

Also Brutus is rather reluctant to accept the perspective offered in the dialogue. When Cassius heavily employs means of *pathos* in his appeal to Brutus to take action against Caesar, the tone of Brutus' response already indicates a more reserved attitude. Cassius' emotional and effusive language strikingly contrasts with Brutus' composed, non-committal answer:

Cas. O, you and I have heard our fathers say,
There was a Brutus once that would have brook'd
Th'eternal devil to keep his state in Rome
As easily as a king.
Bru. That you do love me, I am nothing jealous;
What you would work me to, I have some aim:
How I have thought of this, and of these times,
I shall recount hereafter. For this present,
I would not (so with love I might entreat you)
Be any further mov'd. [*Julius Caesar*, I/ii,156-65]

Brutus' answer might almost be deemed insufficient. A rather obvious appeal such as the one by Cassius, according to the turn-taking rules, calls for either an acceptance or a rejection. Brutus apparently seeks to avoid making a decision immediately and, trying to conceal his thoughts, suggests to continue the dialogue at some other time ('hereafter'), thus delaying his decision. Just as Macbeth, he tries to win time by a non-committal response in order to be able to reflect on his interlocutor's perspective rather than accepting it unquestioned. Accordingly, Brutus ponders upon the question how Caesar is to be prevented from establishing a monarchy in Rome in a soliloquy after his dialogue with Cassius [II/i]. Moreover, Brutus also expresses his wish to be guided by his own ideas and thoughts rather than by someone else's influence [162-65]. The first two verses of Brutus' response contain the same sequence of pronouns ("you […] me […], I") which reflect Brutus' picture of himself as a rationally acting person. Rather than an object ('me') who is guided by Cassius, he sees himself as an independent subject ('I') who is capable of making his own decisions.[321] Hence, even if Cassius' words have greatly impressed him, Brutus does not want to reveal the entire effect of his persuasion before he has examined the arguments again for himself. As Gregson argues, Brutus wants to "revolv[e] Cassius' ideas, oblivious of the personality that is presenting them."[322] This strong sense of his own independence of thought makes Brutus very cautious about accepting another perspective, even if it, on the whole, seems to correspond to his own point of view.

However, despite these 'declarations' of his intellectual independence, Brutus betrays that he, already at this point, largely accepts Cassius' perspective. First, as in the example from *Macbeth*, one could argue that the very fact, that Brutus does not clearly reject such a precarious appeal but tries to postpone the dialogue, indicates that he actually accepts the perspective. Moreover, he closes his utterance with a statement which is much more explicit as to his acceptance of Cassius' reasoning:

> Till then, my noble friend, chew upon this:
> Brutus had rather be a villager
> Than to repute himself a son of Rome
> Under these hard conditions as this time
> Is like to lay upon us. [I/ii,169-73]

Brutus argues that he would prefer to give up the privilege of being a Roman citizen if Rome would indeed be governed by a monarch. For him, Rome derives its special value from the fact of its being a republic. The fact that Brutus is here influenced in his response by Cassius' argumentation is revealed by the language he uses. In his account of the process of perspective taking, Graumann observes that "the perspectival character of social judgement is largely determined by the language used for given objects of judgement […]. And we may only guess that sharing a frame of reference is mediated by sharing the vocabulary or the rhetoric of a given issue"[323]. With the help of deictic phrases ('these hard conditions', 'this time') Brutus refers to circumstances Cassius has described before. In addition, he adopts the plural form ("us", 173) which Cassius uses earlier in the dialogue to create bonds of sympathy and mutuality between them, thus accepting Cassius' concept of an opposition of Caesar on the one hand and noble

[321] Müller points out that Brutus, as a main character, is too complex to be won over in a single scene, and that his persuasion is completed in his soliloqui in II/i. (Müller, 1979, 111).
[322] Gregson, 208.
[323] Graumann, 1989, 102f.

Romans, who defend the Republican ideal, on the other hand. This is a crucial point since it, on a lexical level, prefigures and justifies the conspiracy against Caesar. Thus, Brutus' argument is strongly influenced by Cassius' language and, consequently, also by the ideas Cassius explicated with the help of this language. With the idea of an opposition between Caesar and the rest of the Roman citizens, Brutus adopts Cassius' way of interpreting the complex reality and of giving a particular meaning to it. Although Brutus is obviously much inclined to agree with Cassius, he deliberately delays his final decision to avoid making a hasty resolution. Such an addressee is quite a challenge to a persuader, since he is not won easily.

On the whole, to understand the persuadees' role in persuasive dialogues, and especially their contribution to its success, it is illuminating to investigate whether in cases in which a persuadee accepts the perspective offered by his or her interlocutor, s/he willingly and fully adopts the persuader's view, or whether s/he only reluctantly and more carefully does so. Brutus and Macbeth tend to be somewhat critical and do not easily change their own perspective. This critical attitude, which of course does not necessarily guide all of their responses but becomes apparent only at individual points, makes them more difficult to persuade than less critical addressees, such as Gertrude, Othello, or Gloucester. These persuadees seem quite willing to be persuaded which is revealed by their way of eagerly adopting the persuaders' perspective in their responses. Their uncritical attitude prevents them from putting any obstacles in the persuader's way, who with a minimal effort can successfully influence them. Lady Anne's reaction, which was discussed above, is to some extent ambiguous. Though she is at first decidedly critical of Richard's protestations of love, she suddenly ignores her doubts and accepts his claims, apparently without any motivation. She makes a conscious decision to uncritically adopt Richard's point of view despite her strong suspicion of his falsehood. Thus, she represents an essentially critical interlocutor, such as Brutus, who decides to cease reflecting upon the perspective offered by the persuader and to behave like the less critical kind of persuadees who makes it relatively easy for the persuader to influence him or her.

5.3.3.1.(b) Methods of Increasing the Likelihood of Agreement

Since an addressee's uncritical attitude obviously increases the persuader's chances of being successful, it seems quite reasonable that s/he should seek to reduce the persuadee's mistrust of his or her perspective to increase the likelihood of it being accepted. Apparently, persuaders tend to employ means of manipulation for thus ensuring the acceptance of their perspectives. Hence, persuadees are not always simply uncritical by themselves, when they accept a view without sufficient scrutiny, but at times are given a false sense of the reliability of the persuaders' claims. The consideration of this issue is necessary to complete the picture of the persuadee's contribution to the persuasion in cases when s/he accepts the persuader's perspective. At times s/he cannot be blamed for not being more critical because s/he is deceived by the impression of reliability created by the persuader. In order to present comprehensible results, only those kinds of manipulation will be considered that can be observed on a microlevel, namely within individual passages. There will only be references to explicit attempts by the persuader to prevent the persuadee from critical reflections, which are immediately followed by an accepting response by the persuadee.

Thus, the example from *King Lear* discussed at the beginning of this section, in which Gloucester's instantaneous response to the letter is his exclamation "Conspiracy!" [I/ii,53], is greatly determined by the fact that Edmund has presented the perspective he wants Gloucester to adopt in a faked letter. In other words, it is supported by (fictitious) proof. Gloucester never questions the claim that Edgar has abandoned his loyalty towards his father and plans to conspire against him, because he apparently holds a reliable piece of evidence of the authenticity of this claim in his own hands. Had this perspective been presented in another form, had for instance Edmund merely told Gloucester of Edgar's plans to get rid of their father, he might have reacted with greater doubts or at least caution. However, rather than speculating what Gloucester's response might have been under different circumstances, it is important to note that the impression of authenticity created by Edmund prevents Gloucester from being overly critical and consequently increases the probability that Gloucester adopts the perspective set by Edmund without careful reflections.

Also Iago takes care to reduce the probability of Othello becoming suspicious and questioning his arguments when he comes to critical points of the persuasion. When he argues that Desdemona has a deceitful nature, he creates the impression of reliability by displaying his special knowledge of human nature and of a culture in which Othello is still a stranger and which he hence does not know as profoundly as Iago does:

Iago. I know our country disposition well;
In Venice they do let God see the pranks
They dare not show their husbands: their best conscience
Is not to leave undone, but keep unknown.
Oth. Dost thou say so?
Iago. She did deceive her father, marrying you;

And when she seem'd to shake and fear your looks,
She lov'd them most.
Oth. And so she did. [*Othello*, III/iii,205-212]

Since apparently Iago's perspective is based on the knowledge he has of the customs and morals in Venice, Othello as an (ethnic) outsider has hardly any choice but to believe him and to accept this picture of Venetian depravity. His response, which reveals his interest in this piece of information which is new to him, clearly shows that Othello acknowledges Iago's advantage in knowledge. Othello's question "Dost thou say so?" has to be understood as a move in which he accepts the perspective offered by Iago. It is not a critical or suspicious inquiry, but a question that is meant to elicit a confirmation to reassure himself of the factuality of what he has just heard. After Iago has established his status as an authority on Venetian habits, thus making an uncritical acceptance of his argument by Othello highly probable, he speaks about Desdemona's immorality in particular. Consequently, his argument develops from the general ('they', 'their', 206f.) to the specific ('she', 210ff.), so that his claim about Desdemona is supported by his insight into Venetian practices in general. This argumentative structure makes Othello also accept Iago's perspective concerning Desdemona without critically reflecting on the justification of his reasoning ("And so she did.") With this response Othello accepts a perspective which gives a meaning to Desdemona's behaviour that is extremely negative. Falseness, especially towards persons to whom she appears to be most loyal, seems to be her central characteristic. In this passage Othello adopts a picture of reality and a way of interpreting his wife's conduct which is highly biased, as the language used by Iago suggests. The central verbs he uses to characterize Desdemona's behaviour are "deceive" and the antithetical "fear" and "lov'd" in connection with "seem'd" which highlight the opposition between Desdemona's outward behaviour and her true attitudes. Othello accepts Iago's perspective uncritically, yet he can only partly be held responsible for his readiness to take this perspective, since Iago's perspective is seemingly based on knowledge which Othello lacks. This circumstance encourages an uncritical reception of Iago's claims. The effect of asymmetries of knowledge on the development of further asymmetries in dialogue has recently been investigated by Drew. In his investigation, Drew demonstrates that in dialogue "an unequal distribution of knowledge between participants may be used as a strategic device by the 'knowing' party to do something interactionally, to play games with the other."[324] He concludes that an interlocutor may be put at a disadvantage if other participants make a "strategic use" of their knowledge. This is precisely what Iago does, and, in accordance with his deceptive strategies, his additional 'knowledge' even seems to be a product of his own inventiveness.

Richard's strategy, in contrast to the methods discussed so far, relies not on the semblance of reliability but on the semblance of a freedom of choice between two options, that he gives to Anne. In answer to Anne's argument that death would be the only just penalty for Richard and to support his own argument that he is desperately in love with Anne, Richard presents her with the alternative of either killing him, or forgiving him and accepting his love:

Rich. Nay, do not pause, for I did kill King Henry –
But 'twas thy beauty that provoked me.
Nay, now dispatch: 'twas I that stabb'd young Edward –
But 'twas thy heavenly face that set me on.
She falls the sword.
Take up the sword again, or take up me.
Anne. Arise, dissembler; though I wish thy death,
I will not be thy executioner. [*Richard III*, I/ii,183-189]

In the beginning of the passage, as was argued before (5.2.3.1.), Richard presents two different perspectives, or two different ways of interpreting his behaviour. According to the perspective he wants Anne to accept, Richard's crimes were instigated by his love for her; according to the other one, he is a cruel murderer who deserves punishment. To ensure that Anne accepts the perspective according to which Richard deserves to be forgiven, he forces her to decide between two different actions ("Take up the sword again, or take up me:"), each of which are in accordance with one of the two perspectives. Although Anne seems to have the freedom of choice, there is a considerable degree of manipulation in this forced decision. First, there are only two alternatives between which Anne is allowed to choose. Either she uses physical violence and kills Richard or she forgives him. There is no third alternative that would allow Anne to reject Richard without having to kill him. As Hopkins puts it, "a false reality is constructed in which [Anne] ha[s] only two options"[325]. Of course, Anne is hardly capable of actually killing a human being. Although she indulges in violent language to express her hatred of Richard in the beginning of their dialogue, she could not use physical violence with the same ease. Since Richard apparently knows her disposition well enough, his presentation of these two options is calculated to make

[324] Drew, Paul, "Asymmetries of Knowledge in Conversational Interactions", Ivana Marková and Klaus Foppa (eds.), Asymmetries in Dialogue, New York et al 1991, 32.
[325] Hopkins, Lisa, "Wooing Scenes in *'Tis Pity She's A Whore* and *Richard III*", Notes and Queries, 40, 1993, 228.

Anne accept the perspective he has set in the dialogue. Richard's manipulation is especially obvious when one considers that Anne has already dropped the sword ("Take up the sword *again* …"), which means that she has already made an intuitive decision not to kill Richard. Hence she now almost *has* to decide in his favour. Richard utters his crucial sentence only *after* Anne has already dropped the sword, namely when it is most unlikely that she will use it against him.

Anne's response is only a very reserved acceptance of Richard's perspective. Though she refuses to kill him and lets him rise again, Anne calls him 'dissembler'. Unlike other persuadees who fully or partly accept the persuader's perspective, Anne does not adopt Richard's vocabulary. The periphrase 'dissembler' does not at all fit into Richard's image of himself as a devoted lover, but contradicts it. Anne apparently sees through Richard's deceit, because his manipulative techniques are more evident than the subtle deception of Iago or Edmund. As in the example from *Richard III* discussed above, Anne seems to deliberately disregard her own doubts concerning Richard's sincerity and to accept his perspective against her better knowledge. She is never completely convinced of the point of view she adopts.[326] This makes her role in the development of the dialogue somewhat ambiguous. It is never entirely clear to what extent Anne is actually won by Richard's rhetoric and why she deliberately ignores her doubts. It seems that she finally choses the easiest and most comfortable way. Obviously, the alternatives, considering her position as a powerless widow and Richard's influential status, are not especially promising for Anne. Moreover, the argument that a man of such consequence is so deeply in love with her and puts himself at her mercy, might have a considerable attractiveness of its own. Anne, though she is highly critical of the perspective offered by Richard, deliberately acts as if he had indeed convinced her.

5.3.3.2. Rejection of an Offered Perspective

As has been argued in 2.2.2.(b), to 'take' a perspective does not necessarily mean to accept it. Also the rejection of a perspective offered in a dialogue can be a form of perspective-taking. It is quite obvious that a persuadee who refuses to accept the persuader's perspective and retains his or her own perspective, hinders the development of the persuasion as the persuader intended it. However, not all rejections have an

[326] Young, Bruce W., "Ritual as an Instrument of Grace: Parental Blessings in *Richard III*, *All's Well That Ends Well*, and *The Winter's Tale*", Linda Woodbridge and Edward Berry (eds.), True Rites and Maimed Rites: Ritual and Anti-Ritual in Shakespeare and His Age, Urbana and Chicago 1992, 177.

equally damaging effect on the persuader's schemes. In order to identify differences between individual examples with respect to the effect of a persuadee's rejection, the following analysis will be guided by the question how serious of an obstacle to the plans of the persuader the persuadee produces with his or her rejection.

Central issues that are of interest in this context are not only the question how categorically or resolutely the persuadee rejects a point of view, but also how this rejection is expressed. If a persuadee does not accept the perspective set by the persuader, it necessarily follows that s/he retains his or her own perspective[327], to which s/he might give expression, but which s/he might just as well keep to him- or herself. In other words, a persuader might either express his or her contrary perspective by simply rejecting the one offered by the persuader without further comment, or s/he might explicate it more elaborately. This is typically done by disproving the persuader's arguments, thereby denying the validity of his or her perspective. A third possibility of expressing one's rejection of a perspective is to ignore its true import or to deliberately misunderstand it. Rather than seriously considering the persuader's perspective, persuadees in these cases categorically deny it, thus implying that the persuader's argument is entirely unworthy of discussion..

These different ways of rejecting a perspective will be investigated individually to understand what effects persuadees create in individual examples with such contributions to the dialogues. Since in most of the dialogues investigated in this study persuaders are eventually successful despite such temporary opposition from their interlocutors, the persuadees' ways of expressing their unwillingness to accept the persuader's perspective at some point before the final success may offer some key to understand their role in these dialogues. In other words, since a persuadee's rejection can obviously be overcome, it might be illuminating to find out how easily such rejections might be overcome, or to what extent they present serious obstacles to the persuader.

5.3.3.2.(a) Plain Rejections

A plain rejection without further explanations might denote that the persuadee does not think it necessary to defend his own point of view which is at variance with the persuader's position. This is the case in the following passage from *The Winter's Tale*:

[327] As Graumann points out, the rejection of a perspective always implies an alternative point of view. If the perspective of a speaker is not accepted, "another perspective is suggested or demanded." [Graumann, 1989, 114.]

Paul. Good my liege, I come, –
[…] – I say, I come
From your good queen.
Leon. Good queen!
Paul. Good queen, my lord, good queen: I say good queen,
And would by combat make her good, so were I
A man, the worst about you.
Leon. Force her hence. [*The Winter's Tale*, II/iii,52-61]

The perspective Paulina wishes Leontes to adopt is in this introductory phase of the dialogue epitomized by the attribute 'good queen'. She wants to convince Leontes of the essential virtuousness and innocence of his wife. This tendency of the persuasion is already suggested in Paulina's announcement. Leontes' response clearly shows that he does not share this perspective. From his point of view the usage of the attribute 'good' with reference to Hermione is not justified. For him, Hermione's behaviour has a meaning which contradicts the meaning Paulina gives to it.

His exclamation functions as a contradiction. He rejects Paulina's perspective without making the least effort to justify or explain his own position. This briefness might be due to the asymmetry of power and status between himself as the sovereign and Paulina as a woman and as his subject. Leontes simply does not feel the need to take the trouble and explain to Paulina why he cannot agree with her. He merely utters his contradiction of her perspective. For a king who is used to have his every word obeyed without the need for further justification, this way of expressing his disapproval seems quite natural. Its effect on the development of the persuasion is, however, significant. Since he does not tell Paulina why he is so convinced of Hermione's guilt and what keeps him from considering Paulina's point of view, she does not know where to begin her argument. That she has no clues to help her decide exactly how to approach him is made obvious in her helpless response [59-61] to Leontes' rejection. Rather than dispersing his doubts about Hermione's innocence by well-directed arguments, Paulina ineffectively insists on her view, stubbornly repeating the words 'good queen' which have been challenged by Leontes. This, of course, has only disadvantageous consequences: Leontes is merely provoked, but not persuaded and therefore decides to stop the dialogue. He ceases to address Paulina and tries to have her removed from his rooms. Thus, the circumstance that Leontes responds with a plain rejection to Paulina's point of view presents an additional impediment to the persuasion which goes beyond the basic fact that the answer is a rejection.

Benedick's rejection of Beatrice's request to kill Claudio is given as quickly and intuitively as Leontes' refusal. The interjection at the beginning of Benedick's response

"Ha, not for the wide world!" [IV/i,289] shows that this is an instinctive rather than a deliberate answer. Consequently, it is not consistent with his previous utterance "Come, bid me do *anything* for thee." [287, emphasis added] so that an almost comical effect is created when Benedick refuses the first thing Beatrice asks of him in such a downright manner. This explains the difference between Leontes' and Benedick's rejection and offers a reason why the one is soon overcome while the other is not. Benedick experiences an inner conflict between his love for Beatrice and his loyalty towards his friend Claudio. This conflict between two forces is vividly presented by his two utterances which directly contradict each other (287, 289). Since Benedick is uncertain about what to do and which of the two impulses to yield to, it is possible for Beatrice to overcome his resistance and to make him decide in favour of his loyalty towards her. Leontes experiences no such conflict. Though his refusal to accept his persuader's perspective is, just as in Benedick's case, not the result of a thoughtful deliberation, it reflects a point of view of which he is deeply convinced and on which he therefore rigidly insists.

Also Brutus' rejection of Cassius' insinuations in the beginning of their dialogue is unmistakably clear and resolute:

Cas. […] I have heard,
Where many of the best respect in Rome
(Except immortal Caesar), speaking of Brutus,
And groaning underneath this age's yoke,
Have wish'd that noble Brutus had his eyes.
Bru. Into what dangers would you lead me, Cassius,
That you would have me seek into myself
For that which is not in me? [*Julius Caesar*, I/ii,57-64]

This outspoken reaction to Cassius' careful suggestions, which are meant to unfold their full meaning only after some interpretation by the addressee, expresses Brutus' disapproval of Cassius' sly behaviour that might be associated with morally objectionable motives. This metacommunicative criticism is summarized in the phrase 'Into what dangers would you *lead* me'. Brutus plainly refuses Cassius' attempts of imposing a kind of reasoning on him which is alien to Brutus. Hence, this rejection is partly based on Brutus' objection to the form of Cassius' utterances; it is not so categorical a rejection of the contents of Cassius' insinuations. This is also part of the reason why it is possible for Cassius to overcome Brutus' resistance despite the fact that Brutus does not explicate why he objects to Cassius' insinuations which might make it difficult for Cassius to alter his opinion. Moreover, Brutus' utterance is not merely a rejection but also an invitation. His question elicits further information from his persuader whom he basically asks to introduce his subject with greater clarity and frankness. Thus, Brutus' utterance is a mixture of a rejection of certain tendencies in Cassius' obscure suggestions as far as they can be understood, such as the opposition between Caesar and Brutus which Cassius tries to establish at this point, and of a request to explain his point of view in greater detail.[328] This enables Cassius to largely ignore Brutus' criticism and to focus on his request, as has been pointed out in 5.3.2.2.(c). Consequently, by phrasing his objection as a question, Brutus makes it easier for Cassius to overcome his rejection.

5.3.3.2.(b) Elaborate, Substantiated Rejections

Frequently, persuadees do not simply reject a perspective but comment in some way on the persuader's point of view. Their rejections reveal more or less clearly why they reject their interlocutor's perspective and favour an alternative view. The impact of such rejections of a more elaborate kind is best observed in individual examples and in the context of the respective circumstances, before general conclusions can be attempted.

In *The Tempest*, Sebastian rejects Antonio's argument that Claribel, the prospective heir of Naples, lives at so great a distance as to be quite unfit for the position of its sovereign:

> Ant. She [Claribel] that is Queen of Tunis; she that dwells
> Ten leagues beyond man's life; she that from Naples
> Can have no note, unless the sun were post, –
> The man i'th' moon's too slow, – till new-born chins
> Be rough and razorable; […]
> Seb. What stuff is this! how say you?
> 'Tis true, my brother's daughter's Queen of Tunis;
> So is she heir of Naples; 'twixt which regions
> There is some space. [*The Tempest*, II/i,241-252]

Sebastian basically repeats Antonio's claims and thereby partly confirms his perspective ('Tis true), but also alters the critical part of it, thus correcting Antonio's account of the insurmountableness of the distance and replacing it by his own interpretation of the reality ('some space'). By his rational correction he exposes and thereby rejects Antonio's use of hyperbole with which he overemphasized the distance between Tunis and Naples. The contrast between Antonio's wordy hyperbole and Sebastian's laconic characterization 'There is some space' creates a comic effect at Antonio's expense.

Such a rational exposure of the weak points of a persuader's perspective, one should expect, poses a considerable difficulty to the persuader. However, as the further development of this dialogue reveals, Antonio quickly dismisses Sebastian's objection

[328] For this reason, Brutus' question has already been mentioned in the section on initiatives.

by insisting on his own perspective, while Sebastian accepts this development of the discourse and is defeated by Antonio's insistence. It is characteristic of Sebastian that he, although he raises quite a substantial objection, gives in so quickly. This vacillation, on the one hand, makes him an 'easy prey' of Antonio and, on the other hand, is symptomatic of his readiness to be persuaded.

Macbeth persists more firmly than Sebastian on a perspective that differs from his interlocutor's point of view. After the first dialogue with his wife, in which the possibility of regicide was mentioned, he has resolved to reject the scheme she proposed [I/v,60-70]. Thus, his utterance in their second meeting, in which he informs her of his resolution not to murder Duncan, is not locally linked to the prior turn, but is a response to Lady Macbeth's plan in I/v on which he did not comment at the time. Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen use the term 'locally' versus 'nonlocally linked' responses to point out that speakers may not only respond to immediately preceding but also to more distant turns of their interlocutors.[329] That Macbeth's decision is indeed such a nonlocally linked response to a turn of his wife, that occurred in their previous encounter, is made clear by his repetition of her euphemistic periphrase "this business" to refer to the conspiracy against the king. The repetition of this euphemism creates a nonlocal coherence between these turns and links them together:

Lady M. [...] He that's coming
Must be provided for; and you shall put
This night's great business into my dispatch;
Which shall to all our nights and days to come
Give solely sovereign sway and masterdom. [*Macbeth*, I/v,66-70]
Macb. We will proceed no further in *this business*:
He hath honour'd me of late; and I have bought
Golden opinions from all sorts of people,
Which would be worn now in their newest gloss,
Not cast aside so soon. [I/vii,31-35]

The first line of his utterance clearly expresses his decision for both of them ('*We* will') to hatch no further plots against the king. However, Macbeth does not leave it at that, but explains in detail why he holds a perspective so different from that of his wife. The verses after the colon contain a crucial reason that makes him reject Lady Macbeth's perspective. Macbeth has just been honoured and promoted by the king and is held in high esteem by the entire court. A murder might therefore destroy his current success. In his soliloquy [I/vii,1-28] Macbeth mentions other reasons against the deed. The reason he mentions in the presence of Lady Macbeth seems primarily designed to

[329] Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen, 418.

satisfy his pragmatically minded wife who is not guided by conscience at all and for whom reasons such as a subject's loyalty to his king [I/vii,13-14] bear little meaning.[330]

This well-founded rejection, on the one hand, poses an obstacle for Lady Macbeth, since she has to refute his argument. On the other hand, it also provides clues for an effective counterargument which helps to change his mind. Lady Macbeth uses her husband's emphasis on the importance of other people's opinions of him (which is also part of the clothing images he uses [34f]) to accuse him of a lack of courage to act in accordance with his desires. His ambition and hopes, she suggests, was just another robe he put on temporarily, as he now wears the 'golden opinions' of the court: "Was the hope drunk,/ Wherein you dress'd yourself?" [35/36]

These reproaches have an effect on Macbeth. As a means of *pathos* they work on Macbeth's emotions, as becomes apparent in his somewhat distressed reaction. Challenged by his wife's accusation of cowardice, Macbeth asserts his resolution and courage, and at the same time insists on his former decision to drop the plans against Duncan. Thus he rejects Lady Macbeth's perspective a second time:

> Macb. Pr'ythee, peace.
> I dare do all that may become a man;
> Who dares do more, is none. [I/vii,45-47]

This ethical argument against murder as an inhuman act shows that Macbeth seriously tries to resist his wife's influence. Yet, his argument again provides a basis for an efficient counter-argument by his wife who deliberately misunderstands him, using 'man' in the sense of 'masculine' instead of 'human'. This creates the impression that she basically ignores Macbeth's argument[331]:

> Lady M. What beast was't then,
> That made you break this enterprise to me?
> When you durst do it, then you were a man. [I/vii,47-49]

At this point, the conflicting perspectives of Macbeth and his wife, which make them interpret reality very differently, are concisely contrasted. The rhetorical figure of anaclasis, which is here used in a dialogic form to highlight the disparity of two perspectives, connects their turns. While Lady Macbeth understands her husband's refusal to further discuss the murder of Duncan as cowardice, he sees it as a decision to preserve his humanity. As before, Lady Macbeth's emotional strategy of accusing Macbeth of cowardice is not without effect and finally proves successful. His more

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[330] Spurgeon, Caroline F.E., "Shakespeare's Imagery Heightens Emotions", Clarice Swisher (ed.), Readings on Macbeth, San Diego 1999, 108.
[331] Erlebach, 159.

elaborate rejections of her point of view, therefore, provide clues for her arguments with which she eventually overcomes these rejections.

Lady Anne's rejections of the perspective set by Richard are qualitatively different from the ones discussed so far because they aggressively attack Richard himself. Although they have a rational basis and rely on *logos*, they typically also express her condemnation of his person. When Richard claims that he is not the murderer of her husband, but that it was Edward who killed him, Anne openly calls him a liar. She immediately unmasks his lie by mentioning evidence which supports a contrary perspective, namely the observations of a reliable witness who saw that Richard's sword was used to kill Anne's husband:

> Rich. Nay he is dead, and slain by Edward's hand.
> Anne. In thy foul throat thou liest: Queen Margaret saw
> Thy murd'rous falchion smoking in his blood,
> The which thou once didst bend against her breast
> But that thy brothers beat aside the point. [*Richard III*, I/ii,94-98]

Thus, Anne disproves Richard's argument. Although a reference to the existence of a witness would be enough evidence to justify her rejection of his perspective, Anne mentions an additional point that brings discredit on Richard, namely the fact that he also used this very sword against Margaret herself [97-98]. Her strikingly resolute and categorical rejections of Richard's perspective reveal that they are extremely difficult to overcome. This impression is even strengthened in the next couple of turns:

> Rich. I was provoked by her sland'rous tongue,
> That laid their guilt upon my guiltless shoulders.
> Anne. Thou wast provoked by thy bloody mind,
> That never dream'st on aught but butcheries. [99-102]

Here, two opposing interpretations of Richard's violent behaviour against Margaret are set against one another. While Richard tries to excuse his behaviour, Anne is convinced of the worst explanation possible, according to which Richard's mind generates nothing but murder. A formally interesting point of Anne's way of rejecting Richard's perspective is that the language of her response closely resembles Richard's utterance. This is most notable with respect to the syntax which is exactly repeated by Anne, so that their turns are connected by parallelisms. Moreover, Anne even repeats single words and phrases used by Richard, especially at the beginning of the verses. A crucial alteration she makes is the substitution of central words to drastically change the meaning of the original statement. Thus, she rejects Richard's perspective by countering it with a contrasting view that contradicts it. Such a contrast is created by the opposing attributes each of them uses to characterize Richard ('my *guiltless* shoulders' – 'thy *bloody* mind'). This way of rejecting Richard's point of view at times appears extremely formulaic, which has given rise to the claim that this form also restricts Anne and makes her utterances simply a negative echo of Richard's utterances who determines the conditions and the development of their dialogue[332]. As in the following example, Anne rigidly sticks to the pattern determined by Richard's turns:

> Rich. It is a quarrel most unnatural,
> To be reveng'd on him that loveth thee.
> Anne. It is a quarrel just and reasonable,
> To be reveng'd on him that kill'd my husband. [138-141]

Again, Anne changes the central words and phrases so as to express the opposite of Richard's statement. She thereby gives a different meaning to the things about which they talk. Their argument she characterizes not as 'unnatural' but as 'reasonable', and in her eyes Richard is not the man who loves her but the man who killed her husband. Also Gumperz points out that speakers who both copy elements of their interlocutors' syntactic constructions, "which is commonly interpreted as a sign of agreement", and replace central expressions by their own words, create a series of contrasts by means of which they can "neutralize" their interlocutors' statements and convey their own perspective.[333] Anne thereby refuses to let the meaning Richard gives to the situation become established as the mutually accepted meaning that develops in a dialogue. In their quarrel they do not agree on a common view. Nevertheless, while Anne so vehemently rejects Richard's perspective, she also agrees to a development of the dialogue on his terms. In the passage quoted above, she accepts the obligation to justify her resistance to Richard's attempted influence, although she might just as well refuse to argue with the man who murdered her husband. Despite this rather general concession, Anne's resolute opposition poses no small obstacle to Richard's aim. In contrast to Clemen, some critics even claim that Anne, by imitating Richard's syntax, obtains an "echoic control of the syntax and grammatical structure of their speeches throughout the scene"[334]. Even if the extent of Anne's control is somewhat overrated by Thomas when he maintains that "she is in control of Richard's patterns of thought", it is undoubtedly true that her fervent but also rational counterarguments, as Richard soon realizes, cannot be overcome by regular reasoning. Therefore, he has to rely on an intricate method of manipulation.

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[332] Clemen, 55.
[333] Gumperz, 109.
[334] Thomas, Gordon K., "Is Frailty the Name of Woman? A Reconsideration of *Richard III* 1.2", Encyclia: The Journal of the Utah Academy of Science, Arts and Letters, 64, 1987, 100.

Interestingly, Elizabeth's manner of rejecting Richard's claims at first sight does not seem to differ much from Anne's way:

K.Rich. Say I will love her everlastingly.
Eliz. But how long shall that title 'ever' last?
K.Rich. Sweetly in force, until her fair life's end.
Eliz. But how long fairly shall her sweet life last?
K.Rich. As long as heaven and nature lengthens it.
Eliz. As long as hell and Richard likes of it.
K.Rich. Say I, her sovereign, am her subject low.
Eliz. But she, your subject, loathes such sovereignty. [*Richard III*, IV/iv,349-56]

As in the examples from I/ii, the language is striking for its formulaic style. Due to Elizabeth's responses, their turns are connected by parallelisms [353/4], chiasms ('Sweetly … fair' – 'fairly … sweet' [351/2], 'sovereign … subject' – 'subject … sovereignty' [355/6]) and repetitions of words. Also Elizabeth uses this method to counter Richard's statements with utterances of the opposite meaning. With these more elaborate rejections she exposes the falsity of Richard's arguments, such as the claim that he will love Elizabeth's daughter 'everlastingly'. As in his dialogue with Anne, these categorical rejections represent a considerable obstacle to Richard's success. In Anne's case he nevertheless manages to overcome her resistance. Elizabeth's behaviour however differs from Anne's to such a degree as to thwart Richard's manipulative strategies. First, when compared with Anne, Elizabeth seems to have a greater variety of possible responses at her disposal. Apart from downright contradictions [353/4] as Anne uses them, Elizabeth also challenges Richard's view by the subtler and more detached use of irony or sarcasm as in her questions at the beginning of the quoted passage. Thus, she is less restricted in her responses by Richard's utterances as Anne is. Furthermore, while Anne only rejects Richard's account of past events, Elizabeth primarily questions the sincerity of his intentions for the future, which means that she is not deceived by his attempted manipulation. This comparison suggests that the ultimate effect of a persuadee's refusal to accept a persuader's perspective, and thereby also the persuadee's role in the dialogue, depends on a variety of factors which can be determined by the persuadee, by the persuader, or by the context.

A rejection which the persuader has no chance to overcome is Leontes' rebuff of Paulina's warning that he is about to develop into a tyrant. Although he rejects this point of view, using a counterargument based on *logos*, he disproves his own reasoning and, like a tyrant, has his interlocutor forced out of the room:

Paul. […] I'll not call you tyrant;
But this most cruel usage of your queen –
Not able to produce more accusation

Than your own weak-hing'd fancy – something savours
Of tyranny, and will ignoble make you,
Yea, scandalous to the world.

Leon. On your allegiance,
Out of the chamber with her! Were I a tyrant,
Where were her life? she durst not call me so,
If she did know me one. Away with her! [*The Winter's Tale*, II/iii,115-23]

He is so enraged by Paulina's criticism that he orders others to remove her. Only the middle sentences are addressed at Paulina herself. He argues that he does not behave like a tyrant because he has not killed but only imprisoned Hermione. In a sort of dramatic irony, Leontes' counterargument that he is no tyrant, and his orders due to which physical means are employed to stop the dialogue and to remove the interlocutor against her will, stand in stark contrast. Without realizing it, Leontes does behave like a tyrant. Since he makes use of his social power, the encounter of their perspectives is guided by an extreme asymmetry. Thus, Paulina is given no chance to surmount his rejection of her perspective.

5.3.3.2.(c) Elaborate, Non-Substantiated Rejections

Whereas the examples of more elaborate rejections considered so far directly deal with the content of the persuader's argument and refuse it with the help of rather rational counterarguments, there are also examples in which the persuadee rejects a perspective by simply disregarding or deliberately misunderstanding its true import. In such cases, the interlocutors seem to talk past each other. Talking past one another, as Covelli and Murray observe, is typically caused by an occurrence of more than one topic at a time.[335] Hence, the persuadee in such examples apparently rejects not only an individual argument but an entire topic, which points to a more general opposition.

In a passage from *The Winter's Tale* earlier than the one discussed above, Paulina presents her central evidence, namely Hermione's daughter, both to soften Leontes' heart (*pathos*) and to point out physiognomical similarities between the infant and Leontes to prove that she is indeed his legitimate daughter (*logos*). Leontes, however, simply refuses to consider or comment on this contribution to the dialogue:

Paul. […] The good queen
(For she is good) hath brought you forth a daughter ;
Here 'tis; [*Laying down the child*] comments it to your blessing.
Leon. Out!
A mankind with! Hence with her, out o'door:
A most intelligencing bawd! [II/iii,64-68]

[335] Covelli, Lucille H. and Stephen O. Murray, "Accomplishing Topic Change", Anthropological Linguistics, 22, 1980, 387.

Paulina's perspective and her interpretation of the context finds expression in the attribute *'good* queen' and in her reference to the infant as Leontes' daughter. Unlike in the example discussed in 5.3.3.2.(b), Leontes does not reject this perspective by refuting it with a counterargument, but he altogether ignores Paulina's words. This causes a considerable lack of coherence of their turns. Instead of merely contradicting her words, his response constitutes an attack on Paulina herself. The insults with which he confronts her show that Leontes does not only reject the content of her words, but also her fearless attitude. He disapproves of the whole dialogue that Paulina tries to force upon him, and of her critical approach of him. This general objection makes it very difficult for Paulina to overcome his rejections. It was demonstrated in a recent investigation of another dramatic text that the typical language of Leontes' responses, namely his lack of regard for Paulina's words which indicates an unwillingness to 'attune' his dialogue contributions to her utterances, allows the speaker to dominate his interlocutor.[336]

Such examples of persuadees who reject a perspective without offering any explanation can also be found in other dialogues. The beginning of the dialogue between Richard and Anne can be characterized as a verbal battle in which each interlocutor tries to establish a different topic. Hence, they talk past each other:

Rich. Lady, you know no rules of charity,
Which renders good for bad, blessings for curses.
Anne. Villain, thou know'st no law of God nor man.
No beast so fierce but knows some touch of pity.
Rich. But I know none, and therefore am no beast.
Anne. O wonderful, when devils tell the truth! [*Richard III,* I/ii,68-73]

While Richard seeks to use their encounter for his wooing of Anne, she rejects each of his approaches by completely ignoring [70/71] or deliberately understanding the opposite of what he says [73]. Formally, this passage does not seem strikingly different from those quoted earlier. Also here Anne uses parallelisms and contrasting words ('Lady' – 'Villain') to oppose Richard's perspective. Yet, her responses are insofar different from those discussed in 5.3.3.2.(b), which occur in passages taken from later stages of the dialogue, as she does not in fact respond to the content of Richard's utterances, for example by disproving it with the help of counterarguments. As is typical of verbal battles, the interlocutors speak alternately, but do not or only minimally respond to each other apart from expressing a general rejection of each other's utterances. As Aronsson in her study on topic in verbal disputes demonstrates,

[336] Rommetveit, 195-220.

arguments are frequently characterized by poor local coherence. If interlocutors attack each other instead of rationally arguing about a topic "[i]t is the person, not the topic which is the target of the speech acts. […] Topic incoherence thus gives way for an emotional and interpersonal coherence of battling."[337] Also when Richard more seriously begins his wooing of Anne, she ignores his protestations of his love and maintains her habit of cursing him, thus rejecting his claims:

> Rich. As all the world is cheered by the sun,
> So I by that [Anne's beauty]; it is my day, my life.
> Anne. Black night o'ershade thy day, and death thy life. [133-35]

By entirely disregarding the intended meaning of his words, Anne denies his arguments any chance of having an effect on her. Richard's statement and Anne's response seem hardly connected to each other. Only on a formal level, namely by a repetition of individual words ('day', 'life'), a "minimal degree of discourse coherence"[338] is created. Such categorical rejections in which the persuadee does not even trouble herself with replying in a way that necessitates a consideration of the persuader's perspective are exceedingly difficult to overcome. It is no surprise that this part of the dialogue, in which Anne simply ignores Richard's arguments, is quite lengthy. Much effort is needed until Richard manages to make Anne consider and later accept his perspective. Thus, Anne's categorical rejections represent an opposition which requires a considerable persuasive effort from Richard.

Richard faces a similarly categorical opposition in his dialogue with Elizabeth. When he alludes to the subject that he wants to make the topic of their dialogue by an enthusiastic praise of Elizabeth's daughter, she wilfully misunderstands his intention:

> K.Rich. You have a daughter call'd Elizabeth,
> Virtuous and fair, royal and gracious.
> Eliz. And must she die for this? O let her live,
> And I'll corrupt her manners, stain her beauty,
> Slander myself as false to Edward's bed,
> Throw over her the veil of infamy;
> So she may live unscarr'd of bleeding slaughter
> I will confess she was not Edward's daughter. [IV/iv,204-11]

Instead of accepting this introduction of the topic which is intended to raise certain expectations with respect to Richard's perspective and his attitude towards Elizabeth's daughter, she responds as if his utterance had been a very different one, namely a threat instead of a praise. Elizabeth thus implies that Richard cannot take an interest in a woman without planning to murder her, and thereby unmasks the insincerity of his

[337] Aronsson, 197f.
[338] Ibid., 195.

rhetoric. This resolute opposition, which does not only take the form of a rejection of Richard's perspective, but in addition contains a harsh attack on his own person, denying that he has any *ethos*, increases the difficulty of Richard's endeavour to the extreme. Although Richard has said very little and has in fact only just begun to set his perspective, Elizabeth considers in detail how she might save her daughter from being harmed by him. In other words, there does not seem the slightest chance for Richard to make Elizabeth accept his perspective, since she entirely ignores the intended meaning of his utterance.

Similarly, when Elizabeth inquires what good could possibly come from Richard and he alludes to the advantages of a marriage ("Th'advancement of your children, gentle lady." [IV/iv,242]), Elizabeth misunderstands his proposal on purpose, thereby reinterpreting his words to his disadvantage: "Up to some scaffold, there to lose their heads." [243]. She does not seriously consider Richard's words, but insists on her own perspective. This creates the impression that they talk past one another. Richard, in accordance with his intention of acting the benefactor of Elizabeth's family, uses the idea of 'advancement' in the sense of a social rise, whereas Elizabeth interprets it as a physical upward movement to the scaffold, thereby confirming her picture of Richard as a murderer. Though Elizabeth and Anne reject Richard's perspective in quite similar ways, it seems that Anne tends to get involved in a fierce argument, that is, in a clash of irreconcilable perspectives, while Elizabeth remains emotionally uninvolved and cleverly subverts Richard's arguments. Thus, in her responses she frequently sarcastically misunderstands Richard.

As a summary one might state that persuadees' rejections of an offered perspective can pose very different obstacles to persuaders. Simple rejections without any explanation are not necessarily easier to overcome than more elaborate ones. A more detailed expression of one's rejection might, on the one hand, reveal why a persuadee is not ready to accept the persuader's perspective and thereby provide clues for the persuader's response to such a rejection. On the other hand, a logical counter-argument by the persuadee may produce an additional difficulty for the scheme of the persuader. Thus, the ultimate effect of a rejection depends on the individual circumstances and conditions of the dialogue. The most effective kind of rejection, and hence also the greatest obstacle to the persuader, is produced when a persuadee does not rationally consider the offered perspective but in fact ignores its true import. Such an opposition apparently is a sign of a rejection on a higher level. The persuadee's disapproval is not only aroused by an individual argument but is directed against the entire dialogue or against the person of the persuader. In such cases, namely in the dialogues from *The Winter's Tale* and *Richard III*, there seems hardly any chance for the persuader to overcome their interlocutors' categorical opposition. In fact, only in one case does the persuader finally succeed. Therefore, Anne's, Elizabeth's, and Leontes' opposition is more vehement and efficient than the resistance of Sebastian, Macbeth, or Brutus.

5.3.3.3. Intended Rejection of a Perspective

The persuadee's rejection of a perspective offered by the persuader does not necessarily hinder the persuasion. On the contrary, at times it even represents the kind of response that a persuader meant to elicit, since it actually promotes the persuasion. In other words, a persuader may express an opinion which is not intended to elicit the persuadee's agreement but his or her objection. For some reason, the persuader wants his or her interlocutor to believe the opposite of what s/he seems to support. This possibility is also acknowledged by Graumann, when he remarks that, although typically "speaking to someone about something [...] is an *invitation* to follow the speaker in considering an event or an argument from the speaker's perspective, [...] [i]t may also be in some cases a *challenge* to the hearer to counter the perspective of the speaker."[339]

For example, when Edmund expresses his opinion that Gloucester should not read Edgar's letter, Gloucester's protest is quite expected by Edmund:

> Edm. I beseech you, Sir, pardon me; it is a letter from my
> brother that I have not all o'erread, and for so much
> as I have perus'd, I find it not fit for your o'erlooking.
> Glou. Give me the letter, sir. [*King Lear*, I/ii,36-39]

Although the perspective set by Edmund, which finds its expression in the assessment that the letter is 'not fit' to be read by Gloucester, is clearly rejected by Gloucester's sharp command to hand over the letter, this kind of response is actually necessary for the successful persuasion of Gloucester since the letter contains the facts of the case and thus has the function of a *narratio*. As Gloucester's opposition is crucial to Edmund's success, he, with the help of insinuation, expresses his assumed perspective in such a way as to make its rejection by Gloucester most likely. Edmund's reasons for not using a straightforward way of persuading his father but rather initiating a desired attitude in

[339] Graumann, 1989, 115.

Gloucester in such an intricate manner are, on the one hand, to increase his credibility by concealing his true interest and, on the other hand, to ensure that his intrigue is not unveiled. Gloucester demands to be given the letter and eagerly reads it. By doing so he significantly promotes the persuasion. He 'assists' Edmund without being conscious of it. Since Gloucester neither knows Edmund's true perspective nor suspects him of trying to influence him, he is not aware of the effect of his response. Edmund, it seems, is one step ahead of him, expressing views he knows Gloucester will not share and making his rejections suit his own intentions.

In a quite similar way, Othello unwillingly 'assists' Iago by rejecting his assurance of Cassio's sincerity:

> Iago. […] For Michael Cassio,
> I dare presume, I think that he is honest.
> Oth. I think so too.
> Iago. Men should be that they seem,
> Or those that be not, would they might seem none!
> Oth. Certain, men should be what they seem.
> Iago. Why then I think Cassio's an honest man.
> Oth. Nay, yet there's more in this:
> I prithee, speak to me as to thy thinkings,
> As thou dost ruminate, and give the worst of thought
> The worst of word. [*Othello*, III/iii,128-37]

Obviously, Othello's disagreement with Iago is beneficial to the persuasion since Othello's distrust of Cassio is a precondition of his belief in Cassio's betrayal and his love affair with Desdemona. It is quite illuminating to observe how Othello moves from accepting the first steps of Iago's reasoning [130, 132] to opposing his conclusion that Cassio is an honest man. Apparently, Iago's reasoning does not convince him. This is not particularly surprising since Iago's logic is noticeably fallacious. As also Othello knows, it is a commonplace that men are not always what they seem. Yet, Iago's confirmation of Cassio's honesty is merely based on appearances. Clearly, this point of view is meant to be rejected by Othello. Since Othello's opposition at this point is crucial to Iago's success, he phrases his supposed opinion in a way that makes a contradiction by Othello highly probable. Thus, his employment of evidently fallacious reasoning, just as Edmund's use of insinuation, are strategies to elicit a rejection from the persuadee that is needed for the success of the persuasion. Such strategies can be seen as counterparts to those pointed out in 5.3.3.1.(b), namely means by which persuaders try to ensure that their interlocutors accept an offered perspective.

Edmund and Iago formulate an opinion in a way that provokes contradiction from their interlocutors, who are, consequently, only partly responsible for the ultimate effects of their rejections. Though Gloucester and Othello do not mean to aid them in such a way, their behaviour helps Edmund and Iago to persuade them. Compared with those cases discussed in 5.3.3.1., Othello's and Gloucester's responsibility for their contributions to the persuader's success is further limited, because in the examples quoted here the true opinion and intentions of the persuaders are even more concealed. They do not in the least suspect that their interlocutors want to elicit a contradiction. Due to the superiority of the persuaders and the resulting asymmetry of the interlocutors, the persuadees cannot foresee and are only partly responsible for the consequences of their responses to parts of the persuasion. If persuadees oppose their interlocutors' professed views without realizing that this is what the persuaders wanted them to do, they are quite at the mercy of their interlocutors who seem to control their behaviour in a way of which the persuadees are not aware. There is a significant degree of asymmetry in such a dialogue which puts the persuadee at a disadvantage.

Later in the persuasion it is clearer to Othello which views Iago wants him to adopt and which are meant to be rejected. When Othello, though he is by then convinced of Desdemona's disloyalty, recoils from the idea of taking revenge and laments "O Iago, the pity of it, Iago!" [*Othello*, IV/i, 192], Iago's suggestion to ignore Desdemona's offence and to spare her is evidently no serious advice:

Iago. If you be so fond over her iniquity, give her patent
to offend, for if it touches not you, it comes near
nobody.
Oth. I will chop her into messes … Cuckold me!
Iago. O, 'tis foul in her. [IV/i,193-97]

The rejection of this proposal obviously promotes the persuasion since it accelerates Othello's decision to kill Desdemona which is the ultimate goal of Iago's persuasive efforts. Iago ensures that Othello will indeed refuse to spare his wife by formulating the suggestion in such a provocative way that it can only evoke protest. Especially the idea that Othello could learn to live with an unfaithful wife and give her leave to continue her love affairs in the future ('give her patent to offend') has a provocative effect. This suggestion is in accordance with Iago's account of the general depravity common in Venice which he had used earlier to arouse Othello's disgust at these immoral habits [III/iii,205-8]. To become a part of this general corruption is out of the question for Othello. Consequently, he ignores his feeling of pity for Desdemona and resolves to kill her. Iago reveals that his proposal was no serious one by supporting Othello's decision to reject it [197]. In contrast to the previous example from *Othello*, Iago does not conceal so scrupulously which perspective he truly means Othello to accept. Also the means by which he elicits a rejection, namely provocation instead of insinuation, have become bolder. This noticeable difference between the two passages indicates that in the later part of the persuasion, when Othello has already accepted its central point and is convinced of Desdemona's infidelity, there is less need for Iago to be cautious than in the early part. A persuasive endeavour that belongs to the *genus turpe* seems to be especially critical in its beginning.

In his wooing of Anne, part of Richard's strategy to force her to accept him is to make her reject the alternatives. This part of the dialogue is initiated when Richard presents the options between which Anne has to decide: "Take up the sword again, or take up me." [*Richard III*, I/ii,187]. In the following, Anne attempts to evade making a decision under the conditions thus created by Richard. She does not feel able to be directly responsible for Richard's death, yet she also does not want to accept him. Therefore, Richard offers further possibilities for Anne to cause his death, thereby seeking to elicit a clearer rejection from her, because such a rejection potentially involves her acceptance of Richard:

Rich. Then bid me kill myself, and I will do it.
Anne. I have already.
Rich. That was in thy rage:
Speak it again, and even with the word,
This hand, which for thy love did kill thy love,
Shall for thy love kill a far truer love:
To both their deaths shall thou be accessory.
Anne. I would I knew thy heart. [I/ii,190-96]

Due to the rhetorical structure of the passage which, with the help of metonymy, euphemises Richard's crimes[340], the offer that he would kill himself is very unlikely to be accepted by Anne. However, since Anne knows that a straightforward rejection implies that she forgives Richard, she tries to evade giving a clear answer. Her first response [191] can be understood as an attempt to reject Richard's offer without accepting the consequences. Therefore, Richard insists that Anne, if she does not forgive him, clearly accepts the responsibility for his death [191-95]. Since Anne, as Richard rightly assumes, cannot but reject this option, she finally gives in and lets herself be persuaded to marry Richard. In her immediate response [196] she starts to waver, and soon afterwards ceases to resist Richard. In other words, by rejecting the perspective which Richard wants her to reject she accepts the point of view that he acted out of true love for her and deserves to be forgiven.

As Iago, Richard presents his persuadee with a perspective which provokes resistance, in order to force the persuadee to accept the consequences that arise with

[340] Müller, 2001, 9.

respect to their own behaviour, namely, in Anne's case, to marry Richard and, in Othello's case, to kill Desdemona. It is, however, difficult to determine how far Anne suspects that Richard counts on her rejection and would not really kill himself even if she ordered him to do so. He is remarkably convincing in his role as the devoted lover. Unlike Iago who is extremely careful to hide his true intentions in the beginning of the dialogue and becomes bolder later on, Richard provokes Anne especially at the beginning of their encounter displaying his wickedness, and later carefully deceives her. This difference is due to the different dispositions of Othello and Anne. While Anne is fully aware of Richard's wickedness and vehemently attacks him when she first encounters Richard, so that a cautious approach would be quite ineffectual, Othello at first suspects nobody and sees Iago as a trustworthy soldier. Therefore, Iago, who arouses Othello's rage against Desdemona and Richard who soothes Anne's rage against himself need opposing strategies.

In each case, the persuadee is at some point forced to accept the result of the respective dialogue because s/he cannot accept a perspective the persuader offered while calculating on a rejection. Anne and Othello, although they are to some degree aware of the fact that their interlocutors count on their rejection, thereby unwillingly promote the persuasion. Forced to decide between two alternatives, they choose the lesser evil. They are, however, responsible for their contribution to the persuaders' success insofar as they do not resolutely evade the decision forced upon them. They accept the limitations by which their persuaders manage to guide their responses. By entering into the debate on their persuaders' terms, so it seems, they are already half won. Silence, as Trotter remarks with respect to Lady Anne, would be the best defence.[341]

5.3.4. Summary

Owing to the interdependence of the turns in a dialogue, which has been mentioned in 5.3.1., it is impossible to do justice to the dialogic nature of the texts if one attempts to analyse only the persuadee's utterances and entirely disregards the utterances of the persuader. Therefore, although the interest of this section (5.3.) centred on the role of the persuadee and on his or her influence on the persuasion, the persuader's behaviour had to be repeatedly considered in detail. Thus, it was shown how an initiative by the persuadee may be 'conditioned' by the persuader's preceding utterances

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[341] Trotter, 39.

[5.3.2.1.(b)], or how persuaders utilize their interlocutors' dialogue contributions to introduce persuasive elements into the dialogue, thereby staging a 'collaborative perspective setting' [5.3.2.2.]. Furthermore, the persuader's methods of inducing the persuadee to accept [5.3.3.1.(b)] or to reject [5.3.3.3] certain points of view were examined.

Rather than being a weakness of the present analysis, these repeated discussions of the influence of the persuader are concerned with an issue which is necessary to complement the picture of the persuadee's role in the dialogue. To correctly assess the influence of an utterance by the persuadee at any point in a dialogue, one needs to answer the question to what extent s/he is indeed accountable for his or her contributions and their effects on the development of the persuasion, or how far his or her utterances are influenced by the persuader. This issue is insofar highly relevant to a discussion of persuasive dialogues as the fact that a persuader pursues a clearly defined aim in the dialogue causes a certain asymmetry which finds expression in a variety of ways of influencing or manipulating their interlocutors' contributions to the dialogue.

While the persuaders' influence on the turns of their interlocutors constitutes an important aspect of the present discussion, the main emphasis of this part of the chapter is put on the persuadees' influence on the persuasion. On a rather obvious level, persuadees do indeed either promote or hinder the persuasion by their active participation in the discourse. They may either take part in a collaborative perspective setting by directly or indirectly initiating certain elements of the persuasion, or they might hinder or even prevent the introduction of such elements. Similarly, persuadees may reject or accept a perspective offered by the persuader. An important result of the analysis is that any of these contributions to the dialogue can be made knowingly or without the persuadee's awareness of its effects. If a persuadee deliberately assists his or her persuader in what s/he does, one might conclude that s/he is to some degree willing to be persuaded. Such a conclusion, however, cannot be generalized. Naturally, the specific conditions of an individual dialogue need to be considered before the role of the persuadee can be understood properly.

A variable that provides information about the persuadee's role is the dialogic nature of the texts. With respect to quality, it can be stated that a pronounced disparity of perspectives necessarily engenders a greater dialogic quality. This is the case in passages in which the utterances of the persuadee (potentially) hinder the persuader's schemes [5.3.2.4., 5.3.3.2.] or are meant as an opposition, even if they, in fact, promote the persuasion [5.3.2.2.(c), 5.3.3.3.]. The expression of an opposed perspective can be limited to particular points in a dialogue, as in the examples from *Julius Caesar*, *Macbeth*, *The Tempest*, or *Much Ado About Nothing*, or it can occupy longer passages of the discourse, as in the dialogues from *Richard III* and *The Winter's Tale*. In the later case, persuadees put considerable obstacles in their interlocutors' way which explains why these persuasive attempts tend to fail. Persuaders apparently need a minimal degree of responsiveness and collaboration. At the other end of the scale of dialogic quality are dialogues in which the persuadee seems to have no strongly developed perspective of his or her own, that is, in which s/he immediately accepts the persuader's perspective and of his or her own accord initiates elements of the persuasion. In such examples, it seems as if there were no differing perspectives that encounter each other in the dialogue.

For example, in the dialogue from *Hamlet* the degree of dialogic form and quality largely coincide in that both are rather limited. While the investigation of chapter 4 demonstrated that the encounter of Hamlet and the Queen displays considerable monologic tendencies with respect to form, the qualitative analysis of this chapter indicates that Gertrude lacks a strong perspective of her own to set against that of her son. Thus, the restricted dialogic nature of this text to some extent characterizes Hamlet and Gertrude, since it points to Hamlet's dominating personality and to Gertrude's submissiveness. A distinct dialogic form and a clash of widely contrasting perspectives coincide in the dialogues from *Richard III*. Also here, the form matches the quality since the speakers' awareness of the disparity of their perspectives provokes them to express their opinions and to not let the other's perspective dominate the dialogue, but to challenge his or her account by an alternative one. As a contrast, persuasive scenes which have a remarkably dialogic form, but in which the persuadee hardly questions his persuader's perspective and who is thus quite easily influenced, occur in *The Tempest* and in *Othello*. Due to the ease with which the persuadees adopt their interlocutors' perspectives, the dialogic quality is not as great as in the dialogues from *Richard III* or *The Winter's Tale*. Especially the dialogue in which Antonio persuades Sebastian is marked by an overall agreement of the interlocutors, which makes the dialogue appear like a verbal game that illustrates how easily someone can be seduced to morally reprehensible behaviour.

In a number of persuasive scenes, such as those from *Julius Caesar*, *Macbeth*, and *Much Ado About Nothing*, both the dialogic form and the quality are located between the two extremes. With respect to form, as was pointed out in chapter 4, the persuaders at times dominate the dialogue, so that monological tendencies can be identified especially in its main part. As far as the dialogic quality is concerned, these persuadees have a distinct perspective of their own, which manifests itself in an occasional opposition to the persuader's point of view. However, their behaviour also reveals that they are not entirely averse to their persuaders' schemes. In each case, there are circumstances that, already at the outset of the dialogues, make the persuadees to some extent inclined to accept their interlocutors' point of view. These circumstances are Macbeth's ambition, Benedick's love of Beatrice, and Brutus' uneasiness about the recent political developments in Rome.

On the whole, it is necessary to consider the entire context when analysing an individual passage, and especially to regard its position in the dialogue. For example, it is not particularly illuminating for either dialogue to compare Anne's willingness to accept Richard's perspective towards the end of their encounter to Macbeth's opposition to his wife's schemes at the beginning of their dialogue. Perhaps, the approach used in this chapter might invite such comparisons which would prompt a distorted account of the dialogues. The more chronological approach of the preceding chapter might serve to counterbalance the potential for such fallacies of this chapter's analysis.

5.4. Persuasion As Dialogue

5.4.1. Independent Contributions Versus Manipulation

This part of the chapter will provide a qualitative analysis of passages, in which persuasion occurs in a highly dialogical form. In chapter 4, these passages were characterized as 'persuasion *as* dialogue' (versus 'persuasion *within* dialogue') to point out their distinctive quality, namely the fact that essential functions of the different parts of a persuasive speech are performed in the utterances of both the persuader and the persuadee. In contrast to the examples investigated in 5.3., the central functions of an *exordium*, a *narratio* and *argumentatio*, and of a *conclusio* are in these passages not performed exclusively in the turns of the persuader. In other words, persuasion is not presented as something that is actively fashioned only by the persuader while the persuadee contributes merely indirectly to its development. Rather, in these passages the persuadee contributes directly to the persuasion, for example by raising the topic, by providing arguments that support the persuader's perspective, or by suggesting what actions should be taken in consequence of the dialogue.

The assumption that might be made on the basis of these characteristics is that in such passages the persuadee, due to his or her intense involvement in the persuasive discourse, is not a victim of the persuader, but shares in the responsibility for the outcome of the dialogue. In fact, in such passages persuadees seem to be even more responsible for the development of the persuasion than in examples of 'persuasion within dialogue', since they directly contribute to its substance. As was already indicated in 5.1., the purpose of this section of the chapter is to question the validity of this general assumption and to investigate whether the persuadee's role in these passages is indeed as substantial as it appears.

When compared with those passages, in which persuadees contribute only indirectly to the persuasive discourse (5.3.), it becomes evident that the contributions by persuadees that will be analysed in this section are of an essentially different quality. The persuadee's comments on or reactions to arguments set forth by the persuader that were discussed in 5.3., are rather to be expected by an interlocutor, as such utterances inherently belong to a dialogue. In contrast, utterances with which the persuadee directly contributes to the persuasive discourse seem to present a peculiarity, because the persuadee articulates a point that one should expect to be made by the persuader. Such strikingly direct contributions to the persuasion need to be explained, since these are exceptional cases of the persuadee's participation in the discourse. Apparently, the participation of the persuadee goes beyond what is absolutely required by a dialogic situation. To account for this peculiarity of some of the dialogues, two possible explanations offer themselves. On the one hand, such utterances may be more or less independent contributions by the persuadee who, for some reason that remains to be identified in each example, on his or her own account contributes directly to the substance of the persuasion. On the other hand, such utterances may be motivated by the persuader who somehow manages to manipulate the persuadee so as to elicit such contributions from him or her. These two possibilities have widely different implications with respect to the persuadee's role in the dialogue. While in the first case, s/he apparently does collaborate with the persuader on the production of the persuasion, s/he becomes the victim of the persuader's manipulation in the second case.

To understand the decisive influence of the persuader's manipulation, which of course reduces the persuadee's responsibility for the outcome of his or her contribution to the persuasion, the concepts of asymmetry and dominance seem quite useful. As has been mentioned in 2.2.1., asymmetry is an intrinsic feature of dialogue in general. As the study group of Marková and Foppa maintains, it determines, together with its counterpart mutuality, essential properties of any dialogue.[342] They further point out that 'asymmetry' is "a cover term for a wide spectrum of phenomena"[343] which occur at different levels in dialogue. Thus, Linell and Luckmann make distinctions with respect to the domain (asymmetries of knowledge and of participant status), the source (exogenous versus intrinsic), and the scope (local versus global) of asymmetries to cover a variety of phenomena in which asymmetry may manifest itself.

Which of these types of asymmetry are especially relevant to a discussion of persuasive dialogues may vary among individual passages. However, it seems that some kinds of asymmetry are typical of persuasive dialogues in general. Most notably, the very fact that the persuader, unlike the persuadee, approaches his or her interlocutor with a clearly defined goal, from the very beginning creates a certain asymmetry of the two interlocutors. Since one of the speakers attempts to influence his or her interlocutor, who in turn has no such intentions, the speakers necessarily meet on unequal terms. This asymmetry is further increased when the persuadee is not aware of the persuader's intention. In Linell and Luckmann's terms, the domain of this kind of asymmetry is the disparate knowledge or awareness of the interlocutors. With respect to this sort of asymmetry one can distinguish between overt and covert persuasion, that is, between dialogues in which the persuadee is (more or less) aware of the persuader's intention and dialogues in which the persuader carefully conceals his or her intentions and motives from the persuadee. Examples of overt persuasion are the dialogues chosen for this study from *Hamlet*, *The Winter's Tale*, *Macbeth*, or *Much Ado About Nothing*. While some persuaders, such as Cassius, Antonio or Richard, at the beginning of the persuasion leave their interlocutors in the dark as to their true intentions and only later reveal them, others entirely conceal their goals. The last kind of strategy, which is for example used by Iago and Edmund, results in covert persuasion. The former kind, namely dialogue in which the persuasion is concealed in the beginning but becomes evident later on, shows that the awareness of the persuadee may change, so that certain asymmetries may increase or decrease in the course of a dialogue. The asymmetries typical of persuasive dialogues clearly create inequalities in favour of the persuader and at the expense of the persuadee, who is to a varying degree inferior to the persuader. This inferiority, as will be shown in 5.4.3., makes the persuadee prone to become the victim of manipulation. It has to be noted that the asymmetries mentioned here are

[342] Linell and Luckmann, 2ff.
[343] Ibid.,2.

created within the dialogue, that is, they are not, in Linell and Luckamnn's terms "'exogenous', derived from social power or authority"[344]. Since they are produced by the use of language, and not by a differing social status of the interlocutors, this issue can only be investigated by a close analysis of the dialogues.

Dominance, another concept that seems to be relevant to the dynamics of persuasive dialogues, is closely connected to asymmetry. As Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen point out, the dominance of one speaker manifests itself in an actual control of the dialogue or of other interlocutors.[345] Rommetveit defines dialogically displayed dominance as "manifestations of asymmetric interpersonal relations".[346] Hence, asymmetries do not necessarily generate but offer a potential for dominance. Persuaders may dominate their interlocutors by strategically utilizing asymmetries inherent in the situation.

In their presentation of what they term 'initiative-response analysis', Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen observe that dominance, just like asymmetry, is a phenomenon that may occur on different levels of a dialogue. Consequently, they distinguish between several types of dominance, namely between "(purely) quantitative dominance, topical dominance, and interactional dominance."[347] While quantitative dominance may manifest itself in monological tendencies, an aspect which was investigated in chapter 4, topical dominance is associated with the "introduction of new content words"[348]. The dominating speaker is "he who places the most topics and subtopics 'on the floor'."[349] Finally, interactional dominance enables the superior speaker to control their interlocutors' (verbal) behaviour. Thus, "the dominant party is the one who manages to direct and control the other party's actions to the greatest extent"[350]. Whereas the two former kinds of dominance display the speaker's control of the dialogue in rather conspicuous ways, interactional dominance seems to work more subtly. This aspect of dominance seems to be well suited to understand the persuader's method of covertly controlling dialogues in which it seems as if the interlocutors meet on equal terms and are about equally involved in the generation of the persuasive discourse, since the persuadee actively and directly contributes to it.

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[344] Linell and Luckmann, 10.
[345] Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen, 415.
[346] Rommetveit, 195.
[347] Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen, 415.
[348] Ibid.
[349] Ibid., 416.
[350] Ibid.

Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen analyse interactional dominance by focussing on verbal means of determining the responses of the interlocutor and of reducing the influence of the interlocutor's utterances (for example by not responding to them but by resuming a point the dominant speaker himself raised earlier in the dialogue). Such methods of dominating the persuadee, which are based on processes associated with initiatives and responses and which therefore exist entirely on a verbal level, were already touched upon in certain parts of 5.3. [5.3.2.2., 5.3.3.1.(b), 5.3.3.3.]. This was necessary to present a comprehensive picture of the persuadee's responsibility for promoting the persuasion by *indirectly* supporting the persuader's strategy. As will be shown in 5.4.3.1., such a manipulation by the persuader can likewise reduce the persuadee's responsibility for *directly* adding elements of the persuasion to the dialogue. Moreover, another type of dominance, which enables persuaders to control their interlocutors' behaviour, will be investigated in 5.4.3.2. This kind seems to play a significant role in dialogues in which persuadees are highly involved in the generation of the persuasion. In contrast to the interactional dominance analysed by Linell, Gustavsson, and Juvonen, which relies entirely on verbal processes inherent in dialogue, the instances of dominance, summarised in 5.4.3.2. under the term 'deception', go beyond a merely verbal level although, of course, deception in these dialogues ultimately depends on language. Apart from such manifestations of dominance, by which persuaders manipulate their interlocutors so as to make them contribute to the persuasion, we will also consider examples in which persuadees are indeed responsible for their promotion of the persuasion, since they contribute to it on their own account (5.4.2.).

5.4.2. Independent Contributions by the Persuadee

Examples in which persuadees make essential contributions to the substance of the persuasion without being in some way manipulated by the persuader are admittedly rare. They do, however, exist and inevitably raise the question how such a 'collaboration' may be explained. Are we to conclude that in such cases the persuadee's contribution represents an attempt to persuade him- or herself by assisting the persuader? Surely, as the following analysis will demonstrate, such generalizing conclusions would be rather misleading. To understand the persuadee's role in these passages, it is necessary to consider a number of factors, such as the significance of his or her contribution or at what point in the dialogue it occurs.

For example, Brutus' remarks at times considerably benefit the persuasion. At the end of the *exordium*, after Cassius has assured Brutus of his trustworthiness, Brutus rather unrelatedly professes his anxiety about the prospect of Caesar being made king by the enthusiastic people:

> Cas. […]; or if you know
> That I profess myself in banqueting
> To all the rout, then hold me dangerous. [*Flourish and shout*.
> Brut. What means this shouting? I do fear the people
> Choose Caesar for their king.
> Cas. Ay, do you fear it? [*Julius Caesar*, I/ii,75-79]

It is quite evident that Brutus' statement is not motivated by Cassius' prior utterance which is entirely concerned with the question of Cassius' *ethos*. In fact, there seems to be a certain lack of coherence of the first two turns, as Brutus rather abruptly introduces a new topic, which testifies to the independence of Brutus' utterance. Cassius, in other words, does not arrange for him to make this contribution to the persuasion. Instead, it is a rather impulsive exclamation, inspired by the context, as it is indicated by the stage directions. Brutus comments on something that is not seen on stage but that takes place behind the scenes. As the audience, Brutus only hears the cheering of the people ("this shouting") and guesses at its meaning, speculating that Caesar might be offered a crown. At the same time he reveals his unfavourable attitude towards this possibility ("I do fear"). With this utterance, Brutus contributes to the persuasion in several ways. First, while Cassius only vaguely hints at "this age's yoke" [60], Brutus is the one who clearly articulates the idea of Caesar's increasing political power. Second, by expressing his apprehension that there is indeed a danger of Caesar becoming king, he provides a justification for Cassius' claim that actions must be taken to prevent Caesar from attaining ever more power. Moreover, Brutus considerably simplifies Cassius' task, since his professed attitude presents an ideal starting-point for an attempt to win Brutus for the conspiracy against Caesar. Taking concrete action to stop Caesar is indeed the behaviour that seems most in accordance with the attitude Brutus expresses in his exclamation. In order to emphasize Brutus' contribution, Cassius repeats his exact words in a rhetorical question. The circumstances in this case are so lucky for Cassius that he hardly needs to exert an influence, since Brutus of his own accord pronounces the desired attitude.

It would, however, be premature to conclude that Brutus at this point wants to be persuaded by Cassius and therefore signals his disapproval of Caesar's outstanding position. On the contrary, Brutus' remark is unknowingly contributed to the persuasion.

During the *exordium* Cassius' insinuations were so vague that Brutus does not suspect how much his exclamation happens to suit Cassius. He may not even know that he has just introduced the very topic that Cassius had so discreetly tried to approach in the *exordium*. This impression is created by his next question ("But wherefore do you hold me here so long?" [82]) which clearly shows that he has as yet not realized that his utterance is highly relevant to Cassius' "worthy cogitations" [49], which he meant to disclose. Hence, Brutus is not aware of the significant role he, without actually intending it, plays in this part of the dialogue. Therefore, he is not fully responsible for the beneficial effect of his utterance.

Yet, it might be argued that Brutus, despite his lack of awareness of Cassius' intentions, is to some degree responsible for his contribution to the persuasion. Though they were rather unspecified, Cassius' insinuations have at least conveyed the general import of his cause ("Except immortal Caesar"[59], "this age's yoke" [60]). Under these circumstances and being aware of the fact that Cassius wants to discuss important matters with him, Brutus might be able to consider the possible effects of his so frankly criticizing Caesar's advancement. Since he insists on embodying his ideal of honourableness, thus at times expressing his true opinion in an unreserved manner, Brutus makes himself vulnerable to persons like Cassius (or later Antonius) who are not always frank about their intentions and who make a strategic use of his forthright nature.

Later in the dialogue, after Cassius has recounted the anecdotes about Caesar that function as a *narratio*, Brutus is again prompted by off-stage noises to express his disapproval of Caesar's rise to a singular position in the Roman republic:

Cas. […] Ye gods, it does amaze me
A man of such feeble temper should
So get the start of the majestic world,
And bear the palm alone. [*Shout. Flourish.*
Bru. Another general shout?
I do believe that these applauses are
For some new honours that are heap'd on Caesar.
Cas. Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world
Like a Colossus […] [I/ii,127-134]

Brutus' unease finds expression in the negative connotations of the phrases "some new honours" and "heap'd on Caesar" which suggest that Caesar receives more honours than he deserves, that he, in short, may soon occupy a position to which he is not entitled. By thus referring to the immediate danger of Caesar becoming king, Brutus again adds a point to the dialogue which highlights the urgency of the issue. Thus, after a lengthy utterance by Cassius which was mainly concerned with the past, Brutus' reference to present events, which he interprets in accordance with the import of Cassius' anecdotes (namely by disapproving of Caesar's undeserved status), helps to confirm the relevance of these anecdotes as pointing to a problem that is indeed of immediate significance. At this point, Brutus seems decidedly more responsible for his contribution to the persuasion than in the first example quoted above. After the *narratio* he is well aware of Cassius' charges against Caesar. Hence, he must also be aware of the supportive effect of his own utterance, in which he, moreover, professes his agreement with Cassius' evaluation of Caesar's position. Due to this agreement about the nature of the problem, Cassius can then turn to the *argumentatio* [133-159] and discuss the possibility of a remedy ("The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars" [138]).

The fact that Brutus knowingly contributes to the persuasion in such a beneficial way raises the question what his motivation for this contribution may be. It seems that Brutus, as he too is aware of the problem, recognizes the necessity to discuss it and is ready to search for possible solutions. This readiness makes him to some extent susceptible to Cassius' influence. However, it is important to note that Brutus, though he signals his willingness to analyse the problem, does not deliberately submit to Cassius' persuasive attempts. He does not seem to consider the possibility that Cassius may have motives for talking to him which he does not reveal, and he is likewise not prepared for the use of manipulative, dishonest techniques, such as Cassius' scheme of sending faked letters to his house that deceive Brutus as to the public opinion on the matter.

In *Much Ado About Nothing*, Benedick directly contributes to the initial part of the dialogue by introducing its general topic with the remark that in his conception Beatrice's cousin Hero has been unjustly treated:

Beat. Yea, and I will weep a while longer.
Bene. I will not desire that.
Beat. You have no reason, I do it freely.
Bene. Surely I do believe your fair cousin wronged.
Beat. Ah, how much might the man deserve of me that
would right her! [*Much* Ado,IV/i,256-261]

Obviously, Benedick's crucial remark [259] is not directly elicited by Beatrice's prior utterances. The immediate topic of the first turns is Beatrice's weeping. When he turns to the issue of Hero's mistreatment, Benedick apparently introduces a new topic. However, this example illustrates the complexity of an identification of 'independent' contributions to a dialogue. Benedick's remark, of course, does not introduce an idea that is entirely new but rather mentions the background of their first exchanges, namely the reason why Beatrice weeps. Thus, he is not so much motivated by a personal wish to discuss this topic, but he is prompted by the context. In an attempt to express his sympathy and support, Benedick asserts Beatrice's right to be upset and to pity her cousin.

Since Benedick's contribution is not caused by an inner motivation, one can hardly infer that he means to aid Beatrice in the persuasion. Such a conclusion would moreover be fallacious since Benedick at this initial stage of the dialogue can have no idea of Beatrice's persuasive intentions. Only after his assertion does she begin to make allusions to the idea of revenge. With respect to Benedick's role in the persuasion one may conclude that his contribution does not attest to his willingness to be persuaded by Beatrice, but that it nevertheless does suggest a susceptibility to her influence. Due to his love for her he has some concern for Beatrice's feelings and her well-being and is therefore ready to talk about incidents that cause her sorrow. Thus, Benedick's feelings make him to some extent predestined to surrender to Beatrice's influence and let himself be guided by her, as becomes apparent later on when he is quickly manoeuvred into offering his full support and help [287]. Yet, he does not contribute to the persuasion to such an extent as to become a covert 'accomplice' of Beatrice. The idea of helping her by killing his friend is quite alien to his thoughts.

An example in which the persuadee's contribution even at an initial stage of the dialogue hints at his unacknowledged willingness to be persuaded, occurs at the beginning of Macbeth's dialogue with his wife:

Lady M. Great Glamis! worthy Cawdor!
Greater than both, by the all-hail hereafter!
Thy letters have transported me beyond
This ignorant present, and I feel now
The future in the instant.
Macb. My dearest love,
Duncan comes here tonight.
Lady M. And when goes hence? [*Macbeth*, I/v, 54-59]

Also in this example the persuader's initial utterance is not designed to elicit the persuadee's contribution to the dialogue from him. Macbeth's report of the king's arrival is quite unconnected to his wife's greeting insofar as it is not necessitated by it. This is not to say that the dialogue is at this point incoherent. Rather, there is another, more subtle kind of connection between the turns. It seems that in this passage much is left unsaid by the interlocutors, but is nevertheless mutually understood. In 4.2.2. the significance of their common background knowledge, based on the contents of Macbeth's letter to his wife, was pointed out. It is due to this mutually shared knowledge of Macbeth and his wife that both of them are aware of the implications of Macbeth's announcement of Duncan's visit in the context of Lady Macbeth's allusions to his prospects of becoming king. The possibility of regicide must be an automatic association of all who share in the knowledge of Macbeth's hopes and the prophesies of the witches.

Macbeth's role in the introduction of the subject of their dialogue thus is at best ambiguous. It may be argued that he merely informs his wife of the arrival of a visitor, which was his original purpose for speaking to her. However, the fact that he leaves her initial insinuations altogether uncommented and thereby, as it is implied, accepts them, makes his reaction highly problematic. It seems that his remark is meant as a response to his wife's greeting and that it unfolds its full meaning only in its context. The meaning it *does* suggest, if understood in the context of Lady Macbeth's insinuations, is that Macbeth indicates that Duncan's visit might provide an opportunity for becoming "Greater than both [Glamis and Cawdor]". Since in a dialogue an utterance is invariably understood in the context of prior utterances, Lady Macbeth must get the impression that Macbeth, by his reaction to her greeting, signals his willingness to discuss the issue of his advancement, including the possibility of regicide that inevitably forms part of this issue. Thus, Macbeth's contribution to the persuasion offers an opportunity for Lady Macbeth to assume that they already agree on the necessity of murdering King Duncan, and consequently to advise her husband how to meet his guest and victim under these circumstances ("look like th'innocent flower,/ But be the serpent under't." [65/66]) In contrast to Benedick, Macbeth by his contribution to the initial part of the persuasion reveals his preoccupation with the issue that becomes the topic of the persuasive dialogue. The fact that he already at the beginning is conscious of the possibility of doing away with Duncan, suggests that part of him wants to be persuaded by Lady Macbeth. He has written to her and immediately arranges a dialogue with her.[351] By seeking the conversation with his energetic and pragmatic wife, Macbeth betrays his predisposition to the persuasion. His direct contributions to the persuasion can thus be understood as an expression of those impulses in him which are not altogether averse to the idea of seizing the throne by criminal means.

[351] Klein suggests that "it is Macbeth who seems originally to have thought of murdering Duncan" (Klein, Joan Larsen, "Lady Macbeth: 'Infirm of purpose'", Carolyn R.S. Lenz, Gayle Greene and Carol Th. Neely (eds.), The Woman's Part: Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare, Urbana and Chicago 1983, 241f.).

These impulses are expressed more openly later on, most markedly in Macbeth's telling contribution to the final *narratio* in which both of the interlocutors share in outlining a scenario of a safe way of murdering the king:

Lady M. What cannot you and I perform upon
Th'unguarded Duncan? what not put upon
His spongy officers, who shall bear the guilt
Of our great quell?
Macb. [...] Will it not be receiv'd,
When we have mark'd with blood those sleepy two
Of his own chamber, and us'd their very daggers,
That they have done't?
Lady M. Who dares receive it other,
As we shall make our griefs and clamour roar
Upon his death? [I/vii, 70-80]

Lady Macbeth who rather monopolizes the main part of the dialogue and who apparently intends to overcome Macbeth's objections by the quantitative force of her rhetoric, also begins the *narratio* by talking at great length [60-73] without making attempts to actively involve her husband in it. Her questions, as was pointed out before [4.3.1.1.(a)], have the function of statements, not of inquiries which are meant to elicit a response. Therefore, Macbeth's continuation of the scenario, by which he adds new aspects to it, is an independent contribution to the persuasion. Becoming enthusiastic about Lady Macbeth's vivid description of a seemingly practical plan, Macbeth lets himself be carried away and adds an idea of his own, namely to lay the blame for the murder on Duncan's chamberlains by using their weapons for the deed.

The fact that Macbeth thus contributes to make a plan seem even more feasible, which his persuader was originally prompted to outline because of Macbeth's sceptical question "If we should fail?" [59], is quite revealing with respect to his role in the later part of the dialogue. He, in fact, actively supports Lady Macbeth in her attempt to answer his question and to dispel his doubts. Thereby, he participates in answering his own question and seeks on his own to overcome his scruples. Interestingly, contrasting perspectives seem to manifest themselves in Macbeth's question "If we should fail?" on the one hand, and his contribution to the plan [75-78] on the other hand, rather than in the different turns of him and his wife in the passage quoted above.[352] In this passage it is rather striking how evidently the utterances of Macbeth and his wife resemble one another in tone. They smoothly continue each other's contributions to the scenario without any apparent semantic reversals. So extensive is the concord of their turns that one might easily imagine them being uttered by only one speaker. At this point at the

[352] Kennedy speaks of "the duality, the inner duologue in Macbeth's mind" (Kennedy, 1983, 88).

end of the dialogue Macbeth and his wife seem to speak with one voice, and give expression to only one perspective. Since Macbeth on his own contributes to such a decisive stage of the persuasion, it has to be concluded that he indeed wants to be persuaded. He wants to dispel his own doubts and give way to the ambitious, unscrupulous side of his character.

Worthy of consideration in this context is a tendency in the literature to regard the interlocutors of major persuasive dialogues in Shakespeare's works as "complementary characters"[353] or as "complementary personalities"[354]. Mack who introduces the concept of an "opposing voice, which belongs to the hero's foil"[355] mentions Othello and Iago, Cassius and Brutus, and also Macbeth and Lady Macbeth as examples of complementary characters which, as he claims, form an essential part of Shakespeare's dramatic techniques. His account of the function of such 'paired voices' is that they "bring before us the grandeur of man's nature, which contains, potentially, both voices, both ends of the moral and psychic spectrum."(22) As to the function of an 'opposing voice' within a drama, Mack suggests that it may articulate attitudes "analogous to those which we may presume to be occupying the conscious or unconscious mind of the hero"(25). Lordi, who develops this idea further, argues that Macbeth, due to his paradoxical human nature, struggles "to suppress a darker side of himself that he fears to admit to conscious light."[356] The physical embodiment of this darker side, he argues further, is Lady Macbeth. She represents the "pragmatic, unscrupulous side" of his character (95). Thus, the invention of Lady Macbeth, according to Lordi, is merely a technique to dramatize the dual nature and inner conflict of Macbeth. In explanation of this technique he states that "Shakespeare divided our response to a single individual by presenting his contrary characteristics in two distinct, but complementary characters." (95)

With respect to the central issue of the present study, this would mean that Shakespeare chose a dialogic form (the dialogue between Macbeth and Lady Macbeth) instead of a monologic form (a soliloquy by Macbeth) with a dialogic quality. The dialogic quality of such a soliloquy would, of course, originate from the need to give expression to both sides of Macbeth's character, namely to an ambitious, unscrupulous side and to a humane and honourable side. While such approaches are basically

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[353] Lordi, 95.

[354] Mack, Maynard, "The Jacobean Shakespeare: Some Observations on the Construction of the Tragedies", J.R. Brown and B. Harris, Jacobean Theatre, New York 1960, 19.

[355] Ibid., 15.

[356] Lordi, 99.

acceptable with respect to the contrary impulses which give rise to the inner conflict of Shakespeare's tragic heros, they tend to overrate the importance of single characters and thus neglect the role of interaction between them. Although Macbeth assimilates divergent sides in his personality, and although his wife's pragmatic and resolute nature evidently appeals to one of these sides, she does not simply coincide with this part of his personality. Rather, Lady Macbeth is a complex character in her own right. However, the value of these approaches is that, by emphasizing that the point of view represented by Lady Macbeth already (potentially) exists in Macbeth, they support our view that part of Macbeth wants to be persuaded. This aspect of his character makes Macbeth at times support the efforts of his wife by contributions of his own to the persuasion.

In *The Tempest*, Sebastian makes a similarly significant contribution to the main part of the persuasion. Without being in this respect manipulated by Antonio, he adds a point to the *argumentatio* which materially supports the persuader's perspective:

> Ant. And how does your content
> Tender your own good fortune?
> Seb. I remember
> You did supplant your brother Prospero.
> Ant. True:
> And look how well my garments sit upon me; [*The Tempest*, II/i,264-67]

The argument of Antonio's own successful advancement as a precedent for Sebastian's situation is in no way elicited by Antonio's general question. This development of the persuasion is thus not staged by Antonio, but is entirely initiated by Sebastian. Antonio then merely reinforces this argument by pointing out the benefits he gained from seizing his brother's position.

In this example, it is quite obvious that Sebastian deliberately seeks to aid Antonio in the persuasion. He is well aware of Antonio's intention to persuade him into murdering his brother. It is only due to this awareness that Sebastian remembers Antonio's overthrow of his brother as an event that is relevant to their present dialogue. Consequently, Sebastian is also fully aware of and responsible for the supportive effects of his contribution to the persuasion. At this point he does collaborate with the persuader, trying to find arguments in favour of the removal of his brother. This intention is revealved when he soon afterwards again comments on the point he contributes to the argumentation:

> Seb. Thy case, dear friend,
> Shall be my precedent; as thou got'st Milan,
> I'll come by Naples. [II/i,285-87]

Though part of Sebastian is still hesitant, as an objection he raises later on shows, he is still essentially ready to be persuaded. This favourable attitude of the persuadee makes it rather easy for a persuader to influence him. Although Antonio's endeavour represents a *causa turpis*, Sebastian is remarkably quickly won over. The brevity of the dialogue is therefore another indication of Sebastian's favourable disposition.

As these examples have shown, the actual dimensions of the persuadee's involvement in the persuasion depends on the exact nature of his or her contributions to it. It must be considered not only at what point in the dialogue a persuadee contributes to the persuasion, but also how significant this contribution is in the context of the entire dialogue. Macbeth and Sebastian both contribute to the main part of the persuasion by providing arguments that one might commonly expect to be uttered by the persuader. In both cases, their support of the persuader is not only significant in its substance, but moreover occurs at a stage of the dialogue when the persuadees are aware of their interlocutors' intention and therefore knowingly, that is deliberately, forward the persuasion. Macbeth and Sebastian experience an inner conflict between different impulses. At other points in these dialogue each of them raises objections to his persuader's perspective, which is an expression of one aspect of their character. Their contribution to the persuasion in those passages discussed here reveals another part of them, namely one that wants to be persuaded.

On the other hand, contributions by the persuadee that occur in the initial stage of the dialogue, such as Benedick's introduction of the topic, do not necessarily denote the persuadee's willingness to be persuaded. Benedick is not aware of the role of his contribution in the persuasion as a whole. He only unknowingly promotes the persuasion and therefore cannot be claimed to reveal a particular wish to be persuaded. What he does reveal by his contribution, just as Brutus does, is a certain favourable disposition. Brutus' active contribution to the persuasion is somewhat ambiguous. At least in one instance he is fully aware of his support of the persuasion. However, his remarks are made primarily in response to contextual influences and may not be altogether meant as purposeful contributions to the dialogue. He does, however, knowingly profess his inclination to accept Cassius' perspective and thus to be persuaded.

5.4.3. Contributions Provoked by the Persuader

In most cases, it seems, persuadees do not contribute directly to the persuasion entirely on their own account, but are somehow manipulated by persuaders. This manipulation is an expression of the persuader's dominance, as s/he manages to control the persuadee's utterances to his or her own advantage. Hence, one has to draw the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that in such passages the persuadee, though s/he is highly involved in the generation of the persuasive discourse, is hardly responsible for it but rather becomes its victim.

For a qualitative analysis of such passages it is necessary to consider to what extent the persuadee is indeed a victim of the manipulation or, in other words, how inconspicuous the manipulative techniques are that are used by the persuader. The assumption that leads to such a question is that a persuadee might still have the option to defend him- or herself against an attempted manipulation by the persuader and might decline to respond as the persuader intends. Naturally, this possibility only exists if an attempted manipulation is easily seen through. If a manipulative technique is obvious to the persuadee, s/he must be aware of the fact that the persuader determines his or her own contribution to the dialogue. If s/he nevertheless surrenders to this influence and responds as the persuader intended it, s/he might still be to some extent responsible for his or her direct contribution to the persuasion, despite the manipulation. In accordance with this assumption, the following analysis will be determined by the distinction between overt or apparent [5.4.3.1.(a)] and less evident or covert manipulation [5.4.3.1.(b) and 5.4.3.2.]. It will be investigated how blatantly or subtly the persuader influences the behaviour of the persuadee by manipulation and, consequently, how far the persuadee does indeed become a helpless victim of the persuader's dominance, that is, how far s/he is accountable for his or her direct contribution to the substance of the persuasion.

5.4.3.1. Guiding Utterances

5.4.3.1.(a) Overt Manipulation

If persuaders prompt their interlocutors to contribute to the persuasion by determining the content of their utterances, this manipulation is at times done quite openly, for example by blatant directives. This is a technique Antonio uses to make Sebastian participate in the generation of the persuasive discourse. He thereby involves

Sebastian in a reasoning which leads to the claim that Sebastian would be the only suitable heir to the throne, should the king decease:

> Ant. […] Will you grant with me
> That Ferdinand is drown'd?
> Seb. He's gone.
> Ant. Then tell me,
> Who's the next heir of Naples?
> Seb. Claribel.
> Ant. She that is Queen of Tunis; she that dwells
> Ten leagues beyond man's life; [*The Tempest*, II/i,238-242]

In this passage, Antonio manipulates Sebastian's utterances by considerably limiting his number of possible responses. His strategy relies on mechanisms inherent in dialogue, namely on the connectedness of initiatives and responses. His questions compel Sebastian to respond to them. They moreover predetermine what answers would be appropriate as a response. The first question is not phrased openly ('What do you think has happened to Ferdinand?') so as to allow for very different answers with regard to the sentiments expressed in them, but in an extremely specified way. Not only is the number of appropriate answers limited to two, as would also be the case with a question like 'Do you believe that Ferdinand is drowned?', but it is moreover strongly suggested that the answer favoured is an affirmative one ("*Will you* grant *with me* that…"). Hence, the way Antonio phrases his question has a very limiting effect. He therefore succeeds to determine Sebastian's responses which, as might well be expected, contains the desired contribution to the reasoning. Likewise, Antonio's second question restricts the number of possible answers, since it asks for a mere fact rather than Sebastian's thoughts or feelings. The impression that Antonio already by his way of posing the question exerts control over Sebastian's answer is further supported by the imperative that introduces the question ("Then *tell* me"). In fact, Antonio determines to a considerable extent Sebastian's response and thereby manages to stage a 'communicative project'. Despite the highly dialogic form of the passage, Antonio is in full control of the development of the argumentation. His interactional dominance is, however, very obvious. Influence on an interlocutor's utterances can hardly take a more conspicuous form than it does due to the imperative ("tell me") and its combination with the interrogative form ("Will you grant") used by Antonio.

The question of Sebastian's share in the generation of the persuasive discourse is thus not as easily answered as one might at first suppose. Though it is clear that Antonio dominates the dialogue, one might well question whether in a case of such open control it is justified to speak of 'manipulation'. Is Sebastian indeed a victim of manipulation when he is aware of Antonio's attempt to dominate him and decides to surrender to it? Even dominance depends on two parties to be successful, namely one that dominates and one that lets him- or herself be dominated. Sebastian might well decline to provide the answer which Antonio so openly tries to extract from him. Since he does not take advantage of this option but responds to Antonio's questions and directives as required, it seems that he in a way assents to Antonio's way of controlling the dialogue. Apparently, he deliberately exposes himself to his persuader's influence. Though he might at this point not foresee to what end his contributions to the dialogue will be used, it is important to note that Sebastian is not only a victim of Antonio's dominance but partly helps to establish the asymmetry by assuming the role of the dominated party. Due to the openness of Antonio's technique, Sebastian is thus partly responsible for his contribution to the persuasion.

In a similarly conspicuous yet perhaps less restrictive manner Cassius dominates his dialogue with Brutus and creates an interactional asymmetry to elicit utterances from Brutus in which he directly contributes to the persuasion. Brutus is thus, for example, stimulated to introduce the image of the mirror as an aspect of self-knowledge which Cassius requires to legitimise his own role in the dialogue in which he claims to reveal Brutus' true attitude to himself, that is, the one of which he means to persuade Brutus:

> Cas. Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?
> Bru. No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itself
> But by reflection, by some other things.
> Cas. 'Tis just;
> And it is very much lamented, Brutus,
> That you have no such mirrors as will turn
> Your hidden worthiness into your eye,
> That you may see your shadow. [*Julius Caesar*, I/ii, 50-57]

Cassius' intention to maximally control Brutus' utterance is revealed by his combination of question and imperative. Though a question in itself obliges its addressee to respond to it, Cassius reinforces this obligation by the additional demand "Tell me". He furthermore controls Brutus' answer by formulating a question which does not allow for a great variety of responses but which can be answered with either 'yes' or 'no'. Or, to be precise, since Cassius asks for something that is a commonplace, namely that, as Brutus phrases it, "the eye sees not itself", the answer 'yes' is no realistic possibility. Thus, Cassius controls Brutus' contribution to the dialogue. The only aspect of his answer that Brutus contributes truly on his own account, is the idea of reflection by which one's own face may be seen.

It seems that Brutus, who is greatly influenced in his reply, cannot be responsible for the way he adds to the part of the dialogue functioning as an *exordium*. Yet, since Cassius' strategies to create interactional dominance are rather conspicuous, it is also true that Brutus is at this point aware of Cassius' dominance and knowingly surrenders to it. Consequently, he lets himself be guided by Cassius. At this early point of the persuasion the extent of Brutus' responsibility for his contributions cannot easily be determined. He knowingly responds as Cassius apparently wishes him to do, yet it does not seem likely that he foresees Cassius' shift of argumentation from the literal level of physical perception to a methaphorical level of recognition of the self, and that he will claim to offer such a reflection for Brutus. Although Brutus may not suspect into what kind of reasoning he gets involved, it is nevertheless significant that he consents to Cassius' attempts to guide his utterances, and thereby helps to establish Cassius' interactional dominance at this point. Such an established asymmetry of the interlocutors may serve as a basis for a successful persuasion for which it is necessary that the persuader gains sufficient influence on his or her interlocutor's (verbal) behaviour and mental processes.

Later in the dialogue when Brutus, as was argued above [5.4.2.], of his own accord admits his disapproval of Caesar's accumulation of power, Cassius makes another obvious attempt to control his subsequent utterance and to make him add a further point to the persuasion:

Bru. What means this shouting? I do fear the people
Choose Caesar for their king.
Cas. Ay, do you fear it?
Then must I think you would not have it so.
Bru. I would not, Cassius; yet I love him well. [78-81]

Cassius seizes the opportunity of Brutus' profession of an attitude in accordance with his own perspective to make him repeat this opinion and to elicit a kind of declaration from him to the effect that Brutus would not put up with a coronation of Caesar. For this purpose, Cassius again noticeably dominates the discourse. He does so by repeating Brutus' sentiment ("Ay, do you fear it?") and by implying that, as a consequence, Brutus would also have to take decisive action to hinder Caesar from actually accepting a crown. On the basis of his logic, which neglects the complexity of the issue and the existence of aspects which may keep Brutus from interfering with Caesar's career, Cassius in a way obliges Brutus to profess his determination to act against Caesar, should he be chosen to be king. Cassius' way of phrasing his utterance strongly encourages an affirmative response by Brutus, as he claims that what he infers necessarily follows from Brutus' initial remark ("*Then must* I think"). Thereby he elicits a positive response from Brutus who indeed announces that he would not accept Caesar as a king.

This direct contribution to the persuasive discourse is to some extent staged by Cassius who cleverly obliges Brutus. However, since Cassius' method is a rather obvious one, Brutus must be aware of his intention to elicit a particular response from him. Consequently, it would not be entirely true to claim that Brutus is 'tricked' into professing his determination to act against Caesar. Rather, he is aware of the significance of his turn, which could be understood as a commitment to prevent Caesar's further advancement. In this context it is also significant that Brutus formulates his response in a very cautious manner. His disapproval of Caesar's apparent disregard of republican values, as he takes care to let Cassius know, is to some extent counterbalanced by his love for Caesar: "I would not, Cassius; *yet* I love him well." Hence, though Brutus agrees with Cassius in the first part of his sentence, he adds a counterargument in its second part. The contrast between these two attitudes is emphasized by the adversative conjunction 'yet' which connects the clauses and, by marking the semantic reversal, points to the different perspectives that manifest themselves in Brutus' utterance. Brutus thereby hints at his inner conflict between his political attitudes and his personal feelings which makes it impossible for him to agree with Cassius without reservation. This cautiousness is typical of Brutus' generally guarded behaviour in this dialogue which makes him such a difficult target for persuasion. Brutus is not easily guided in his utterances, especially when the attempted 'manipulation' is evident to him.

On the whole, Mack's claim that Cassius represents an 'opposing voice' which articulates thoughts that occupy the mind of Brutus is justified insofar as the issue Cassius wants to discuss does indeed also trouble Brutus. This is not only made apparent by his independent contributions to the persuasive discourse, but also mentioned directly by Brutus when he, in the beginning of their dialogue, hints at thoughts that have lately worried him. However, an interpretation of Brutus and Cassius as 'complementary personalities' would not do justice to this scene. The function of Cassius is not merely to give expression to a suppressed side of Brutus' character. While Macbeth considers the murder as something he secretly wishes to commit while being fully aware of the baseness of such a deed and, therefore, desires to be persuaded by someone else, Brutus is drawn between different impulses, neither of which he perceives as dishonourable. Although Brutus at times consents to Cassius' attempts to dominate the dialogue and thus makes himself susceptible to his manipulation, his cautious reactions to blatant manipulation show that he does not necessarily accept this influence. Hence, his direct contributions to the persuasion do not denote Brutus' unacknowledged wish to be persuaded, but are expressions of his readiness to discuss what he and, as he learns by Cassius' words, also his friend perceive as a problem.

5.4.3.1.(b) Covert Manipulation

It is, of course, difficult to determine how obvious or disguised manipulation is in particular examples. At times such categorizations may be arbitrary, since actual differences could be represented more realistically on a scale of differing degrees of openness than by a dichotomy. In the following examples, persuaders also manipulate their interlocutors' turns by 'guiding' utterances so as to make them contribute directly to the substance of the persuasion. Yet, this intention is hardly apparent to their persuadees since they use subtler methods than those identified in 5.4.3.1.(a).

Brutus is, for example, easily made to contribute to the *exordium* of the dialogue by acknowledging Cassius' *ethos*. As an aspect of the *exordium* (*benevolum parare*) it is crucial for the persuader to ensure the persuadee's goodwill. That this function of the *exordium* is fulfilled, becomes clear when Brutus reassures Cassius of his friendship, thereby implicitly expressing his trust in him. However, this significant contribution to the introductory phase of the persuasion is elicited by Cassius' reproach for Brutus' neglect of their friendship:

Cas. Brutus, I do observe you now of late:
I have not from your eyes that gentleness
And show of love as I was wont to have.
You bear too stubborn and too strange a hand
Over your friend that loves you.
Bru. […]
But let not therefore my good friends be griev'd
(Among which number, Cassius, be you one)
Nor construe any further my neglect,
Than poor Brutus, with himself at war,
Forgets the shows of love to other men. [I/ii,31-46]

Cassius' way of manipulating Brutus' response is rather efficient. He claims to have observed Brutus and to have come to the conclusion that his behaviour has changed, namely that he neglects his friend Cassius. By this reproach, Cassius exerts an emotional pressure on Brutus who, in order to reassure Cassius of his esteem and goodwill somehow needs to demonstrate his friendship, for example by taking him into his confidence. This means that Brutus is more or less bound to explain why his behaviour is altered and what has recently occupied his mind. Although Brutus does not fully confide in Cassius, but only vaguely mentions "Conceptions only proper to [him]self" which have troubled him, he emphasizes that his apparent indifference is not due to an alteration of his feelings towards Cassius whom he explicitly refers to as his friend.

Both Brutus' expression of his feelings of friendship for Cassius and his hints at thoughts that have lately preoccupied his mind (especially since they are closely connected to the subject of the persuasion) provide a favourable starting point for the persuasive dialogue. Brutus is manipulated to make these contributions to the initial part of the persuasion by Cassius' reproach. Cassius appeals to Brutus' loyalty by referring to himself by the periphrase "your friend" [35]. That this appeal is not lost upon Brutus becomes obvious in his reply in which he echoes the periphrase and mentions Cassius as one of his "good friends" [43]. Since Cassius only indirectly elicits this response, the attempt to manipulate is not obvious to his persuadee. Hence, Brutus does not profess his trust in Cassius with a full consciousness of the significance of this move for the further dialogue. He does not deliberately expose himself to Cassius' influence. On the contrary, his refusal to reveal the thoughts that have troubled him, explaining that they are "only proper to [him]self" [40], displays his pronounced discreetness, which poses some difficulties for Cassius throughout the dialogue. Thus, as in the previous example, Cassius' manipulative strategies are only partly successful. Brutus' cautiousness in the previous example prevents him from entirely accepting Cassius' conclusion about his readiness to act, and, in this example, makes him reassure Cassius of his friendship without actually confiding in him.

In *King Lear*, one of Gloucester's contributions to the *argumentatio* is elicited very subtly by Edmund. When Gloucester questions him about the authenticity of Edgar's handwriting, Edmund, instead of simply asserting that he recognizes his brother's handwriting, avoids to give a clear answer, thereby however eliciting this assertion from Gloucester himself:

> Glou. You know the character to be your brother's?
> Edm. If the matter were good, my Lord, I durst swear it
> were his; but, in respect of that, I would fain think it
> were not.
> Glou. It is his. [*King Lear*, I/ii,60-64]

At the end of this passage, Gloucester adds a crucial aspect to the persuasion, namely the point that the incriminating letter was indeed written by Edgar. Yet, he does not do so of his own account. On the contrary, his original question [60] reveals that he is at first not at all sure of the authenticity of the letter. What makes him finally answer his own question and add a point to the persuasion which he expected to be made by Edmund, is the use of insinuation in Edmund's unsatisfactory reply. Although Edmund neither acknowledges nor denies to recognize his brother's handwriting, which might suggest that he is simply not able to clearly identify it, the effect of his obscure answer to Gloucester's blunt question apparently is to convince Gloucester of the genuineness of the letter. What Edmund actually says is that he would be strongly convinced ("I durst swear") that his brother was the author of the letter if it contained different sentiments, that he however would prefer to assume someone else to be the writer, because of the letter's dishonourable content. Consequently it is not the handwriting itself that makes him unwilling to give a clear answer, but the content of the letter. Edmund, it seems, does not want to believe his brother to entertain such base ideas. Hence, it seems that his loyalty as a brother keeps him from acknowledging an unwelcome truth, namely that his brother has revealed himself to be a criminal. The impression that Edmund refuses to acknowledge his brother's despicability against his better knowledge is reinforced by the contrast of the emphatic "I *durst swear* it were his" and the rather lame "I *would fain think* it were not". Thus, the manner in which Edmund phrases his evasive reply implicitly does provide an answer to Gloucester's question. Since this answer is, however, extremely implicit and obscure, Gloucester drastically rephrases it and extracts from it the essential information about the identity of the handwriting ("It is his.") In short, Edmund by a deliberately obscure answer elicits this response from Gloucester which adds a crucial point to the persuasion. Edmund strongly insinuates this information, yet formulates it in such an unsatisfactory and vague manner, that Gloucester is induced to make the decisive point himself.

Since this contribution is strongly predetermined by Edmund's insinuation, while at the same time Edmund's influence on Gloucester's utterance remains very implicit, Gloucester is not fully responsible for it. He becomes the victim of manipulation which is not overt, and of which he is therefore not aware. Edmund's pose of the loyal son and brother, who condemns the sentiments expressed in the letter but refuses to believe his brother capable of entertaining such opinions and therefore attempts to protect him, do not at all encourage the supposition that he might intend to elicit such a response from Gloucester. His behaviour at this point could also be described by the techniques of deception that will be discussed in 5.4.3.2. These techniques provide the opportunity for covert manipulation. Due to the imperceptibility of the manipulation, Gloucester could not easily defend himself against it. Yet, the fact that the insinuation has the desired effect on him, is an indication of his predisposition, which makes him rather inclined to believe in the betrayal of one of his sons. Edmund's insinuations can only play upon suspicions and fears that Gloucester already has or to which he is ready to give way. The insinuation of particular points depends on Gloucester's inferences and interpretation as its counterpart to unfold its full meaning, that is, it relies on those processes of active understanding[357] which make Gloucester finally utter "It is his." Hence also this mutual assertion of the authenticity of the letter is a communicative project, if, however, an asymmetrical one in which one participant controls the contribution of his interlocutor.

The part of this dialogue which functions as an *exordium* [I/ii,74-99] is, to use Linell's terminology, a 'communicative project' in the sense that, as was observed in 4.3.2., both interlocutors discuss what kind of action should be taken and contribute different aspects to this part of the persuasion. Furthermore, it was also pointed out earlier that this arrangement is characterized by an asymmetry, due to which it is Edmund's scheme that is implemented although Gloucester has the authority to make the final decision. Gloucester contributes to the *conclusio* by initiating it when he expresses the necessity to confront Edgar with the accusation and to punish him ("Go, sirrah, seek him; I'll apprehend him. Abominable villain! Where is he?" [I/ii,74f.]) and by making the final decision that they should follow Edmund's suggestions ("Edmund, seek him out; wind me into him, I pray you: frame the business after your own wisdom." [94-96]). While the first of these contributions is a rather independent one which is not directly elicited by Edmund, the latter hardly seems to represent Gloucester's own free will, since Edmund plays a considerable role in eliciting it. As a qualitative analysis reveals, Edmund subtly manipulates Gloucester's utterances so as to make him abandon his initial idea that Edgar should directly be confronted with his crimes [74f.] and to authorize Edmund to proceed as he deems it appropriate [94-96].

These manipulations, rather than being based on processes of dialogue associated with initiatives and responses as in the cases of interactional dominance [5.4.3.1.(a)], rely on more subtle techniques that play upon Gloucester's feelings. Instead of following his father's first instructions, Edmund proposes an alternative plan which he phrases in a way that manipulates Gloucester's response to it:

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[357] Linell, 1998, 104.

Edm. […] If it shall please you
to suspend your indignation against my brother till
you can derive from him *better testimony* of his
intent, you should run *a certain course*; where if
you violently proceed against him, mistaking his
purpose, it would make *a great gap in your own
honour*, and *shake in pieces the heart of his obedi-
ence*. [76-83, emphasis added]

Within this proposal Edmund contrasts two perspectives, or two different ways of proceeding, namely Gloucester's plan to immediately confront Edgar and to "violently proceed against him", and his own suggestion to wait and seek additional evidence. While Gloucester's scheme, as Edmund emphasizes, involves certain risks, which do not make it especially attractive, his own plan is presented as much more advantageous as it promises a considerable safety and even offers the chance of a positive solution since "better testimony" might turn up. Edmund plays upon Gloucester's fears by overemphasizing the damages that might be done by taking hasty action. Not only Gloucester's own honour would thus be threatened, but also Edgar, should he turn out to be innocent, might eventually turn against his father. By thus picturing the evil results that might ensue from Gloucester's plan, Edmund succeeds to elicit a decision from him which is much more in accordance with his own scheme. Moreover, Edmund plays upon his hopes that Edgar's innocence may still be revealed:

I dare pawn down my life for him, that he hath
writ this to feel my affection to your honour, and to
no other pretence of danger. [83-85]

This assertion, in which Edmund almost vouches for his brother's integrity, adopts a tone that is remarkably different from his feeble statement "I would fain think it were not [his handwriting]" [62f]. Gloucester is thus enticed by new hopes to make a decision about what actions to take, which suits Edmund's schemes. Edmund moreover influences Gloucester's contribution to the *conclusio* when he suggests a proceeding that seems to offer a certainty about Edgar's true sentiments, a prospect which clearly appeals to the alarmed and bewildered Gloucester, who immediately grasps at the hope held out to him:

Edm. […] I will place you where
you shall hear us confer of this, and by an auricular
assurance have your satisfaction; and that without
any further delay than this very evening.
Glou. He cannot be such a monster –
Edm. Nor is not, sure.
Glou. […] I pray you: frame the business
after your own wisdom. I would unstate myself to
be in a due resolution. [87-97]

Edmund utilizes Gloucester's uncertainty, who, as he confesses, would 'unstate' himself only to be sure of Edgar's innocence or guilt, and thus guides his final decision to authorize Edmund. His scheme seems to provide a reliable and speedy method to fathom Edgar's true opinion as Gloucester is promised to witness a situation in which the brothers unguardedly discuss the matter raised in Edgar's letter. That means he will have direct, "auricular" evidence already on the same day. Gloucester clearly has the authority to decide how they should proceed in this situation and thus contributes to the final stage of the persuasion. However, Edmund cleverly plays upon Gloucester's feelings, such as his fear of a loss of his honour, his love of his son Edgar and the wish that he may still prove innocent, and his desire for certainty, to manipulate this contribution to the persuasive discourse.

Gloucester, who is therefore quite subtly manipulated, cannot be held fully responsible for his contribution to the development of the persuasion. Instead, Edmund's dominance reduces his responsibility. This dominance is not based on overt means of control, but on a utilization of his interlocutor's emotions in a way he may not see through, since it works on a more or less irrational level.

Also Iago uses a variety of indirect means to manipulate his interlocutor, who due to their subtlety is not aware of the control Iago generally has over his utterances.[358] Consequently, Othello several times adds substantially to the essence of the persuasion, which is partly caused by Iago's skilful manipulation, and partly by Othello's disposition and his susceptibility to the thought of Desdemona's faithlessness. For each of these contributions Othello is partly but not fully responsible. As the share of each interlocutor in Othello's contributions to the persuasion may vary, a number of individual examples will be analysed with respect to Othello's and Iago's roles and the extent of their influence in these passages.

During the *argumentatio* it is Othello who at one point utters the thought that Desdemona, despite her generally honest nature, may yet be unfaithful to him since at times people do not act in consistence with their nature:

Oth. I do not think but Desdemona's honest.
Iago. Long live she so, and long live you to think so!
Oth. And yet how nature erring from itself –
Iago. Ay, there's the point [...] [*Othello*, III/iii,229-32]

[358] Several critics comment on Iago's use of insinuation (for example Kennedy, 1983, 91 and Coulthard, 173). Gilbert investigates it as an exploitation of the Cooperative Principle and the Politeness Principle (Gilbert, 1997, 204-207).

This thought supports Iago's reasoning who accordingly seizes the opportunity to reinforce Othello's suspicion that there may be a darker side to Desdemona which has not yet been revealed to Othello. It is, however, quite clear from this passage that this point, as much as it appears to be Othello's original thought, is to some extent inspired by Iago's prior remark. In his own previous utterance Othello still expressed his unshakeable belief in his wife's honesty. What has suddenly made him falter is Iago's opaque response to this utterance.

On the surface, this response ("Long live she so …") seems to be an affirmative one. Yet, there is a notable peculiarity to its tone which subverts the surface impression. First, the wish "Long live she so" suggests that although Desdemona once was or still is honest, this may very well change at any time. Second, the striking addition "and long live you to think so!" creates a certain dissonance as it insinuates that what Othello thinks does not correspond to reality, that, in other words, he is simply mistaken about his wife's character. These insinuations give rise to Othello's thought that his wife may not be what she seems. He seems to be quite unaware of Iago's influence. The beginning of his utterance "And yet" shows that he perceives Iago's remark to stand in contradiction to his own utterance which therefore begins like an objection. Othello apparently does not realize that he does not contradict Iago but articulates what he has just insinuated.

Due to the imperceptibility of Iago's manipulation, Othello does not have the possibility to reject it. He inevitably becomes its victim. Nevertheless, this does not entirely free him from the responsibility for his contribution to the persuasion. Othello accepts Iago's insinuations and thus lets them unfold their full meaning. Not only does he allow the thought of Desdemona's infidelity to come to his mind and seriously considers it as a realistic possibility. He even expresses his doubts in the dialogue, and thereby supports Iago's argument that Desdemona successfully deceived even her own father about her true character so that "[h]e thought 'twas witchcraft" [215]. Hence, Othello must be aware of the effect of his utterance in its context, namely to reinforce Iago's accusations against Desdemona. Since he does not keep his doubts to himself but introduces them into the discourse, one has to conclude that he has a motivation for doing so. It seems that Othello, who at this point knowingly supports Iago's reasoning, is essentially ready to be persuaded of his wife's disloyalty. He is already partly persuaded and begins to accept the thought of Desdemona's unfaithfulness. Thus, he actively supports Iago's attempts to undermine the part of him which still insists on his trust in Desdemona.

Also during the final part of their first dialogue, Othello crucially participates in the generation of those elements that perform a central function of a *conclusio*, namely the call to decisive action. As was pointed out earlier (4.3.2.), he arranges Cassio to be killed by Iago while he will similarly punish Desdemona. Though it seems as if Othello made these decisions on his own, especially since he has just resolved to take "a capable and wide revenge" [466], a closer analysis of the passage reveals that Iago manages to influence Othello's decisions and to guide his utterances by methods which are utterly difficult to notice. For example, his decision to have Cassio killed is instigated by Iago's oath of loyalty:

> Iago. Witness that here Iago doth give up
> The excellency of his wit, hand, heart,
> To wrong'd Othello's service: let him command,
> And to obey shall be in me remorse,
> What bloody work so ever. [III/iii, 472-76]

On the surface, Iago merely expresses his loyalty to Othello and his willingness to do whatever is requested of him. However, he also introduces the idea of murder by insinuating that what Othello will most likely request of him is some "bloody work". More important, though, is the seemingly paradoxical point that, while Iago apparently gives up his own will "[t]o wrong'd Othello's service", he actually impels him to settle upon the details of a plan of action. The seemingly neutral expression "let him command" involves a 'request' for commands. Othello is made to feel an expectation on Iago's side to be told what steps to undertake against Cassio and Desdemona. By these subtle means Iago creates an asymmetry in his favour which subverts the more obvious asymmetry of social power that puts Othello in the position to give him orders and to determine his actions. Hence, Othello's dominance, which relies on exterior sources, is of less consequence in this part of the persuasion than Iago's dominance which is based on his use of language that enables him to manipulate Othello. Since these two levels of asymmetry, which correspond to Linell and Luckmann's distinction of exogenous and intrinsic asymmetry, do not coincide, Iago's dominance with respect to the development of the dialogue is even less recognizable.

Also Othello's resolution to kill Desdemona is skilfully elicited by Iago's use of insinuation and deception. Since the issue of deception will be analysed in detail in the next section, it is sufficient at this point to investigate Iago's use of insinuation.

Oth. Within these three days, let me hear thee say
That Cassio's not alive.
Iago. My friend is dead:
'Tis done as you request, but let her live.
Oth. Damn her, lewd minx: O damn her!
Come, go with me apart, I will withdraw
To furnish me with some swift means of death,
For the fair devil: now art thou my lieutenant. [III/iii,479-85]

Othello's decision that Desdemona too shall die, as becomes apparent in the context of this utterance, is a response to Iago's appeal to spare Desdemona. After they have settled on a way of taking revenge on Cassio, Iago's plea reminds Othello of the necessity to decide what shall be done about Desdemona. Moreover, the phrasing 'let her live' insinuates, on the one hand, that *if* someone is to punish Desdemona, it would naturally by Othello and, on the other hand, presupposes that Othello indeed means to kill Desdemona. By talking as if Othello had already resolved that not only Cassio but also his wife is to die, Iago puts him under a certain pressure. He creates the impression that a particular attitude, namely the wish to kill his wife, is to be expected from Othello, that it represents a normal reaction. By insinuating what he expects Othello to do, Iago indirectly influenced Othello's decision. Othello, whose feelings are aroused by the dialogue is, of course, not able to reasonably reflect on his feelings for Desdemona but automatically curses her. His decision to look for "some swift means of death" for her is hence the only realistic possibility for Othello to respond to Iago's appeal.

Iago's influence on Othello's utterance is indeed a rather covert and indirect one. This imperceptibility of Iago's techniques considerably reduces Othello's responsibility for his share in the generation of the *conclusio*. Also, is seems that in such a highly dramatic situation as the one created by Othello and Iago, when both of them kneel and swear an oath by which they commit themselves to revenge Othello, he cannot but make the contributions that Iago covertly draws from him. The solemn act of swearing oaths lends this part of the dialogue a somewhat official tone, due to which considerations such as the proper way of proceeding gain considerable relevance for Othello. He is thus likely to take those measures that Iago signals are to be expected. Rather vague hints like the phrases "What bloody work so ever" or "let her live" therefore have an immediate effect on Othello's responses.

A discussion of Iago's methods of inducing Othello to contribute directly to the persuasive discourse would be incomplete without a closer examination of the dialogue in IV/i in which Iago's means have drastically changed. Instead of the rather cautious methods such as insinuation by which he controls Othello's behaviour in the beginning of the persuasion, he employs increasingly direct language which repeatedly becomes downright offensive. Apparently, provocation is another instrument of the verbal arsenal Iago uses to gain control over Othello's utterances.

In the beginning of IV/i, the *argumentatio* is again taken up, as Iago makes Othello once more reflect upon the weight of the evidence against Desdemona:

Iago. But if I give my wife a handkerchief –
Oth. What then?
Iago. Why then 'tis hers, my lord, and being hers,
She may, I think, bestow't on any man.
Oth. She is protectress of her honour too,
May she give that? [IV/i, 10-15]

Othello's argument, that Desdemona's negligence about his presents can be compared to a loss of her honour, is of course a contradiction of Iago's claim that a wife may do with her husband's presents whatever she likes. However, in this passage Iago's statement [12/13] does not so much function as the sincere expression of an alternative and rather liberal opinion which challenges the one held by Othello, but its purpose is to provoke a contradiction and to make Othello articulate an opposed attitude. Therefore, Iago's provocative remark plays a significant role in the generation of Othello's contribution to the *argumentatio*. By a calculated challenge of Othello's conception of his rights as a husband, Iago materially influences his utterance.

Due to Iago's general understatement and his pose as an honest, straightforward fellow, his intention to provoke Othello is not overly obvious. Since he only indirectly elicits a certain response from Othello, namely by playing upon his feelings, Othello does not become aware of this intention. Hence, he is not able to repulse Iago's methods of taking control of his utterances. He is only partly responsible for his reasoning which reinforces the accusations against Desdemona, namely insofar as he has already accepted the claim that she indeed gave his handkerchief to Cassio and as he ascribes a meaning to the fact that Cassio possesses Desdemona's handkerchief which allows for inferences concerning her moral depravity. Instigated by Iago's sly provocations it seems to be Othello who wants to convince his interlocutor that the negligent abandonment of her husband's presents has indeed serious implication with respect to Desdemona's integrity. Othello and Iago seem to have exchanged the roles of persuader and persuadee. Though Iago's provocations initiate this exchange of roles, Othello also has to be ready to accept the role of the one who proves Desdemona's base motives. Othello to some extent remains responsible for his contribution to the persuasion because he has accepted the premises which are necessary to contradict Iago's unacceptable conclusion, and to oppose it with an alternative one that in fact suits Iago's purposes.

Guiding utterances, as the analysis has shown, can take widely different forms. Persuaders may plainly limit the range of utterances available to their interlocutors in order to determine their contributions to the dialogue, or they may conceal their influence by using more indirect methods of eliciting a particular response, such as insinuation or provocation. While an obvious control over the content of the persuadee's turns leaves a possibility for the persuadee to reject the persuader's influence, because s/he is made aware of it, less overt means work beyond the consciousness of the persuadee, who is therefore less responsible for the result of the manipulation, namely for his or her direct contributions to the persuasion. In contrast, persuadees who submit to the overt influence of their persuaders to some extent collaborate with them since they implicitly consent to the influence. However, even if a persuader indirectly guides the persuadee's verbal behaviour, the latter is not merely an innocent victim of this dominance. As was argued, even methods like insinuation are dependent on the interlocutor's willingness to understand what the persuader does not choose to make more explicit.

5.4.3.2. Deception

An interlocutor's manipulation by the persuader may be even more concealed than in the examples of less overt dominance discussed in 5.4.3.1.(b). Unlike in those examples, persuaders at times do not rely on language alone but use means of manipulation that have an extraverbal dimension and that are entirely beyond the persuadee's control. They withhold relevant information from the persuadees and/or make false pretences and thereby deceive their interlocutors. The relationship between deception and dominance is quite evident: since the persuader provides the persuadee with false information or keeps crucial information from him or her, s/he creates an asymmetry of knowledge which s/he utilizes for the persuasion.

That deceit can generate a dominance which differs qualitatively from the forms of the persuader's dominance discussed so far (such as interactional dominance), becomes obvious when philosophical approaches to the issue of lying are considered. According to Kant, who understood falsehood as a form of perversion of human existence, lying involves a violation of human dignity. It has a destructive and aggressive dimension.[359] This destructiveness is especially highlighted in the philosophy of Marquis de Sade. He propagates the individual's freedom from all forms of authority, including the authority of moral standards. By speaking the untruth, humans can free themselves from morals. Obviously, Sade's philosophy aims at a general destructiveness which, as he maintains, is the true achievement of mankind. By destruction, by creating nothingness, man counterbalances God's *generatio*. Such a philosophy is based on a radical reversal of conventional values and, consequently on an appreciation of hatred, murder, and the will to destroy. The individual who adopts this philosophy necessarily abandons his or her human(e) side. Peaceful relationships with others are rendered entirely impossible.[360] The characteristics of Sade's philosophy seem remarkably well suited to explain the behaviour of Iago, and arguably even of Edmund. Both entirely disregard moral standards in their relationships with others and unscrupulously deceive their interlocutors. While Edmund does so for his personal gain, Iago's behaviour can more clearly be explained by mere destructiveness. His opposition to creativeness in general is quite apparent, and his diabolic characteristics have frequently been pointed out. Kennedy characterizes Iago as a "master of […] dialogue in its most *parasitical* form."[361] As Baruzzi observes, this sort of philosophy does not allow for harmonious relationships with other people but aims at their suppression. Iago's and Edmund's attitude can thus only result in asymmetric relationships with their interlocutors. Also in linguistic approaches, deception is characterized as an "aggressive act" since it "involves, among other things, hindering or preventing someone else from reaching certain information which is, or might be, if he were aware of it, relevant to that other person."[362] Deception constitutes a "breach of faith, [a] shift, on the speaker's part, from coordination to conflict."[363]

The concept of lying is somewhat ambiguous, especially in its distinction from other forms of saying something which does not coincide with what one believes to be true, such as irony. This ambiguity results in a terminology which may at times be confusing. As Barbe rightly observes, irony and lying can superficially be described by the same definition: the speaker says something s/he does not believe to be true, yet

[359] Baruzzi, Arno, Philosophie der Lüge, Darmstadt 1996, 74.
[360] Ibid., 69-71.
[361] Kennedy, 1983, 90, emphasis added.
[362] Vincent, Jocelyne M. and Cristiano Castelfranchi, "On the Art of Deception: How to Lie While Saying the Truth", Herman Parret, Marina Sbisà, and Jef Verschueren (eds.), Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics: Proceedings of the Conference on Pragmatics, Urbino, July 8-14, 1979, Amsterdam 1981, 752.
[363] Ibid., 753.

pretends to be convinced of its truthfulness.[364] In its original sense, the term *eironeia* in classical rhetoric designates a form of understatement as it was practiced by Socrates, who, by hiding his superior knowledge, for pedagogical reasons reveals the lack of knowledge of his interlocutors. In a broader sense, *eironeia* is any kind of simulation or pretence which is used as a means to expose and criticize the opposing party.[365] In Roman rhetoric two terms are used to cover the concept of *eironeia*, namely *simulatio* and *dissimulatio*. These terms define two complementary aspects of irony. *Simulatio* is used to pretend that one holds an opinion which is in fact contrary to one's true attitudes. *Dissimulatio* means that one conceals one's true opinion. It seems that most instances of irony involve both aspects, though one may be more important than the other. The methods of *simulatio* and *dissimulatio* may of course also be used to deceive the addressee. The crucial distinction between deception and irony, as is generally acknowledged, is that deception is meant to remain unnoticed by its addressee whereas irony is intended to be recognized and therefore employs verbal or nonverbal signals that mark an ironic statement.

Although this difference is quite plausible, there seem to be certain contradictory conceptions in the literature. Lapp claims that irony can only be associated with *simulatio* since it simulates an act of deception. An ironist, as he explains, acts as if s/he wanted to deceive his or her interlocutor but, since s/he uses certain signals to ensure that the irony is recognized as such, this simulation of deception is crucially different from actual deception.[366] While Lapp's account of irony as a simulation of insincerity is rather convincing, his mixture of the idea of simulation as in a game or scientific experiment and of the rhetorical term *simulatio* is problematic. An ironist may well simulate to hide his or her true opinion, that is s/he may use the method of *dissimulatio* and, by certain signals, reveal that s/he only simulates to deceive the interlocutor. Another problem is created by Plett's distinction between explicit and hidden irony. According to Plett, explicit irony corresponds to *simulatio*. It depends on signals and is meant to be recognized by the addressee. Hidden irony corresponds to *dissimulatio*. The speaker avoids to mark the usage of irony, since the speaker's true opinion is not to be inferred by the addressee. Plett remarks that in such cases the ironist, by concealing his or her insincerity, can attain his or her goal all the better.[367]

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[364] Barbe, Katharina, Irony in Context, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 1995, 118.
[365] Lapp, Edgar, Lingusitik der Ironie, Tübingen 1992, 28.
[366] Lapp, 148f.
[367] Plett, 1991, 120f.

This claim inevitably raises the question what kind of goal this may possibly be, which is achieved by masking the discrepancy between the speaker's words and his or her true opinion. It can only be to deceive the addressee. Consequently, it seems that Plett uses the term irony to cover both irony and deception, and that he accounts for the difference by distinguishing between explicit irony and hidden irony.

Deception, we may then summarize, can be realized either by *simulatio* or by *dissimulatio*. In either case there are no signals to make the addressee realize that the speaker says something which s/he does not believe to be true. The addressee's lack of awareness is essential for the deception as it constitutes a necessary prerequisite for a successful manipulation. The following analysis will investigate instances of the persuadee's direct contribution to the persuasion which are staged by the persuader, who manipulates the persuadee by techniques of deception. It will be shown how examples of *simulatio* [5.4.3.2.(a)] and of *dissimulatio* [5.4.3.2.(b)] can delude the persuadee and determine his or her responses so as to make him or her contribute to the substance of the persuasion. Vincent and Castelfranchi's distinction between direct and indirect deception is quite appropriate to describe how *simulatio* and *dissimulatio* are put to use in these examples. As the subtitle of their essay, "How to Lie While Saying the Truth", suggests, they distinguish direct deception from indirect forms of deception by the criterion that the former is based on the provision of plainly false information, while the latter is not.[368]

5.4.3.2.(a) *Simulatio* – Manipulation by False Information as Direct Deception

Both Edmund and Iago fake evidence which, unlike the faked letters Cassius sends to Brutus *after* their dialogue, activates the persuadees and makes them add crucial points to the *argumentatio*. Edmund's letter, which creates the impression that Edgar is not content with his life and especially with his dependence on his father, involves Gloucester in the argumentation insofar as he draws an obvious conclusion and evaluates his son's intentions as illegal:

> Glou. […] *If our father would sleep till*
> *I wak'd him, you should enjoy half his revenue for ever,*
> *and live the beloved of your brother*, EDGAR. – Hum!
> Conspiracy! […] [*King Lear*, I/ii,50-53]

Edmund, of course, knows that the sentiments he ascribes to Edgar do not at all coincide with Edgar's real attitude. He makes Gloucester believe something he knows to be false. Yet, this letter is not only a simple lie, but a special case of *simulatio*. Not only is

[368] Vincent and Castelfranchi, 754.

the information contained in the letter false, Edmund furthermore deceives Gloucester about the origin of this information. He pretends that Edgar is the writer of the letter by adopting his point of view and using his signature. Thus, this letter constitutes an example of double *simulatio*. Gloucester is deceived about Edgar's sentiments and is made to believe that Edgar himself reveals his treacherous character in a letter to his brother. Due to these falsehoods which are not marked, Gloucester is misled into believing that Edgar is not the loyal son he appeared to be. His contribution to the persuasion is to a considerable degree co-determined by Edmund, which means that Gloucester himself is only partly responsible for so quickly condemning Edgar, since he is manipulated by the false information which distorts his view of reality. Gloucester's conclusion that Edgar plans a conspiracy is a very evident one. He does not raise an entirely new point but simply summarizes what the faked letter evidently suggests. Thus, his contribution to the persuasion, critical as it might be, is really cleverly staged by Edgar who secretly dominates the discourse and determines its development. Similar observations could be made with respect to another passage in which Edmund's deception again provokes Gloucester to make inferences about Edgar's treacherousness:

Glou. Has he never before sounded you in this business?
Edm. Never, my Lord. But I have heard him oft maintain
it to be fit that, sons at perfect age, and fathers de-
clin'd, the father should be as ward to the son, and
the son manage his revenue.
Glou. O villain, villain! His very opinion in the letter! [67-72]

Also in this case, Edmund's *simulatio* is entirely unmarked, so that Gloucester believes in the authenticity of the *sermocinatio*. Edgar's reported words serve as sufficient evidence for Gloucester to assume that the scandalous letter gives a just account of Edgar's frame of mind and of his attitude towards his father. As before, Gloucester is manipulated into contributing to the persuasion. Edmund secretly dominates him with the help of deceptive utterances.

In a passage quoted in 4.3.2.2.(b) as an example of Othello's active participation in the generation of arguments, Iago confronts Othello with a detailed account of Cassio's shocking behaviour in his sleep, which, however, is entirely the product of his own imagination. Othello takes this lie as an evidence of Desdemona's infidelity and thereby provides an argument which supports Iago's claim that Othello is cuckolded by his wife:

Iago. And then, sir, would he gripe and wring my hand,
Cry out, "Sweet creature!" and then kiss me hard,
As if he pluck'd up kisses by the roots,
That grew upon my lips, then laid his leg

	Over my thigh, and sigh'd, and kiss'd, and then
	Cried "Cursed fate, that gave thee to the Moor!"
Oth.	O monstrous, monstrous!
Iago.	Nay, this was but his dream.
Oth.	But this denoted a foregone conclusion. [III/iii,427-34]

In its vividness Iago's *simulatio* is very convincing. There are no signals from which Othello could induce that the account is entirely made up. On the contrary, the evidence faked by Iago, just as those fabricated by Edmund, seems especially reliable. It is, in fact, so clear that in each case the persuadee is prompted to pronounce the obvious conclusion. What makes these lies an efficient evidence is the impression of authenticity that is created when the persuadees are informed about the behaviour of the accused one, that is of Edgar and Desdemona. Since Iago by the use of an *evidentia* and Edmund with the help of a *sermocinatio* seem to report merely the facts, their interlocutors apparently disregard the important aspect that their information about Edgar's words and Cassio's behaviour was not obtained directly, but that they hear about it only through the persuaders. Therefore, Gloucester and Othello do not consider the possibility that they are deceived and that their own contributions to the dialogues might be based on false information.

In the passage quoted above Iago even twice deceives Othello about his true opinion. First, he presents an account of Cassio's behaviour which he knows is not true. When Othello's exclamation reveals that he believes in the authenticity of this story and that he understands its alarming implications, Iago deceives him a second time. He pretends to disagree with Othello's fatalistic evaluation of the evidence and seemingly does not believe in its evidential value: "Nay, this was but his dream." In both cases Iago deceives and thus manipulates Othello. While in his first turn he says something which he knows to be false and which he wants Othello to accept as true, in his second utterance he deceives Othello about the view he seems to support. Iago simulates a scepticism and cautiousness which he intends Othello to reject. Yet implicitly Iago still upholds his previous lies. When he apparently soothes Othello with the words "this was but a dream", he again claims that the dream did indeed exist. When Othello, in coherence with this implied message insists that the evidence does prove the adultery, something significant has happened. While at first Iago seeks to convince Othello of his perspective by confessing how remarkably Cassio acts in his sleep, the point of view, that Desdemona has indeed betrayed Othello, finally seems to be held *only* by Othello, but not by Iago. As Othello must recognize, it has become entirely his own opinion. Thus, by his various deceptive techniques, Iago has manipulated Othello so that he embraces the belief in Desdemona's faithlessness as his own original belief, which manifests itself in Othello's direct contribution to the persuasive discourse.

Later in the dialogue, Othello and Iago in a 'communicative project' establish another argument that speaks against Desdemona. Iago initiates this project and invents evidence which he presents as a fact and from which they both reason together in a way that mingles their two voices:

> Iago. […] tell me but this,
> Have you not sometimes seen a handkerchief,
> Spotted with strawberries, in your wife's hand?
> Oth. I gave her such a one, 'twas my first gift.
> Iago. I know not that, but such a handkerchief –
> I am sure it was your wife's – did I to-day
> See Cassio wipe his beard with.
> Oth. If 't be that, –
> Iago. If it be that, or any that was hers,
> It speaks against her with the other proofs. [III/iii,440-448]

At this point it seems as if Iago and Othello argued together, each of them providing relevant information to complete the picture of Desdemona's offence. Iago describes the handkerchief he knows to be Desdemona's, Othello mentions that it was a gift from himself, a fact which makes the 'evidence' even more severe, and then both of them agree that this incident constitutes a valid proof. Othello's contributions to this argument are, however elicited by several manipulative techniques Iago uses in order to stage the collaboration. The central means of manipulation is, of course, the lie that Iago has seen Cassio use a handkerchief he recognized as Desdemona's. By deceiving Othello, Iago gains a certain control over his dialogue contributions. Also here, Iago seems to report merely facts, namely what he has observed. He thereby creates an impression of authenticity which prevents Othello from mistrusting his words. The *simulatio*, in other words, contains no signals that reveal its fictitiousness, but on the contrary is presented in a way that discourages such a suspicion.

Apart from this *simulatio*, Iago also uses more apparent methods to manipulate Othello's behaviour. For example, his first turn is a combination of an imperative and a rather limiting question and therefore strongly guides Othello's response ("*tell me* but this,/ *Have you not* sometimes seen a handkerchief […]?"). Othello practically has no choice but to respond in the affirmative. Hence, Iago with his question determines the import of Othello's turn. It is, however, interesting to note that the information, that this handkerchief was Othello's first present to Desdemona, is provided by Othello entirely on his own account. He gives more information than is necessary, which could be understood as an expression of his overeagerness as an interlocutor. Othello's anxiousness, which makes him unnecessarily add to the persuasive argument, may be incited by Iago's reluctance to reveal his thoughts to Othello earlier in the dialogue. As a consequence, Othello is eager to 'assist' Iago to bring his knowledge of Desdemona's misconduct to light.

Iago further manipulates Othello by yet another kind of deception, namely when he pretends to be unaware of the special significance of this particular handkerchief ("I know not that"). When he pretends to be unaware of the additional weight the evidence gains due to the fact that the handkerchief was Othello's first present, Iago leaves it to Othello to recognize its full meaning. He thus highlights Othello's share in the generation of this argument and at the same time plays down his own role. Iago, it seems, is only the observer of facts but does not evaluate them. With the help of this lie Iago conceals his dominance in this passage and thereby also the asymmetry of this situation in which he efficiently manipulates Othello. The true extent of Iago's dominance, which he thus cleverly hides, becomes more obvious when he interrupts Othello, who starts to infer from his 'observations' ("If 't be that, – "), to continue his sentence and, by making the conclusion in his stead, to determine Othello's reaction and evaluation of the evidence. Iago's interruption of Othello appears to be less aggressive and dominating than it actually is since he repeats the exact words that Othello uses to start the sentence and thereby creates the impression that he merely articulates what Othello would have said, namely that Cassio's possession of Desdemona's handkerchief clearly speaks against her. Iago eliminates the possibility that Othello finds an alternative explanation or arrives at a less explicit conclusion. The 'communicative project', in which Othello and Iago establish an argument against Desdemona, is hence characterized by Iago's for the most part hidden dominance, and additionally also by Othello's eagerness to participate in this project.

5.4.3.2.(b) Indirect Deception by *Dissimulatio*

In the previous section, examples were analysed in which the persuader's ability to manipulate the persuadee is predominantly based on means of deceitful simulation, that is, on a central lie. False information is used throughout the *argumentatio* by both Edmund and Iago. As a counterpart, both of them also employ the method of dissimulation to control the utterances of their interlocutors. The strategy of withholding essential information is used excessively in the beginning of either persuasion.

It was argued in 4.2.2. that Gloucester and Edmund jointly introduce the topic of their dialogue. Edmund's feigned reluctance to talk, it was further argued, plays a decisive role in this 'collaboration'. Rhetorically, Edmund's reluctance can be described as *dissimulatio*, since he steadfastly refuses to share his knowledge with his father:

> Glou. […] Edmund, how now! What news?
> Edm. So please your Lordship, none. [*Putting up the letter*.
> Glou. Why so earnestly seek you to put up that letter?
> Edm. I know no news, my Lord.
> Glou. What paper were you reading?
> Edm. Nothing, my Lord.
> Glou. No? What needed then that terrible dispatch of it
> into your pocket? The quality of nothing hath not
> such need to hide itself. Let's see: come, if it be no-
> thing, I shall not need spectacles. [*King Lear,* I/ii,26-35]

In this passage, Edmund obviously hides something. His reticence is so firm that the most noticeable feature of his words is the entire lack of information. Hence, variations on the word 'nothing' are the central elements of each of his turns. In contrast to his plain lies later on in the dialogue, this kind of deception is intended to be seen through. In Lapp's terms, it is not real *dissimulatio,* but only a simulation of *dissimulatio*. Edmund only pretends to conceal something, which actually he means Gloucester to become aware of. As this strategy is successful, Gloucester, as was pointed out in 4.2.2., contributes directly to the introduction of the topic. What Edmund pretends to hide, however, is not the truth but an additional lie. If he pretended to conceal the truth, Edmund's utterances would be ironic, but actually they constitute lies, though of another sort than those investigated in 5.4.3.2.(a). Edmund's implicit lies also find expression in the false assumptions Gloucester makes, when he hints at what he suspects Edmund to hide from him: "What needed then that *terrible dispatch* of it into your pocket? the quality of nothing hath not such need to *hide* itself." To summarize the central points, Edmund in this passage only simulates to dissimulate, that is, he means Gloucester to partly see through his deception. Unlike in instances of irony, he does not hide the truth in a transparent way, but he hides another lie. Gloucester, who takes this lie, namely that Edmund has got some important news, for a fact, is deceived *indirectly*. Vincent and Castelfranchi argue that indirect deception is a deception in which nothing that is literally untrue is uttered. They mention a number of methods which enable a speaker to 'lie while saying the truth'.

In the passage quoted above, Edmund does not utter a single falsehood. In fact, the first two of his statements are strikingly accurate. He *does* have no news, because Edgar did not write any letter to him. The 'lie', if one can call it a lie, is the letter which he holds in his hand. It contains the potential for the false assumption that Gloucester makes, namely that there must be news. Not correcting an interlocutor's false assumptions is identified by Vincent and Castelfranchi as one possibility of indirect deception. 'Pretending to lie' is recognized as another possibility. One may lie while saying the truth, they explain, by making one's interlocutor believe that one is lying. Although one utters the truth, one's interlocutor "will not assume the truth, and so is he deceived.'[369] And finally, another method of indirect deception which is practiced by Edmund in this short exchange is his reticence. Vincent and Castelfranchi's description of reticence nicely fits the situation: "the speaker lets the hearer understand that he is keeping quiet about something […]; he lets the hearer suspect exactly what this something is (helped by the context) […]. As with insinuation, the inferable information will be somehow negative or hurtful."[370] The context which stimulates the hearer's suspicion is, in this case, the letter Edmund hurridly puts away. And although in the passage quoted above, Gloucester cannot 'suspect *exactly*' what Edmund keeps quiet about, clues which Edmund provides later on will stir Gloucester's imagination. Nevertheless, he apparently expects something unpleasant already at this stage.

This analysis should have made it clear that Gloucester is not fully responsible for his direct contributions to the part of the dialogue functioning as an *exordium* which were identified in chapter 4. His responsibility is considerably limited since he becomes the victim of an intricate method of manipulation. He is deceived indirectly and in ways that are beyond his recognition. Nevertheless, Gloucester's direct contributions to the persuasive discourse cannot be explained solely by the covert manipulation of deceptive methods. Gloucester's readiness to speculate about the existence of unpleasant news without having any substantial reason for doing so is an important precondition of the success of Edmund's technique. Indirect lies, as Vincent and Castelfranchi point out, work "by entrusting to the hearer's imagination the completion of a deceptive picture"[371]. Thus, a successful indirect lie is based on a communicative project which involves both interlocutors. That Gloucester makes the contribution required of him is made apparent by his replies.

The part of the dialogue between Iago and Othello, which functions as an *exordium*, offers another example of indirect deception in the form of simulated dissimulation. Also in this passage, the persuadee is cleverly manipulated with the

[369] Vincent and Castelfranchi, 764.
[370] Ibid., 761.
[371] Ibid., 771.

result that he unwillingly collaborates with the persuader in the introduction of the subject of the persuasion:

Iago. Ha, I like not that.
Oth. What doest thou say?
Iago. Nothing, my lord, or if – I know not what.
Oth. Was not that Cassio parted from my wife?
Iago. Cassio, my lord? … no, sure, I cannot think it,
That he would sneak away so guilty-like,
Seeing your coming.
Oth. I do believe 'twas he. [III/iii,35-41]

Othello gets the impression that Iago seeks to conceal his motives for his disapproving exclamation at the sight of Cassio speaking with Desdemona.[372] Iago's attempts to deny his disapproval ("Nothing, my lord") is contradicted, and hence also unmasked, by the decided dislike he expresses at first. Iago's awkward manoeuvre to conceal his opinion, which Othello easily recognizes, is however only simulated. Iago only pretends to dissimulate something. Since due to his contradictory utterances Othello makes false assumptions, Iago's behaviour can be described as deceptive. He does not lie plainly by providing clearly false information but indirectly. As a result, Othello contributes to the introduction of the subject by explicitly mentioning Cassio [38]. He does so in an attempt to reveal what Iago seems to hide from him. Therefore, Othello's contribution to the persuasion is called forth by Iago's deception.

Also Iago's next response is a curious yet effective mixture of truth and lying. His statement that he does not believe Cassio to sneak away "guilty-like" from Desdemona to avoid meeting Othello is truthful insofar as Iago has no reasons to assume that Cassio feels guilty about talking to Desdemona. He lies when he pretends not to recognize Cassio. Since the identity of the person is clear to Othello it may not be especially believable to him that Iago does not recognize Cassio. Hence, this instance of *dissimulatio* is easily seen through. It is, in other words, only simulated. Iago does not seriously want to make Othello believe that he has doubts about the identity of the person talking to Desdemona, but he wants Othello to make false assumptions on the basis of the impression that Iago *attempts* to obscure the person's identity. From the very beginning of their dialogue, Othello becomes the victim of an intricate and subtle method of manipulation which motivates most of his contributions to the persuasive discourse. Therefore, he is only partly responsible for these contributions. However, as in the example from King Lear, the success of a technique of indirect deception depends on the persuadee's readiness to participate in the

[372] Coulthard, 176f.

communicative project and to complete the 'deceptive picture'. Neither Gloucester nor Othello are particularly sceptical or cautious interlocutors. Hence they unknowingly aid their persuaders in their endeavours.

With respect to Mack's concept of Iago and Othello as complementary personalities used as a dramatic device to reveal the complexity of the central hero who potentially incorporates both perspectives, it can be concluded that such an interpretation misses the central point of this persuasive scene. Othello's direct contributions to the persuasion are not indications of his unacknowledged, subconscious wish to be persuaded by Iago, but testify to Iago's extraordinary ability to manipulate his interlocutor against his will. They are staged by covert manipulation or by direct and indirect means of deception. Othello might, at the most, be blamed for his over-eagerness to contribute to communicative projects arranged by Iago, but even this eagerness is stimulated by Iago's initial reticence. There are, however, additional aspects that make Othello especially susceptible to Iago's manipulation, such as his sense of being an outsider in Venice, a sense of his ethnic inferiority, and a willingness to accept clichés with regard to gender. Hence, Othello easily becomes the victim of his persuader who not only influences his attitudes but even manages to make him add directly to the discourse by which this change of attitudes is effected.

5.4.4. Summary

The aim of the present chapter was to question whether persuadees indeed collaborate with their interlocutors in cases in which they directly contribute to the substance of the persuasion. In general, it is quite obvious that by such substantial contributions their involvement in the generation of the persuasive discourse, and hence also their responsibility for it, is greater than in examples in which their utterances constitute no such immediate contributions. A close analysis of the dialogues reveals, however, that in most examples persuadees who immediately add to the substance of the persuasion are manipulated by persuaders, while it is an exception that such contributions are made of the persuadee's own accord and without the persuader's stimulation. In these rare cases the persuadee is clearly responsible for his or her promotion of the persuasion. S/He typically has a special motivation for momentarily occupying the persuader's perspective. The persuadee is similarly, though to a lesser degree, responsible for his or her contributions that are elicited by rather overt methods of manipulation. Surrendering to manipulation in spite of one's awareness of it constitutes a borderline case of collaboration.

Persuadees are frequently manipulated in a very covert manner, so that they hardly have an opportunity to defend themselves against the domination by their interlocutors. Such covert manipulation is either based on purely verbal means or it relies on deception. In either case it significantly limits the persuadee's responsibility for advancing the persuasion. Hence, the persuader's dominance enables him or her to control the dialogue to a greater extent than the persuadee does. S/He may stage certain developments of the dialogue, which means that s/he must be able to influence the persuadee's behaviour more decisively than his or her own behaviour is determined in turn. Asymmetries therefore seem to be a prerequisite of successful persuasion.

Nevertheless, persuaders depend on their interlocutors' willingness to accept the role imposed on them, especially when persuaders employ means like insinuation, provocation, or indirect lies, which can only be fully realized in a 'communicative project' by both interlocutors. Since there clearly are cases in which the persuadee becomes the victim of the persuader's manipulative techniques, it would be misleading to assume that his or her direct contributions to the substance of the persuasion necessarily points to a hidden side of the persuadee's character which coincides with the perspective promoted by the persuader, and that consequently the persuadee's substantial contributions represent his or her attempt to convince him- or herself. Such a conclusion, misleading as it would be in the case of Othello, Gloucester, or Benedick, seems more appropriate with respect to Macbeth and Sebastian, who either submit to very obvious attempts of manipulation or do not even require any manipulation to add to the persuasive discourse.

6. Conclusion

6.1. Dialogic and Monologic Influences in Shakespeare's Persuasive Dialogues

The question initially raised in this study concerning the dialogization of persuasion in Shakespeare's dramatic dialogues indicates a basic problem in analyses of persuasive dialogues in Renaissance drama. With respect to both form and quality, persuasive dialogues are not 'ideally' dialogic[373], but display a monologic influence. The very idea of the 'dialogization' of persuasion used in this study starts from an originally monological concept of persuasion. A knowledge of the monologic background of persuasion, the persuasive speech or *oratio*, is important to understand the monological traces it has left on Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues.

Nevertheless, this monologic influence should not be overrated. One does not do full justice to Shakespeare's art by analysing his persuasive dialogues as if one would deal with monologic texts, for example by focussing entirely on the utterances of the persuader. Each of the texts analysed in this study is a genuine dialogue. The essential features of a dialogic form, namely the verbal interaction of several participants who share an immediate context, characterize each of these scenes. The interaction of the interlocutors is marked by regular turn-taking. Yet this formally dialogic discourse contains passages which display monologic tendencies, since one of the participants, typically the persuader, talks at great length without being interrupted by the interlocutor s/he wants to persuade. In such cases the utterances of the persuader are unusually extended and apparently go beyond the bounds of a dialogic situation. In authentic dialogues utterances of such length are not likely to occur. These monological tendencies may, on the one hand, be a relic of the tradition of the persuasive speech, and, on the other hand, may be caused by the asymmetry which is characteristic of persuasive discourse. The dialogue's asymmetry in favour of the persuader thus manifests itself in his or her quantitative dominance which ideally corresponds to his or her qualitative dominance. It is a characteristic feature of these extended utterances that they frequently contain several types of 'dialogic elements' which were pointed out in chapter 4. These elements, such as an explicit address of the interlocutor or deictic references to the mutually shared context, indicate that these passages, although they contain no turn-taking, are part of a dialogue. Moreover, as was demonstrated in 5.2., utterances in which persuaders monopolize the discourse contain such elements not only because the utterance occurs in a dialogic situation but because the persuader utilizes

[373] Linell, Gustavsson and Juvonen introduce the concept of an ideal dialogue which is characterized by maximal symmetry [426f.].

these elements for his or her own purposes. This utilization for the persuasion is an aspect of the persuader's qualitative dominance of the dialogue.

Despite the monologic tradition of persuasion, in which the asymmetry inherent in the relationship between persuader and persuadee is further intensified, persuasion seems well suited for a dialogic form. The persuasive discourse is highly oriented towards the persuadee's disposition. The basic advice which already Aristotle gives to the rhetor is that the persuadee is the central factor one should consider at all stages of the generation and performance of a persuasive speech. Due consideration of the persuadee's disposition, as is acknowledged in rhetoric books, is a necessary precondition of the persuasion. This pronounced orientation towards the persuadee seems to encourage the realization of the persuasion in a dialogic form. Except in cases, in which social conventions demand the persuader to give a speech, it seems quite natural that the persuadee should respond to a discourse that persistently attempts to influence him or her.

Yet, in spite of the distinctive orientation towards the addressee, which has always been recommended and practiced by skilled rhetors, it is still a considerable step from an *oratio* to a persuasive dialogue in which the persuadee participates actively. In such dialogues persuasion gains an essentially different quality which offers the possibility of a wide range of developments of the discourse. Due to the dynamics of a dialogue which, caused by the interaction of different perspectives, is crucially different from that of a speech, persuasive dialogues can develop in extremely different ways. A clever strategy of involving the persuadee in the discourse can make the persuader's efforts more effective, especially when the persuadee directly or indirectly contributes to the persuasion. On the other hand, a verbal battle may evolve in which the persuadee's opposition may even hinder the persuader to develop the argumentation as effectively as s/he perhaps could have done in a speech. In other words, in a dialogue persuasion cannot be planned in the sense in which an *oratio* is planned in advance. The development of a persuasive dialogue is not predictable by the persuader. This special feature of dialogues poses considerable difficulties to the persuader which are irrelevant to monologic persuasion. The connection of persuasion as a discourse which to some extent needs to be pre-planned, because it has a well-defined aim, and dialogue as a discourse which is inherently dynamic seems highly problematic. Its result is the actual or attempted dominance of the persuader. To dominate the dialogue is the persuader's only way in which s/he may be able to control the discourse and thereby to plan what actually cannot be planned in advance. Hence, the asymmetry which is typical of persuasion in general is especially crucial for the success of dialogical persuasion, since the persuader's dominance serves as a means to steer the dialogue in accordance with his of her pre-formed intentions.

Persuaders employ several strategies to pursue their plans despite the dynamics of dialogues which, in the end, are beyond the control of a single participant. They may openly dominate their interlocutors by initiatives such as imperatives or questions, which elicit a certain response, or by assuming the perspective of their interlocutors and speaking in their stead. In the example of covert persuasion, the persuader conceals his or her true intentions and his or her motives for engaging the persuadee in the dialogue. This deception creates an asymmetry of knowledge which helps the persuader to control the dialogue.[374] The persuadee, who is not aware of the intentions of his or her interlocutor, lacks crucial information which would influence his or her responses to the discourse in general, and thus makes decisions based on false premises. Furthermore, persuaders may gain control over the dialogue by manipulating persuadees so as to make them unknowing accomplices to the persuasion. In such cases, the persuader stages certain utterances of the persuadee and developments of the dialogue, which obviously requires great rhetorical skill, such as a good command of the techniques of insinuation or a psychologically clever use of *pathos*. If the persuadee can be made to unknowingly support the persuader's designs, the persuader manages to overcome the unpredictable nature of dialogue and becomes a sort of puppeteer who pulls the strings behind the scenes. However, a control of the dialogue to such an extent occurs typically in individual and short passages. Only in rare cases can it be sustained throughout an entire dialogue. Such masters of rhetoric, as for example Iago or Edmund, do indeed control other characters on a large scale and manipulate them in interactions which consequently are noticeably asymmetrical. Another strategy in dialogic persuasion is to respond to the flexibility of dialogue by utilizing it. For the skilful persuader the dynamics of dialogue are no hindrance but a chance, since a clever involvement of the persuadee in the discourse makes the persuasion even more effective. A flexible persuader can adjust his or her strategies to the utterances of the persuadee. S/He seizes

[374] An illuminating concept which was first introduced by Bertrand Evans is that of discrepant awareness. In his study of Shakespeare's comedies he investigates discrepant awareness between characters which results from a disparity regarding the characters' knowledge. He also points out the connection between awareness and "control in the world that is represented by the play". [Evans, Bertrand, Shakespeare's Comedies, Oxford 1960, ix.]

opportunities as they arise in the dialogue and can utilize both favourable and unfavourable points contributed by the persuadee. Such a utilization of the characteristics of dialogue is perhaps a more genuinely 'dialogic behaviour' than attempting to suppress them and to minimalize their influence.

It has become apparent that persuaders use a variety of strategies to dominate the discourse that arises from the interaction of several participants. In each case, they attempt to establish asymmetries or utilize existing asymmetries. Monological tendencies, that is, a significant quantitative asymmetry of the interlocutors, are but one result of this strategy. Hence, the necessary dominance of the persuader is the reason why Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues frequently contain passages that strongly resemble extracts from an *oratio*. Characteristically, persuaders who hardly talk in monologue, heavily employ other means of dominating the dialogue and of thus controlling its development. Deception and manipulation, it seems, may to some extent replace the persuader's quantitative dominance.

Thus, the means of dominance employed by persuaders are connected to the question whether the persuasion works openly or covertly. It is noticeable that some persuaders display their dominant position (the most obvious example is Hamlet, but also Richard, Beatrice, and Lady Macbeth, at least at times, overtly dominate their addressees), while others (especially Iago, Antonio, and Edmund) conceal it. In examples of the latter kind, the dialogical form is deliberately used as one device to obscure the basic asymmetry which is typical of persuasion. Persuaders who openly admit that they intend to influence their addressees, as is certainly the case with Hamlet, Beatrice, and Lady Macbeth, match the form of their replies to their dominant position, namely by making lengthy utterances. In these examples the asymmetry with respect to influence finds expression in an equally asymmetrical form.

6.2. The Persuadee as Victim and Co-Creator of the Persuasion

The disposition of the persuadees, and thereby also their inclination to support the persuasion as well as their susceptibility to it, vary considerably. Hence, persuadees play quite different roles in persuasive dialogues. As was indicated in 6.1., the kind of influence a persuadee has on the persuasion is not only determined by the persuadee him- or herself, but can be manipulated by the persuader. As a consequence, the corpus used for this study includes no case in which the question, to what extent the persuadee is a victim or a co-creator of the persuasion, can be simply answered in either way. The persuadee's role in persuasive dialogues is intrinsically ambiguous.

On the surface, this issue seems to be fairly clear. There are persuadees who are rather active and talkative and others who appear to be more reticent. Some persuadees obviously hinder their interlocutors by their utterances, whereas others promote the persuasion. Yet, such characterizations offer only a very superficial insight into the role of the persuadee and his or her responsibility for the developments of the discourse in which s/he participates. For a deeper understanding of the persuadee's specific role it is necessary to analyse the persuadee's utterances in their context, namely as part of an interaction which is the product of two participants. Such an analysis, which considers the context of utterances in a dialogue, acknowledges the fact that an utterance in a dialogue is not only shaped by its speaker.[375] In the analyses of 5.3. and 5.4. distinctions were made between different types of the persuadee's (direct or indirect) contributions to the persuasion. These contributions may be heavily shaped by the persuader, so that one might even characterize them as being 'staged' by the persuader. Yet, they may also appear to be hardly influenced by the persuader. In this case they can be described as the persuadee's independent or unconditioned contributions to the persuasion. This distinction offers a more reliable account of the persuader's responsibility for the development of the persuasion. Contributions s/he makes on his or her own account do, of course, suggest that the persuadee knowingly supports the persuader, and that s/he is a co-creator of the persuasion. In some dialogues this impression is so distinct that critics have even understood the persuader as a dramatic device of depicting an inner part of the persuadee, who subconsciously wants to be persuaded (5.4.2.). Instances in which the persuadee unwillingly contributes to the persuasion, because s/he is manipulated by the persuader who stages these contributions, make the persuadee seem like a victim of an especially intricate strategy. That the persuadee, without becoming aware of it, can be made to support the persuasion borders on dramatic irony. The astonishing extent of the persuader's control over the persuadee's utterances in examples of manipulation disproves the persuadee's immediate responsibility for the development of the persuasion in such cases.

However, in most dialogues the nature of the persuadee's individual contributions varies. Frequently, one dialogue contains passages in which the persuadee is tricked into unknowingly adding to the persuasive discourse as well as passages in

[375] Farr and Rommetveit, 272.

which s/he seems to collaborate with the persuader. Therefore, the persuadee's role on the whole remains rather ambiguous in most of the dialogues. A fairly clear account can be given of the roles of Elizabeth in the persuasive dialogue with Richard III and of Leontes in his dialogue with Paulina. They are neither victims nor co-creators of the persuasion. Instead, both of them vehemently refuse to be influenced by the persuasive discourse. They deny their interlocutors the minimal degree of responsiveness and collaboration that is necessary for a successful persuasion.

One of the persuadees least responsible for the development of the dialogue is certainly Gertrude. She cannot seriously be considered a co-creator of the persuasion. Instead, she is dominated by Hamlet who aggressively intimidates her. Her very slight share in its generation consists of indirect forms of support. Gertrude accepts Hamlet's dominance and the way he elicits certain utterances from her. By providing these utterances, that is, by taking Hamlet's perspective and being responsive, Gertrude indirectly promotes the development of the persuasive discourse. Also Othello is mainly a victim of the persuasion. Not only is he deceived throughout the dialogue, he also becomes the victim of Iago's intricate psychological strategies, for example when he plays upon Othello's sense of inferiority. Moreover, Iago utilizes his utterances in ways which are not intended by Othello to develop the persuasive discourse further. Othello's direct contributions to all parts of the persuasion are cleverly staged by Iago. He thus becomes an unwitting co-creator of the persuasion. As in the persuasive dialogue from *Hamlet*, the persuadee's actual responsibility for the persuasive discourse does not go materially beyond his readiness to enter into a dialogue with his interlocutor and to sustain this dialogue without seriously questioning the persuader's perspective. This, it seems, also characterizes Gloucester's role in his dialogue with Edmund. He, too, is the victim of extensive deception. He is responsible for Edmund's success insofar as he readily believes in the authenticity of his evidence, that is, he uncritically accepts Edmund's perspective. Gloucester, however, also becomes a co-creator of the persuasive discourse. After he has read the fatal letter, he overeagerly seeks to confirm the negative picture it creates of Edgar. By purposefully questioning his persuader as in a cross-examination, he elicits additional arguments from him.

Anne's role in the persuasive dialogue is perhaps even more ambiguous. Her responsibility for its success is definitely greater than that of either Othello or Gloucester. Her role as a co-creator of the persuasion is only slightly developed, yet she is not merely the victim of Richard's influence. On the one hand, Anne is clearly manipulated both by deception and by a psychological exploitation of her emotions. On the other hand, she apparently assists Richard in establishing certain arguments even though his intentions are clear enough for her to be aware of them. In the end, Anne deliberately ignores her doubts and accepts Richard's perspective despite her awareness of his deceitfulness. This highly ambiguous behaviour, for which one can hardly find a satisfactory explanation, evidently justifies the claim that Anne is in the paradoxical situation of becoming the victim of a discourse which she at some points helps to develop. To some degree, she collaborates with Richard in her own persuasion.

Also Brutus' part in his dialogue with Cassius is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, Cassius seems to be in full control of the dialogue. He utilizes both benevolent and critical utterances in unforeseen ways and, if necessary, alters their meaning. On the other hand, Brutus is not simply a dominated addressee of the persuasive discourse, whose utterances are cleverly made to fit into it. Rather, Brutus frankly expresses his discontent with Caesar even when he realizes that he thereby adds to Cassius' argumentation. In several instances, Brutus thus becomes a co-creator of the persuasion. Similarly, Benedick is manipulated and helps to develop the persuasion at the same time. He becomes the victim of Beatrice's emotional blackmail when she questions the genuineness of his love and accuses him of cowardice. Despite this significant influence Beatrice exerts on him, Benedick is not entirely guiltless of the development of the persuasive discourse, since he asks for arguments which he knows will support Beatrice's cause. Hence, he shapes the very discourse which in the end makes him resolve to give in to Beatrice.

Both Macbeth and Sebastian seem less the innocent and unsuspecting victims of the persuasive discourse than its co-creators. Although Macbeth is influenced by the emotional pressure of his wife when she accuses him of unmanly behaviour, his responsibility for the persuasion is considerable. From the very beginning he signals his willingness to discuss the issue of regicide. He initiates the dialogue with his wife on this subject and seeks her advice. As the dialogue proceeds, he materially contributes to the argumentation and thereby finally helps to convince himself of the plan advanced by his wife. Sebastian's position as a victim of his persuader is even less convincing. Antonio clearly dominates the dialogue, yet the forms of dominance he chooses are so explicit that Sebastian must be aware of them and, since their social status seems more or less equal, could reject them if he wanted to evade Antonio's influence. In fact, Sebastian soon indicates his readiness to be persuaded and, later on, contributes substantial arguments to the persuasion quite on his own accord.

As these individual accounts demonstrate, the significance of the persuadee's active participation and his or her contribution to the success (or failure) of the persuasion varies considerably. In most cases it can be described as a combination of being a victim and a co-creator of the persuasive discourse. A comparison does, of course, reveal certain differences. While interlocutors like Gertrude or Othello can hardly or only minimally be held responsible for the development and outcome of the dialogues in which they participate, most persuadees are to some degree accountable for it, and some of them, most notably Macbeth and Sebastian, considerably share in the conscious creation of the persuasion. Since the role of the persuadee frequently seems to oscillate between the two extremes within one dialogue, it is difficult to determine exactly the extent of his or her involvement and responsibility. This ambiguity is caused by the typical situation of a persuadee in a persuasive dialogue, which is somewhat paradoxical, since s/he actively participates in a discourse which has the power to exert a decisive influence over him- or herself.

6.3. Summarizing Comparison

This recapitulation is meant to compare the results of the formal and of the qualitative analyses conducted in the previous chapters. Moreover, it is meant to summarize the answers to the central questions of the present study in a comparison of dialogues which, due to similarities or due to their contrasts, may elucidate one another. The persuasive dialogue in Shakespeare's drama is a multifarious kind of dialogue, specifically with respect to those issues that were of central interest in this study, namely the dialogical nature of the texts, and the persuadee's share in the persuasion. Consequently, there is a wide range of dialogic form and quality within this type of dialogues. Also, as has been revealed by the analysis, form and quality seem to be virtually unconnected with each other, so that one can frequently observe a discrepancy of form and effect. Persuasion may, even in a dialogic context, be very much the work of only one interlocutor, and it may in other instances be significantly shaped by the persuadee's contributions.

The incongruity of formal and of qualitative aspects in persuasive dialogues is especially apparent in passages in which the persuadee's substantial contributions to the persuasion contrasts with the extensive control of the persuader. With respect to these passages it was demonstrated in chapter 4 that frequently persuadees contribute vitally to the introduction of the topic and seem to be even more responsible than persuaders for the arrangement of subsequent action during the *conclusio*. A characteristic example of the discrepancy of form and effect is the opening of the dialogue between Gloucester and Edmund. Although it has a truly dialogical form, its development is clearly under the control of the persuader, basically because Edmund has an advantage of knowledge over Gloucester and is in the position to decide how much he will reveal to him. The example from *King Lear* illustrates what is typical of the *exordium* in dialogical persuasion: due to the discrepant awareness that frequently characterizes the relationship of the speakers at the beginning of the persuasive discourse, both a dialogical form and an asymmetry regarding the control the speakers have of the discourse are originated. Since the persuadee is made interested in something the persuader knows, s/he asks questions, thus giving the discourse the form of a dialogue. At the same time, the persuader's advantage of information gives him or her control over the dialogue which prevents the development of a truly dialogical quality.

Similarly, an absence of a one to one relation between form and quality can be attested to the part of the dialogues that functions as a *conclusio*. In all of the examples of monological and different degrees of dialogical discourses about subsequent actions it is the persuader who eventually manages to impose his or her will on the persuadee – a parallel that points to an underlying qualitative asymmetry between the speakers. The vital difference between the forms is that in a *conclusio* which has a strongly dialogical form the asymmetry with respect to influence is not as easily recognized as in a monological form. Hence, in such strongly dialogical forms of *conclusiones*, in which on the surface the contributions of persuadees are even more substantial than those of persuaders (4.4.3.), the discrepancy of form and effect is especially pronounced.

In general, a monologic form corresponds more clearly to the qualitative asymmetry which is characteristic of persuasion. However, in passages without turn-taking, which tend to occur in the central parts of the persuasion, persuaders frequently create a dialogic semblance. Thus, extended utterances of persuaders may even have a dialogic quality which, however, does not entail a genuine influence of persuadees. At such points in the dialogues, the relationship of form and effect is especially difficult.

Interestingly, examples in which a dialogic form corresponds to a strongly developed dialogic quality belong to those dialogues that take the form of 'verbal battles', such as the persuasive dialogues from *Richard III.* These passages, since the persuader's discourse meets with the counter-discourse of the persuadee, have been described as persuasion *within* dialogue. In other words, texts with a strongly developed dialogical quality do not correspond to texts in which the persuasive discourse is given a highly dialogic form. It might even be argued that in an extreme case of the persuadee's contributions to the persuasion, as for example in Macbeth and Lady Macbeth's collaborative construction of the scheme to murder the king without being blamed for the deed, in which the interlocutors seem to speak with one voice, a true dialogic quality disappears from the formally dialogic text. This tendency towards a monologic quality in examples of persuasion *as* dialogue reflects the ultimate dominance of persuaders and of their discourse which is necessary for a successful persuasion.

The persuasive dialogues from *Richard III*, *Othello*, and *King Lear* are comparable insofar as deception is a major device of the persuaders to control the dialogues. This method, as we have seen, enables the persuader to dominate his interlocutor. Hence, these dialogues are characterized by an asymmetry against which the persuadee is not able to defend him- or herself. This asymmetry, which exists on a qualitative level, is in these dialogues only rarely reflected quantitatively. As was established in chapter 4, the persuasive dialogues from *Richard III* contain passages in which Richard's utterances are significantly longer than those of his female opponents, whereas the persuasive dialogues from *Othello* and *King Lear* are remarkably symmetrical throughout with respect to form. This difference can be explained by the differing roles of the persuadees, which are in turn at least partially conditioned by the differing strategies of the persuaders. While Anne's and Elizabeth's disposition at the outset of the dialogues is decidedly unfavourable towards Richard's plans and arouses their opposition, which leads to a strongly dialogic form as long as the opposition continues, neither Othello nor Gloucester are aware of the evil character of their persuaders. Trusting in their interlocutors' *ethos*, their disposition is not noticeably unfavourable. Therefore, Iago and Edmund meet with little or no resistance. Any difficulties are easily overcome by forms of deceptive behaviour, such as insinuation, a feigned reluctance to communicate, or plain lies. Othello and Gloucester, who on the surface seem to be among the most co-operative persuadees, are thus clearly victims of their persuaders. Their substantial contributions to the persuasion are for the most part staged by Iago and Edmund who manage to manipulate their behaviour. In these dialogues, the remarkably dialogic form of the discourse disguises a strongly asymmetrical relationship. Othello's and Gloucester's role as co-creators of the persuasion is, in other words, staged by their persuaders. Both Othello and Gloucester prove quite susceptible to their interlocutors' strategies, since they let themselves be guided easily and quickly adopt the perspective they present. Their absolute and uncritical trust, their lack of suspicion, in short, their favourable disposition makes them suitable victims of their persuaders' strategies. Unlike in these two dialogues, the strongly dialogic form and frequent turn-taking of the persuasive dialogues from *Richard III* is caused by the persuadees' opposition. This means that the essence of the persuasive discourse is not given a dialogic form, but that it is opposed by a 'counter-discourse' of the persuadee. While the attraction of the dialogue between Richard and Anne can be ascribed to the extreme development in the course of this dialogue and, consequently to the contrast between Anne's expressed hatred towards Richard in the beginning and her final surrender to him, the special appeal of the persuasion of Othello or that of Gloucester lies in the extent to which the persuadees are made to participate in their own persuasion without becoming aware of it. It is fascinating to witness how completely and ingeniously they are manipulated. While Anne, even when she accepts Richard's proposal, is not entirely convinced of his sincerity, the deception of Othello as well as of Gloucester is in fact complete. Consequently, Anne's responsibility for her participation in the persuasive discourse is greater than that of either Othello or Gloucester.

Each of these dialogues, though in very different ways, testifies to the power of rhetoric which, as it seems, cannot be resisted. Hence, it is all the more surprising that *Richard III* offers an alternative example of a persuasive dialogue, namely an attempt to persuade which fails. For various reasons, Elizabeth proves immune to Richard's techniques. She has greater control over her feelings than Anne does, and she is less susceptible to emotional arguments than Anne and hence sees through Richard's strategic use of *pathos*. What this dialogue demonstrates, especially when it is contrasted with its counterpart in I/ii, is the significance of the persuadee's disposition for the success or failure of the persuasion which evidently does not depend entirely on the persuader. It might however also be argued that the failure of this persuasion is caused by Richard's employment of inappropriate strategies and by his inability to find the suitable arguments to move Elizabeth, whom he utterly misjudges. One might imagine that there is a strategy which even Elizabeth could not resist and by which she could be persuaded. This possible objection questions the absolute independence of the persuadee and his or her ability to bring about the failure of the persuader's attempts, and emphasizes the importance of the specific relationship between the interlocutors which develops as a result of the behaviour of both the persuader and the persuadee.

Two rather dissimilar dialogues which might however throw some light on each other are the persuasion of Gertrude and Paulina's attempted persuasion of Leontes. Both Hamlet and Paulina are very forthright persuaders and openly announce their intentions to their interlocutors. Yet the reactions they elicit with this approach are widely different. While Hamlet is able to monopolize the dialogue and to elaborate his arguments which meet with no serious opposition from Gertrude, Paulina's proceeding elicits an instant and violent opposition from Leontes which prevents her from engaging Leontes in the kind of dialogue she has envisioned. Instead, Leontes' utterances significantly hinder Paulina's endeavours. His opposition is an obstacle to Paulina's success which is too great for her to overcome.

The reason of these contrasting results of similarly open approaches can be found in the differing attitudes of the persuadees and, consequently, in the differing relationships of the interlocutors. Since Gertrude is rather submissive in her interaction with Hamlet, he is capable of dominating her. The pronounced asymmetry of their interaction is a crucial factor which contributes to Hamlet's success. In contrast to this constellation, the relationship between Leontes and Paulina is obviously not characterized by a superior position of the persuader. While Gertrude accepts Hamlet as a moral authority, Leontes clearly does not agree with Paulina when she lays claim to a morally superior position. He is, on the contrary, greatly irritated when he learns that Paulina does not respect his singular authority and superiority as her king. Leontes' insistence on his supremacy constitutes the crucial factor that thwarts Paulina's attempts to move and convince him. Thus, his unfavourable disposition and Paulina's consequential inability to give the persuasive discourse a dialogic form are responsible for the failure of the persuasion. This comparison of the persuasive dialogues from *Hamlet* and *The Winter's Tale* illustrates the fact that the development of a persuasive dialogue and its outcome are not determined solely by the persuader's ability to influence the persuadee, or by the persuadee's disposition but by the specific kind of interaction which develops between the participants and which is, naturally, influenced to a considerable degree by these individual factors.

The persuasive dialogues between Beatrice and Benedick and between Cassius and Brutus, although they differ widely in their context, subject matter, and style of the argumentation, are similar with respect to their dialogization and to the inner conflicts of the persuadees which makes them, on the one hand, tend to agree with their interlocutors and, on the other hand, makes them inclined to reject their influence. Brutus is concerned about Caesar's acquisition of power, yet he also appreciates him as a friend. Benedick is caught between his love for Beatrice and his friendship with Claudio. Their ambiguous disposition contributes to the suspense of the dialogues, so that the persuasion appears as a process of resolving the persuadee's inner conflicts which the persuader tries to influence as much as possible. That this influence is successful is ensured by forms of dominance, for example by Cassius' quantitative dominance or by Beatrice's qualitative dominance when she puts emotional pressure on Benedick and indirectly blackmails him. Yet, in both dialogues the persuadees at times do not hesitate to contradict their interlocutors' claims or to reject their appeals. Hence, it can be concluded that Cassius and Beatrice are more successful in dominating their interlocutors than Paulina is, but that their dominance is not as pronounced as that of Hamlet. Likewise, the characteristics of these dialogues reveal that the disposition of the persuadees Brutus and Benedick is more favourable to the persuasion than Leontes' disposition, but not as unreservedly supportive as it is in the case of Gertrude. As for the dialogues' individual peculiarities, it is important to note that Benedick is already won when he realizes that Beatrice's love for him depends on his readiness to avenge her cousin. After this stage in the dialogue he wants to be persuaded and deliberately asks for relevant information. Brutus is an extremely reserved and cautious persuadee who does not easily accept Cassius' attempts to control his responses. At the end, he refuses to commit himself to any resolution but delays his decision, which is then the result of his own deliberation as much as of the dialogue with Cassius.

In the dialogue between Antonio and Sebastian from *The Tempest*, the persuasive discourse is given a highly dialogic form. Unlike in the persuasion of Othello or that of Gloucester in *King Lear*, the persuadee's direct contributions are frequently not staged by the persuader, or they are elicited in such an obvious way that Sebastian is fully responsible for his share in the successful development of the persuasion. It is quite evident that at some point he wants to be persuaded. In the persuasion of Macbeth, this inclination of the persuadee to succumb to the persuader's influence is, if possible, even stronger than in *The Tempest*. The fact that Macbeth informs his wife at all of the prophecy of the witches before he meets her again, suggests that he is from the very beginning ready to expose himself to her counsel and ambitious plans. Thus, Macbeth's disposition is quite favourable to the persuasion even before the dialogue begins, whereas Sebastian at first seems somewhat indifferent to Antonio's plans and needs to be informed of as well as interested in them. Despite their basically opportune attitudes both Sebastian and Macbeth also raise objections to their persuaders' schemes and hesitate to agree with them. They experience an inner conflict which they, however, seek to resolve in accordance with the view favoured by their interlocutors. With respect to Macbeth one might even argue that the dialogic form and the important role of Lady Macbeth camouflage his real desires, and that he essentially seeks to dispel his doubts by the dialogue with his wife.

The persuadee's inner conflict, which is also dramatized in the dialogues selected from *Much Ado*, *Richard III*, *Julius Caesar*, *Othello*, and, to some extent, in *Hamlet*, seems to be a characteristic feature of Shakespeare's persuasive dialogues. Major differences occur with respect to the question whether these conflicts already exist prior to the dialogue. They obviously do so in the cases of Macbeth and Brutus, but they are created *by* the dialogue in the cases of Sebastian, Benedick, Lady Anne, and Othello. When persuadees obviously experience no inner conflict, as for example Elizabeth or Leontes, the persuasion tends to fail. The persuadee's share in the outcome of the persuasive dialogue is in part related to the source of his or her inner conflict that is resolved in the course of the dialogue. If s/he already wavers between two options or impulses before the dialogue, his or her share in the persuasion tends to be greater than in cases in which such a conflict first has to be created by the persuader. Furthermore, as was demonstrated by the analysis, the persuadee's participation in the generation of the persuasive discourse, and hence his or her responsibility for its result, also varies considerably when the central issue of the persuasion is entirely raised by the persuader. The persuadee's role may thus range from that of a co-creator of the persuasion to that of its victim, or it may oscillate between these two extremes, as can be observed in several of the dialogues.

What should have become clear by this review of the individual dialogues, is that Müller's characterization of Shakespeare's drama as a 'universe of dialogues' quoted at the beginning of this investigation can also be applied to the particular case of the persuasive dialogue in Shakespeare's drama. Although the corpus of the present analysis comprises a rather restricted number of texts, it can justly be concluded that this type of dialogue is so varied, that its individual examples mark out a universe of persuasive dialogues. Obviously, Shakespeare is not only a master of rhetoric who is unsurpassed in the dramatic art of great persuasive monologues. He is also a master of the dialogical presentation of persuasion within the dramatic interaction of his characters, in which he is equalled by none of his contemporaries.

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Zusammenfassung

1. Einführung

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dialogischer Persuasion im Dramenwerk Shakespeares. Diese findet in der Regel zwischen zwei Personen, d.h. im Duolog, statt, wenn auch während des Gesprächs weitere Personen auf der Bühne sein können. Speziell geht es dabei um die Fragestellung, inwieweit Persuasion bei Shakespeare dialogisiert wird, inwieweit also beide Gesprächspartner im Dialog am Prozess der Persuasion beteiligt sind. Da traditionell die Persuasion auch in dialogischen Kontexten als das Werk einer Person betrachtet wird, richtet sich in dieser Dissertation das Augenmerk besonders auf die bisher vernachlässigten Figuren, nämlich auf die zu überzeugenden bzw. zu überredenden Dialogpartner und auf die Frage, ob diese Figuren aufgrund ihrer Beteiligung am persuasiven Dialog zu ihrer eigenen Persuasion beitragen und somit für einen erfolgreichen Verlauf der Persuasion mit verantwortlich sind. Ein besonderes Erkenntnisinteresse liegt also in der Frage, welchen Einfluss der zu Überredende bzw. zu Überzeugende[1] auf die Persuasion hat.

Die Auswahl des Korpus wurde mit der Absicht getroffen, möglichst verschiedenartige Dialoge zusammenzustellen, um die ganze Bandbreite des persuasiven Dialogs bei Shakespeare zu erfassen. Die dialogische Persuasion war für Shakespeare während seines gesamten Schaffens immer wieder von Interesse. So finden sich persuasive Dialoge in den frühen Geschichtsdramen ebenso wie in den späten Romanzen. Auch ist der persuasive Dialog bei Shakespeare nicht auf ein bestimmtes Genre festgelegt, sondern steht in einer Vielzahl von Kontexten. Die für die Analyse ausgewählten Szenen stammen aus Geschichtsdramen (*Richard III*; I/ii und IV/iv), Römerdramen (*Julius Caesar*; I/ii), Tragödien (*Hamlet*; III/iv, *Othello*; III/iii und IV/i; *Macbeth*; I/v und I/vii und *King Lear*; I/ii), Komödien (*Much Ado About Nothing*, IV/i) und Tragikkomödien (*The Winter's Tale*; II/iii und *The Tempest*; II/i).

Ebenso wie es bei Shakespeare nicht den prototypischen Kontext für persuasive Dialoge gibt, sind auch die Merkmale dieser Dialoge sehr verschiedenartig, so dass jeder der ausgewählten Texte ein einzigartiges Beispiel von dialogischer Persuasion darstellt. Persuasion kann, um nur einige der relevanten Parameter zu nennen, sowohl für moralische als auch für unmoralische Absichten eingesetzt werden. Sie kann erfolgreich oder erfolglos verlaufen. Überredende können ihre Absichten offen legen oder sie vor ihren Gesprächspartnern verbergen, die ihrerseits entweder sehr aktiv am

[1] Im Folgenden wird der Begriff 'überreden' neutral, also für beide Aspekte von Persuasion gebraucht.

Dialog beteiligt sein können oder eher zurückhaltend auftreten. Die Zusammenstellung eines recht heterogenen Korpus lässt erwarten, dass die zentrale Fragestellung zu einem differenzierten Ergebnis führt. Die vorliegende Dissertation hat konsequenterweise auch das Ziel, die Bandbreite der Dialogizität von persuasiven Dialogen bei Shakespeare auszuloten, und dies besonders im Hinblick auf den genannten Schwerpunkt der Verstrickung des zu Überredenden in die eigene Persuasion.

Gerechtfertigt wird der Untersuchungsgegenstand dieser Arbeit besonders dadurch, dass aufgrund des ausgeprägten Interesses, welches zur Zeit der Renaissance an der Rhetorik bestand, auch die Persuasion als das eigentliche Ziel der Rhetorik ein Gegenstand allgemeiner Aufmerksamkeit war. Mit Rebhorn lässt sich in diesem Zusammenhang feststellen, dass das große Interesse der Renaissance an der Rhetorik nicht nur in der Verwendung rhetorischer Figuren im Drama Ausdruck findet, sondern dass auf einer direkteren Ebene 'rhetorische Prozesse' in Dramen thematisiert werden. Der Persuasion als dem 'Prototyp' eines rhetorischen Prozesses kommt dabei eine besondere Stellung zu. Shakespeares Augenmerk liegt zu einem gewissen Grade auf der Darstellung von rhetorischen Prozessen. Angesichts der Bedeutung der Rhetorik in der Epoche war auch das zeitgenössische Publikum für eine solche Thematik sensibilisiert. Die Problematik der Verstrickung von Figuren in ihre eigene Persuasion, wie sie im persuasiven Dialog fast zwangsläufig gegeben ist, leistet einen wesentlichen und für die Renaissance mit ihrem Interesse am Dialog charakteristischen Beitrag zur Auseinandersetzung mit rhetorischen Prozessen. Shakespeares Interesse gilt offensichtlich nicht allein der Tatsache, *dass* überredet oder überzeugt wird und der Frage nach den rhetorischen Mitteln, die der Überredende verwendet. Vielmehr offenbart sich im Dramenwerk Shakespeares eine dialogische Sicht auf die Persuasionproblematik, indem nämlich die spezielle Dynamik der Persuasion im Kontext einer Interaktion der beteiligten Figuren thematisiert wird.

Diese dialogische Sichtweise ist von der Shakespearekritik lange Zeit nicht berücksichtigt worden. Persuasion wurde und wird zum Teil immer noch als ein monologisches Phänomen verstanden. Selbst bei der Analyse persuasiver Dialoge lag demzufolge das Hauptaugenmerk auf den Repliken, auf den Absichten und rhetorischen Strategien der Figur, die überredet, so als würde es sich dabei um einen persuasiven Monolog handeln. Ein solches Verfahren vernachlässigt jedoch wesentliche Aspekte dialogischer Persuasion und gleicht in gewisser Weise der zweidimensionalen Sicht auf einen dreidimensionalen Gegenstand. Der traditionell bevorzugte monologische Ansatz bei der Analyse persuasiver Dialoge kommt allerdings nicht von ungefähr. Die Vernachlässigung der dialogischen Dimension dieser Texte wird vielmehr begünstigt, man kann fast meinen provoziert, von einigen für Persuasion und persuasive Dialoge charakteristischen Merkmalen. Zum einen ist das Verhältnis der an der Persuasion Beteiligten notwendigerweise von einer ausgeprägten Asymmetrie gekennzeichnet, so dass die Figur, welche überredet, durch ihre Überlegenheit als aktiv wahrgenommen wird, ihr Gegenüber hingegen passiv erscheint. Zum anderen weisen persuasive Dialoge bei Shakespeare tatsächlich offensichtliche Parallelen zur persuasiven Rede, zur *oratio*, auf, so dass man geneigt ist, sie als solche zu behandeln. Diese Faktoren haben wesentlich dazu beigetragen, dass Shakespeares persuasive Dialoge zu Unrecht beinahe ausschließlich unter monologischen Gesichtspunkten interpretiert wurden. Der dialogische Ansatz dieser Arbeit soll einen Beitrag dazu leisten, eine essentielle Dimension der Texte, die bisher häufig vernachlässigt wurde, näher zu beleuchten und ihre Tragweite für Shakespeares Darstellung von Persuasion zu erläutern. Folglich zielt die eingangs formulierte Fragestellung der Dissertation auch auf inhaltliche Implikationen der vernachlässigten dialogischen Ebene der Texte ab, die für eine Interpretation der Dramen fruchtbar gemacht werden können. Die Frage 'was geschieht im persuasiven Dialog' wird dabei aus einem neuen Blickwinkel beantwortet.

2. Definition des Dialogs

Um die Dialogizität der ausgewählten Texte richtig erkennen und angemessen bewerten zu können, ist es unerlässlich, den für die Arbeit zentralen Dialogbegriff zu definieren. Grundsätzlich muss man hierbei zwischen zwei Definitionen unterscheiden, nämlich einer, die Dialog als formales und einer, die ihn als qualitatives Merkmal versteht. Diese beiden Definitionen widersprechen einander jedoch nicht, sondern ergänzen sich gegenseitig. Mit Mukarovský kann man also sagen, dass die dialogische Form und die dialogische Qualität gemeinsam die dialogische Natur oder Dialogizität eines Textes ausmachen. Form und Qualität müssen allerdings nicht übereinstimmen. In Fällen, in denen sie das nicht tun, spricht man von dialogischen Monologen, die ausschließlich nach qualitativen Gesichtspunkten Dialoge sind, oder von monologischen Dialogen, die nur formal dialogisch sind.

Eine dialogische Form ist gegeben, wenn mindestens zwei Dialogpartner aktiv am Diskurs beteiligt sind und dabei abwechselnd die Sprecher- und Hörerrolle übernehmen. Ein zentrales Merkmal von Dialogen ist also das Prinzip der Reziprozität.

Dieses Prinzip hat obligatorischen Charakter; eine sprachliche Handlung im Dialog wird daher mit der Erwartung auf eine bestimmte Reaktion oder Gegenhandlung ausgeführt. Auf dieser Basis lassen sich auch die sogenannten 'adjacency pairs', d.h. paarweise zusammengehörige Äußerungen wie z.B. 'Frage – Antwort', erklären. Die Dialogpartner begegnen sich in einem konkreten (zeitlich und, bei enger Definition, auch räumlich) gemeinsamen Kontext, welcher in den Dialog einfließt, diesen also ständig durchdringt.

Dialogische Qualität entsteht durch das Aufeinandertreffen zweier, voneinander möglichst verschiedener Perspektiven oder Positionen, deren Existenz durch semantische Wenden im Text markiert ist. Durch den wechselseitigen Bezug auf einen Redegegenstand, also das Übernehmen, Zurückweisen oder Modifizieren der jeweils anderen Perspektive, das Teil eines interpretativen Prozesses ist, wird Bedeutung im Dialog verhandelt. Das heißt, dass die Bedeutung einzelner Äußerungen nicht von ihren Sprechern festgelegt wird, sondern einem ständigen Prozess des Aushandelns durch sämtliche Dialogpartner unterliegt. Daher rührt auch der dynamische Charakter von Dialogen. Im Verlauf dieses Prozesses der Verständigung entsteht ein gemeinsames "Zwischen" (Martin Buber), eine Art Brücke, welche die unterschiedlichen Perspektiven miteinander verbindet. Die Ausgangspositionen beeinflussen sich gegenseitig im Dialogsprozess, so dass sie verändert aus ihm hervorgehen.

Trotz der Reziprozität und der Etablierung einer gemeinsamen Sphäre sind Dialoge im Allgemeinen sowohl in formaler als auch in qualitativer Hinsicht eher von Asymmetrie als von Symmetrie gekennzeichnet. Meist dominiert also einer der Dialogpartner, beispielsweise dadurch, dass seine Äußerungen quantitativ überwiegen oder dadurch, dass seine Ausgangsposition in einem stärkeren Maß die gemeinsam ausgehandelte Bedeutung bestimmt als die Perspektiven anderer Gesprächspartner.

3. Das Konzept der Persuasion

Persuasion wird allgemein als eine Form der Kommunikation definiert, deren hauptsächliches Anliegen es ist, die Gedanken, Meinungen, Gefühle und/oder das Verhalten anderer in einer bestimmten Weise zu verändern. Mit dieser Einflussnahme wird ein Ziel außerhalb der unmittelbaren kommunikativen Situation verfolgt. Daher ist Persuasion als teleologische, zielgerichtete Kommunikation zu verstehen, die sich von nicht-teleologischer Kommunikation dadurch abhebt, dass Beeinflussung ihr vorrangiges, wenn nicht gar alleiniges Ziel ist.

Persuasion gehört traditionell in das Gebiet der klassischen Rhetorik, die als *ars persuadendi* Methoden und Techniken liefert, welche zum Zweck der Persuasion eingesetzt werden. Ein wesentlicher Punkt der rhetorischen Lehre sind zwei substantiell unterschiedliche Konzepte von Persuasion. Im Deutschen wird diese Polarität durch das Begriffspaar 'überzeugen' und 'überreden' widergegeben. Überzeugen bezeichnet das rationale Element von Persuasion, das sich logischer und ethischer Argumente bedient, wohingegen 'überreden' das emotionale Element meint, das sich mit Hilfe psychologischer Strategien verschiedenste Gefühle des zu Überredenden zu Nutze macht.

Von jeher wurde Persuasion aufgrund der Verwendung irrationaler Mittel kritisiert und dem Vorwurf der Manipulation ausgesetzt. Das emotionale Element der Persuasion birgt die Gefahr in sich, dass der zu Überredende in einer Weise beeinflusst wird, die seiner Wahrnehmung und Kontrolle entgeht, gegen die er sich also nicht wehren kann. Die Gefahr der Manipulation erhöht sich noch bei einem asymmetrischen Verhältnis der Beteiligten. Solche Asymmetrien sind im persuasiven Diskurs vielfach gegeben. Sie entstehen beispielsweise, wenn der Überredende seinem Gegenüber rhetorisch überlegen ist, so dass er den eigenen Standpunkt besser verfechten kann als der unterlegene Gesprächspartner, oder auch wenn er seine Absicht vor dem zu Überredenden verbirgt, so dass dieser ohne sein Wissen, und damit ohne Möglichkeit zur Gegenwehr, beeinflusst (d.h. manipuliert) wird.

4. Persuasion im Dialogischen Kontext

Aufgrund der im 2. Kapitel gewonnenen Erkenntnis, dass Form und Qualität eines Textes nicht in jedem Fall übereinstimmen, wird der Analyseteil in ein Kapitel, welches sich stärker mit formaler Dialogisierung von Persuasion beschäftigt (4.) und in eines, das qualitative Aspekte persuasiver Dialoge untersucht (5.), untergliedert. Diese Zweiteilung der Analyse soll dazu dienen, eventuelle Diskrepanzen zwischen dialogischer Form und der tatsächlichen Verteilung von Einfluss der Dialogpartner aufzudecken und so die subtile Dynamik der Dialoge näher zu beleuchten.

Im ersten Analysekapitel wird also die Frage nach der Dialogisierung des traditionell monologischen Konzepts von Persuasion bei Shakespeare auf einer formalen Ebene beantwortet. Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchung ist die Struktur der persuasiven Rede (*oratio*), wie sie dank zahlreicher Rhetorikbücher auch in der Renaissance weithin bekannt war. Obgleich sich in solchen Rhetorikbüchern eine Vielzahl von Varianten finden lässt, kann man doch eine wiederkehrende Grundstruktur erkennen, die (bereits überliefert aus der Antike) dem Verfasser einer *oratio* als Modell dienen sollte. Laut dieses Modells beginnt eine persuasive Rede mit dem *exordium*, das die Aufmerksamkeit der Hörer wecken, sie mit dem Redegegenstand bekannt machen und ihr Wohlwollen für den Redner gewinnen soll. Daran schließt sich der Hauptteil an, in dem der Redegegenstand ausführlich dargestellt wird (*narratio*) und die Beweisführung erfolgt (*argumentatio*). Am Schluss der Rede werden die Hauptargumente in gedrängter Form zusammengefasst. Es erfolgt ein oftmals emotionsgeladener Appell an die Hörer, durch den sie zu einem bestimmten Handeln aufgerufen werden (*conclusio*). Diese Struktur liegt auch Shakespeares persuasiven Dialogen zu Grunde, da in ihnen unterschiedliche Dialogphasen ausgemacht werden können, die die oben genannten Funktionen erfüllen.

Zur Beantwortung der Frage nach der formalen Dialogisierung von Persuasion wird untersucht, inwieweit die Aufgaben der einzelnen Redeteile auf die Repliken der Gesprächspartner verteilt sind. Dabei werden einzelne Passagen betrachtet, da sich die dialogische Form innerhalb eines Textes verändern kann. Bei der Analyse der Dialogabschnitte, die die Funktionen von *exordia* oder *conslusiones* erfüllen, wird die Betrachtung auf einzelne Funktionen beschränkt, nämlich auf die Einführung des Redegegenstandes am Anfang und auf den Handlungsaufruf am Schluss der Persuasion.

Zur Erfassung unterschiedlicher formaler Grade von Dialogisierung wird ein Spektrum zwischen geringer und sehr hoher Dialogisierung von Persuasion vorgeschlagen, welches aus praktischen Gründen auf drei grundsätzliche Formen vereinfacht wird. Bei geringer formaler Dialogisierung enthalten die Dialoge längere Passagen ohne Sprecherwechsel. In diesen Dialogen monopolisiert ein Sprecher (für gewöhnlich der Überredende bzw. der Überzeugende) mit außergewöhnlich langen Repliken das Gespräch, das dadurch einen monologischen Charakter annimmt. Stärker dialogisch ist eine zweite Form, bei der Textpassagen durch Sprecherwechsel, also durch aktive Beteiligung beider Dialogpartner gekennzeichnet sind, in denen die Funktion der jeweiligen Persuasionsphase jedoch ausschließlich in den Repliken der Überredenden erfüllt wird. Obgleich zu Überredende ebenfalls am Dialog teilnehmen, haben ihre Repliken lediglich kommentierenden oder reagierenden Charakter. Diese Form stärkerer, aber doch eingeschränkter Dialogisierung von Persuasion kann als

'Persuasion *im* Dialog' beschrieben werden. Im Gegensatz dazu ist der Grad formaler Dialogisierung besonders hoch in einer dritten Form von Textpassagen, die unter dem Begriff 'Persuasion *als* Dialog' zusammengefasst werden. Bei dieser Form nehmen die zu Überredenden nicht nur am Dialog teil, sondern tragen auch direkt dazu bei, die Funktionen der jeweiligen Phase der Persuasion zu erfüllen. Die Elemente, die in einer persuasiven Rede enthalten wären, sind also auf die Repliken beider Dialogpartner 'aufgeteilt'.

Im Einzelnen stellt sich heraus, dass es Unterschiede im Grad der formalen Dialogisierung sowohl zwischen den Dialogen als auch zwischen den Persuasionsphasen gibt. Die dialogische Form einiger Texte, wie z.B. die persuasiven Dialoge aus *Othello*, *King Lear* und *The Tempest,* ist deutlich stärker ausgeprägt als in anderen Texten, so zum Beispiel der ausgewählten Dialoge aus *Hamlet, Macbeth,* und *Richard III.* Dies ist sowohl durch das Verhalten der Überredenden begründet als auch durch das Verhalten der zu Überredenden. Erstere neigen entweder dazu, den Dialog zu monopolisieren und ihm eine monologische Note zu verleihen oder sie sind explizit darum bemüht, ihr Gegenüber in das Gespräch einzubeziehen und aktiv werden zu lassen. Letztere können durch Passivität monologische Tendenzen unterstützen oder aber, indem sie ihre Gesprächspartner unterbrechen, den Diskurs dialogischer gestalten. Bezüglich der Persuasionsphasen kann gezeigt werden, dass insbesondere *exordium* und *conclusio* fast ausschließlich eine ausgeprägt dialogische Form aufweisen, wohingegen *argumentatio* und *narratio* auch längere Passagen ohne Sprecherwechsel enthalten können. Die einführenden und abschließenden Phasen der Persuasion sind also homogener in ihrer dialogischen Form als die Hauptteile der Persuasion. Somit ändert sich häufig der Grad der formalen Dialogizität im Verlauf eines Dialogs.

Eine Analyse der dem *exordium* entsprechenden Dialogphasen zeigt, dass man trotz der erwähnten Homogenität weiter zwischen *exordium* als Dialog und *exordium* im Dialog unterscheiden kann. Bei einem weniger stark dialogisierten *exordium* führt nur der Überredende den Redegegenstand in den Dialog ein. Geht man den Repliken der zu Überredenden auf den Grund, so kann man feststellen, dass diese häufig metakommunikative Äußerungen sind, also kommentierenden Charakter haben. Der zu Überredende reagiert auf die Einführung des Themas, trägt aber nicht direkt dazu bei.

Ist das *exordium* stärker dialogisiert, so sind beide Dialogpartner direkt am Etablieren eines gemeinsamen Gesprächsthemas beteiligt. Das mag zunächst paradox erscheinen, da sich doch für gewöhnlich allein der Überredende mit einer bestimmten

Absicht und einem geplanten Thema auf den persuasiven Diskurs einlässt, in der Regel ohne dass der Gesprächspartner davon weiß. Dennoch ist es nicht selten der Fall, dass zu Überredende mit ihren Äußerungen direkt dazu beitragen, das Thema der Persuasion aufzuwerfen. Eine detailliert Analyse ergibt sogar, dass die Repliken der zu Überredenden keineswegs nur nebensächliche Aspekte dieses Themas einführen. Vielmehr sind es in den meisten Fällen ganz zentrale Punkte, die von ihnen beigesteuert werden. Ein wiederkehrendes Muster in Dialogen diesen Typs ist, dass zu Überredende Dinge aussprechen, die von ihren Gesprächspartnern nur vage angedeutet werden. Durch diesen Kontrast von direkter und indirekter Sprache tragen zu Überredende explizit zum Teil stärker zu diesem Teil der Persuasion bei als ihre Dialogpartner.

Bei einer Betrachtung der zentralen Teile der Persuasion fällt auf, dass längere Passagen ohne Sprecherwechsel trotz ihres monologischen Charakters Elemente enthalten, die eigentlich für Dialoge typisch sind. Solche Elemente erwachsen allerdings nicht nur aus dem dialogischen Kontext, in welchem die sehr extensiven Repliken nichtsdestoweniger stehen, sondern sie sind auch bewusst eingesetzte Mittel, die über die Dominanz der Überredenden hinwegtäuschen und ihren Ausführungen einen dialogischen Anstrich geben sollen. Durch emphatisches Ansprechen, etwa mit Hilfe von Imperativen, deiktischen Elementen oder (rhetorischen) Fragen, wird der für den Moment passive Hörer als potenziell aktiver Dialogpartner wahrgenommen und zu erhöhter Aufmerksamkeit angehalten. Indem Überredende außerdem die Perspektiven ihrer Gegenüber berücksichtigen und in die eigenen Repliken integrieren, also eine hypothetische oder potenzielle Äußerung der zu Überredenden vorwegnehmen, wird der Eindruck einer tatsächlichen Beteiligung des zu Überredenden vermittelt. Solche dialogischen Elemente in Passagen ohne Sprecherwechsel sind ein Hinweis darauf, welche Bedeutung bei der Persuasion der Involvierung und Berücksichtigung der Adressaten zukommt. Persuasion erfordert also eine gewisse Art von Dialogizität.

Passagen mit Sprecherwechsel können wiederum in Beispiele von Persuasion *im* und Persuasion *als* Dialog unterschieden werden. Im ersten Fall bilden die Repliken der zu Überredenden den (oftmals metakommunikativen oder kommentierenden) Rahmen für die Äußerungen der Überredenden, welche die eigentliche Substanz von *narratio* oder *argumentatio* enthalten. Die Äußerungen der zu Überredenden können hierbei zweierlei Art sein. Entweder enthalten sie eine Reaktion auf bereits vorgebrachte Argumente und offenbaren damit die Wirkung dieser Argumente auf den Adressaten, oder sie stellen Bitten oder Forderungen an die Überredenden dar, bestimmte Argumente zu liefern.

Sind *narratio* und *argumentatio* in stärkerem Maße dialogisiert, so sind die Argumente oder die Teile einer *narratio* auf die Repliken beider Gesprächspartner verteilt. Zu Überredende tragen beispielsweise mit eigenen Argumenten zur Persuasion bei. Mitunter sind sie aber auch an deren Generation beteiligt. Sind auf diese Art sogar einzelne Argumente dialogisiert, so können die Äußerungen der beiden Dialogpartner jeweils einen Teilschritt eines Syllogismus umfassen. In einem solchen Fall ergänzen sich die Repliken, die etwa die Funktion einer Prämisse oder einer Konklusion haben, und ergeben zusammen ein Argument.

Um Aussagen über die Dialogisierung der abschließenden Persuasionsphase (*conclusio*) treffen zu können, wurde der für diese Phase charakteristische Handlungsaufruf untersucht. Als Besonderheit persuasiver Dialoge betreffen die gefassten Beschlüsse nicht nur Handlungen, die die zu Überredenden ausführen sollen, sondern in gleichem Maße auch Handlungen der Überredenden. In einer Variante ohne Sprecherwechsel nimmt dieser tatsächlich, wie in einer *oratio* vorstellbar, die Form eines direkten Appells an. Ist diese Dialogphase von Sprecherwechseln bestimmt, so lassen sich, ähnlich den vorhergehenden Phasen, eine weitreichende und eine weniger ausgeprägte Dialogisierung unterscheiden. Bei einer eingeschränkten Dialogisierung enthalten ausschließlich die Äußerungen der Überredenden eine Art Handlungsaufruf, Empfehlungen oder Appelle, die von den zu Überredenden kommentiert werden. Bei stärker ausgeprägter Dialogisierung nimmt dieser Teil des Dialogs die Form eines mehr oder weniger gemeinsam gefassten Plans für Handlungen, die aus dem Dialog erwachsen sollen, an. Allerdings fällt eine deutliche Asymmetrie zu Gunsten der zu Überredenden auf, die in jedem Fall die letztendliche Entscheidung darüber treffen, welche Handlungen von wem ausgeführt werden sollen. In der Tat erscheint der Anteil der zu Überredenden an der gemeinsamen Planung in der Regel bedeutsamer als der Anteil der Überredenden. Ähnlich wie in einem stark dialogisierten *exordium* führt die Kombination von indirekter, auf eine Handlungsnotwendigkeit hinweisende oder Vorschläge implizierende Sprache der Überredenden und direkter Sprache mit den expliziten Anordnungen der zu Überredenden dazu, dass letztere äußerlich stärker zum gemeinsam geformten Handlungsplan beitragen.

Dieser erste Analyseschritt, der sich auf die formale Dialogisierung von Persuasion beschränkt, liefert Zwischenergebnisse, die von einer qualitativen

Untersuchung ergänzt und relativiert werden müssen. Die Tatsache, dass zum Teil sehr verschiedenartige Dialogpassagen derselben formalen Kategorie zuzuordnen sind, ist als Hinweise darauf zu deuten, dass der methodische Ansatz des 4. Kapitels nicht ausreicht, um die Vielfalt dialogischer Persuasion bei Shakespeare zu erfassen.

5. Eine Qualitative Analyse Persuasiver Dialoge

Die für die Arbeit zentrale Frage, inwieweit im persuasiven Dialog beide Gesprächspartner die Persuasion gestalten, wird einzeln für die drei im 4. Kapitel aufgestellten formalen Kategorien untersucht. Aufgrund der Zwischenergebnisse ließe sich die Hypothese formulieren, dass bei einem Vergleich der Kategorien zu Überredende besonders stark in Beispielen von Persuasion *als* Dialog für die Entwicklung der Persuasion verantwortlich sind, und dass sie in Passagen ohne Sprecherwechsel die Persuasion am geringsten beeinflussen. Nach dieser Hypothese wäre die Persuasion mit zunehmender formaler Dialogisierung auch in stärkerem Maße das Produkt beider Dialogpartner. In Passagen ohne Sprecherwechsel wären zu Überredende Opfer der Persuasion, bei Persuasion *im* Dialog wären sie zum Teil für sie verantwortlich, und bei Persuasion *als* Dialog wären sie als Mitgestaltende nicht vorrangig Opfer sondern 'Täter'.

Die Aufgabe des 5. Kapitels ist es, die einzelnen Aspekte dieser Hypothese zu überprüfen und die Ergebnisse des 4. Kapitels gegebenenfalls zu relativieren. Eine qualitative Analyse von Passagen ohne Sprecherwechsel soll zeigen, ob zu Überredende trotz ihrer Passivität indirekt die Persuasion beeinflussen. Bei der Analyse von Passagen, in denen zu Überredende zwar aktiv sind, aber nicht unmittelbar zur Substanz der Persuasion beitragen, wird der Frage nachgegangen, inwiefern sie dennoch für bestimmte Entwicklungen des persuasiven Diskurses verantwortlich sind und den Verlauf der Persuasion entweder fördern oder behindern. Die Untersuchung von formal stark dialogisierter Persuasion soll zeigen, ob der Eindruck, die Gesprächspartner seien in etwa gleichem Maße an der Entwicklung der Persuasion beteiligt und für sie verantwortlich, gerechtfertigt ist; ob zu Überredende also tatsächlich von 'Opfern' zu 'Tätern' werden.

(a) Passagen ohne Sprecherwechsel

Zeichen eines indirekten Einflusses zu Überredender auf monologartige Repliken ihrer Gesprächspartner könnten die im 4. Kapitel untersuchten 'dialogischen Elemente' sein. Wie jedoch eine qualitative Analyse zeigt, ist die Wirkung dieser

Elemente nicht eine gleichberechtigte Berücksichtigung der Perspektive der zu Überredenden, sondern die besonders effektive Etablierung der Perspektive der Überredenden. Formen der emphatischen Ansprache wie Imperative, Fragen oder deiktische Elemente basieren ausschließlich auf dem formalen Dialogkonzept, führen also nicht zu einer dialogischen Qualität innerhalb längerer Passagen ohne Sprecherwechsel. Imperative und Fragen setzen die Anwesenheit mehrerer Individuen voraus, die, zumindest potenziell, abwechselnd sprechen. Deiktische Elemente verweisen auf den gemeinsamen Kontext, in dem sich diese Beteiligten begegnen. Beides sind konstitutive Merkmale dialogischer Form und zeigen somit, dass diese längeren Repliken auf formaler Ebene Teile eines Dialogs sind. Ein qualitativer Einfluss zu Überredender auf die entsprechenden Repliken ist dadurch jedoch nicht gegeben.

Ein solcher Einfluss scheint eher in Fällen möglich, in denen Überredende die Perspektive ihrer Adressaten in die eigenen Repliken integrieren, da durch das Gegenüberstellen verschiedener Perspektiven tatsächlich eine dialogische Qualität innerhalb dieser Repliken entsteht. Allerdings ergibt auch hier eine Analyse, dass durch die eingeschränkte Dialogizität der betreffenden Stellen zu Überredende keinerlei Einfluss auf den persuasiven Diskurs haben. Vielmehr integrieren Überredende hypothetische oder potenzielle Äußerungen ihrer Gegenüber in einer Weise in die eigenen Repliken, die es ihnen erlaubt, sie gleichzeitig zu entkräften. Die eigene Perspektive und die des zu Überredenden werden also nicht gleichberechtigt gegenübergestellt, sondern durch syntaktische Mittel einer Wertung unterzogen, welche die Perspektive der Überredenden klar favorisiert. Da diesen Passagen eine voll ausgeprägt dialogische Form fehlt, wird durch die dialogische Qualität nur der Anschein eines echten Dialogs erzeugt, welcher letztendlich die Dominanz des Überredenden verstärkt.

Eine Verantwortung zu Überredender für die Entwicklung der Persuasion kann jedoch auf einer anderen Ebene festgestellt werden. In einem dialogischen Kontext sind zu Überredende insofern für monologartige Repliken ihrer Gesprächspartner verantwortlich, als sie sie nicht unterbrechen und ihnen dadurch erlauben, besonders weitschweifig zu sprechen. Durch ihr eigenes Schweigen ermöglichen sie ihnen, den Dialog zu dominieren. Allerdings muss auch diese Feststellung weiter eingeschränkt werden. Überredende benutzen zum Teil sprachliche Strategien, die ihnen auch nach den linguistischen Regeln des Sprecherwechsels eine längere Redezeit sichern, indem sie zum Beispiel durch die Ankündigung einer längeren Redeabsicht oder durch ausufernde Satzkonstruktionen den Punkt eines möglichen Sprecherwechsels hinausschieben.

(b) Persuasion im Dialog

Um den Einfluss zu Überredender auf die Persuasion erfassen zu können, wird ein methodischer Ansatz verwendet, der die gegenseitige Einflussnahme verschiedener Gesprächspartner im Dialog besonders berücksichtigt. Ausgehend von der wechselseitigen Abhängigkeit einzelner Repliken im Dialog werden Äußerungen unter dem Gesichtspunkt ihrer Funktion als Initiative (*initiative*) oder Erwiderung (*response*) betrachtet. Laut dieser von Linell, Gustavsson und Juvonen verwendeten Terminologie sind Initiativen nach 'vorn' gerichtet und entwickeln den Dialog weiter, indem sie neue Informationen in den Diskurs einbringen oder von anderen Gesprächspartners fordern bzw. erbitten, wohingegen Erwiderungen die Verbindung zu vorangegangenen Äußerungen herstellen und so Kohärenz erzeugen. Obwohl Äußerungen in der Regel sowohl mit der vorangegangenen als auch mit der folgenden Replik verknüpft sind, tritt meist einer dieser beiden Aspekte stärker hervor und weist die Äußerung vorrangig als Initiative oder Erwiderung aus. Durch diese beiden Arten der Bezugnahme können zu Überredende auch essentielle Teile der Persuasion beeinflussen, selbst wenn sie ausschließlich von ihren Dialogpartnern geäußert werden.

Die Analyse von Initiativen zu Überredender soll zeigen, wie diese Äußerungen bestimmte Bestandteile der Persuasion vorbereiten und dazu beitragen, dass Überredende ihre Perspektive im Dialog einbringen können. Eine wesentliche Unterscheidung ist hierbei die zwischen *direkten* Aufforderungen usw. der zu Überredenden und Fällen, in denen ihre Äußerungen nur *indirekt* dazu führen, dass ihre Gesprächspartner die Persuasion weiterentwickeln. Letzteres ist gegeben, wenn Überredende die Äußerungen ihrer Gegenüber ausnutzen und zum Anlass nehmen, selbst die Persuasion weiterzuführen.

Tragen zu Überredende mit Fragen, Forderungen, Bitten usw. *direkt* zu einer Weiterentwicklung der Persuasion bei, so sind sie dafür in stärkerem Maße verantwortlich, als wenn sie mit ihren Äußerungen eine solche Entwicklung nicht beabsichtigen. Allerdings variiert auch hier die Verstrickung zu Überredender in die Persuasion und das Ausmaß, in dem ihre Initiativen die Substanz der Persuasion gestalten. Dieses Ausmaß lässt sich anhand verschiedener Kriterien näher bestimmen. So sind zu Überredende besonders für die Entwicklung der Persuasion verantwortlich, wenn sie wissentlich Gesprächsbeiträge einer ganz bestimmten Art oder eines bestimmten Inhalts initiieren, wenn ihnen also die unmittelbaren Folgen ihrer Initiativen bewusst sind. Ein weiteres Kriterium für den Grad der Verantwortung zu Überredender ist die Stärke der Verknüpfung ihrer Initiativen mit vorangegangenen Äußerungen der Überredenden. Je eindeutiger ihre Äußerungen ausschließlich Initiativen sind (Linell: *'free initiative'*), desto unabhängiger von Gesprächspartnern, desto eigenständiger werden sie gemacht. Äußerungen, die nicht nur Initiativen, sondern zu einem gewissen Teil auch Erwiderungen sind, sind durch frühere Repliken Überredender bedingt, d.h. die Verantwortung zu Überredender für diese Beiträge zum Dialog ist eingeschränkt.

Betrachtet man *indirekte* Beiträge zu Überredender zur Einführung bestimmter Elemente der Persuasion, so fällt auf, dass rhetorisch geschickte Überredende jegliche Art von Äußerungen für ihre Zwecke ausnutzen können. Indem sie sich auf die Replik des Gesprächspartners beziehen, erwecken sie den Eindruck, beide Dialogteilnehmer würden dazu beitragen, die Persuasion weiterzuentwickeln. Dabei spielt es keine Rolle, ob die Replik des zu Überredenden, die vom Überredenden wie eine Initiative behandelt wird, ursprünglich unterstützenden oder kritischen Charakter hatte. Als Gegenstück zu Repliken, die der Persuasion zuträglich *sind* (oder von Überredenden zuträglich *gemacht* werden), können zu Überredende jedoch auch die Bemühungen ihrer Gesprächspartner, bestimmte Schritte der Persuasion einzuleiten, behindern und damit die Persuasion schwieriger gestalten oder sogar scheitern lassen.

Die Analyse von Reaktionen zu Überredender auf bestimmte Teile der Persuasion soll zeigen, inwieweit die Art, wie zu Überredende diese Perspektive aufnehmen, die Entwicklung und den Erfolg der Persuasion beeinflusst. Bei Zustimmung übernehmen zu Überredende die Perspektive ihrer Gesprächspartner. Lehnen sie sie jedoch ab und bestehen sie auf einer anderen Sichtweise, so sind die beiden sich im Dialog begegnenden Perspektiven nicht ohne Weiteres in Einklang zu bringen, d.h. die dialogische Qualität ist in solchen Texten stärker ausgeprägt.

Werden Teile der Persuasion, also die von Überredenden angebotene Perspektive angenommen, so wirken zu Überredende förderlich auf die Entwicklung der Persuasion ein. Es gibt allerdings Unterschiede in der Verantwortung der zu Überredenden für diese Entwicklung je nachdem, ob sie die Sichtweise ihrer Gesprächspartner sofort und ohne Abstriche zu machen akzeptieren oder ob sie Einschränkungen machen und diese Sichtweise modifizieren. Im ersten Fall setzen sie sich bereitwillig dem Einfluss anderer aus, sind also verantwortlich für die Folgen ihrer unkritischen Haltung, im zweiten Fall erschweren sie die Bemühungen ihrer Dialogpartner. Diese Aussagen müssen weiter differenziert werden, da die Verantwortung zu Überredender auch für eine sehr bereitwillige Annahme der Persuasion in Texten geringer ist, in denen Überredende spezielle rhetorische Strategien anwenden, mit denen die kritische Haltung zu Überredender unterwandert und die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Zustimmung erhöht wird.

Mit einer Ablehnung von Teilen der Persuasion, also der angebotenen Perspektive, wird die Entwicklung der Persuasion behindert. Unterschiede bestehen hinsichtlich der Frage, wie verheerend dieser hinderliche Einfluss ist. Ist die Ablehnung keine einfache Negation, sondern wird sie begründet, so widerlegen zu Überredende zwar die Argumente ihrer Gesprächspartner und erschweren damit die Persuasion zusätzlich, jedoch liefern sie Überredenden gleichzeitig Hinweise für eine effektivere Gestaltung der Persuasion indem sie aufzeigen, welche Gegenargumente es noch zu beseitigen gilt. Eine deutlich verheerendere Wirkung haben Ablehnungen, die sich nicht gegen einzelne Punkte der Persuasion richten, sondern mit denen auch die Person des Überredenden angegriffen wird oder die eine Ablehnung des Dialogs als solchen darstellen. In solchen Fällen ist die Persuasion meist zum Scheitern verurteilt.

(c) Persuasion als Dialog

Während sich 'kommentierende' Äußerungen zu Überredender beinahe zwangsläufig aus der dialogischen Situation ergeben, stellen ihre substantiellen Beiträge zur Persuasion eine Besonderheit dar und bedürfen einer Erklärung, da im persuasiven Diskurs in der Regel nur Überredende eine, ihren Gesprächspartnern zumeist unbekannte, Absicht verfolgen. Wenn zu Überredende Punkte äußern, die eigentlich von den Überredenden zu erwarten wären, so liegt zunächst die Vermutung nahe, sie würden die Rolle ihrer Dialogpartner zum Teil selbst übernehmen, wären also in einem hohen Grade in die eigene Persuasion verwickelt und für sie verantwortlich. Eine nähere Betrachtung relativiert diesen Eindruck und legt recht verschiedene Erklärungsmöglichkeiten für die weitreichende Beteiligung zu Überredender nahe.

In einigen Fällen tragen zu Überredende tatsächlich von sich aus eigenständig zur Persuasion bei. Geschieht dies nicht unwissentlich, so werden zu Überredende zu Mittätern, die überredet werden wollen und ihre Gesprächspartner darin aktiv unterstützen. In solchen Fällen befinden sie sich in einem inneren Konflikt, d.h. die beiden sich im Dialog begegnenden Perspektiven sind zumindest potenziell im zu

Überredenden schon angelegt. Durch die dialogische Form wird der Konflikt äußerlich sichtbar gemacht und, in der Begegnung mit dem Überredenden, schließlich gelöst.

In den meisten Fällen sind die Beiträge zu Überredender zur Substanz der Persuasion eine Folge der qualitativen Dominanz der Überredenden. Diese können aufgrund ihrer überlegenen Position ihre Gesprächspartner manipulieren und ihnen so bestimmte Beiträge zur Persuasion entlocken. In diesen Fällen sind zu Überredende natürlich nicht in dem Maß für ihre Beteiligung an der Entwicklung der Persuasion verantwortlich wie sie es durch eigenständige Beiträge sind. Vielmehr werden sie zu Opfern ihrer Dialogpartner, die ihre Dominanz für eigene Zwecke ausspielen und den Dialog in gewisser Weise inszenieren. Unterschiede bezüglich der Rolle zu Überredender ergeben sich aus den unterschiedlichen Wirkungsweisen der Strategien, welcher sich Überredende dabei bedienen. Versuchen sie, in offensichtlicher Weise, beispielsweise durch direkte Aufforderung zu bestimmten Reaktionen, die Äußerungen zu Überredender zu steuern, so ist die versuchte Manipulation offenkundig. Wenn sich zu Überredende dennoch mit solchen Mitteln lenken lassen, sich also bewusst der Beeinflussung aussetzen, so sind sie nicht unschuldig an der Persuasion und an den eigenen Beiträgen zu ihrer Entwicklung. Steuernde Äußerungen können aber auch weniger offensichtlich sein. Je geschickter Überredende dabei ihre Dominanz ausspielen und die Beteiligung ihrer Dialogpartner an der Persuasion inszenieren, desto eher kann man von zu Überredenden als 'Opfern' der Persuasion sprechen.

Einen sehr hohen Grad erreicht die qualitative Dominanz Überredender, wenn sie auf Täuschungsstrategien, also auf einer aggressiven Art der Machtausübung, beruht. Zu Überredende können auf direkte Weise getäuscht werden (*simulatio*), so dass sie aufgrund falscher Informationen direkt zur Persuasion beitragen, oder sie können auf indirekte Weise getäuscht werden (*dissimulatio*). In diesem Fall sagen Überredende nicht explizit eine Unwahrheit, sondern sie führen ihre Gesprächspartner zu falschen Schlussfolgerungen. *Dissimulatio* meint ursprünglich (d.h. als Mittel der Ironie) das Verbergen der Wahrheit. Zu Zwecken der Täuschung geben Überredende vor, die Wahrheit zu verbergen, während sie tatsächlich eine Unwahrheit verbergen. Der getäuschte zu Überredende 'entdeckt' diese Unwahrheit und hält sie für die Wahrheit. Diese indirekte Art der Täuschung veranlasst zu Überredende, zur Persuasion beizutragen, insbesondere indem sie die von Überredenden vermeintlich verborgene 'Wahrheit' aussprechen. Werden zu Überredende durch Mittel der

Täuschung dazu veranlasst, sich am persuasiven Diskurs direkt zu beteiligen, so sind sie dafür nicht voll verantwortlich.

6. Ergebnisse

Shakespeares persuasive Dialoge lassen sich, mit Hinblick auf die eingangs formulierte Fragestellung nach der Dialogisierung von Persuasion, in einem Spannungsfeld zwischen Monolog und Dialog verorten. Weder formal noch qualitativ können sie als ideale, d.h. symmetrische Dialoge eingestuft werden. Vielmehr machen sich in ihnen monologische Einflüsse bemerkbar. Schon die Vorstellung der Dialogisierung von Persuasion geht ja von einem ursprünglich monologischen Persuasionskonzept aus. Das Wissen um den monologischen Hintergrund von Persuasion, die persuasive Rede oder *oratio*, ist notwendig, um die monologischen Einflüsse zu verstehen, die dieser Hintergrund auch in Shakespeares persuasiven Dialogen hinterlassen hat.

Auf formaler Ebene haben sich diese Einflüsse in einem unausgewogenen Verhältnis der Replikenlänge der einzelnen Dialogteilnehmer niedergeschlagen. Immer wieder monopolisieren Überredende den Diskurs und reden so ausdauernd ohne von ihren Gesprächspartnern unterbrochen zu werden, dass die dialogische Situation für einige Zeit aufgehoben scheint. Viele der untersuchten Dialoge enthalten daher Repliken der Überredenden, die eher an Monologe innerhalb eines Dialogs als an Teile eines Dialogs erinnern. Qualitativ äußert sich der monologische Einfluss in der stark ausgeprägten Asymmetrie zu Gunsten der Überredenden. Diese Dominanz oder Kontrolle über den Verlauf der Persuasion lässt sich nicht nur für die monologisch erscheinenden Repliken feststellen, sondern auch in den Teilen des Dialogs, die durch Sprecherwechsel gekennzeichnet sind. Folglich kommt es häufig zu einer Diskrepanz von Form (aktive Beteiligung zu Überredender) und tatsächlichem Einfluss (Kontrolle der Überredenden über die Entwicklung des Dialogs). Diese Diskrepanz wird besonders bei einer Gegenüberstellung der Ergebnisse der formalen und der qualitativen Untersuchung offensichtlich. Je stärker die Persuasion formal dialogisiert ist, desto umfassender werden zu Überredende unter Umständen von ihren Gesprächspartnern manipuliert. Gerade wenn zu Überredende also besonders weitreichend zur Persuasion beitragen, ist ihr tatsächlicher Einfluss oft gering.

Abgesehen von den monologischen Einflüssen, die sich in der quantitativen wie auch in der qualitativen Dominanz Überredender manifestieren, scheint Persuasion durchaus für den Dialog geeignet zu sein. Die Notwendigkeit, jeden Schritt der Persuasion auf die zu Überredenden auszurichten und sich an ihrer Disposition zu orientieren, wird von jeher in Rhetorikbüchern besonders herausgestellt. Die aktive Involvierung zu Überredender in den persuasiven Diskurs scheint eine folgerichtige Konsequenz dieser Orientierung zu sein. Nichtsdestotrotz ist es ein beträchtlicher Schritt von der persuasiven Rede zum Dialog. Im Vergleich mit einer *oratio* gewinnt in einem Dialog Persuasion eine essentiell andere Qualität. Durch die sich aus der Interaktion verschiedener Perspektiven ergebende besondere Dynamik von Dialogen ist dialogische Persuasion für eine Vielzahl von Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten offen. Unter Umständen kann die aktive Beteiligung zu Überredender am Diskurs den Absichten der Überredenden zuträglich sein und ihre Bemühungen erleichtern. Dies ist besonders dann der Fall, wenn zu Überredende direkt oder indirekt zur Persuasion beitragen. Andererseits können durch das Aufeinandertreffen sehr verschiedenartiger Positionen Streitgespräche entstehen, bei denen der Widerstand der zu Überredenden die Entwicklung der Persuasion in entscheidendem Maße behindern kann. Im Unterschied zur *oratio* kann ein persuasiver Dialog also nicht vorausgeplant werden.

Aus dieser grundlegenden Eigenschaft entstehen bedeutende Schwierigkeiten für Überredende, die ja mit persuasiven Dialogen bestimmte Ziele verfolgen. Aus der paradoxen Situation, das Unplanbare (nämlich einen dynamischen Diskurs) vorausplanen zu müssen, ergibt sich für den Überredenden die Notwendigkeit, den Dialog zu dominieren, also so weitreichend wie möglich zu kontrollieren. So lassen sich die monologischen Tendenzen, d.h. die quantitative und qualitative Asymmetrie zu Gunsten der Überredenden, erklären. Dabei scheint es, dass einige Arten der Dominierung andere ersetzen können. Eine weitreichende Kontrolle des Diskurses durch qualitative Dominanz macht beispielsweise die Asymmetrie auf formaler Ebene unnötig. Daher lenken Überredende, die kaum monologisieren, ihre Dialogpartner besonders häufig durch Strategien der Täuschung oder durch andere Arten der Manipulation. Alternativ zu diesen Versuchen, das Unplanbare zu kontrollieren, machen sich Überredende häufig die Dynamik des Dialogs zu Nutze. Diese Strategie verlangt, dass Überredende flexibel auf verschiedenste Entwicklungen des Dialogs und auf Äußerungen ihrer Gesprächspartner reagieren, sie für ihre Zwecke ausnutzen und das eigene Verhalten der Dynamik des Dialogs anpassen. Ein solches Ausnutzen der Eigenheiten von Dialogen erlaubt eher die genuine Dialogisierung von Persuasion als es das Unterdrücken dieser Eigenheiten tun kann.

Die Rolle der zu Überredenden variiert beträchtlich in den einzelnen untersuchten Dialogen. Dies ist bedingt durch weitreichende Unterschiede bezüglich der Disposition zu Überredender, also ihrer Anfälligkeit für die Beeinflussung, und damit auch ihrer Bereitschaft, die Persuasion zu unterstützen. Auf welche Art zu Überredende die Persuasion beeinflussen, wird nicht nur von ihnen selbst bestimmt, sondern kann auch durch Manipulation von ihren Gesprächspartnern bestimmt werden. Daher kann in keinem der in dieser Arbeit untersuchten Dialoge die Frage nach der Rolle des zu Überredenden eindeutig beantwortet werden. Ihre Rolle ist grundsätzlich ambivalent, da zu Überredende in den meisten Fällen gleichzeitig 'Opfer' und 'Mitgestaltende' der Persuasion sind.

Eine eindeutigere Aussage kann für Beispiele getroffen werden, in denen die Persuasion scheitert. Elizabeth in ihrem Dialog mit Richard III und Leontes in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Paulina sind weder Opfer noch Mitgestaltende der Persuasion. Sie verweigern das Mindestmaß an Bereitschaft, der Perspektive ihrer Gesprächspartner Beachtung zu schenken, welches für eine erfolgreiche Persuasion notwendig ist.

Einige der zu Überredenden sind in stärkerem Maße Opfer als Mitgestaltende der Persuasion. Sie werden entweder so stark dominiert (Gertrude) oder so umfassend getäuscht (Othello), dass sich ihr eigener Anteil an der Entwicklung der Persuasion auf indirekte Formen der Unterstützung beschränkt. Gertrudes Beitrag zur Persuasion besteht im wesentlichen darin, dass sie die Dominanz Hamlets akzeptiert und sich von ihm steuern lässt. Othello trägt zwar auf der Oberfläche vieles zum Dialog bei, wird jedoch zu diesem Zweck manipuliert. Da er auf eine nicht offensichtliche Weise dominiert wird, besteht sein genuiner Anteil an der Persuasion aus seiner Gutgläubigkeit und aus seiner Bereitschaft, sich auf den Dialog zu Iagos Bedingungen einzulassen.

Stärker ambivalent ist die Rolle der zu Überredenden in Dialogen, in denen ihr Anteil an der Persuasion innerhalb des Dialogs variiert, so dass kein eindeutiges Bild entsteht. Gloucester wird in *King Lear* zwar ebenso getäuscht wie Othello, aber er trägt zur Persuasion in höherem Maße von sich aus bei. Nachdem er einen gefälschten Beweis erhalten hat, ist er übereifrig darum bemüht, diesen durch gezielte Fragen zu bestätigen, so dass er die Argumentation entscheidend mitgestaltet. Auch Anne, obwohl sie von Richard durch Täuschung und psychologische Strategien manipuliert wird, ist nicht bloß sein Opfer. Sie trägt zur Argumentation bei und lässt sich von Richard überreden, obwohl sie sich seiner Falschheit bewusst ist und beträchtliche

Zweifel an der Echtheit seiner Beweise hegt. Ein solches Nachgeben wider besseren Wissens ist nur eine Art, durch die zu Überredende zu Mitgestaltenden der Persuasion werden, obgleich sie auch dominiert oder gar manipuliert werden, also 'Opfer' ihrer Dialogpartner sind. Andere Arten, für die eigene Persuasion teilweise verantwortlich zu werden, sind eigenständige Argumente, welche die Persuasion fördern, wobei der zu Überredende sich dieser unterstützenden Wirkung bewusst ist (Brutus) oder ein wissentliches Erbitten von Argumenten, die für den Erfolg der Persuasion ausschlaggebend sind (Benedick).

In einigen Dialogen tritt die Rolle des Mitgestaltenden der Persuasion deutlich gegenüber der Opferrolle hervor. Macbeth etwa, der von Anfang an seine Bereitwilligkeit signalisiert, die Möglichkeit eines Königsmordes in Erwägung zu ziehen und sich absichtlich dem Einfluss seiner ambitionierten und skrupellosen Frau aussetzt und später eigenständig zur Argumentation beiträgt, ist ganz bewusst an der Gestaltung seiner eigenen Persuasion beteiligt. Ebenso weisen in *The Tempest* Sebastians substantielle Beiträge zur Argumentation und seine Bereitschaft, auch auf die offensichtlichsten Dominierungsversuche entsprechend zu reagieren, ihn als eine Art Komplize seines Überredenden aus.

Die Beteiligung zu Überredender am persuasiven Diskurs muss also recht unterschiedlich bewertet werden und lässt auf eine beträchtliche Breite der Möglichkeiten bezüglich ihrer Rolle im Dialog schließen. In den meisten Fällen kann man diese Rolle als eine Mischung aus 'Opfer' und 'Mitgestaltenden' der Persuasion beschreiben. Da sich die Gewichtung dieser beiden Komponenten häufig auch innerhalb eines Dialogs ändert, ist es schwierig, das Ausmaß der Involvierung von zu Überredenden und ihre Verantwortlichkeit für die Persuasion eindeutig zu bestimmen. Diese Ambiguität ihrer Rolle entsteht aus der paradoxen Situation in persuasiven Dialogen, dass zu Überredende an einem Diskurs beteiligt sind, der doch letztendlich die Macht hat, sie in einer von den Überredenden festgesetzten Weise zu beeinflussen.

Außer in Fällen, in denen die Persuasion erfolglos verläuft, wird im persuasiven Dialog ein innerer Konflikt des zu Überredenden dramatisiert, der im Persuasionsprozess gelöst wird. Dieser Konflikt kann schon vor der Begegnung mit dem Überredenden bestehen (z.B. im Fall von Macbeth oder Brutus) oder erst im Dialog erzeugt werden (z.B. im Fall von Othello, Lady Anne oder Benedick). Durch diese Darstellung der Konflikte zu Überredender, die durch die Dialogisierung von Persuasion ermöglicht wird, gewährt Shakespeare einen erweiterten Blick auf die

Wirkungsweise von Persuasion. Indem er die Adressaten von Persuasion aktiv werden lässt und Persuasion als Dialog gestaltet, erweist er sich nicht nur als Meister der Rhetorik, sondern auch als Meister der Interaktion von dramatischen Figuren unter zum Teil außergewöhnlichen Bedingungen.

Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung

Ich erkläre hiermit, dass mir die Promotionsordnung der Philosophischen Fakultät der FSU bekannt ist.
Ferner erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfe Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Die aus anderen Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Daten und Konzepte sind unter Angabe der Quellen gekennzeichnet.

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Die Arbeit wurde bisher weder im In- noch im Ausland in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form einer anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt.

Jena, den 01.09.2003

Lebenslauf

Boden, Stefanie	ledig
18.11.1976	Dresden
1983 – 1990	Polytechnische Oberschule 'Karl Liebknecht', Ilmenau
1990 – 1995	Goetheschule Ilmenau, Staatliches Gymnasium
1995	Abitur
1995 – 2000	Studium an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena Hauptfach: Anglistik/Amerikanistik Nebenfächer: Politikwissenschaft Interkulturelle Wirtschaftskommunikation
26.07.2000	Hochschulabschluss (Magister) an der FSU
08/2000 – 02/2002	wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für Anglistik/Amerikanistik der FSU

Jena, 01.09.2003